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Chapter 1
	
Introduction: A geography of transformation
1.1	 Introduction
In 1989 the landscape of the global economy was dramatically refashioned.
The collapse of the soviet system in east and central Europe (ECE) was accompanied
by immense enthusiasm for capitalism as people and states stampeded for the market
hankering after a 'western' lifestyle. At the same time new markets and new low-cost
production locations proximate to the European Union (EU) raised the prospect that
ECE could provide the latest 'spatial fix' for capital and could contribute temporarily
to cure the ills of a global economy that had stumbled from one crisis to another since
the early 1 970s. In the initial period after 1989 the automotive industry was foremost
in shaping ECE's reintegration into the global economy. The intensely-competitive
automotive market in western Europe arising from over capacity and highly efficient
Japanese competitors, resulted in major companies rapidly investing in ECE as they
sought solutions to the industry's problems. As a result the opening up of ECE to
international flows of capital led to a new round of investment which dramatically
refashioned the geography of European automotive production. In this way after 1989
east and central Europe was reintegrated into the global economy.
The soviet system had never been totally isolated from the capitalist world
economy and from the late 1960s onwards had become increasingly dependent on
global commodity and financial markets as a means of maintaining a system that
could not intensify production. Growing dependency on the capitalist system failed to
resolve the inherent problems in the crisis-ridden soviet system and moreover tied it
into the unstable global economy and the law of value. Insertion into the global
economy, which was increasingly managed accdrding to neo-Iiberal principles
resulting in deflation, the extension of the law of value and the flow of wealth from
poor to rich regions, led to a deterioration in ECE's 'terms-of-trade' and high levels of
indebtedness (see Clarke et al., 1993, see also Lipietz 1984). These problems
accelerated the disintegration of the soviet system in the late I 980s. Following 1989,
ECE sought an 'institutional fix' to the region's crisis which centred on a 'transition to
capitalism' and reintegration with the global economy. Central to ECE's reintegration
into the global economy was direct foreign investment (DFI) and its role in the
transformation of production systems. However, as reintegration proceeded it was
accompanied by continued crisis in the region as recession and social inequality
intensified.
This thesis sheds light on these processes through an examination of the
transformation of the automotive industry in Hungary and east Germany. This
chapter introduces the thesis by outlining the research topic and detailing the research
design and methodology. Having specified the research questions, the second and
third sections consider respectively the design of the research project, the focus of the
research strategy, and the methodologies employed in conducting it. In doing so the
chapter refers in particular to the specific problems involved in researching rapidly
transforming countries. The chapter ends by outlining the organisation of the thesis.
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1.2	 A geography of transformation: the automotive industry in east and
central Europe
Since the early 1 970s the automotive industry was emblematic in not only
reflecting the crisis in the Fordist organisation of production but also in pursuing
solutions to that crisis'. In particular auto-makers sought to introduce new production
techniques, not least in reassessing the 'make' or 'buy' equation, and new forms of
labour organisation. Both types of reorganisation were inseparable from the changing
geography of production. Reform in east and central Europe (ECE) 2 opened up a new
'spatial fix' (see Harvey 1982) for the industry by widening the range of options open
to car makers. The changes in ECE after 1989 were widely interpreted as contributing
to the creation of a painful 'transition to capitalism' and the establishment of
democratically regulated market economies. However, several years after the
disintegration of the soviet system 3 the outcome of complex and often contradictory
developments in the region undermined the notion of a simple rapid teleological
'transition' to a capitalist system. Whilst marketisation occurred it did so in
combination with the legacies of the soviet system. These in turn depended on the
different ways in which the soviet system collapsed in different ECE countries (for
example, unification, rapid revolution or evolutionary change). As a result ECE
Automotive industry refers to not only passenger cars but also, where relevant, commercial
vehicles.
2	 East and central Europe (ECE) refers to: Albania, Bulgaria, former Czechoslovakia (and its
successor states), Hungary, former GDR, Poland, Romania, former USSR (and its successor states west
of the Urals), and former Yugoslavia (and its successor states). This is not to suggest, however, that the
findings reported herein are necessarily representative of the region.
The term 'soviet system' is the preferred referent (in contrast to state socialism,
actually-existing-socialism, socialism, communism, state capitalism, central-administrative system) for
the socio-economic formation that existed in the USSR after 1917 and elsewhere in east and central
Europe after the 1945. It is the term used in this thesis because it excludes contestable ideological
references, does not reify the state (which was weak) nor central control (which was illusionary) but is
historically and geographically specific and therefore refers to a social system that was the output of
conflicting strategies rather than the outcome of ideological design.
3
underwent complex predetermined 'transformations' involving conflicting strategies,
which were path dependent and path shaping, and esulted in the generation of new
combinations of social relations (see Hausner et a!., 1995). Moreover these
transformations were highly regionally specific, being territorially embedded and
constituted. In consequence changes in ECE were different at national and
sub-national scales with the result that there was a complex geography of
transformation. Industrial systems were central to post-soviet transformations.
The planned soviet automotive industry reflected the problems that were
inherent in the soviet model of industrialisation. The planning system did not provide
any incentives for enterprises to intensify production by increasing efficiency nor to
innovation in manufacturing processes or products. Production was organised into
large highly vertically integrated enterprises but was inefficient and disorganised due
to the lack of mechanisms to control and co-ordinate the productive efforts of workers
within and between factories and enterprises. As a result the automotive industry, like
the system as a whole, was unable to transform itself from an extensive to an intensive
mode of accumulation owing to an inability to intensify production (substitute eapital
for labour).
In the course of the disintegration of the soviet system and the development of
markets the region's automotive industry, along with other economic activities, was
transformed. The transformation of the automotive industry in ECE occurred in two
ways: marketisation through commodification and reintegration with the global
economy. First, newly-elected post-soviet governments, heavily influenced by
4
western states and multilateral financial institutions, permitted the capitalist law of
value to wash across their territories in the belief that the market would modernise
their indigenous automotive industries. This involved the liberalisation of the market
(by legalising imports for example), the introduction of market forms of
co-ordination, and the privatisation of state owned producers. As a result economic
rationality was altered which involved a reassessment of the viability of production
based on new market-based criteria, the valorisation of capital, rather than
bureaucratic directives. In short production was marketised through comrnod?flcaiion.
Second, governments opened their economies to flows of direct foreign investment
(DFI) and established a welcoming stance towards potential investors in the
expectation that they would modernise industry, assist in export-led growth and
contribute further to marketisation and the development of an internationally
competitive capitalist production system 4 .	 At the sanie time west European
auto-makers, in a phase of significant restructuring, sought new markets and
production locations to form a new basis of competition not only between themselves
but also with Japanese competitors. Thus the reintegration of BCE raised the
prospect of ECE providing the latest 'spatial fix' for the global auto industry,
particularly for companies already established in western Europe.
The automotive industry was at the forefront of new production strategies in
ECE not least through committing considerable amounts of direct foreign investment
to the region. By mid-1992 ten major assembly projects had been announced
Throughout the thesis investment by west German companies in former GDR is considered to
be 'foreign prior and subsequent to unification in order to reflect the dynamic of flows of capital even
though they were technically within the same state after 1st October 1990.
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entailing 1 .2 million units of additional automobile assembly capacity (see Swain
1992a, Sadler el a!., 1993). In addition, automobile components producers also
invested in the region as they followed their major customers into the new market or
sought new low cost production locations from which to supply existing markets
predominantly in western Europe. As a result automotive investment in ECE formed
a significant proportion of total DFI in the region. By the end of 1993 automotive
investment in ECE (excluding former GDR) comprised over lOpe of total DFI in the
region (Sadler and Swain 1994, 395). In addition some of the largest single
investments in the region were made by car companies such as VW and GM Europe.
Automotive DFI therefore played a significant role in the transformation of the
industry and more generally in shaping the region's post-soviet transformations.
Automotive investment had two types of impacts on host regions and countries. First,
by locating production in the region automotive investment contributed to the
establishment of capitalist social relations of production. This was achieved not only
through the demonstrative role implicit in establishing new production concepts but
also by the generation of new business rules which were diffused through those with
whom such investment did business with (state authorities and other companies) (see
Radice 1993). Second, investment played an important role in shaping uneven
regional development. In attempting to attract foreign investment the government
policies that were pursued had important implications for uneven regional
development. In addition, the location of the projects themselves had an important
propulsive impact which played a crucial role in uneven economic development.
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This thesis, therefore, examines the transformation of the automotive industry
in Hungary and east Germany and in particular the role of automotive DFI in this
process. In doing so the research addresses two sets of questions which arise from the
conceptual issues which surrounded the crisis of Fordism, the disintegration of the
soviet system, and post-soviet transformations in ECE. The first set of questions
revolve around how ECE became a 'spatial fix' for the automotive industry. What
local conditions made automotive production in ECE attractive to foreign investors?
Was investment attracted by the prospect of lOW labour costs and/or the potential to
utilise labour in a flexible way? To what extent did investors seek location in ECE in
order to refashion the supply chain? What were the implications of automotive
investment in ECE for production and employment in the industry in western Europe?
The second set of questions centre on the role of automotive DFI in instituting
capitalism in ECE and transforming its auto industry. What impacts did different
automotive investments have on the transformation of host regions? Moreover, the
fusion of these two sets of issues begs a further question: how did the integration of
auto production in ECE into pan-European and global production systems shape paths
of regional development in ECE? These questions are addressed through an
examination of the transformation of the automobile industry. The transformation is
examined from three different angles: (1) through changes in the regulatory and
governance environment, (2) strategies pursued by companies, and (3) strategies
pursued by employees and their representatives. We now turn to the progression and
design of the research project.
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1.3	 Research design
Stage one: Preliminary investigations
The doctoral project commenced in 1991 with two possible avenues of
research owing to the uncertainty and complexity of doing research in east and central
Europe at that time. One was to concentrate on the significance of the opening-up of
ECE for the European automotive industry as a whole with the object of focus lying in
corporate strategies, in other words the macro scale. The second avenue was to
pursue detailed micro-scale research into the investments themselves and their
impacts on the host region. The decision as to which strategy to follow depended, in
part, on how investment in the region developed.
With this in mind preliminary investigations were undertaken into automotive
company strategies which indicated that there were two simplified types of investment
and production strategy in ECE5 . The first involved the extension of existing west
European production systems by the location of elements of the production filières
into ECE. These investments closely resembled traditional 'branch plants' which
sought low-cost and pliant labour forces for specific parts of the production process.
The second trend involved the establishment of regionally integrated car production
systems in ECE. Both types of strategy formed part of the industry's response to
competition from highly efficient Japanese producers. Thus investment in ECE
contributed to the intemationalisation of the west European automotive industry and
involved experimental forms of production (particularly connected to supply logistics
and the organisation of labour). The two types of investment strategy had a complex
These preliminary findings were reported in Swain (1992a) and Sadler eta!., (1993).
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and distinctive geography at the international scale. Hungary, for instance, rapidly
attracted branch plants which particularly specialised in the production of automotive
components. Elsewhere, particularly former GDR, the Czech Republic and Poland,
investors sought to maintain or create local car production systems. In the early 1 990s
investors did not look beyond these countries which gave an indication of the
geographical and socio-economic limits of ECE's 'spatial fix'. However, the picture
was somewhat more complicated than thus far indicated, at least in some ECE
countries, involving a complex combination of different strategies which had varied
implications. Thus Suzuki, the only Japanese assembler that had made an investment
in ECE at that time, established an assembly plant and set about attempting to build a
'localised' production system. It was thus very different from the 'branch plant'
investments. The picture was also complicated in east Germany. VW sought to
establish a regionally integrated production plant (utilising concepts adopted from
Japanese producers) in the former GDR. In contrast GM Europe's assembly plant in
east Germany more closely resembled a 'branch plant' type investment. In addition
the speed and development of the investment projects varied across ECE. Hence,
Fiat's ambitious plans to build a large assembly plant in the former Soviet Union were
subsequently abandoned as the country broke-up. However, even in the more stable
countries, such as Poland, investment projects proceeded only slowly.
As the same time as investment strategies established new spatial divisions of
labour, newly-elected post-soviet governments began to pursue different paths of
transformation. Thus a mode of development based on forced industrialisation was
replaced by divergent national and regional development paths which resulted in the
9
fragmentation of ECE. Particularly significant, was the manner of the disintegration
of the soviet system in different countries and the wa9s governments sought to induce
the 'transition to capitalism'. Thus in Poland, where there had been powerful
oppositional groups (the Solidarity trade union and the Catholic church) change
involved rapid destablizing 'shock therapy'. Change was also rapid in the Czech
Republic but the sorts of reforms introduced were very different, reflecting the lack of
powerful opposition to the soviet regime. In contrast change in Hungary predated
collapse of the soviet system and an evolutionary approach was maintained.
however, the most rapid and all-encompassing change occurred in the former GDR in
the form of unity with West Germany and accession to the EU.
There were two important outcomes of the preliminary research findings.
First, as investment projects were proceeding and production was coming on stream it
was decided that a detailed study of investments was feasible. In consequence the
option which concentrated on corporate strategies and change at the macro-scale was
rejected because a detailed study of particular investments would better indicate the
nature of change. Second, owing to marked international differences in the impact of
global processes of change involving the disintegration of state planning and the
redrawing of the map of European automobile production, it was decided that an
international comparison would be the most fertile course of study.
Stage two: International comparison
An international comparison was chosen for a number of reasons. First, it
underlined the significance of the national scale in mediating broader processes of
10
change. Not least this included national paths of transformation and national
regulatory environments. Second, in seeking to i1entify points of contrast and
comparison it facilitated interrogation of broader processes. However, there were
some disadvantages in pursuing an international comparison.
Hungary and the former GDR were selected as two case studies to permit
international comparison. The selection of the two study areas was grounded in
conceptual issues arising from the preliminary research. By early 1992 large amounts
of automotive DFI had been attracted to both countries and production was due to
commence soon if it had not already done so. However, the path of transformation of
each country was very different, and in some respects represented the extremes within
ECE. The conceptual basis for selecting Hungary and east Germany was twofold.
First. investment in the two study areas typified the variety of investment strategies
that existed in ECE. Thus Hungary attracted branch plants and became integrated into
west European production systems whilst the indigenous sector floundered. In
contrast in the former GDR investment centred on experimental 'lean' production. In
addition, investments in the two countries and the manner in which manufacturing
facilities were integrated into the European car production system captured the variety
and coexistence of different trends.
The second conceptual basis for the selection of the two case studies centred
on their very different paths of transformation. The soviet system in Hungary had
been gradually reformed through decentralisation and liberalisation after 1968. As a
result over the course of 20 years, rigid central planning was replaced by bureaucratic
Ii
controls. In consequence the disintegration of the soviet system represented an
acceleration of processes that had been in existence for two decades. As a result
post-soviet change remained gradual, evolutionary and relatively negotiated,
involving for example a tripartite body including representatives of the state,
employers and employees. In contrast the former GDR's path of transformation was
highly statist. The rigid central control of the GDR's soviet system which existed
right up to its collapse continued after the Wende (the word, meaning change, used by
the Germans to refer to unification) in the foim of rapid change centrally imposed by
the west German state.
Stage three: Case studies
Having selected the two study areas, research visits were made, in mid-1992,
to both countries in order to identif' case studies and other relevant institutions,
government bodies and trade unions, and to commence investigations 67 . A case study
approach was pursued for a number of reasons. First, it permitted the examination of
local factors to identify the mediation of place at the sub-national scale. Second, it
enabled detailed investigations through which to examine broader processes. Third, it
enabled the identification of points of contrast and comparison at the national scale.
However, there were some disadvantages in pursuing a 'case study approach. First,
case studies can be interpreted as being 'representative' which may not be the case.
Second, there is a tendency to select examples which are in differing ways
6	 Investigations of five of the six case studies presented in the thesis commenced in 1992.
The preliminary findings of the research visits in 1992 were reported in Swain (1992b, 1993)
and Sadler and Swain (1994).
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exceptional. Third, there is a danger of extracting examples from their contexts and
presenting a misleading account.
The selection of case studies sought to minimise these problems. First,
attention was directed to the largest investments and largest enterprises and therefore
those most likely to have significant impacts. As a result the choice of assemblers,
Suzuki in Hungary and VW in east Germany, was straightforward8 . Second,
investigations were directed at different sorts of firms to capture the variety of change.
Hence, component producers were investigated in addition to assemblers, greenfield
plants in addition to acquisitions, and state owned enterprises in addition to privatised
firms. Third, a database of foreign automotive investments was compiled which
served to contextualise the case studies. Fourth, the six case studies featured in the
thesis were, in part, selected because of their links with each other. As a result,
particularly in east Germany, the case studies collectively and individually tell a story.
1.4	 Research methodology
The research project sought to combine intensive semi-structured interviews
and an extensive survey. The intensive element of the research involved four research
visits, two in 1992 and two in 1993. The extensive part of the research involved a
postal survey of automotive component producers in Hungary, east Germany, the
Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland. The survey arose from the findings of the
first research visits and was conducted in mid-i 993. However, the results of the
8	 In Hungary Suzuki was the only genuine automobile manufacturer as GM Hungary assembled
kits imported from west Germany. In eastern Germany, Opel's production facility would have proved
an interesting case study given the stress on innovative forms of production. However, access to the
facility was not forthcoming in part owing to its later opening.
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postal survey are not reported in this thesis 9 . In addition, information on automotive
investment, in order to contextualise the case studies was compiled from secondary
sources' .
In the course of four trips to the study areas, in excess of 100 interviews were
conducted. In total around 65 interviews were conducted at 23 companies, two
unions, seven national state bodies and four local state bodies visited in Hungary in
1992 and/or 1993. In (east) Germany 39 interviews were conducted at eight
companies, the IG Metall trade union, the Treuhandanstalt, and three local state
institutions visited at least once in either 1992 and/or 199311. In addition to these
formal interviews relevant academics in Hungary and east Germany were also
consulted and secondary sources connected to the institutions visited collected.
Although the interviews did not follow a standard procedure some general
remarks are possible. The interviews were open-ended, semi-structured in content and
ranged in length from half an hour to a whole day. In some instances there were
repeat interviews with the same individuals or others in the same organisation. Whilst
The survey illustrated the problems of carrying out such a methodology in societies undergoing
rapid transformation. Thus there were 61 completed replies giving the survey a response rate of only
around lOpc. The calculation of an exact response rate is prevented owing to the inadequacies of the
population and the chaotic situation at the time in many of the enterprises surveyed. The low response
rate is despite a considerable level of official support for the survey from relevant authorities in the
countries.
0	 These included corporate press releases, government publications, newspapers, and specialist
industry media.
In the course of organising fieldwork in east Germany in 1993, to return to further investigate
the case studies begun in 1992, it became clear that another UK based researcher sought access to
similar organisations at the same time. To facilitate access, approaches to organisations were
co-ordinated which resulted in some tandem interviews and the exchange of other interview transcripts.
Six tandem interviews - three at VW Sachsen (where six were conducted in 1992), one at GKN (where
one was conducted in 1992) and two at local 1GM offices - are particularly drawn upon in this thesis.
Their interpretation remains my own. In addition, two transcripts were generously made available to
me and are acknowledged at the appropriate points in the thesis.
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the thesis is not a longitudinal study where institutions were visited in 1992 and 1993
it proved more possible to investigate change over time. The majority of interviews
involved more than one interviewee. Early interviews were taped but the presence of
a tape recorder was counter productive to the interview strategy, and thereafter
consultations were recorded in written note form.
A wide variety of informants, who played varied roles, were consulted in a
broad range of situations. There were three types of informant: managers,
government officials and trade union/employee representatives. The majority of
corporate interviews were conducted with managers responsible for strategic
development. This was often the plant's general director. In larger companies access
was sought with managers responsible for logistics and personnel issues. The
structure of the interviews depended on the nature of the enterprise concerned.
Interviews with foreign investors who built new plants, for example, addressed the
reasons behind the investment and location decision, the sorts of logistics systems
employed, and systems of labour organisation. In contrast interviews with existing
enterprises addressed the operation of the enterprise under the soviet system, the
impact of the disintegration of the system on the enterprise and the subsequent
management strategies employed to restructure the company in terms of production
and privatisation. Where possible the opportunity to observe production was sought.
Interviews with government officials were more specialist depending on the
responsibility of the officials concerned but centred on the changing nature and role of
the state in general and policies connected to industrial change, foreign investment,
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and privatisation in particular. Interviews with trade union and works council
representatives addressed the industrial relations sysfem, trade union strategies and
workers' resistance to and/or acquiescence in management strategies. In addition to
interviews there were additional sources and forms of data. These included press
reports, press releases, specialist industrial sources (such as privatisation tenders),
published and unpublished official documents, and academics and experts (who often
doubled up as government or corporate consultants).
In the course of the research a number of significant methodological issues
were identified which were specific to researching rapidly transforming societies. The
legacy of the soviet system and its disintegration raised four specific issues. First, the
isolation of ECE in general and academia in particular meant this author's research
was not always readily understood. Indeed the fondness with which the market was
held at the time, particularly in government circles, resulted in doubts about the need
for the research: after all had not capitalism "solved" east and central Europe's
problems!? There was thus a tendency for informants uncritically to reproduce the
dominant cultural views of the time. Second, a lack of familiarity with the market and
its language led to some misunderstanding' 2 . As a result there was often a hybrid of
capitalist rhetoric and soviet-style action.
Third, the rapid disintegration of the soviet system resulted in confused and
blurred roles. This had some advantages and some disadvantages. Not least, the
rapidly changing situation fostered a 'pioneer' spirit which facilitated openness. As a
2	 Translation accentuated this problem.
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result in some instances informants were more forthcoming than would generally be
expected in more 'stable' situations. However, the major disadvantage was the
difficulty of identifying informant roles and interests. To indicate the scope of
uncertainty it was sometimes not clear whether managers assumed the role of owners,
or government officials the role of managers or whether trade union officials assumed
the role of workers or were co-managers. As a result the boundaries between politics,
coimerce and research were blurred. Fourth, dealing with government bodies was
difficult.	 The almost continuous reorganisation of government hindered the
identification of responsible individuals. This was connected with the fifth issue. The
soviet system simultaneously created highly specific lines of responsibility and
accountability resulting in departmentalisation and fragmentary knowledge.
Individuals were adept at circumventing responsibility.
Researching rapidly transforming societies demanded a multiplicity and
combination of different data collection strategies and forms of data. One example
was the way interviews were often not confined merely to informant's current role.
Some managers, for example, had been production workers, some plant directors (and
plant owners) had formerly been central planners, some interviewees had formerly
worked at other automotive enterprises and so on. As a result information on issues
was sought from managers, employee representatives, former employees, competitors,
consultants, experts and regulators. This permitted verification of evidence. In
consequence although the data was in some ways not strictly comparable, the variety
of sources allowed the identification of informant's roles and a sensitivity to
situatedness. The combination of fragmentary evidence developed a view of events
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from several angles, permitting a rounded assessment. The eclectic combination of
sources permitted a greater and deeper understanding due to the triangulation of
methods.
1.5	 Organisation of the thesis
The thesis is divided into two parts: part one comprises theorised
inteipretations of change in the European automotive industry and in east and central
Europe, and part two examines in detail the transformation of the automotive industry
in Hungary and east Germany. Chapter two examines the crisis the west European
automotive industry faced from the early 1970s onwards as the traditional Fordist
organisation of mass production of standardised products became less profitable.
Moreover it examines the search process by which car makers sought to cure Fordist
ills. T n doing so this chapter emphasises the variety and coexistence of solutions and
considers the position of ECE in the emergence of competing strategies to ensure
continued profitable production. The third chapter investigates the disintegration of
the soviet system in ECE. It charts the complex geography of transformation and the
development of coexisting forms of capitalist development.
Part two consists of three empirical chapters which examine the
transformations of regulation and governance, of production, and of work. They
collectively chart the transformation of the automotive industry in Hungary and east
Germany. Chapter four begins with the legacy of the soviet automotive industry and
goes on to examine the changing role of the state and trade unions in shaping new
forms of regulation and governance. Chapter five considers the transformation of
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production through an examination of the strategies of foreign automotive capital and
indigenous enterprises in Hungary and east Germany. In doing so the chapter
introduces the case studies (based mostly on semi-structured interviews) referred to
above. The final chapter of part two investigates the transformation of work by
focusing on management attempts to reorganise work, and resistance to it by
employees. This is also illustrated by referring to the case studies. The concluding
chapter examines points of contrast and theoretical significance.
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Part!
Transforming production and society
20
Chapter 2 Fordism, after-Fordism and neo-Fordism: the restructuring of the
European automotive industry
2.1	 Introduction
Since the early I 970s the dominant model of economic organisation and
co-ordination has been in crisis (see Lipietz 1989) and in a period of transformation
(see Amin 1994). For many the crisis of the Fordist model, a coupling of a scientific
labour process and a specific organisational form geared to mass production with a
state-supported mass consumption norm, represented the exhaustion of its social and
technical capacity and the limits of its spatial logic. This prompted a search for and the
identification of a number of competing post-Fordist forms with new spatial logics.
Flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel 1984), disorganised capitalism (Lash and Urry
1987; Offe 1985), and flexible accumulation (Harvey 1989) were all said to have
created 'new industrial spaces' (Scott 1988). 	 However, as the crisis in the
co-ordination of the global economy persisted, more emphasis was placed on: (I) the
continuation of an essentially Fordist system (Hudson 1989), (2) the coexistence of
competing experimental solutions to the crisis in Fordism arising from the increased
influence of markets as a means of social co-ordination resulting from the uncoupling
of the Fordist regime of accumulation and mode of regulation (see Aglietta 1979,
Lipietz 1986) and, (3) the complexity of the geography of 'after-Fordism' (see Peck
and Ticket! 1994).
The restructuring of the automotive industry has been emblematic in reflecting
the problems confronting Fordism and the search for solutions to them (see for
instance, JUrgens et a!., 1989, Berggren 1993, Morales 1994, Hudson 1994, and
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Hudson and Schamp 1995). In particular there were three dimensions of change:
production technology, co-ordination mechanisms and regulatory systems. First,
production techniques were restructured incorporating both flexibility and rigidity or
standardisation. Collectively these changes were associated with the adoption and
adaptation of the 'Japanese model' (Kenney and Florida 1993) and related 'lean
production' techniques (see Womack et a!., 1990). Second, co-ordination mechanisms
within production fihières were refashioned, ranging from the introduction of unfettered
markets within firms at one extreme to the extension of hierarchical forms between
firms at the other. The third dimension of change concerned regulatory systems and
the labour process. At one end of the spectrum was 'Kalmarism', representing
negotiated, human centred work regimes whilst at the other was a coercive
(neo-)Taylorist model (see Leborgne and Lipietz 1988, 1992). In presenting the
restructuring of the industry in this way the intention is to move away from a simple
substitution of one omnipotent organisational form for another, say Fordism to
post-Fordism, and emphasise instead the complexity and inter-penetration of
institutional 'fixes' (see for example, Thrift 1989). Indeed, the restructuring of the
automotive industry points to just how elastic Fordism itself is.
This chapter presents an overview of these major dimensions of change in the
European automotive industry in order to contextualise automotive investment and
restructuring in Hungary and east Germany. In doing so it examines change within the
workplace, in other words the organisation of production and labour process but also
refers to the broader issue of social regulation. However, first, the chapter begins by
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examining the factors which brought the Fordist automotive industry in to crisis in the
1970s.
2.2	 Crisis in the automotive industry
The causes of the crisis in the automotive industry can be divided into those
which were internal to the industry and its organisational forms and those which were
external.	 There were three, interconnected, key external developments which
dramatically shaped the automotive industry. First, the sector was severely effected by
the break down of the Bretton Woods financial regulatory system and in particular the
cyclical recessions, beginning with the oil crisis in 1973, which temporarily
dramatically increased the cost of motoring and many of the industry's inputs. Second,
the growing internationalisation of the economy, first in terms of the market and later
in connection with production, resulted in greater competition from low-cost
producers in less developed parts of the world. Third, diffusion of the 'new orthodoxy'
of neo-Iiberal economics and politics resulted in state policies antithetical to traditional
forms of state intervention in manufacturing industry. In large part these three changes
formed part of the unwinding of the Fordist period of rapid economic growth and were
embedded in structural problems in the Fordist model of industrial organisation.
In the late 1 960s the Fordist model of industrial organisation dominant in the
automotive industry began to show signs of stress and strain, a reflection of the
paradox that co-ordinating a hierarchical organisation required greater hierarchical
control which in turn made it more difficult to co-ordinate because of
bureaucratisation. Berggren (1989) identified four particular problems with the Fordist
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auto industry. First, the specialisation of tasks, in other words the highly detailed
technical division of labour (intra-firm) and simple social division (inter-firm) resulted
in the disruption of material flows owing to 'balance-delay' problems and 'system
losses'. This led to a reduction of productivity and profitability which undermined
companies' ability to invest in modernisation. Second, the complex technical division
of labour rendered the organisation vulnerable to industrial unrest. Third, the increase
in thc number of components needed to assemble a vehicle meant efficient sequencing
of material flow to the line was difficult. Finally, the monotonous labour process and
increasingly oppressive regimes which sought to overcome the co-ordination problems
resulted in workers' resistance. As productivity gains in the industry fell the 'solidarity
pact' which had ensured that the benefits were shared out between wages and profits
broke down, with the result that capital-labour bargaining became increasingly
politically fraught. Real wages declined, which threatened future consumption and
profitability, and generated high levels of industrial unrest, in particular in the UK (see
Beynon 1984) and Italy (see Amin 1985), which reduced productivity and profitability
even further and made modernisation even more difficult. In particular this reflected
the limitation of the geography of the industry in which the value-added chain was
concentrated within firms and in single plants which generated local barriers to change.
As a result of these developments profitable car manufacturing in some parts of
western Europe was no longer possible by the mid-1970s. However, the geography of
the break down of the classic Fordist model of industrial organisation was highly
uneven. Largely due to different capital-labour relations and systems of allocating and
regulating labour, productivity varied highly between different plants within and
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between companies and countries. Also, since some of the major car assemblers were
either partly or wholly state owned, national politics pla'ed a significant role in the
management of the crisis in the industry in different countries.
In the course of the 1970s the market for cars was dramatically refashioned in
three ways which contributed to generate simultaneous market segmentation and
homogenisation. First, national markets in western Europe became increasingly
mature and saturated (see Dankbaar 1984). As a result vehicle makers designed
'planned obsolescence' into their model development and concentrated on stylising cars
and image creation. These strategies sought to segment a mass market but this implied
a change in the mass production of standardised models utilising purpose-built
technology (see Schoenberger 1987). As a result the competitive strategy employed
by car assemblers became almost as important as how the cars were made. Second,
the traditional pattern of isolated national markets in western Europe in which
domestic firms, and often a single 'national champion', dominated was gradually
undermined, albeit to differing extents, by the Europeanisation of the car market. The
result was the internationalisation of the market and the standardisation of models
directed to various national markets. At the same time there was the growth of new
low-cost automobile producing regions within Europe, in particular in the Iberian
Peninsula, which intensified competition (see Lagendijk 1994). 	 Thus the
Europeanisation of the automobile industry contributed to the problems the industry
faced. rhis was not unrelated to the third change, the rise of Japan as a major
constructor and trader of automobiles. Thus whereas in 1960 just one per cent of
global car production was in Japan, by 1985 this had increased to 27pc. In addition
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the main companies, Toyota, Nissan, and Honda, were very successful in winning
market share in western Europe claiming around lOpe by the mid-1980s.
The success of the Japanese auto makers was fuelled by a highly efficient
production model based on the concept of 'just-in-time' rather than 'just-in-case' (see
for instance, Child-Hill 1989, Jurgens et a!., 1985, Sheard 1983, Turnbill 1987, Sayer
1986). It involved the introduction of flexibility to an essentially Fordist system by
substituting greater control over the social division of labour in place of rigid control
over the technical division of labour. The effect was to institute a multifaceted strategy
of simulating automation by the fluid utilisation of assets at the same time as enforcing
authoritarian control or so called 'responsible autonomy'. As a result far from
representing a post-Fordist system the Japanese model represented the intensification
of Fordism or 'neo-Fordism' (Leborgne and Lipietz 1988). The Japanese system
centred on low levels of vertical integration, close linkages with major suppliers and
high intensity of work. Together these contributed to create a highly efficient system
based on waste elimination (cost reduction) and cost displacement. Waste elimination
involved speed up of production (reducing work-in-progress), build-to-order and
design-to-build concepts of model development, and simplified manufacturing
operations. CosL displacement amounted to the creation of 'core' and 'peripheral'
workforces, sets of suppliers and production spaces. As a result the integrated core
'partners' in the production system were protected from risk at the expense of the
disintegrated peripheral workers, suppliers and spaces which were burdened with
uncertainty.	 This created a 'workfare' production system which only
socio-economically supported the core of the production web leaving the rest to be
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sustained in other ways (through other production systems, casual or family labour, or
welfare, for example).
The efficiency of the Japanese producers and their success in winning market
share in western Europe resulted in an increase in competitive pressures in the
industry. This was heightened by the establishment of a number of 'transplants', mainly
in the UK (see Hudson 1992), to avoid market protection measures introduced by the
European Union in order to support the indigenous industry (see Dicken 1992, Sadler
1992). This had two effects. First the construction of new capacity for 800,000 units
per year by the Japanese worsened the problem of over capacity in the west European
industry. As a result by the late 1980s there was estimated to be eight million units of
over capacity in western Europe (Womack el al., 1990). Second, the 'transplants'
illustrated the widening gap in productivity between the Japanese transplants and
existing west European plants; by 1991 Nissan produced 21.7 cars per employee per
year compared with 4.5 at Ford (Hudson 1992, 78).
Crucially then the geography of the crisis in the industry was uneven. The
crisis was first evident in the UK in the late 1 970s and was most destructive there in
part due to the application of neo-liberal inspired market-led restructuring policies (see
Willman 1984, Scarborough 1986). In the course of the 1980s the crisis spread to
other parts of western Europe. Afier the UK, France and Italy were next to enter the
crisis which led to state-managed support for restructuring and to maintain the industry
(see Oberhauser 1987, 1990, Savary 1995, Conti and Enrietti 1995). By comparison
the crisis, at least in employment terms, in 'neo-corporatist' countries, such as Germany
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and Sweden, was much more restricted and occurred later largely because they
succeeded in establishing a 'modernisation pact' and specialised in highly engineered
high value added products for the upper end of the market. However, by the late
1980s and early 1990s both industries faced problems and 700,000 job losses were
predicted in Germany (see Auer 1993). As a result in the late 1980s and early 1990s
virtually the entire west European automotive industry sought solutions to its crisis.
2.3	 Experimental rather than emergent solutions
The UK auto-industry, led by the neo-liberal Conservative government, was the
first to seek solutions to the crisis in the industry. First amongst them was the strategic
alliance that was forged between Rover (formerly known as British Leyland) and
Japan's Honda'. More significantly the UK government also encouraged investments
by Nissan (see Garrahan 1986, Garrahan and Stewart 1992, Hudson 1992, Dicken
1987) and later by Toyota and Honda (see Hudson 1995). Above all these
investments, and responses to them, such as Ford's 'After Japan' programme, illustrated
the 'Japanisation' of the auto-industry (see Oliver and Wilkinson 1988). If the UK's
almost wholesale adoption of the Japanese industrial system represented the
intensification and extension of the Fordist model (neo-Fordism) then the strategies
employed in Sweden, in particular by Volvo, represented the other extreme, a
non-Fordist solution. Whereas the Japanese model centred on the establishment of
external flexibility, the government supported Swedish model, or 'Kalmarism'
(Leborgne and Lipietz 1988), was based on internal flexibility generated by 'human
centred' regimes of work (see, in particular, Berggren 1993). The assembly line was
Rover's strategic alliance with Honda was terminated in 1994 following BMW's takeover of
the British finn.
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replaced by a 'dock' assembly system which was accompanied by the introduction of
longer task cycles, enriched jobs and relatively autonomou group work. However, in
the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s Volvo's and Saab's innovative assembly
factories were closed having operated for a relatively short period (see Malmberg
1995). Nevertheless, the Kalmarism experiment had longer lasting and wider influence
elsewhere, in particular in West Germany.
With the apparent failure of 'Kalmarism', the intensification of Fordism became
the dominant driving force behind the restructuring of the west European automotive
industry. One book, 'The machine that changed the world', played a huge role in
establishing the parameters of change, and termed them 'lean production', based
primarily on techniques associated with Japanese producers (Womack ci al., 1990).
However, it would be wrong to essential/se 'lean production' since it became clear that
what was meant by 'lean' depended on a host of circumstances beyond the production
floor. As a result the 'trimming' of production systems resulted in paradoxical
outcomes. There were, though, three key dimensions of change: production
technology, intra- and inter-firm co-ordination, and social regulation. It is to these
three dimensions that we now turn.
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Production technology: flexibility and rigidity (standardisation)
The need to increase the responsiveness of the Fordist industrial system
involved the selective and often simultaneous introduction of flexibility and increased
rigidity or standardisation. Two different technological strategies were pursued: first,
increased rigid automation and second, increased reliance on the flexible use of
technologies and labour. Initially, some west European firms, in particular Fiat and
VW, tried to match Japanese levels of productivity by investing in standardised
automation systems and made attempts to extend the use of automation to include
more of the assembly process. However, both abandoned that approach following
their inability to secure sufficient returns to cover investment as production runs were
shortened owing to changing market conditions. As a result they began to focus more
on the organisation of production and labour. Elsewhere firms invested in flexible
manufarturing and computer integrated manufacturing systems which permitted
technology to be used in the production of successive models and increasing number of
variants. Hence there was a growth of programmable technologies (see Sclioenberger
1987). However, the level of automation varied in different parts of the production
process.	 The level of automation was increased in body shops, employing
programmable robots assembling different model bodies, but remained constant - or
fell - in final assembly and trim as companies relied on more efficient use of suppliers
and labour through, for example, just-in-time' and 'systemofacture' (Kaplinsky 1988).
The need to have flexible stamping capacity, permitting rapid changing of dies, was
central to facilitating flexibility down stream in the production process.
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These changes meant that vehicle assemblers began increasingly to concentrate
on core processes, the development of design concepts and the production of vehicle
bodies, and to out-source other activities (see below). This had important implications
for the geography of the industry as core competences remained spatially concentrated
and peripheral ones were decentralised. The blend of changes resulted in the
'hollowing-out' of core historic plants, such as Renault's Billancourt which was closed,
Ford's Dagenham plant which was partially closed and \ TW's Wolfsburg head quarters
plant which remained under threat of closure, and elsewhere the proportion of
value-added in assembly plants was reduced. This trend had two impacts. First, the
reduction of vertical integration in assembly companies resulted in the proportion of
employees in suppliers increasing (see Auer 993), and the sourcing of components
from low-cost locations. This process involved not only the out sourcing of
components but also of research and development functions. This was part of a
broader strategy employed by vehicle makers to reduce development time and cost per
model whilst the number of models increased. First, assemblers began to synchronise
the design and tooling stages in a model's development, second they encouraged the
input of those involved in manufacturing in the design process to permit
'design-to-build' and prevent over engineering, and third, they placed greater
responsibility for designing components on to key suppliers. These changes resulted in
a change in the focus of the development process from engineering to cost, as models
were designed to a target price suitable for the intended market segment.
Second, there was a move towards the standardisation of key components
across models. VW, in particular, pursued a 'platform' approach in which four
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standard chassis designs, so-called 'world chassis', were used as the basis of models in
four different sizes across its four different European marques, As a result even the
smaller producers introduced models in all the major market segments and the launch
of new model ranges was accompanied by a large number of variations (for the
example of BMW see Schamp 1991). Producers were able to place greater emphasis
upon mass customisation, the stylising and differentiation of standard products. Also
there was a contradictory trend towards concentrating on high value-added products at
the same time as offering models in all of the major vehicle sizes. Thus BMW and
Mercedes-Benz began to concentrate on developing high quality products in the small
car market segment. In addition manufacturers began to produce new niche products
(such as multipurpose vehicles (see Ferrao and Vale 1995), multi-passenger vehicles
(such as the Renault-Matra 'Espace') and off-road vehicles). However, to emphasise
the variations in the strategic solutions that different companies sought to overcome
the industry's crisis, Ford pursued a typically Fordist standardisation strategy through
the design and launch of the 'Mondeo' 'world car' and the reorganisation of its
corporate structure to enable the production of 'world cars' in each of the main market
categories. At the same time Ford also acquired a luxury car maker, Jaguar of the UK,
which gave it its first presence in the upper-end of the market in Europe. Thus the
majority of assemblers simultaneously pursued a strategy combining both mass and
niche production.
Intra- and inter-firm co-ordination: hierarchies and markets
To overcome the apparent problems of organising complex traditional Fordist
production systems automobile producers introduced new forms of co-ordination and
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control. In order to undo the bureaucratisation associated with the problems of
Fordism, companies 're-engineered' their businesses by introducing a new blend of
markets and hierarchies grounded in different organising principles than in the past.
This was closely connected to the increase in the complexity of and difficulty in
co-ordinating organisations as production systems were internationalised.
Internationalisation represented the intensification of the Fordist segmentation of the
production process in which different operations were located in different labour
markets (through acquisition and greenfield investments) within and between
countries. As a result there was a growth of investments in the UK, southern Europe
(see Lagendijk 1994, 1 995a, 1 995b) and later east and central Europe (see Nestorovic
1991, Harwitt 1993, Swain 1992a, Sadler ci aL, 1993, Sadler and Swain 1994).
However, above all there was a trend to relocate production from high-cost to
low-cost locations at different geographical scales. The result was the simultaneous
trend towards greater functional integration and greater institutional disintegration. At
the corporate level the major producers internationalised their production systems,
albeit to various extents and in different ways, and sought to foster greater functional
integration between different parts of the company. Thus GM Europe increased the
level of integration between its main subsidiaries, Opel in Germany and Vauxhall in the
UK, and VW Group, Europe's only true indigenously owned automotive multinational
company, began to increase the level of co-ordination between its four different
'marques', \'W, Audi, Seat and SKODA (see VW 1991). Significantly, and connected
to this, as the market became ever more competitive automobile assembly companies
identified opportunities for co-operation with each other. The result was a partial
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diminution of market relations between companies as competitors identified fields for
potential co-operation and formed joint ventures and strategic alliances (see Ferrao and
Vale 1995, Savary 1995, Anderson 1992).
However, greater functional integration at the corporate level was
compensated for by institutional disintegration within the company as intra-firm
hierai chies that had become bureaucratic were loosened and undone through the
introduction of new market forms of co-ordination. As a result some automobile
assemblers separated their component production plants and regrouped them together
in pan-European and pan-global subsidiaries, some of which specialised in the
production of particular types of components (such as GM's Packard Electric which
concentrated on wiring harnesses). Within and between assembly plants companies
introduced systems designed to increase the transparency of intra-firm transactions and
establish a basis for so-called 'bench marking', from which comparative performance
indicators could be identified. Parts of companies, subsidiaries, plants, divisions and
increasingly teams, were transformed into 'profit centres' placed in competition with
each other, whose effectiveness was measured in crude financial and market terms.
Despite the application of market forms of co-ordination, as rationalisation proceeded
corporate politics (and also in some cases state politics) continued to interfere with
crude market determined decisions.
The co-ordinating mechanisms between car assemblers and their suppliers were
also reformed, and mirrored the blend of hierarchies and markets established within
companies. Indeed as assemblers reduced the level of vertical integration and placed
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greater responsibility on key suppliers, the co-ordination of suppliers became even
more significant and had important implications for the geography of the industry. The
traditional regional concentrations of automobile companies and their suppliers, for
example in the west Midlands in the UK, north central Italy, south west Sweden and
various local concentrations in Germany (including Mercedes Benz around Stuttgart
(see Schamp 1995)), were gradually undone as new procurement policies introduced
market competition by moving towards national, international and 'global sourcing'.
The result was the reorganisation of the European automobile components industry as
major suppliers mimicked assemblers by internationalising production and
concentrating on their core competences (see Sadler and Amin 1995). At the same
time to ease the burden of co-ordination, assemblers sought to reduce the number of
direct suppliers to their plants. However, given the significant role that direct suppliers
were required to play, such as in pre-assembling modules and systems, relations
between them and assemblers were bureaucratised and became hierarchically
co-ordinated, and supplier plants became more integrated with assembly plants through
more exacting quality and logistical requirements (such as, but not exclusively,
just-in-time' logistics). As a result relations with key suppliers were governed not only
by markets based on the prices of components but also, and increasingly, by other
factors such as competence and reliability. Thus relations between assemblers and
suppliers were transformed, based on trust, negotiation and 'voice' rather than crude
financial criteria, and involved contracts lasting the lifetime of a model. However, the
balance between co-operation and competition varied between companies, product
lines and between different types of market conditions.
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The result of these events was the creation of a 'first tier' of privileged
automotive component suppliers which were highly integrated with different
assemblers. The first tier of suppliers contained two types of firm which reflected two
types of purchasing strategy: those assemblers which had used a 'global sourcing'
strategy as a means of identifying direct suppliers (for example GM Europe) and those
which identified key suppliers and then pursued a global-local sourcing policy (for
example \/W Group). Thus the first tier comprised, first, a number of international
industrial conglomerates which supplied the automotive industry, in addition to other
industrial sectors, and which specialised in particular product lines and which sought
to concentrate production of particular parts in large 'branch plants' in low cost
locations to supply customers across Europe (see Sadler 1991). Second, it comprised
a group of producers which was dedicated to one or two particular assemblers or
plants, frequently having supplied them for many years having originated from the
same home base as the assembler, and which concentrated on the assembly of systems
and modules, such as seats. The location of such plants close to assembly plants raised
the prospect for some of a regional reconcentration of production but even where this
occurred it represented a small proportion of the value-adding chain.
However, whereas market relations were partially curtailed at the top of the
pyramidal supply structure, further down market relations were rigorously enforced as
direct suppliers were encouraged to pursue global sourcing strategies of their own.
Thus the 'first tier' suppliers introduced more market based forms of co-ordination
between them and their sub-suppliers in the 'second' and 'third tiers'. These smaller
suppliers increasingly became subcontractors on short-term contracts, which included
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few price and volume guarantees, and which competed with low-cost producers in the
Far East and increasingly with parts of east and central Europe. Thus the governance
of the industry was restructured as a new and subtle combination of hierarchies and
markets was introduced to re-engineer production systems in which new patterns of
co-ordination and control redefined the relations between the technical and social
division of labour.
Social regulation: coercion and negotiation
The crisis in the traditionally Fordist automotive sector was first reflected in
industrial unrest in the industry. As a result, throughout the assembly and supply
industry, working practices and industrial relations were restructured which involved a
combination of authoritarian coercion and negotiation. This occurred at the same time
as there was a large reduction in the number of employees (see Auer 1993, 13).
Employment in the UK automotive industry, for example, contracted by 55pc between
1974 and 1991. This compared poorly with France, which lost l9pc and Italy where
employment in the industry fell by l5pc. By comparison employment in the German
and Swedish automotive industries increased in the same period and in the case of
Germany reached a peak of nearly 800,000 in 1991, thanks in large part to the
post-unification boom. However, by this time warnings of mass redundancies were
becoming common. Thus 57pc of all job losses in the west European automobile
industry were in the UK. Against this back drop, which severely weakened the
influence of workers and trade unions (TIE 1991), companies pursued two strategies
designed to refashion capital-labour relations; first, in situ change through the
'greening of brownfield sites'2 and second, the relocation of operations to new labour
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markets to permit experimentation with new forms of labour organisation. The
outcome of these changes depended in large part on the institutional arrangement of
industrial bargaining and interest representation more broadly in different west
European countries. Thus Leborgne and Lipietz (1988, 1992) identified different types
of capitalism in western Europe ranging from the highly negotiated 'Kalmarism',
through the 'neo-corporatist' West German model and 'Toyotaism' to the highly
coercive neo-Fordist model exemplified best by the UK.
Assemblers and suppliers alike sought to renegotiate the labour process in
existing factories. There were two coexisting, contradictory and therefore often
confiated approaches. First, there was an emphasis on the humanisation of work
through increasing the level of employee participation in the production process,
leading to notions of 'enterprise democracy' and 'industrial citizenship'. This was
variously associated with the lengthening of cycle times (in Germany for example),
Japanese inspired techniques (coercive team working, the polyvalent worker,
suggestion schemes and corporate identification) (see Mueller 1992, Garrahan and
Stewart 1992, Stewart and Garrahan 1995), and also the Kalmarist model of
autonomous group work (see above). Second, and related, management sought
greater control over the labour process through reducing the power of employees and
the introduction of new working practices such as continuous improvement and total
quality management. These two developments generated two contradictory
interpretations of labour process change, one which celebrated the increased
involvement of the worker, and another which pointed to the intensification of labour
2	 1 am indebted to Tim Strangleman for this phrase (see Roberts and Stranglernan 1995).
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and the 'desubjectification' of workers. In practice there was a simultaneous, and
inter-connected, increase both in the participation of workers in the production
process, rigorously institutionalised and corporate centred, and in management control
over the labour process. However, the balance between the two trends varied greatly
within the industry.
In the neo-Fordist UK, unions were weakened and there were moves to
single-union and non-strike labour agreements, as pioneered by the Japanese
transplants (see Hudson 1992). In contrast, union influence in Germany was preserved
through the establishment of a 'modernisation pact'. However, by the beginning of the
1990s even in Germany the system of co-determination was under threat. In particular
the impending crisis in the industry resulted in the substitution of internal labour
markets (in which workers competed for scarce employment security) where there had
once been internal labour reserves (made up of unskilled, usually foreign workers, laid
off in poor market conditions) which threatened to undermined traditional
co-operation between management and employees.
Across Europe there was a trend to the incorporation of labour and its
representatives and the growth of 'business trade unionism' as unions accepted the need
to restructure in order to compete with and match the most efficient plants. Thus the
introduction of new management techniques accompanied new working practices,
which undermined the ability of workers and their representatives to influence work.
This was most noticeable in West Germany where new 'lean' forms of organisation
conflicted with an established collaborative industrial relations system. Elsewhere,
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resistance by auto workers to the new techniques was much more muted. However,
even in West Germany, the automotive workers' union, IG Metall, began effectively to
accept that the German model, which had been regarded as the cause of its success in
the 1980s in the face of contraction elsewhere in western Europe, had become a barrier
to the successfl.il adoption of 'lean' working methods (see Auer 1993, JUrgens 1993 a,
1993b). As a result IG Metall effectively adopted team work preferring to interpret it
as humanising work in spite of the threat it posed to the role of the works council, the
basis of co-determination and union influence in the industry.
New work practices and systems of labour organisation undermined traditional
'sites' of worker influence by changing job descriptions, reducing the number of types
of job and abandoning old methods of communication, as a way of reducing
occupational identity and influence. The result was a shift away from the line
management of skilled specialists to the 'management by stress' of semi-skilled
generalists with fluid demarcation boundaries. At the same time new systems of labour
organisation were introduced which increased the transparency of work, permitting
new forms of surveillance (as part of the opening up of labour organisation to the
influence of markets), and institutionalised worker interests through teams, quality
circles, and visualisation, in such a way as to align them with the company. This
contributed to a process of 'desubjectification' as workers subjectivity was redirected
from one centred on work and which extended beyond the plant to one centred on
performance and confined to the corporate mission. In this way management sought
new ways to incorporate labour into capital's project (see Stewart and Garrahan 1995).
However, the nature of work, in terms of the tasks required of workers, did not
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fundamentally differ from traditional Fordist plants (see for example Garrahan and
Stewart 1992). As a result employee resistance remained and resulted in moves
towards the establishment of European works councils and other forms of international
collaboration amongst workers (see Sadler 1995) and in the case of VW the successftil
negotiation of a work-share scheme as a way of implementing lean production and
avoiding redundancies.
The threat of closure, and bench marking between comparable plants, was an
important weapon employed by management to establish new working practices but
the relocation of production to greenfield sites was equally important. Thus Fiat in the
1970s relocated production away from its militant bases in Turin in favour of
non-unionised agricultural areas in the south (Amin 1985). Likewise, Citroen and
Renault pursued similar strategies by decentralising production (see Oberhauser 1987,
1990). In addition to the decentralisation of the industry at the continental scale (see
above) there were two geographical trends at the national scale. These were the
location of plants in rural areas in order to recruit 'green' labour, and in declining
industrial regions, often without a tradition in the automotive industry, which attracted
large state subsidies. In both types of location companies sought to forge new forms
of working practice and industrial bargaining procedure. In the main these were based
on Japanese inspired 'lean' principles with the exception of Mercedes-Benz's new plant
at Rastatt in west Germany which was more reminiscent of Volvo's Kalmarism (see
Jurgens 1993a). In addition, the out sourcing (see above) of value-added processes to
less privileged and weaker workers in supplier factories was one means of escaping
and reforming social regulation.
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Thus the restructuring of the social regulation of labour in the automotive
industry represented the outcome of capital-labour struggles in different institutional
settings. The result was the coexistence of work intensification and coercion with
varying degrees of worker involvement and negotiation, but as the early 1 990s
proceeded these two trends gradually combined to forge fundamentally new ways of
controlling labour across the west European automotive industry
The role of east and central Europe in the automotive industry in the 1990s
The changes in east and central Europe introduced in chapter one opened a
range of new possibilities for automotive producers. After 1989, attracted by the
prospect of lower cost production and the opportunity to experiment with different
production methods (to discover what might be possible in plants back in western
Europe) a new round of investment rapidly took shape. By 1993 auto firms had
invested around USD4bn in east Germany and a further USD1. 9bn elsewhere in ECE,
including USDO.9bn in Hungary and USDO.8bn in the Czech Republic. This
investment formed a significant proportion of total direct foreign investment in the
region (Table 2.1). However, as the new round of investment took shape the amount
of investment earmarked for the region reduced and was increasingly directed to the
more stable countries there (see Table 2.2). By mid-1992 plans existed for the
construction of 1.2 million automobiles annually in ECE (see Swain 1992a, Sadler et
a!., 1993, Sadler and Swain 1994). This figure had inceased to more than 2 million
units by the end of 1995 (Table 2.3). As a result in the same way that the Japanese
'transplants' in the UK played a central role in the restructuring of the auto industry iii
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the mid-1980s, so the new round of investment in east and central Europe, including
the so-called 'German transplants' in eastern Germany based on 'lean production'
(Jurgens 1993 a) seemed likely to play a significant role in shaping the geography of
automobile production in east and west Europe.
2.4	 Conclusions
Thus whereas there was a broad spectrum of experiments which sought to cure
the ills of traditional Fordism, increasingly the west European automotive industry saw
the adoption and adaptation of Japanese inspired 'lean' production as the most likely
cure. This was all the more the case following Volvo's and Saab's abandonment of
Kalmarism. Although the employment of 'lean' production generated contradictory
and co-existing outcomes, the general difihision of techniques representing the
development of a neo-Fordist organisational form could be identified. However, it
remained to be seen whether other experimental solutions would develop and thrive in
the new market environment.
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Table 2.1	 Direct foreign investment in east and central Europe, 1993
	
Country	 Total DFI	 Auto industry	 % of total	 Auto as a % of
	
(Sm)	 DFI (Sm)	 auto	 total DFI
	Hungary	 5,600	 900	 52	 16
	
Poland	 3,000	 180	 10	 6
	
Russia	 2,500	 20	 1	 1
	
Czech Republic 	 2,100	 770	 41	 37
	
Ukraine	 700	 0	 0	 0
	
Romania	 600	 0	 0	 0
	
Kazakhstan	 500	 nd	 nd	 nd
	
Belrus	 400	 0	 nd	 0
	
Slovak Republic	 350	 30	 2	 9
	
Slovenia	 350	 nd	 nd	 nd
	
Other	 1,000	 0	 0	 0
	
Total	 17,100	 1,900	 11
Source:after Sadler and Swain 1994, 395
Note that $4bn had been invested in the auto sector in eastern Germany.
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Table 2.2	 Auto-related capital investment earmarked for east and central
Europe (estimates)
	Country	 1992	 1993	 1994
	
_______________	 $bn	 % of total	 $bn	 % of total	 $bn	 % of total
	
CIS	 9.7	 37.3	 2	 13.7	 1	 11.1
	
east Germany	 7.3	 28.1	 5	 34.2	 3.5	 38.8
	
Czech Republic	 4	 15.4	 2.5	 17.1	 0.8	 8.8
	
Poland	 3.2	 12.3	 3.2	 21.9	 2	 22.2
	
Hungary	 I	 3.8	 1.4	 9.6	 1.6	 17.7
	
Slovakia	 0.8	 3.1	 0.5	 3.4	 0.1	 1.1
	
Total	 26	 14.5	 9
Sources: various
45
Table 2.3	 Additional automobile assembly capacity in east and central
Europe, end-1995
Company Partner	 Location	 Capacity share value ($) Start-up
('OOOs)	 (%)	 date
Fiat	 FSM	 Biatsko Biala, Poland	 280	 l8Oin	 1992
VW	 IFA-VEB-SAW	 Mosel, Germany	 250	 100 3.lbn	 1990
VW	 Skoda	 Mlada Boleslav, Czech R 220 	 50.5 2.3bn	 1991
Daewoo Oltcit	 Craiova, Romania 	 200	 950m	 1994
Daewoo Tartarstan authorities Yelainbuga, Russia	 200	 500m
Daewoo Uzautoprom	 Assake, Uzbek.	 200	 50	 658m	 1996
Daewoo FSO	 Warsaw, Poland	 70	 1.lbn	 1995
GM	 IFA-VEB-AWE	 Eisenach, Germany	 150	 100 450m	 1991
Peugeot FSL	 Lublin, Poland
	 115
GM	 Cracow. Poland	 100	 100 375m	 1997
Honda	 Irtysh Machine	 Ust-Kainenogorsk, Kaza. 70
	 -
________ Building
	 ____________________ ________ 	 _______ _______
Suzuki	 Autokonzern,C.Itoh, 	 Esztergom, Hungary
	
60	 40	 300m	 1992
IFC
GM	 RABA	 Szenigotthard, Hungary 50	 67	 65m	 1992
Renault IMV	 Novo Mesto, Slovenia 	 50	 54	 ISOin	 1994
GM	 FSO	 Warsaw. Poland	 10	 70	 12.2m	 1994
VW	 BAZ	 Bratislava. Slovakia	 30	 80	 32.5	 1991
Fiat	 Pavlodar Tractor Fac	 Paviodar. Kaza. 	 30
Ford	 Plonsk, Poland	 30	 100	 54	 1995
Rover	 Doinostroene	 Varna, Bulgaria 	 10	 49	 120	 1995
Volvo	 GAZ	 Nizhniy Novgorod, Rus 10
Total___________________ ____________________ 2,035 	 10,322.7 _______
Source: various
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Chapter 3	 The uneven regional development of 'emergent', 'constructed' and
'embedded' capitalism in east and central Europe'
3.1	 Introduction
The (alleged) 'transition to capitalism' in east and central Europe (ECE) was
dominated by a neo-liberal constructivist orthodoxy (conveyed by Anglo-American
academics and multilateral institutions (see especially Sachs 1990, 1993, Fukuyama
1992)) that was rather reminiscent of Lenin's own 'socialist construction' earlier in the
century (see Hausner 1995). The construction of capitalism, it was alleged, comprised
a technocratic four-stage process: (1) the establishment of the 'right' formal
institutions (marketisation and private property), (2) the reformation and/or
termination of the 'wrong' formal institutions (the 'hollowing out' of the soviet state
and demecratisation), (3) the introduction of the 'right' prices to unleash the necessary
niarket signals and incentives to re-orientate behaviour in order to create the informal
institutions needed for capitalism to emerge in the systemic vacuum created by the
disintegration of the soviet system, and (4) the convergence of development in east
and west Europe through integration with the global economy.
This prescription plunged the region into an unprecedented spiralling
economic crisis (see for instance Gowan 1995). The disintegration of CMEA and its
disruption to production systems resulted in decreases of national output of up to
4Opc. The absence of co-ordinated state-led industrial restructuring prevented
enterprises from investing in modernisation and compelled them to compete on the
basis of low labour costs. In addition inflated price increases, which followed
This chapter develops, in part, ideas first presented in Smith and Swain (1995).
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economic liberalisation, reduced real wages and created a large pool of under- and
unemployed people. The supply-side crisis led to a reducfion in consumption (and
growing social inequality (see, for the case of the CIS, Piirainen 1994)) which in turn
resulted in a fall in investment and the degeneration of the existing capital stock
(EBRD 1995). The neo-liberal reform programme (whether rapid or gradual)
hindered rather than assisted regions' adaptation to marketisation. The continuing
crisis led to the election in a number of countries of former communist parties, and
criticism of the nco-Iiberal approach from institutional and evolutionary perspectives
(see for instance Amsden el al., 1995, Balabanov 1994, Pejovich 1994, Poznanski
1995). In particular, neo-liberal capitalism (1) failed to embed (see Granovetter 1985,
1992, Grabher 1993, 1994a) in the social fabric, (2) intensified socio-economic
fragmentation bequeathed by the soviet system thereby perpetuating disembedded
development, and (3) resulted in highly divergent paths of regional development.
The post-soviet 'transition to capitalism' unevenly destroyed the region's
socio-economic fabric and transformed a systemic crisis (the disintegration of the
soviet system) into a post-systemic crisis (the failure to embed new mechanisms of
integration and co-ordination). This arose out of the collapse of the soviet system,
which resulted from social forces implicated in the inherent contradictions of the
system and which consequently failed to generate the transformatory social forces
required to articulate and construct a capitalist vision (see Bauman 1992, 1994,
Dahrendorf 1990). The development of an alternative system was necessarily
interactive with and contingent on existing conditions; in other words the output of
transformations (conflicting strategies) rather than the outcome of transition (design)
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(see, for instance, Stark 1992a, 1993, 1995, Burawoy l992a, Nielsen el aL, 1995,
Hausner ci al., 1993, 1995, and Kregel et a!., 1992). Therefore transformations were
simultaneously path-shaping and path-dependent. Not least they depended on a state
or region's path of extrication from (see Stark 1 992b) and enduring legacies of the
soviet system (see for instance Bryant and Mokrzycki 1994).
As a result the neo-liberal policy formula intensified the regulatory deficit
inherited from the soviet system. Three co-existing types of capitalism could be
identified. First, there was the emergence of primitive capitalism based on 'insulated'
development overly embedded in inherited legacies of the soviet system. Second, the
nco-liberal reforms resulted in 'isolated' development which was globally regulated
but locally disembedded and which resulted in and depended on heightened uneven
development. However, third, post-soviet transformations also resulted in 'embedded'
capitalisms which were regionally integrated and self-sustaining and had the potential
of overcoming the post-systemic crisis.
The chapter therefore seeks to reconcile regulationist (see Altvater 1993,
Smith 1994, 1995) and socio-economic accounts of change in BCE. It emphasises
that economic activity is constitutive of mechanisms of seif-organisation (governance,
markets and hierarchies) which are embodied in networks of institutions which are
territorially constituted (Amin and Thrift 1 994a) and which necessarily
simultaneously permit accumulation and regulation strategies as part of the same
process (see Offe 1995, Jessop 1995a). The chapter presents an overview of these
three major types of capitalist development in east and central Europe. It concentrates
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on the development of industrial systems and addresses the complex and fragmentary
geography of transformations in order to contextualise the restructuring of the
automotive industry in Hungary and east Germany. However first, the chapter
examines how the soviet system painted socialism (Burawoy 1992b, Burawoy and
Lukács 1992) a legacy which proved crucial in over determining post-soviet
transformations which contributed to painting capitalism.
3.2	 The soviet system
Behind the façade of regulation and order, the formal elements of the soviet
system were poorly co-ordinated which resulted in the generation of compensatory
informal relations which initially maintained the system but ultimately led to its
disintegration. High vertical integration combined with a regulatory deficit,
functional overenibeddedness and regional disembeddedness, generated a poorly
co-ordinated system which painted rather than embedded socialism.
The soviet system was hierarchically and bureaucratically regulated but poorly
co-ordinated. There were two socio-economic co-ordination mechanisms. First, a
compulsory bureaucratic planning system (see Kornai 1992) in which constituent
institutions (planning bodies, state owned enterprises and workers) were hierarchically
arranged (see Bahro 1978). Second, the fusion of economic and political power (see
Altvater 1993) created a hegemonic regime which held constituent institutions in
tutelage which denied the development of other institutions through atomisation
(Filtzer 1986). The result was the development of a quasi-Fordist economy (a
'scientific organisation of work'; see Kössler and Muchie 1990) and an extensive
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mode of growth which was adapted to the needs of planning (resulting in an industrial
system comprising a small number of large vertically integrated enterprises, structured
along one organisational model, and hierarchically integrated so as to restrict the
complexity of transactions between enterprises) rather than the needs under which
planning was justified (see Burawoy 1985). The two co-ordination mechanisms
became increasingly ineffectual with the result that industrial systems were poorly
integrated.
This was for three reasons. First, despite the rigid plan, enterprises were not
required to meet efficiency targets, owing to 'soft' budget constraints, which in turn
encouraged them to maximise inputs and minimise outputs. Thus there was a
tendency towards the hoarding of resources and the creation of an economy of
endemic shortage (see Kornai 1980, Burawoy 1985). Second, implementation of the
plan depended on atomised, dependent and exploited state employees with only a
marginal interest in the appropriation of surplus product (see Konrad and Szelenyi
1979, Filtzer 1986, Clarke et al., 1993), Third, since the system relied upon a
structural form of control in which its constituent parts were not only dependent but
were also deprived of the institutionalised means of influence or seif-organisation,
there was a lack of collective and individual responsibility. This was encouraged by:
(1) workers' high security of employment, (2) the creation of monopolistic enterprises,
and (3) the grounding of social relations in bureaucratic rather than economic relations
(see Hausner n.d.). As a result the system was not habituated and individuals and
informal institutions pursued strategies of self-enhancement and plan-circumvention.
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In sum the system exhibited the regulation paradox; namely that greater hierarchical
control required bureaucratisation which made control even more difficult.
To overcome production irregularities arising from the limitations of the plan
and to counteract the atomisation of institutions, informal bargaining developed
(albeit to differing extents in different countries and sectors). Through plan
bargaining a shadow pian developed (see Burawoy 1985, Clark et al., 1993) and
social relations not prescribed by the soviet system flourished (Stark and Nee 1989)
including a tolerated 'second economy' (see especially Stark 1992c). As a result
horizontal informal networks developed which permitted and regulated exchanges
which were reciprocal over a given period of time (see Voskamp and Witte 1991,
Heidenreich 1992, Grabher l994a, 1995). Three types of informal bargaining
networks were particularly significant: between enterprise directors and central
planners, amongst enterprise managers and between workers and supervisors. First,
enterprises' access to scarce resources in a shortage economy depended on their
leverage amongst central planners and their ability to win preferential treatment. This
in turn led to increasingly arbitrary and discretionary decisions by central planners
which further undermined the integrity of the plan. Second, to overcome supply
disruptions directors and supervisors informally networked and transacted 'favours' in
order to compensate for production bottlenecks. Thus labour, tools and supplies were
exchanged, usually in the form of barter, between production shops and between
enterprises in the same local area. Third, the irregularities of work (resulting in
'storming' to meet targets and overcome production bottlenecks) resulted in
supervisors entering into informal bargaining with workers to secure their consent
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(and tolerating activities counterintuitive to the plan)(see in particular Burawoy 1985,
Stark 1988).
However, since the ephemeral informal networks developed in response to
day-to-day production problems and did not constitute strategic forms of collective
action, they were not formally institutionalised. Thus, for example, whilst trade
unions existed in enterprises they acted as 'transmission belts' which conveyed
information from the regime to workers and were not permitted to articulate the
interests of workers (see chapter 4). As a result informal relations, which were
grounded in personal networks, sought not to re-orientate or reform the system (owing
to the dislocation of formal and informal relations) but rather to capture the plan for
sectional (sectoral or local) interests. Thus the networks succeeded in perpetuating
the system for a time but could not resolve its inherent contradictions because it was
functionally overembedded in social relations which precluded dynamic adaptability
(see Grabher 1 994b). As the planning system stagnated, owing to its inability to
transform the mode of growth from an extensive to an intensive one (see Altvater
1993), the planning system increasingly depended on the existence and the efficacy of
informal relations by decentralising economic decision making to individual and
groups of state owned enterprises (albeit to different extents in different ECE
countries). Instead of resolving the system's regulation problems, decentralisation
merely worsened co-ordination and central decisions became increasingly
discretionary and unpredictable. In consequence enterprises which depended on
informal networks in order to fulfil their formal obligations, became gradually more
powerful in relation to central planning authorities and the integrity (predictability) of
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the command system declined further (see Hausner n.d.). Thus the system
disintegrated from below.
Functional overembeddedness (an inability to evolve in a strategic manner)
was matched by regional disembeddedness (deregionalisation) (see Grabher 1992)
owing to the centralisation of control and the non-institutionalisation of local informal
networks. First, control and planning decisions were exercised by external actors in
the 'national interest' in centralised state ministries. As a result industrialisation was
forced from above and did not emerge from local social forces (see van Zon 1994).
Also the planning system resulted in very high levels of vertical integration (and low
levels of horizontal integration) in which autarchic state enterprises were integrated
into national and subsequently international production systems (through the CMEA's
international production system - such as for automobiles (see chapter 5)). As a result
producers did not have forward or backward linkages in the local area beyond the
enterprise. Second, owing to the inability of the system to permit the formalisation or
institutionalisation of informal relations (because of the need to maintain the regime's
hegemony), there was a poorly defined and articulated 'local interest'. As a result
strategies	 of	 self-enhancement	 through	 plan-circumvention	 (through
non-institutionalised informal networks) resulted in exclusionary modes of social
action which resulted in social fragmentation that intensified the atomisation of social
life. The legacy of up to seven decades of a command planning system was a
regulatory deficit owing to functional overembeddedness and regional
disembeddedness in which regions were 'locked-in' to a failing system without the
means of strategic agency.
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3.3	 'Emergent', 'constructed', and 'embedded' capitalism and uneven regional
development
The collapse of the soviet system represented a rapid acceleration of a process
which had existed for at least two decades, namely systemic disintegration owing to a
regulatory deficit. The collapse of established formal networks, such as national
production systems and the CMEA trading system, merely served to illustrate and
exacerbate the systemic crisis rather than resolve it. Significantly neo-liberal reforms
imposed on ECE by western governments through the World Bank, IMF and EBRD
(see Gowan 1990, 1995, Chomsky 1994) and adopted by elites in the east (albeit in
different ways and to differing extents), were grounded in exactly the same premise as
the Stalinist 'mission regimes' whose 'social constructivism', in the form of forced
industrialisation, had never embedded in the social fabric resulting in its failure (see
l-Tausner 1995, and also Grabher 1995). Moreover, the neo-liberal policy formula
(reduction of subsidies and state expenditure, liberalisation of prices and privatisation)
resulted in the break-up of existing formal (plan) and crucially, informal (bargaining)
networks (see Albach 1993). Thus the statist approach to transformation, as opposed
to negotiated (see Bruszt 1995), mimicked the soviet system in adopting alien
institutions and introducing 'fictitious' reforms (Hausner n.d.), such as
'pseudo-privatisation', which failed to embed and had unforeseen consequences (see
Pejovich 1994).	 Instead the regulatory deficit was intensified and social
fragmentation was exacerbated contributing to the retraditionalisation of society (see
Grancelli 1995). In addition the changes in the institutions and the networks of
relations between them were crucial in shaping regional development (see Kosonen
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1995). As a result regional fragmentation mirrored social fragmentation in being
intensified. In consequence regional and local development diverged as uneven
development was accentuated.
A systemic crisis had been transformed into a post-systemic crisis in which the
means to establish the conditions (institutions and regulation) needed for strategic
collective action were absent. Post-soviet transformations thus comprised an
institutional and regulatory search process to establish the conditions necessary for
long term capital accumulation. However, this search process had been prematurely
curtailed by the neo-liberal agenda which had resulted in the painting of capitalism
over the top of, and thus disembedded from, emergent primitive capitalism
overembedded in the partial transformation (monetarisation and/or marketisation) of
inherited social relations. Three coexisting types of capitalism developed in the early
1 990s. First, 'emergent' primitive capitalism based on the pseudo-marketisation of
inherited soviet social forms and, second, neo-liberal 'constructed t capitalism
integrated with the global economy. However, neither of these capitalisms resolved
the post-systemic crisis but served to intensify it. There was though a third
'embedded' capitalism based on new forms of regulation and governance, comprising
markets and state hierarchies arising out of, but not locked in to existing formal and
informal relations. It is to these three types of capitalism that we now turn. In doing
so reference is made to three types of regional development: overembedded,
disembedded, and embedded.
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'Emergent' capitalism: primitive accumulation and overembedded regional
development
Neo-liberal 'structural adjustment' policies and the absence of micro-level
industrial restructuring (industrial policy) and institutional reform (of the financial
system and the state) (see Nielsen 1995) resulted in the insulation of existing
enterprises from embryonic market signals preventing industrial restructuring. Thus
the disintegration of the soviet system and the introduction of neo-liberal policies
resulted in simultaneous (re)centralisation of economic control in the hands of state
ministries and agencies responsible for privatisation (see Voszka 1995) and
decentralisation as the state deserted enterprises by casting them adrift from the plan
(see Brada c/ a!., 1994). It generated a stagnant fragmented industrial sector, with
declining output and much reduced levels of investment, in so-called 'pre-privatisation
agony'2 . The result was an emergent form of capitalisni which represented hybrid
organisational forms, overem bedded in inherited social relations, engaged in 'primitive
accumulation'.
Privatisation programmes required the maintenance or re-establishment of
central control over the economy in order to permit the distribution of state owned
assets (by restitution, vouchers, direct sale - including MBOs and ESOPs - or
liquidation).	 As a result across ECE enterprises were taken under direct
administrative control by different arms of the state. Where de facto ownership had
been devolved to enterprise councils as part of the introduction of self-management
programmes in the 1 980s, recentralisation amounted to 're-nationalisation' (Voszka
2	 Refers to the inability of enterprises waiting to be privatised to engage in strategic planning.
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1995) or étatization (Bruszt 1995). The end of the planning system only served
formally to sever links between enterprises and the central industry ministries since
dependence on the state continued in the form of reliance on informal and
unco-ordinated industrial policy (see Nielsen 1995). Indeed state involvement in
industry remained bureaucratic (administrative) but its application became ever more
unpredictable and discretionary (unregulated) (in part because of fiscal crisis) and
dependcd on whether enterprises and local areas were able to muster sufficient
influence (through establishing local or branch monopolies) to lever central power.
Industrial subsidies remained (although at lower levels - and often exercised in the
form of debt rescheduling and recorporatisation) and limited the number of
bankruptcies and liquidations. 	 The effect was to generate high levels of
inter-enterprise debt. In addition, states selectively intervened to manage trade, for
example by arranging barter, in certain circumstances. In this way the distinction
between 'preferred' and 'non-preferred' enterprises (depending on how important
producers were to the regime's priorities) under the soviet regime became more
complex. Overall the economy became even more disorganised and poorly regulated
than before (see Hausner n.d.). This was closely connected to the simultaneous
decentralisation of economic control.
Re-nationalisation coexisted with economic disintegration - the withering
away of the state (Burawoy and Krotov 1992) - which resulted in de facto
decentralisation of economic control involving greater reliance on local formal and
informal relations as workers and managers sought to control 'their' enterprises, which
they had been told, during the soviet era, they owned but which they could not
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control. Many enterprises, convinced that the planning system was the problem,
sought autonomy by entering into direct relationships with central authorities thereby
breaking away from regional ministries and trusts of enterprises. In this way the
industrial sector was fragmented. Continued market failure, owing to the neo-liberal
policy prescription which prevented collective strategic action because of uncertainty
(Bunce and Csanádi 1993), led to the reintegration of enterprises into bureaucratic
relations with the centre. In this way the break up of industrial systems in conjunction
with an inability to engage in constructive restructuring (whilst foreign investors
received 'tax holidays' and market protection) led to the application of coping
strategies which insulated enterprises from the regulatory deficit induced by the
market failure surrounding them. The social forces underpinning the movements were
clans which comprised localised alliances within enterprises (between management,
core workers and trade unions to maintain the reproduction of the 'labour collective')
and between local enterprises and local authorities (see Stark 1990, Clark ci al., 1993,
Burawoy and Krotov 1992, 1995). The clans resulted in increased integration at the
local level, most obviously through the intemalisation of production, and the
generation of united local or sectoral interests, often involving the establishment of
political alliances, to form the basis of enhanced bargaining positions with respect to
central state authorities (see above) (see McDermott 1994).
Insulation depended on informal networks from the soviet era which became
monetarised and increasingly marketised (see Sik 1992) and represented the
development of merchant capitalism based on a class of 'entrepreneurchiks' (see
Burawoy and Krotov 1995). This in turn generated so-called 'red-brown' alliances
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between 'communist' enterprise directors, former nomenklatura who had exchanged
political for economic power, and nascent entrepreneurs (often embodied in the same
person) operating in part in the formal (the legacy inherited from the plan) economy
and in part in the informal (the criminalised economy inherited from the shadow plan)
economy. In particular, localised mercantilist relations developed in which
transactions were commercialised without inducing an intensification and
restrucinring of production (see for instance Burawoy and Krotov 1992, Smith 1994,
1995). In addition, there was the development and growth of the Mafia controlled
'shadow economy' most visibly represented by the growth of privately owned kiosk
retail outlets, which in some senses represented the privatisation of privatisation (see
Pejovich 1995).
This form of development was particularly evident both in countries such as
Russia, where reforms proceeded in a disrupted fashion, but also in countries where
marketisation proceeded further and where there was a reintegration of corporatist
planning structures (for example the continuation of barter to manage trade between
Russia and Hungary and privatisation resulting in reciprocal equity stakes between
customers and suppliers - for the example of IKARUS see chapter 5). In both types of
development it represented the generation of production systems insulated from the
regulatory deficit.
The result was the development of pockets of 'primitive accumulation' (see
Nagels 1993) in which accumulation was based on trading (fostered by the
differentiation of subsidies and price liberalisation across the region, or in other words
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lack of regulation) and speculation. However, the low cost of labour and its
increasing availability (as unemployment grew) in conjunctIon with declining demand
and output (deindustrialisation) meant that capital was not substituted for labour,
implying an absence of investment even though prices approached world market
levels. Instead speculative profits were used to fund conspicuous consumption by a
Latin American-style comparador elite (see Lomax 1993) which lay at the apex of
formal and informal networks. Thus primitive capitalism was a symptom of systemic
crisis and a condition of post-systemic crisis and could not provide the conditions for
long term accumulation.
'Primitive accumulation' hindered regional development because it resulted in
wealth being leached away from productive economies into conspicuous
consumption, mostly of imported products. Moreover regional development was
overembedded in inherited social relations and 'locked-in', in other words regions
lacked strategic 'agency' necessary to re-orientate paths of development. Thus
privatisation, in the form of vouchers and management-employee buyouts, failed to
create 'real' owners who could discipline management into co-ordinating and
intensifying the use of labour and instituted instead the 'absentee owner' inherited
from the soviet system (see for instance MertIk 1995). In particular, this allowed
'tight' integration between enterprises at the local and sectoral levels which isolated
them from embryonic market signals and the competence of a weak state, with the
result that they reproduced and petrified inherited soviet relations of production rather
than resolved the contradictions within them (see for example McDermott 1994). In
doing so these conditions served certain types of foreign investment well.
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'Constructed' capitalism: painted capitalism and disenibedded regional development
The neo-liberal advocates believed inward investment would be the engine
driving economic development (see Piatkin 1993) and concentrated on establishing
the conditions and institutions (legislative regimes) needed to open the region's
economies to international flows of capital and goods and allow foreign investors to
acquire assets and market share, and establish 'greenfield' plants at little cost in a
favourable atomised social environment (see above). In sum the neo-liberal policy
agenda generated a forced dependency on foreign investment but the investment
attracted was isolated from the host region and fostered disembedded development.
Between 1989 and the end of 1993 some USD10.6 billion direct foreign
investment (DFI) was sunk into greenfield and joint venture projects in east and
central Europe (UNCTAD 1994, 12, see also, for instance, Dobosiewicz 1992, Csáki
1993, Artisien et al., 1993, Michalak l993).	 However, whilst the forced
dependence of DFI was crucial in shaping 'constructed capitalism' the volume of flows
was relatively insignificant (due to the continuing of the post-soviet recession; see
Gowan 1995). In 1992 and 1993 investment in ECE comprised just 3pc of global
flows of DFI, and the stock of foreign capital in ECE compared poorly with the
USD11.1 billion invested in China in 1992 alone (UNCTAD 1994, 12, 14).
Moreover, as recession continued the growth of DFI slowed after 1992.
This figure does not include direct foreign investment in former East Germany or former
Yugoslavia.
For a detailed examination of DFI in Hungary see Barta (1993), Wang (1993) and Hamar
(1994).
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Despite this DFI was significant in shaping uneven development and had
important local impacts, not least since a few large projects accounted for a large
proportion of investment. Inward investment was geographically concentrated at the
national scale, former East Germany (USD12 billion by mid-1992) and Hungary
(USD 3.4bn by the end of 1992) receiving the largest portions of investment in the
region. At the sub-national scale foreign capital was particularly attracted to capital
cities and western regions proximate to the EU's Single European Market (see for
instance Murphy 1992). Investment was also sectorally concentrated reflecting the
post-systemic crisis. First, investment was attracted to the food/drinkltobacco,
retailing and construction sectors which were geared to serving western products and
brands to the new elite engaged in conspicuous consumption. The second investment
trend involved using ECE as a low cost export production base, and a place to
experiment with new forms of production and labour organisation, to compete in the
global market place. The sector foremost in this trend was the automobile sector (see
Swain 1992a, Sadler et al., 1993, Sadler and Swain 1994).
The forced dependency on DFI (which raised the spectre in political circles of
external control) meant that the absence of industrial restructuring was pinned on the
low levels of investment - even in Hungary (see Barta 1993). However, in reality DFI
had a much more ambiguous role in regional development and the establishment of
capitalism. First, in acquiring the most modem and efficient enterprises and
integrating them with pan-European production systems, foreign investors
undermined indigenous production systems and contributed to the break down of
production networks (and the devaluation of 'network capital'; see Czako and Sik
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1993) and thus the intensification of the regulatory deficit (see above). As a result,
and in large part due to the 'rules of origin' contained in the EU's Association
Agreements with ECE countries (see Gowan 1995), the most modem parts of the
manufacturing sector were locally disintegrated and reintegrated into western Europe
(where some 6Opc of the investment originated) on the basis of low labour costs.
Second, the investment attracted to the region was not locally embedded and
resulted in specific paths of disembedded regional development. Thus in former East
Germany, which attracted the largest inward
	
investment, foreign investors
transformed production systems in to 'western enclaves' removed from the local social
fabric (see Grabher 1992, 1994a). Even where flows of DFI were lower, investment
contributed to the same form of development. Thus whilst 67pc of the USD5.3 billion
that was invested in ECE between 1988 and 1992 was used to acquire state assets
through privatisation, it was significant that the proportion fell from 75pc in 1991 to
53pc in 1992 (TJNCTAD 1994, 26-7). As the 1990s proceeded investment in the
region was concentrated in greenfield operations isolated from the local environment,
whose beneficial impacts bypassed local industry. As a result much of the investment
involved the establishment of manufacturing facilities with few local forward and
backward linkages; they were 'cathedrals-in-the-desert'. Thus the role of DFI in
instituting capitalism in host regions (see Radice 1993) was severely restricted by
foreign owned plants' lack of local integration. DFI had limited effect in the
modernisation of indigenous industry and even the demonstrative effect of gleaming
greenfield factories was undermined by local industry's inability to engage in
constructive restnicturing. In addition, this limited the propulsive role of DFI in
64
modernising local industry (through technology and know-how transfer) and
sustaining local economic development (Lomax 1993).
Integration into the global economy also involved the generation of an ECU 3
billion trade deficit between ECE and the EU in 1993 replacing the trade surplus that
existed up to the late 1980s, and also the 'flight' of capital (including money
laundering) from ECE to financial institutions in western Europe and North America.
As a result where DFI did not locate, global integration and the painting of capitalism
involved unprecedented deindustrialisation and the transformation of
production-based regional economies in to (frequently welfare dependent)
consumption-based ones. In this way a state of anomie was created which permitted
certain investment strategies. As a result there was a divergence in regional
development (for the case of Slovakia see Smith 1996) which was borne directly from
the mode of global integration. Thus investment in ECE was predicated on the
dislocation, and deindustrialisation, that the 'transition to capitalism' implied.
DFI had a crucial influence on regional development in ECE not so much in
providing an engine of growth (it did not) but in peripheralising the region by
reinforcing and intensifying the regulatory deficit and creating disembedded regional
development. Thus regional development did not so much involve 'holding down the
global' (Amin and Thrift 1 994b) as the global holding down the local.
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'Embedded' capitalism: re-embedding accumulation and regional development
Jessop (1994, 1995b) argued that capitalist transformation involved a
two-stage process: (1) disembedding emergent market forces from the soviet 'strait
jacket', and (2) re-embedding them into an institutional and organisational framework
that could regulate long term accumulation. Whilst the regulatory and institutional
deficit was intensified by neo-liberal paths of transformation, there were important
differences in the manner in which they developed which raised the prospect of
embedded forms of regional development in some parts of ECE. Although all the
paths of transformation in ECE were predominantly statist, the balance between
state-led and negotiated reforms varied between the different countries (see Bruszt
1995). The most statist and centralised path of transformation was in former East
Germany where the power of the West German state made such centralisation
possible. Elsewhere transformation was either more chaotic (leading to primitive
capitalism; see above) or more negotiated - albeit the rhetoric often exceeded the
reality - owing to the weakness of the state. Thus in Hungary, where political change
predated 1989, and in the Czech Republic, where the 'Velvet Revolution' occurred
(see Rychetnik 1995), transformation was more negotiated than elsewhere involving
decentralised reorganisation (see Stark 1993) and tripartite bodies.
The increasing emphasis on a negotiated transformation centred on two
developments. First, the neo-liberal programme led to social resistance, fostering the
view that capitalism could not simply be imposed by the adoption of alien institutions.
Second, there was evidence that decentralised reorganisation was instituting new
forms of corporate governance and overcoming the regulatory deficit. The prolonged
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post-soviet recession prompted governments to re-intervene in the economy and
encourage the mobilisation of civil society and in particular entrepreneurship. States
placed emphasis on the development of small and medium sized enterprises via the
establishment of local enterprise agencies (encouraged by financial support from the
EU PHARE programme; see Gowan 1992, 1995) to foster the development of a
middle class. This was based on evidence that 'institutional thickness' at the regional
level was required in order to promote the conditions for regiona' restructuring (see
I lausner ci a!., 1995). Also, the slow down in inward investment and domestic fears
about external control resulted in new forms of privatisation (distribution,
worker-management buyouts) designed to increase the number of domestic owners.
As a result states began to plan a more proactive role in forming industrial policy and
restructuring enterprises prior to privatisation (Nielsen 1995).
Second, the disintegration of the soviet system led to an increased emphasis on
expanded and reformed informal networks (Szako and Sik 1993). Whilst in some
places these networks were insulated and unable to permit collective strategic action
(see above) elsewhere they gradually became institutionalised, assisted by more
negotiated paths of transformation, but they crucially retained their loose ties and
hence flexibility. In particular decentralised reorganisation led to the combination of
state and private property relations, recombinant property (see Stark 1993, 1995),
which broke down the distinction between hierarchy and market. This led to the
deve'opment of new forms of governance between state and market and the
regionalisation of production systems and raised the prospect, for some, of the
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development of 'flexible specialisation' as a path for regional development (see
Neumann 1992, 1993, Murray 1992, Bianchi 1992).
In addition the establishment of new types of organisational forms, such as
recombinant property, increased the diversity of institutions. This overcame one of
the major problems inherent in the soviet system, namely the uniformity of
organisational forms, which had been perpetuated by the foreign investment attracted
to the region. For some the increase in the pool of organisational forms was likely to
result in competition not only between individual enterprises but also between
different ways of governing production, facilitating evolutionary change. In this way
a region would develop the capacity of dynamic adaptability and embedded capitalist
regional development (see Grabher 1994b, 1995).
3.4	 Conclusions
The complexity of post-soviet transformations in east and central Europe did
not illustrate the simplistic notion of a 'transition to capitalism'. Neo-liberal policies
served to intensify a regulatory deficit bequeathed by the soviet system. Moreover,
the neo-liberal agenda curtailed a regulatory search process which prevented the
generation of the conditions that would resolve the post-systemic crisis. It suceeded
in integrating ECE with the global economy but did so through peripheralisation, in
which access to the global market for individual enteprises and regions was through
western European production systems. Also it deprived governments of the
opportunity to actively assist industrial modernisation and regional restructuring. The
result was extreme uneven development coupled with social fragmentation, as
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exclusionary modes of socio-economic action prevailed which threatened social and
international political stability. This made self-sustaining devlopment more difficult
to achieve. Nevertheless, there was evidence that more decentralised transformation
paths could assist in the development of embedded capitalism through permitting
regional agency. Without such a course of action transformation seemed destined to
paint capitalism over the cracks of a systemic crisis.
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Part!!
The transformation of the Hungarian
and East German automotive industries
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Part II	 The transformation of the Hungarian and East German
automotive industries
There was no better symbol of the failure of the soviet system than the
Trabant, a small, ubiquitous, heavily polluting vehicle that was ridiculed all over east
and central Europe. In samizdat circles and beyond, it was a '1eitmotf for a system
which oversaw the regression of half of Europe's human and material resources. Thus
the substitution of Trabarit production by the assembly of the VW Golf in April 1991
symbolised for many the end of communist stagnation and the birth of capitalist
imagination and prosperity. But underneath the facade, the change in production also
belied the popular supposed simplicity of the transition to capitalism. For the decision
to end Trabant production was overlain by a complex web of contradictory strategies
embedded in networks of unevenly transforming social relations.
However, the story of the Trabant better symbolised the dynamics of East
Germany's transformation than anywhere else in ECE. Thus the effective closure of
the hierarchical state-owned automotive industry there and its replacement by West
German producers, reflected East Germany's highly statist path of extrication from the
soviet system which involved the destruction of its socio-economic formation
(including the state) and the imposition of alien structures. However, even in the
former GDR, where the course of events was imposed and so abrupt, transformation
was necessarily not predetermined, was uneven, contradictory and partial. This was
more obviously true in the transformation in Hungary where the state-owned, but
more market co-ordinated, industry slowly adapted to the market system and was
joined by foreign owned producers integrated into pan-European production networks.
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This reflected Hungary's relatively negotiated and more gradual transformation, the
high level of continuity in its path of extrication, and the maintenance of parallel
structures.
The transformation of the auto industry in both countries comprised thc
reorganisation of state owned producers and the inflow of foreign capital as the
regulation, governance and social relations of production were reconstituted. There
were three outcomes of transformation: the adoption of capitalist mechanisms of
production and economic integration; the maintenance, to differing extents, of
quasi-planning mechanisms of production and integration; and the marginalisation
and termination of production. 	 The following three chapters examine the
transformation of one significant industry in two places from three different positions.
First, the evolutionary negotiated transformation of the regulation and governance of
production in Hungary is contrasted with the revolutionary statist approach employed
in eastern Germany (chapter 4). Second, the increasing significance of market forms
of co-ordination in coexistence with the remains of bureaucratic forms is considered
in the transformation of production (chapter 5). In the final chapter of part two the
establishment of capitalist and the maintenance of non-capitalist social relations of
production, are considered in the transformation of work. In doing so six case studies
are introduced: two assembly-plant case studies, Suzuki in Hungary and VW in east
Germany, which were closely connected to the state and aimed to establish regionally
integrated production systems using innovative production techniques; two large
components factories, Ford in Hungary and GKN in east Germany; and two important
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indigenous enterprises, IKARUS in Hungary and SAW (the former Trabant producer)
in east Germany.
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Chapter 4 Transforming regulation and governance: creating capitalist
production, consumption and reproduction in the automotive
industry in Hungary and eastern Germany
4.1	 Introduction: replacing hierarchies with markets
The first element in the transformation of the automotive industry concerned
the restructuring, from above and from below, of regulation and governance
structures. The course of transformation reflected significant differences in the
organisation of state owned automotive industries. Although both country's planning
systems were dominated by hierarchical structures there were differences. In Hungary
after 1968 industry was, in part, increasingly self-organised and regulated by a
combination of quasi-market forms of co-ordination and bureaucratic regulation. In
contrast hierarchical forms of co-ordination became increasingly significant in the
GDR (see for instance Grabher 1995).
The Hungarian planned automotive industry was undermined by state-led
initiatives which decentralised economic decision making and served to highlight the
system's problems by permifting the articulation of divergent enterprise interests. In
consequence the planning system gradually unwound. In contrast the more
hierarchical industry in the GDR offered no scope for the expression of differing
interests. As a result the collapse of the system was far more precipitous than in
Hungary. In the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s in Hungary transformation
accelerated but whilst partially statist, remained relatively negotiated and gradual
because of the legacy of decentralisation. However, in the GDR I West Germany
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stepped into the breach and led a highly statist and rapid course of transformation
again because of the legacy of a lack of decentralisation.
This chapter examines and compares the relatively negotiated restructuring of
governance and regulation structures in Hungary with the revolutionary and more
statist course of events in the GDR. The chapter first considers the legacies of the
planned automotive industries in both countries. It then goes on to examine three
types of regulatory and governance changes. First, it explores the dissolution of the
plan and the casting adrift of individual enterprises, the privatisation (or lack of it) of
ownership and the changing relationship with the state as industrial planning was
turned into industrial policy. Second, the chapter considers the creation of a market
for cars as the state's monopoly in car retailing was terminated. Third, the
disintegration and reestablishment of industrial relations relations systems in Hungary
and eastern Germany and the responses by the two most important unions in the
industry, VASAS in Hungary and 1GM in eastern Germany, are investigated.
4.2	 The soviet automotive industry in Hungary and the GDR
The automotive industries in Hungary and the GDR developed according to
the soviet industrial model (see Chapter 3). The late 1940s and early 1950s saw the
attempted replication of the soviet version of'the scientific organisation of work'. This
was an allegedly non-ideological work organisation whose origins lay in Taylorism
and represented a crude attempt to create a soviet version of Fordism (see Kössler and
Muchie 1990; Murray el a!. 1990). The industry was regulated by the state plan which
sought to determine the entire development of the branch and the state enterprises
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which belonged to it. Central to the soviet auto industry was the attempt to mimic
capitalist industry. Planners tried to establish a Taylorist labour process involving the
separation of the conception and execution of work which depended on deriving
economies of scale from the mass production of standardised products. To permit this
and to facilitate plan co-ordination, production was concentrated in a few large state
owned enterprises. Production in these enterprises was very highly vertically
integrated as the vast majority of components were manufactured in-house.
In both countries the enterprises were organised according to the principles of
the soviet system (see Clarke ci a!., 1993, 10-13). The purpose of the enterprises was
not to valorise capital but to reproduce the labour collective (the employees and their
families). Thus many economic transactions were non-monetary and those that were -
such as wages - represented the transfer of money from one account to another within
central state budgets. The enterprises were thus not subject to the law of value and
were not required to produce nor accumulate surplus value. Wages and prices were
thus not related to the costs of the production process but rather the ability (or
otherwise) of state authorities to alter the weight of products in barter exchanges. Thus
the plan did not operate as a surrogate law of value based on calculations of necessary
labour-time for production but rather as a competition for scarce resources based on
political weight and political priorities.
Both industries were centrally controlled by the state, albeit to varying
degrees, regulated by the plan, had guaranteed markets and exhibited the features
which dogged the stat&s system of resource allocation. However, the sectors also
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differed in some important ways. First, the Hungarian industry was integrated into an
international vehicle production system oriented to meet the needs of the CMEA
(which in practice meant the Soviet Union) and was able to use its bargaining power
within this production system to win access to hard currency to purchase western
technology. By contrast the East German industry was isolated from the rest of the
CMEA and was entirely nationally regulated. Second, the industries were organised in
different ways. State enterprises in Hungary were less state directed and more
independent from the state plan, particularly after the economic reforms of 1968, than
was the case with the industry in east Germany which was highly integrated and
centralised into a huge industrial Kombinate. Thirdly, the industrial organisation also
differed and this had quite different regional impacts in the two countries. In Hungary,
owing to labour shortages, auto industry state enterprises were organised according to
a simplified 'branch plant' model in which newer plants were located in rural areas
some distance from the centres of engineering where the headquarters plants were
located. In East Germany the industry was more vertically integrated and located in
the traditional industrial heartland of Saxony and Thuringia.
Hungary
Little emphasis was placed on the automotive industry in Hungary until the
mid-i 960s when the country became a key player in the CMEA vehicle development
programme (see Kapitány 1992, 1993). As part of the international plan Hungary
specialised in the production of buses and automotive components which were
exported in return for importing completed cars from other CMEA members. The
industry was dominated by three very large firms which together constituted the bus
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vehicle production system. Bus chassis were supplied by Csepel Auto from its plant in
Budapest and delivered to IKARUS plants in Budapest and Szekésféhevár where the
bodies were pressed and assembled. The buses were powered by diesel engines
produced under a MAN licence by RABA in Gyor. Together the production system
produced up to 14,000 buses per year of which 8Opc were exported - some 9Opc of
which went to satisfy the Soviet Union market - amounting to up to lSpc of the
country's entire exports denominated in the rouble. In addition, RABA and Csepel
also produced up to 1,800 heavy duty trucks mostly for the Siberian oil industry. Of
these enterprises only RABA succeeded in tapping into western markets, supplying
rear axles to Eaton and Rockwell of the US.
hungary's partial adherence to the soviet model of industrial development
resulted in a bus production system in Hungary which was not as highly vertically
integrated - 8Opc of the value of the bus was outsourced - as in other CMEA
countries. As a result a supply base developed of some 50 major suppliers which were
often very dependent on IKARUS but which were legally independent from vehicle
assemblers. Others were almost entirely dependent on and tied to IKARUS, such as
IMAG (based in Mór), which produced 500,000 seats for IKARUS and was thus one
of Europ&s largest seat manufacturers. However, despite this, the bus production
system was rigorously regulated by the CMEA plan. The plan was based on the
outcome of an annual bargaining procedure between the Soviet and Hungarian state
authorities. Every December a summit between Foreign Trade officials from Moscow
and Budapest negotiated a commodity exchange agreement which permitted the barter
of buses for oil, gas and finished automobiles. Following the agreement in January of
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each year the enterprises were informed of the annual production target. Suppliers
were then in competition to secure the materials necessary to meet the planned target.
The annual competition for resources was governed not by the law of value nor the
plan but rather by informal networks between ministries, enterprise directors and trade
officials. One consequence was the poor allocation of resources as indicated by
inventory turnover time of 67 days in 1989 compared to an average ofjust 3 to 7 days
in the west (Mattheisen 1991).
As the planning system began to show signs of weakness in the 1980s
I lungary's privileged position was undermined. The Soviet Union (the customer)
squeezed its partners in the CMEA system. As a result the barter value attributed to
the export of buses declined (see Table 4.1). As the 'value' of the product was
negotiated centrally by governments and without reference to either the cost of
production or customer demand, additional development or engineering of a product
was not necessary since there was not a direct relationship with the customer, who in
any case could not pay a higher price. Therefore, there was little incentive to
innovation in production processes or product development.
In contrast to other CMEA countries Hungary's industrial enterprises were
relatively independent - at least from each other if not the Ministry of Industry - and
were not organised into huge industrial combinations. That created an industrial
structure which included a large number of engineering firms which were independent
from any one vehicle assembler and were thus suited to take part in the CMEA's
international plan. Thus a number of existing diversified engineering enterprises were
79
included in the plan supplying automobile components as jiart of the production,
under license, of Fiat models in Poland, the Soviet Union and later Yugoslavia. This
involved a number of diversified state owned enterprises, such as Tungsram
(lighting),MMG (dashboards), Bakony (electrical parts) and Elzett (locks), producing
components in addition to their main activities.
Similar to the bus production system the component industry depended on
foreign trade agreements negotiated centrally. The 'price' of the parts depended on
their value not in terms of money transfer but their barter value in respect to finished
cars. As the priority given to the production of automobiles in CMEA and the
strategic significance of Hungarian producers within the industry increased,
Hungarian producers won access to scarce resources and in particular were able to use
hard currency to purchase foreign components and production licences. In time the
general malaise in the soviet system resulted in the limitation of hard currency
available to purchase components and technology from abroad - in 1987 the average
age of the machinery stock in the industrial sector was 10.6 years (Mattheisen 1991) -
and later limited the amount of money customers could pay for the kits of components
produced by Hungarian firms. Thus production costs increased, sometimes because of
the need to import components and technology from the west with hard currency,
disproportionately greater than the prices that states were prepared or were able to
pay. In consequence production, itself, became an loss making activity. To alleviate
this situation, Bakony, for example, received a subsidy from the Hungarian
government worth 283m HUF in 1989. The terms of trade turned against Hungary as
suppliers had to export below cost more and more kits of components to permit
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I lungary to import finished automobiles, and the state had to step in to support its
producers. Once the major customer, VAZ, could not afford to pay sufficient to cover
the costs of production, the Hungarian state paid the difference between the price and
the cost. In effect this meant that the Hungarian state subsidised the production of cars
elsewhere in CMEA since VAZ in particular could not afford the price of products
produced in Hungary.
By the beginning of the I 980s the automotive industry was one of Hungary's
most significant industries employing in excess of 100,000 workers and contributing
heavily to the country's exports. However, even by that time the industry was
beginning to exhibit the features of the crisis which ultimately led to the down fall of
the soviet system in ECE - the failure to transform the economy from an extensive to
an intensive one. The Hungarian auto industry was saddled with low productivity and
suffered from an absence of incentives to innovate (see ECHO 1989; Kapitány and
KálIay 1991).
In this context, increasingly, the CMEA system was seen by the Hungarian
state as a barrier to rather than a force for industrial development and as a result some
larger companies were encouraged to export to the west. In the case of RABA this
involved the establishment of an additional plant on the same site to produce rear
axles; the existing plant was governed by the logic of the plan and produced low
quality but robust axles for the Soviet Union and the new facility produced highly
engineered products for western customers. This showed that the limitation of the
industry's performance owed little to competence and much to the regulation of
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industrial activity by the plan. The 'plan fetishism' (Burawoy 1985) resulting in poor
co-ordination prevented Hungarian producers from winning more than token market
shares in western markets: in 1988 little more than USD 53 millions worth of
automotive products were exported to the west (Vienna Institute for Comparative
Economic Studies 1990). Other attempts to reduce dependence on the CMEA plan led
the authorities to enter into negotiations with Toyota and later Suzuki, to establish car
manufacturing in the country.
Just as Hungary began to look in directions other than the plan to sustain its
industry, so too the interests of other CMEA member states began to diverge; under
the pressure of economic stagnation, governments began to encourage the domestic
production of components which severely undermined Hungarian producers. Thus
during the 1980s the industry's problems intensified as exports to other east and
central European states fell below the 1980 level while trade with the west barely
increased. Production of buses peaked in 1984 at 14,341 but subsequently fell by
nearly l4pc by 1988 (see Table 4.2). Investment in the industry also fell as obsolete
and fully depreciated machinery was not replaced. Given the extensive organisation of
the industry the most disturbing measure of the industry's problems was the reduction
in the workforce from 104,000 in 1980 to 63,700 in 1990 (see Ministry of Industry
and Trade 1991a; see also Table 4.3).
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East Germany
In contrast to Hungary the newly formed East German state inherited a modern
automotive industry. Some 25pc of pre-war German car capacity fell within the
borders of the new state including facilities which belonged to firms which later
became known as Audi and BMW. The industry was very highly regionally
concentrated around two towns (Zwickau and Eisenach) in the southern Lander of
Saxony and Thuringia and was organised along craft production principles. After the
creation of the East German state, planners were sent in to restructure the industry in
the mould of the soviet industrial model. Thus disparate craft workshops were
integrated in an attempt to introduce mass production techniques by deepening the
division of labour.
The first industrial governance model comprised confederations of state
owned firms which were attached to industry ministries. However as planning did not
follow the logic of the production process (suppliers were usually attached to a
different ministry from that of the final producers) the co-ordination of sectors and
integration of firms were poor. The failure of the planners to enforce their aims
resulted in further centralisation of the industry in the late 1 960s but this time
organised along sectoral lines (see Voskamp and Wittke 1991; Grabher 1 994a). The
entire automotive industry was restructured and came under the control of the
Industrie-Fahrzeug-Anlagen-Kombmnate (IFA -Kombinate), a holding company which
encompassed the entire road vehicle production industry in the country (see Kowaiski
1992). It was headquartered in Berlin and comprised 62 state owned enterprises
producing components and another nine firms for final assembly employing 130,000
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workers and employees. The IFA-Kombinate consisted of thfee subsidiaries. The car
manufacturing system formed the IFA-Personenkraftwagen (IFA-PKW,) which was
headquartered in Karl-Marx-Stadt (Saxony) (see von Schleinitz 1993). The two
further organisations formed the commercial vehicle and motorcycle production
systems respectively'.
IFA-PKW was responsible for planning, co-ordinating and managing the
production schedules and logistics of the automobile production system comprising
29 component and three assembly facilities employing at its peak some 65,000
workers and employees. The two largest assembly plants were VEB-Sachsenring
Auj'ornohile Werk (SAW) located in Zwickau (Saxony) employing 11,700 workers
producing the Trabant and VEB-Automobile Werk Eisenach (A WE) producing the
Wartburg in Eisenach (Thuringia) employing 9,300.2 The significance of the car
production system (IFA-PKW) was indicated by the fact that its turnover of 10.8
billion Ostinarks represented some 5pc of the GDR's entire nationaL income.
The result was a centralised, highly vertically integrated 'mass' production
system concentrated in Saxony and Thuringia in which no two enterprises were meant
to replicate production. In reality the production system continued not to work in an
effective manner. The central administrators attempted to impose production
schedules but the lack of competition in the supply chain rendered them
The CV production system was concentrated in IFA-Nui:kraftwagen (/FA-NKW) and
comprised 26 firms employing 50,000 workers and employees. The motor cycle production system
consisted of seven firms employing 15,000 people.
2	 In addition to SAW and AWE there was an assembly facility in Karl-Marx-Stadt (Saxony)
producing Barkas vans employing 7,300 workers and employees.
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unenforceable; political patronage would not suffice. As was the case in much of ECE
such economic co-ordination as existed resulted from informal forms of collective
action that took place behind the facade of the planning institutions (see Heidenreich
1992). The unreliability of suppliers and the frequent need for assemblers to
re-engineer parts meant that vehicle assemblers were dependent on component
producers. As Rudolf Leichsenring, the purchasing director of Sachsenring
Autornobilwerk (SAW) (the producer of the Trabant) put it: 'Die Zulieferer waren die
Konige, ii'ir die Be/tier' (The suppliers were the king, we the beggars) (quoted in
Jageler 1990; see also Kowalski 1992, Kaden 1990)
The soviet industrial model and the unreliable supply chain (resulting from the
plan's inability satisfactorily to co-ordinate the social and technical division of labour)
resulted in a very high level of vertical integration - with some 8Opc of the Trabant
being produced by SAW - compared to the average of 5Opc in West Germany.
Nevertheless there existed a supplier sector comprising 29 outdated inefficient firms
employing 37,000 workers. In addition as vehicle models became more sophisticated,
for example in utilising more electronic components, the assemblers became reliant on
sourcing components from other Kombinate for whom such production was peripheral
to their main business. This merely served to underline the inadequacy of the system's
ability to co-ordinate the production of complex manufactured products.
Thus despite central control, the volume of production in SAW, the larger of
the two main automobile assembly plants, did not exceed 140,000 units, somewhat
less than that considered to be a minimum efficient scale in western mass production
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plants (see JQckstock 1990). The organisation of an industry iii which competition was
an anathema and research and development functions were centralised, failed to
generate the conditions necessary for innovation and development. In addition, the
absence of market mechanisms and signals to translate demand into supply and the
existence of captive markets meant there was no demand-led incentive for producers
to develop their products and production processes (see Lungwitz 1991, Lungwitz and
KreiBig 1992). These structural problems created a general malaise in the industry
which was symbolised by its two main products. Both the Trabant (which entered
production at Zwickau in 1955) and the slightly more modem Wartburg (produced at
Eisenach) owed much of their design to 1930s technology and were powered by
two-stroke engines produced at Karl-Marx-Stadt. The economy's technological
capacity failed to keep pace with the west because of the nature of the system,
government priorities and international controls on the transfer of technology to the
east bloc. Thus in spite of indicative state planning the volume of production failed to
keep pace with western levels, peaking at only 218,000 units in 1986. Regulatory
mechanisms failed to alleviate poor co-ordination and integration in the sector
reinforcing the inability of the system to transform itself from an extensive to an
intensive mode of production (see Table 4.4).
In contrast to Hungary, the East German automotive industry was highly
centralised at the national level but was not integrated with other CMEA partners.
East Germany was excluded from the CMEA international car production system
which was associated with the co-ordinated purchase of Fiat technology in the
mid-l960s. This was due to the political regime's ideological position against
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personalised private transport and the inability of the sector to earn hard currency
which would have made considerable levels of investment worthwhile. For these
reasons the state did not permit enterprises to enter into any major licensing
agreements with western firms.
By the middle of the 1 980s the automobile industry had ceased to develop
further. Burdened by debt and obsolete products, and starved of investment, the
industry had fallen behind other east European producers and even further behind
those in the west. Labour productivity was very low, believed to be around 3Opc of
the level in West Germany. Approximately 12 cars were produced per worker per
year by SAW in 1985 (as 12,000 workers produced 140,000 units). Indicative of the
stagnation of GDR auto sector was its falling contribution to total east European
automobile production: whereas in 1965 the GDR had produced 23pc of the total, by
1985 this had fallen to only 9pc (see Swain 1992a). Despite this car production had
increased from 7,000 in 1950 to 218,000 in 1986 and the GDR was the second largest
CMEA car producer after the USSR. When the size of the two countries is taken into
account the volume of production per 10,000 of the population was 131 in East
Germany and only 44 in the USSR in 1988. Therefore in crude arithmetic terms the
planned car industry had succeeded; car ownership density was 199 per 1,000
population in 1985, considerably higher than in some other CMEA countries and also
in some parts of west Europe (such as Spain, Greece and Portugal) but compared
poorly with a figure of 424 in West Germany (see Table 4.5; Swain 1992a). By 1989
ownership had increased further with some 54 households out of 100 owning a
vehicle, but the production system remained unable to satisfy demand as individuals
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savings increased. Thus despite the lack of affection toward the car models, waiting
times for a Trabant were in excess of 15 years.
As the 1 980s proceeded the leadership became concerned that the industry was
falling too far behind its counterparts in other CMEA countries and that the imbalance
in demand and supply might prompt social unrest. This resulted in efforts to
reinvigorate the sector. The first plans involved the production of a new car in
conjunction with Czechoslovakia, however, as anticipated costs rose to 7 billion
Ostiiiarks, the project was dropped. With the failure of this option the East German
regime looked to the west to satisfy its need to modernise the industry without
crippling an already struggling economy. In 1984 an accord was reached with VW.
This paved the way for the production, beginning in 1988, of 1050 cc Polo engines at
Karl-Marx-Stadt. In order to pay for the modernisation a portion of the production
was to be exported to VW in West Germany whilst the remainder was to be used to
power versions of the Trabant and Wartburg. The exportation of other automobile
components to western Europe was initiated to generate further hard currency.
Part of the investment, anticipated initially to be 4 billion Ostmarks but which
rose to 10 billion, involved the construction of a small new assembly plant at Mosel,
just north of Zwickau, and a new engine facility at Karl-Marx-Stadt. In addition, some
suppliers had access to resources to re-engineer parts for the modernised models.
Nevertheless, the distribution of the investment for new plant followed a rationale
more in keeping with the need for political patronage than a genuine industrial
strategy (see Lungwitz 1991). These attempts at modernisation, however, were
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quickly over taken by subsequent developments in the country and elsewhere in east
and central Europe.
4.3	 State policies towards the automotive industry in Hungary and eastern
Germany
In the course of the break up of the soviet regimes in Hungary and the GDR
the co-ordinating mechanism of the economy was transformed from a more-or-less
plan or hierarchical system to a more-or-less market or horizontal one. This occurred
in two ways: first, through change from below as the institutions and actors that
comprised the soviet system failed to respond to traditional forms of co-ordination
(the plan); and second, through change from above as state authorities reformed the
co-ordinating mechanism in the face of stagnation. In the remainder of this chapter
we consider the three ways in which these bottom-up and top-down changes resulted
in Hungary and the GDR abandoning the planning system and establishing the
foundations for the new forms of regulation and governance of the automotive
industry. First, we examine the privatisation of the industry and the state's industrial
policy. Second, the chapter considers the creation of a market for passenger cars.
Thirdly, we examine the role of civil society and the state in establishing the core
principles behind new forms of interest representation and industrial relations
systems. This is followed by a discussion of the restructuring of trade unionism in the
automotive sector.
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4.3.1 Privatisation
The differing course of privatisation in the two countries reflected the
differences in their planning systems (see Grabher 1995). The major difference in the
two systems was that whereas after 1968 centralised plarmed control in Hungary was
replaced by a more decentralised system of bureaucratic regulation, in the GDR the
state sought to overcome lack of co-ordination by increasing hierarchical control.
Thus the economies in the two countries operated quite differently from each other
and presented quite different legacies. As a result privatisation in Hungary was
gradual and relatively decentralised compared to the former GDR where economic
reorganisation was highly centralised and statist.
Hungary
Privatisation in Hungary can be divided into three phases. The first phase
began in earnest in 1987, but was the culmination of the soviet-backed regime's
attempts to liberalise the economy after 1982, when state owned enterprises were
permitted to reorganise themselves by forming subsidiary companies limited by
shares. The result was in fact the creation of nominally private finns owned by state
owned holding companies. Where such reorganisation was pursued rigorously, state
owned enterprises became 'hollowed out' shells co-ordinating numerous satellite firms
limited by shares (limited liability companies or KFTs) (see Burawoy 1992, Stark
1993). Such a course of development did not represent genuine privatisation but
'etatization' and the creation of 'recombinant property' as the distinction between
private and state owned property forms was blurred (see Stark 1993). This period of
'spontaneous privatisation' (Stark 1990) was enterprise-led with the state authorities
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having no powers to regulate or control a process which generated resentment as
individuals, via enterprise councils, swapped administrative-political power for
economic power by taking control of formerly state assets in the form of so-called
'nomenklatura buyouts' (see Stark 1990). A degree of statutory regulation of the
process was introduced with the passing of the Law on Business Association (1989)
which governed the creation of limited liability companies and joint stock companies
(Rts). Thus change from below had begun to force the state to introduce new forms of
control over economic institutions.
The second phase of involved 'controlled privatisation' as the state took over
the entire process with the establishment in 1990 of the State Property Agency (SPA)
and later, in 1992, the State Holding Company (À y
 Rt). The phase of controlled
privatisation was regulated by the Law on Transformation (1989 and subsequent
amendments) which governed the actual transformation of state owned enterprises.
This involved two stages: first, the pre-privatisation process of transforming state
owned enterprises into KFTs and Rts by means of 'corporatization' in which shares
were deposited with the state and public authorities and second, privatisation itself,
the sale of the shares to private investors. With the establishment of the SPA the
symbolic ownership of around 2,000 state owned enterprises was transferred from
enterprise councils to the SPA whose responsibility it was to corporatize and privatise
the enterprises. The role assigned to the SPA meant that the state, led by the first
post-communist government, re-took control over the economy (undoing the last
years of the soviet regime's devolution of economic control). Some likened this
process of privatisation to the 'renationalisation' of the economy (Voszka 1994). The
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formation of the SPA also signalled the beginning of a period of dependence on
foreign capital to privatise state property given the absence of domestic capital.
Following the creation of the SPA, the various means of privatisation were
brought under control (see, for instance, SPA/SHC 1994, Bridger 1993).
Enterprise-initiated privatisation, involving state owned firms attempting to attract
strategic (invariably foreign) investors, continued but was brought under the
regulatory control of the SPA in the form of the Self-Privatisation Programme.
Likewise the SPA took over the responsibility for processing unsolicited bids for state
property by foreign companies. In addition, the SPA began a new privatisation
method which involved selling groups of companies. The first tranche of twenty
companies was put up for sale in the First Privatisation Programme (FPP) in
September 1990. However by the end of 1991 the sale of only three companies had
begun. In that year the Second Privatisation Programme (SPP) was announced
involving 23 enterprises. None of them attracted investors. A major problem was the
lack of domestic capital which led to the Existence Credit scheme which permitted
Hungarians (individuals or companies) to apply for soft-loans to purchase state owned
property. Even so the company initiated privatisation programme involving strategic
foreign investors remained the most important method of sale. However, foreign
interest was confined to relatively few sectors of the economy including in particular
cigarettes and the food and drink sector. In 1991 85pc of the SPA's sales were to
foreign buyers and this declined only slightly to 6Opc in 1992. As a result the bulk of
the engineering sector, including the automotive sector, was not privatised, largely
because of an absence of foreign interest, which resulted in the Ministry of Industry
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and Trade arguing for new methods of privatisation (MIT 1992). Despite this the
MIT continued to regard the attraction of strategic foreign investors as the only way of
ensuring the survival of state owned industrial enterprises. At the same time the
Pre-Privatisation Programme was introduced to permit domestic investors to purchase
small service enterprises.
Amid western criticism that Hungary's privatisation process was proceeding
slowly and domestic criticism that it was over dependent on foreign investors and did
not provide sufficient opportunities for domestic investors to become involved, the
state embarked on the third phase. To accelerate privatisation, the state introduced
'simplified privatisation' or the Seif-Privatisation Programme in which the SPA
established a tranche of approved consultancies which were permitted to privatise
smaller enterprises without reference to the SPA. In addition, responding to domestic
political pressure, the state introduced a number of schemes designed to allay fears of
overdependence on foreign investors. In early 1993 the state established the State
Holding Company (Ay Rt.) and transferred the ownership of 162 state owned
enterprises which were considered to be of strategic importance to the national
economy. Whereas the SPA was responsible solely for privatisation, Ày was
established to develop long term corporate strategies for firms where the state wished
to remain the majority owner3.
At the same time there was renewed interest in Employee Stock Ownership
Programmes (ESOPs) in which employers could be 'given' lOpc of an enterprise's
Following the victory of the Socialist Party in the 1994 elections the new government indicated
its intention to merge the SPA and Ày and reduce the number of'strategic' companies to just 46.
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equity and purchase additional equity at up to 5Opc of its face value. In 1993 there
were 122 ESOPs making it the most important privatisation method. In practice
ESOPs were used to privatise enterprises - mostly in the industrial sector - which had
failed to attract strategic foreign investors. In addition there were two privatisation
methods designed to create a class of Hungarian owners. The first permitted
Hungarians to lease firms from the SPA with a view to eventual privatisation and pay
back the cost of the fee from pre-tax profits. The second involved the distribution of
compensation notes to former owners of property which had been confiscated by the
soviet regime. These notes could be exchanged for shares in selected state owned
companies that were floated on the stock exchange. As a result of these new forms of
privatisation, for the first time in 1993 the majority of privatisation proceeds were
generated from domestic investors even if virtually all of it had been borrowed from
the state.
Following their election to become the first post-communist government, the
1-lungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) aimed to privatise SOpc of state owned property
by the end of 1994. However by May 1994 the SPA had completely sold 538
companies, sold minority stakes in a further 41 and majority stakes in 166 enterprises.
This meant that there were 481 state owned enterprises which had been transformed
into corporations but remained entirely state owned (SPA 1994). Out of the 1,848
state owned enterprises that were assigned to the SPA some 431 had been liquidated
by May 1 9944• In effect liquidation also represented the privatisation of economic
organisations as a large number of liquidated enterprises were in some form or other
A further 44 economic organisations were liquidated by the SPA following corporatization.
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sold to investors. In total the privatisation programmes generated 1-IUF I 18bn 5 of
which HUF 13 bn was reinvested in restructuring SPA owned enterprises. 	 In
addition there were 9,661 small businesses, mostly in the service sector, which had
also been privatised. However, by the end of 1993 the proportion of state property
that was estimated to have been privatised was between 18 and 2Opc (cited in Stark
1993).
Responsibility for the privatisation of the automotive industry was assigned to
the State Property Agency. However, owing to a non-sectoral organisation and
because the state owned automotive component enterprises resembled
'mini-conglomerates' operating in a wide variety of sectors including the automotive
industry, responsibility for the privatisation of firms involved in the automotive
industry was dispersed amongst different departments. As a result it was difficult to
assess the privatisation of the sector in general terms. However, the privatisation (or
rather the lack of it) of two of the most important auto component producers, MMG
and Bakony, indicated the problems the state had in attempting to privatise the
industry.
Both companies, each employing around 4,000 at their peak, were important
members of the CMEA international vehicle programme supplying dashboard
instrumentation (MMG) and electrical components such as windscreen wiper motors
(Bakony) to a number of assemblers in eastern Europe. However, both also had
considerable interests outside of the automotive industry (equipment for the Soviet oil
Including cash and non cash revenues.
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industry and the defence industry respectively). Both MMG and Bakony were
corporatized by the SPA which with management sought to identify strategic foreign
partners that could supply new markets. However, the SPA and the respective
management in the two firms disagreed over whether the firms should be divided up
and sold or privatised as single entities. In both cases, although some peripheral
'branch plants' were sold and intra-corporate trade was marketised, the management
view prevailed and the enterprises were not broken up. In 1992 the SPA put out a
tender for potential buyers for MMG but by the time of the submission date in June of
that year no bids had been received. After a further year of seeking a strategic
investor and considering an MBO in early 1994 privatisation by ESOP was initiated.
Bakony also had considerable problems. Having been transformed into a company
limited by shares (owned by the state) by mid-1992 it failed to attract a strategic
foreign partner to invest in the whole firm.6
Both MMG and Bakony were typical of the sector as a whole. Although in
most cases joint ventures were established with foreign firms as part-owned
subsidiaries, the sale of core enterprise, to either foreign or domestic private investors,
was very limited. As a result the sector continued to be bypassed by foreign investors
which established green field investments (see chapter 5) instead of acquiring existing
producers. In consequence privatisation of the sector became dependent on initiating
ESOPs.
A number of bids had been made by foreign firms for parts of the company but these had been
rejected because of the management wish to keep the firm together. In addition there were prolonged
negotiations between GM and Bakony to set up ajoint venture but the US company withdrew.
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Following the establishment of AV Rt at the end of 1992, the ownership and
responsibility for the partial privatisation of IKARUS and RABA were transferred
from the SPA. This signalled the government's decision to consider these two
enterprises, believed to support in excess of 1,000 domestic suppliers, as of 'strategic'
importance to the national economy and which were therefore to remain under partial
state ownership in the long term. It also recognised that considerable restructuring
was required before even partial privatisation could be considered. It was envisaged
that the state's involvement in the two enterprises would be confined to an equity
share of either 2Spc or 5Opc plus one 'golden share' giving the state a potential veto
over future development of the firms. As a result Ày took steps to reduce the state's
equity in the companies but with some difficulty with the result that an offering to sell
some 5.9pc of IKARUS remained unsubscribed. At the beginning of 1994 AV's stake
in IKARUS stood at nearly 64pc and in RABA at 41pc 7 . The third major state owned
automotive company, Csepel Auto, was put in liquidation in 1992 and the state sought
a buyer for 'empty' assets (without liabilities).
Eastern Germany
The process of privatisation was very different in the former GDR than was
the case in Hungary. Whereas the Hungarian authorities pursued a 'gradualist'
strategy, in the course of German unification, as the West German state gained the
ascendancy, 'shock therapy' was applied. However, it was significant that in
following such a course the West German state harnessed and exercised the
institutional capacity of the old soviet backed regime for its privatisation effort. In
A further 51 Pc of RABA was owned by the state owned Hungarian Investment and
Development Bank Rt. following a debt rescheduling agreement.
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consequence the method of privatisation was 'top down', bureaucratic, planned,
goal-orientated, centralised and as such mimicked the GDR planning system (see
Seibel 1994, Grabher 1995).
In March 1990, just a few days before the first free elections the SED
government established the Treuhandanstalt (THA) to administer and preserve state
owned property. However, as moves towards unification moved rapidly, and the
Trust Law of June 1990 was passed, the legal basis of the THA was altered and
ownership of state property was transferred from 'the people' to the THA which was
empowered to privatise and reorganise (with a view to sale) East German state
property as quickly as possible. This role assigned to the THA, and its organisation,
was subsequently included in the Unification Treaty. Thus unification resulted in the
TI IA being transformed from an administrator and manager of state owned property
into an owner and privatiser (Drobnig 1992). At the same time the majority of the
existing directors were replaced by west Germans; ultimately the board of directors
became entirely composed of west Germans. The THA thus became the world's
largest holding company (THA 1991), employing 4,200 employees, owning 13,781
enterprises (after some enterprises had been divided up) 8 which collectively employed
four million workers, of which 75pc were in industry. Enterprises employing more
than 1,500 workers were the responsibility of the TI-IA headquarters located in the
former GDR's I-louse of Ministries. The agency was divided into eight departments,
including six responsible for an industrial branch, thus mirroring the organisation of
the GDR's industrial ministries (Grabher 1995). In addition there were two further
l'he THA also owned 10,600 small retailing outlets.
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important sub-departments, one (Abwicklung) responib1e for liquidating enterprises
and devising social plans and one to ensure that contracts with investors were adhered
to. Smaller enterprises were made the responsibility of the THA's 15 regional offices.
It was initially anticipated that the sale of all state property would raise DM600bn to
be allocated to industrial reorganisation and the Federal budget.
Although the THA was responsible for both privatisation and job protection,
as Theo Waigel, the federal economics minister at the time, pointed out, in practice
privatisation was the agency's priority: 'Experience teaches that privatisation is the
best form of restructuring' (Financial Times 3 July 1992 cited in CURDS 1993, 103).
Following the passing of the Trust Law in June 1990, enterprises were given just one
month to transform themselves into limited liability companies. 	 The THA
subsequently began to convert public into private property in two ways:
reprivatisation to former owners and privatisation to new owners by sale. The
primary means of achieving that was the sub-division of enterprises to create focused
viable companies. In the first nine months of operation the THA sold 1,600
enterprises (Drobnig 1992) and by the middle of 1992 the first regional offices were
closed having sold all their enterprises.
The operation of the THA can be divided into three phases. The first phase
occurred between monetary union and unification when the THA sought to preserve
continuity. As a result it guaranteed a DM2Obn liquidity credit to allow all east
German enterprises to continue in business and pay wages. The second phase began
with unification, when the THA's market philosophy resulted in the rapid privatisation
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oF enterprises but without a strategic vision (beyond letting the market develop) for
the economic development of the region. The result was the rapid deindustrialisation
of the region and the generation of considerable opposition to the THA's strategy. In
the year and a half following unification industrial output fell 65pc, involving the loss
of 3.2 million jobs, and GDP fell by l4pc in 1990, and 3Opc in 1991. In addition the
THA was criticised for selling assets inappropriately, for example to property
developers seeking valuable real estate, too cheaply and for allowing too much of the
economy to become owned by west Germans. This led to the agreement of the
'Solidarity Pact', between the federal government, the political parties, the Lander and
the trade unions, which included a commitment to preserve east Germany's 'industrial
cores', even if they could not be sold to the private sector. This change of strategy
signalled the third phase of the THA's activities.
Where privatisation was possible the THA began to place greater demands on
potential investors and also invested in active labour market policies. One important
new rule was that a sale was only permitted where there were at least two competing
bids. Also, the agency placed more and more emphasis on the investment and job
creation commitments of potential investors. Later however, as the THA's debt
liabilities increased, the price became as significant as the buyer's guarantees.
Enterprises that formed part of the 'industrial core' were identified on the basis of the
so-called 'Saxony model', where the Land government, following discussions with
business and trade unions, identified companies of regional importance
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1993). Where an enterprise was deemed to form
part of eastern Germany's 'industrial core' the THA played an important role in the
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lrrnulation of industrial development concepts 9. This involved the creation of a new
category of 'controlled enterprises', those enterprises - most of which had had portions
privatised - that were directly managed by the THA. In practice, however, the
majority of these 'core' companies - defined according to the local impact of closure -
were subsidised in order to provide additional time for an investor to come forward;
they were not given additional investment capital to facilitate significant restructuring.
It did however enable the Land governments to play a more active role in protecting
and developing their regional economy. As it became increasingly difficult to sell
enterprises the THA become ever more proactive in restructuring firms (see below).
The agency also became more willing to permit a privatisation even if it amounted to
more than the cost of liquidating the enterprise - this had previously been against the
rules of the THA. Some enterprises that could still not be sold were transferred to
'management companies' in which west German private holding companies were
established to manage up to three THA enterprises.
To overcome charges that the TI-IA had allowed too much of the east German
economy to fall into west German ownership and had prevented the development of a
locally owned Mittelstand'°, the THA began to place greater emphasis on
management-buy-outs (MBO5). By the end of 1994, by which point the THA had
closed, 2,679 MBOs had been completed. However the THA conspicuously failed to
use its power to distribute shares in former state property to citizens - a measure that
'	 The most important example was the THA's refusal to sell the east German steel maker, Eko
Stahl, without investors committing themselves to developing an integrated iron and steel complex.
10	 The miuelsgand is the sector of small and medium sized industrial companies that were so
important in securing West Germany's post-war industrial development.
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would have stimulated demand in the region and permitted former state firms rapid
access to capital markets.
Where the THA considered a firm not viable it was liquidated and, where
possible, the assets sold. This resulted in the creation of 'empty shells', companies
owned by the TI-IA whose assets had been sold to private investors. By the end of
1994 a total of 3,527 enterprises had been closed. These closures, and the
restructuring of other enterprises, resulted in a 2 million drop, to 1.2 million, in the
number of people working in manufacturing industry between 1989 and 1993. As a
result the open unemployment rate peaked at 1 8pc but the hidden rate ranged between
30 and 35pc (including around imillion on short time working and employment
training schemes) (The Economist 21 May1994, 10). By the end of 1994 the
unemployment rate remained at I 3pc. The high rate of unemployment forced the
TI-IA to become more active in the labour market and in particular to support
'employment promotion companies' (see chapter 6).
As a consequence of securing investment and job guarantees the THA was
able to illustrate its success by publicising projected investment and employment
levels. Thus by the end of June 1994 the THA claimed to have attracted DM 198bn
and saved or created 1.46 million jobs (THA 1994). However, these figures were
somewhat misleading. First, the figures included commitments made in the course of
early privatisations which were not contractually enforceable. Secondly, even after
the introduction of contractually enforceable guarantees, the publicised levels of
investment and job creation were not enforceable. This was because in the course of
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purchasing an enterprise from the TI-IA contracts includec two figures for investment
and job creation. The first figures, which were publicised by the THA, referred to the
level of investment and employment that the investor hoped to achieve. The second
set of figures, which were confidential and contractually enforceable, were
considerably lower and referred to the guaranteed investment and employment levels.
In addition, the commitments were to be met over a five-year period. Although one
privatisation was annulled by the THA, in practice it could only fine investors who
failed to meet the commitments and only did so infrequently. As a result investment
and employment secured by the TI-IA in the new Lander was rather less than publicly
claimed.
The TI-IA was therefore responsible for the privatisation and reorganisation of
the East German automotive industry (see Kreil3ig and Lungwitz 1993). The two car
assemblers, IFA-SAW and IFA-AWE, and the truck assembler IFA-NKW, posed the
agency most difficulties given the size of the subsidy the two companies required to
continue operating. Following the initial period of the THA during which the west
German state indicated it would permit the agency to subsidise continued vehicle
assembly at the two plants, the new market-led approach resulted in a change of
policy and the termination of car assembly in the new Lander. It was estimated that
continued production at IFA-AWE would require a DM100m annual subsidy. As a
result AWE, and later IFA-NKW, were placed in liquidation and IFA-SAW was
reorganised to focus on component production (see chapters 5 and 6).
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As early as 1990, the federal government, largely over the head of the THA,
enticed three strategic investors, Opel, VW and Mercedes-Benz, to establish
operations respectively at AWE (Eisenach), SAW (Zwickau) and NKW
(Ludswigfelde). The political significance of the projects resulted in large sums of
funding being made available from the federal ministry of finance to 'protect the
locations'. The finance was used to allow the THA to enter into joint ventures with
the three strategic investors. In all three cases, the THA took a majority stake, but not
management control, in the joint venture and guaranteed to pay the losses (up to an
agreed maximum). In return the investors established CKD operations and guaranteed
a level of production and employment for a specific period of time, at the end of
which the joint venture was to be sold or liquidated. The ventures were established to
maintain production and employment whilst the three investors established wholly
owned subsidiaries to construct and operate new integrated manufacturing and
assembly facilities. However, the THA's competence to ensure that the investments
were made by the three subsidiaries owned by Opel, VW and Mercedes-Benz, was
limited. Thus the THA was unable to penalise VW when it postponed its investment
because no penalties had been included in the contract. 	 However, when
Mercedes-Benz reneged on its promise to construct a new truck production facility
near Berlin it was forced to return some of the subsidies that it had received.'1
As the activities of the three strategic investors developed the THA had to
negotiate the winding up of the three joint ventures. In each case the fate of the joint
ventures reflected the progress of the strategic investor's original plans. Following
The intial contract between Opel and the THA, signed in 1990, did not include penalties for
postponing or cancelling investment but these were included in a revised agreement in 1992.
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Mercedes-Benz poor performance and termination of its ipvestment the joint venture
was liquidated with the THA incurring the losses. With the postponement of VW's
investment the life of the loss making joint venture was extended until 1997 when
production at the new plant was due to begin. The joint venture with Opel was sold to
the car manufacturer. Since it owned the new plant that was only sold to Opel in 1993
the THA received a return on its investment. The result of these dealings was that
whereas the TI-IA made large losses in its dealings with VW and Mercedes-Benz it
only made a small loss with Opel, despite contributing a subsidy amounting to a
greater proportion of its investment than was the case with the other two investment
projects; the public subsidy amounted to 6Opc of Opel's investment and 4Opc of VW's
(Induslriemagazin 5 October 1990). The other GDR vehicle assembler, Multicar,
located in Walterhausen (Thuringia), which produced small commercial and special
vehicles was the subject of a MBO , backed by investors from western Germany,
which meant it became the only automotive assembler to survive unification intact
The THA's vehicle construction unit, part of Department 4 (U4)' 2, was
responsible for the conversion of the automotive components sector' 3 . In addition the
unit was also responsible for privatising and reorganising the engine building sector,
train construction, the agricultural machinery sector and later the ship building
industry. Some 36 THA officials were involved in the privatisation of the auto
sector' 4 . In keeping with the corporate ethos of the THA the Fahrzeugbau (FB) unit
12	 Department 4 (U4) was also responsible for the privatisation of the optical
instruments/equipment sector, paper manufacturing and chemicals.
Initially responsibility for the auto sector was placed with Department 2 (U2) before being
transferred.
4 A high proportion of the officials worked for west German management consultancies which
were contracted to work for the THA. These officials were commonly known, by THA employees, as
one dollar men' for being regarded as selling enterprises cheaply.
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operated in a goal-orientated way (officials stood to earn substantial bonuses) with the
result that most information publicly released referred to their goals rather than what
actually occurred.
There were 185 auto-related enterprises to be privatised when the THA was set
up; at the end of 1991 75 were left to be sold to the private sector. In early 1992
tenders were sought for the sale of 43 automotive component producers, which
collectively had a turnover of DM5.2bn and made losses of DM500m. Given that the
auto industry had come to an effective halt in April 1991 these figures indicated the
extent to which balance sheets could be manipulated. Also the public tender of the
firms illustrated the public selling strategy of the unit. Not least, it was claimed that
VW and Opel's emphasis on 'lean production' and just-in-time logistics (see chapter 2)
meant that the overwhelming bulk of their component procurement would be froni
producers in the new Lander (Guardian, 28 March 1992). However, as the assembly
plants entered production such localised development seemed increasingly unlikely.
By the end of 1992 FB had sold all but 26 enterprises and had secured a projected
level of 28,000 jobs. The remaining THA firms employed 14,000 workers and had a
turnover of DM 608 million. In addition, there were 10 auto related enterprises which
were 'controlled' by the THA. This meant that out of the 185 automotive enterprises
allocated to the THA nine were 'officially' liquidated.
The ease of privatisation depended, in part, on the product profiles of the
enterprises. Thus enterprises which produced products such as shock absorbers and
electrical parts were the easiest to sell, whilst engine parts makers and others with
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foundry capacity, such as spring and small body part manufacturers, were the hardest
to find buyers for. Also following the postponement of investment by VW and the
cancellation by Mercedes-Benz, the speed of privatisation slowed, and a number of
agreements that were close to conclusion collapsed. As a result the department, which
up to then had not encouraged their formation, began to support MBOs. Also, as the
weight of political pressure increased from the Lander governments, the department
began to place greater emphasis on restructuring and reorganisation prior to
privatisation (see chapter 5).
4.3.2 Industrial policy
Hungary
In the first phase following the unwinding of the planning system, industrial
policy was coterminous with privatisation (see MIT 1992). Thus the Ministry of
Industry and Trade's overriding policy goal was to promote the privatisation of state
owned enterprises in order to facilitate organisational restructuring and
decentralisation. Privatisation was meant to restructure the manufacturing sector in
four ways: by eliminating monopolies, decentralising economic decision making,
establishing new types of economic integration, and promoting property acquisition.
The ministry's policy was to transform and privatise enterprises prior to restructuring,
believing that it was better for the market rather than the state to dictate change. Thus
industrial policy was defined in opposition to the past experience which resulted in a
neo-liberal policy environment. In any case, the state lacked the institutions and
107
finance to articulate a more interventionist approach even if it had wanted to pursue
one.
It was anticipated that privatisation and subsequent restructuring would result
in the contraction in the manufacturing sector (and particularly a reduction in the
number of large firms and those involved in the engineering sector) resulting in the
loss of over 200,000 jobs, as industrial employment fell from 900,000 to under
700,000 by 2000. Given the emphasis that Hungary placed on attracting DFI to
provide the impetus for its privatisation programme the main instrument of industrial
policy was the attraction of direct foreign investment in the form of greenfield
investments and strategic foreign partners for existing producers (see MIT 1991,
1992). I-lungary was the first ECE country to permit DFI with the introduction of the
Foreign Investment Act XXIV in 1988. To further encourage DFI the government
compiled an unrivalled bundle of investment incentives including tax holidays,
preferential customs treatment, and privileged market access. As a result Hungary
attracted more joint ventures and DFI than any other country in ECE. Up to the end
of 1993 Hungary was the recipient of around USD 5.767 bn direct foreign investment,
representing in excess of half of all investment in east and central Europe (EBRD
1995). The investment resulted in the formation of 20,000 joint ventures, although
the majority were small and dormant.
As part of the policy of attracting DFI the government identified a number of
sectors on which it placed particular emphasis. Given Hungary's specialisation in
commercial vehicles and automotive components in the CMEA vehicle programme
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(which bequeathed a legacy of an independent component sector) and following the
securing of investments by Suzuki and GM in passenger vehicle assembly, the
government decided to emphasise the automotive components industry. An
amendment to the Foreign Investment Act XXIV (1988) was introduced in 1991
which placed the automotive industry in a preferred category qualifying investments
in the sector for additional government support (see MIER 1991). As a consequence
of the amendment auto-related investments were entitled to receive a five year tax
'holiday' and thereafter a 60pc tax concession until the end of the tenth year after the
commencement of production. In addition the government held out the possibility of
an extension to the tax concessions after the tenth year where a project was deemed as
having strategic importance to the national economy. Automotive investment
potentially fell into this category.
In addition various government ministries offered cash incentives designed to
encourage investment co-ordinated by an Inter-Departmental Committee.
Auto-related investors were disproportionately supported by cash incentives. The
most important source of funding was the Ministry of International Economic
Relations (MIER) Investment Promotion Fund which permitted the government to
support foreign (mostly manufacturing) investments which involved in excess of HUF
50m DFI and a foreign equity share of greater than 3Opc. The fund was particularly
designed to contribute towards infrastructural modernisation where this was essential
to the success of an investment project. Also the fund could be used to buy state
participation in a venture. The government placed a ceiling on the value of support
from the Investment Promotion Fund of HUF lOOm or 3Opc of the value of the
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investment (whichever was the lowest). There was also a number of other
discretionary funds which were allocated according to a competitive procedure.
Domestic firms were eligible to apply for support from these funds. The Ministry of
Labour administered the Employment Fund which dispersed funds to support training
and job creation. The third most important source of support was the Nature and
Environmental Fund which could be used to contribute to the costs of clearing up
pollution. Also the Regional Development Fund assisted, largely through wage
subsidies, investment in areas of high unemployment.' 5 The other means of state
support for DFI was a commitment to protect long term investors from the impacts of
liberalising trade and markets. Thus in the automotive sector customs regulations
were organised so that the major investors (Suzuki, GM and Ford) enjoyed a 23pc
tariff advantage compared to vehicle importers who had not invested in local
inanufacturi ng.
As a result of these incentives Hungary was successful in attracting a
significant level of automotive investment in the early 1 990s (see Chapter 5). Not
least one investment in particular through its close links with the government and a
number of significant state owned automotive enterprises (including for example
IKARUS) that by Suzuki, became an integral part of MIT's industrial policy (see
chapters 5 and 6). However, the predominance of greenfield investments and the
difficulty that local suppliers had in trying to become involved in such projects forced
the state to alter the emphasis of its industrial strategy. DFI had failed to provide the
IS	 Whereas the Investment Promotion Fund was for the exclusive benefit of foriegn investors the
other funds could be applied to by foreign and domestic enterprises but were largely used to support
DFI rather than the restructuring of existing producers.
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hoped-for impetus. for the privatisation and modernisation of the industry with the
result that the state had to begin to develop an industrial policy designed to assist
modernisation of the auto industry.
In the course of 1993 the Ministry of Industry and Trade began to develop an
industrial policy that was not exclusively dependent on privatisation and the attraction
of DFI. As a result, at the end of 1993 the value of the investment incentives was
reduced and measures designed to assist domestic industry were developed. The
policy centred on a series of interim, medium and long term goals to restructure and
modernise Hungarian industry (see MIT 1993 and Table 4.5). Regarding the
Hungarian automotive industry the most important element of the new industrial
policy was the crisis management programme (see Kapitány 1993 l6)• The programme
involved the so-called 'dirty-dozen' or twelve major engineering companies, including
IKARUS and RABA, and one corporation in liquidation, Csepel Auto (see Table 4.6).
As part of the programme the government committed itself to spending HUF 3Obn on
long term subsidies. It was anticipated that HUF lObn would be allocated to
supporting the three automotive firms alone in the form of debt restructuring and
consolidation (in conjunction with their privatisation by Ày), subsidies, and
privatisation revenue. Thus the state took steps to guarantee the continuation of
commercial vehicle manufacturing. In addition these companies were permitted to
apply to the Employment and Regional Development Funds to support restructuring
costs. As a result IKARUS was able to secure HUF 1 OOm from these two funds.
This manuscript was commissioned by the MIT.
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The most important element of industrial policy far the rest of the engineering
sector was the National Technical Development Committee Fund worth around HUF
I Obn in 1993. Domestic industrial concerns could apply for financial support to take
out commercial loans to enable them to invest in new technology in order to penetrate
new markets and boost exports. In addition to this general fund designed to support
the modernisation of the engineering sector, the Ministry of Industry and Trade
established a special fund worth 1-IUF 200m in 1992 and HUF 250m in 1993 to which
only automotive component producers (and especially those contracted to supply
Suzuki) could apply' 7 . This fund was also used to enable suppliers to take out
commercial loans without having to pay the rates of interest set by the banks. Also, as
part of its support for IKARUS, MIT established and funded a project to develop
quality control systems in its twelve most important suppliers.
Easterii Germany
Following its formation by the last soviet-type government in 1990, the
Treuhandanstalt was intended to be an instrument of industrial policy (THA 1991).
However, even though the THA's purpose and functions were altered in the course of
unification it remained the most important institutional influence on industrial
development in the region. Not least, it remained for some years following
unification a very major employer in the new Lander. Initially, the THA's influence
was exercised through the manner in which it pursued privatisation. Later, it became
a more direct instrument of industrial policy.
This gave an indication of the extent to which the state's involvement in the Suzuki project was
an instrument of industrial policy.
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Although the federal government argued that the THA should not become an
instrument of industrial policy, in the course of privatisation it shaped the path of
industrial development in a number of crucial ways (see, for example,
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1993). For example, in deciding not to subsidise
production of the Trabant and Wartburg resulting in the termination of vehicle
production, the THA made it impossible for the component sector to penetrate new
markets to replace those lost (despite the establishment of the joint ventures with
Opel, VW and Mercedes-Benz). At the same time the THA refused to support the
majority of the business plans drawn up by component producers and was unwilling
to provide them with adequate capital investment (see Lungwitz 1991)18. As a result
TI-IA owned enterprises had no choice but to wind down production and place
workers on short time working. As part of this process the THA shied away from
taking over day-to-day control (to do so would have destroyed its claim to
technocratic neutrality), but in the majority of cases replaced the old management with
new west German personnel. The THA did, however receive frequent reports
concerning the financial situation of the enterprises, including the estimated costs of
liquidation, and set it 'bench marks', usually turnover per employee, that management
had to meet. These disciplines resulted in the contraction of research and
development capacity in its enterprises and the establishment of marketing and sales
functions which under the planning system had been provided centrally. Starved of
the resources needed to rehabilitate itself the east German automotive sector became
dependent on its counterpart in the west.
18	 The THA provided between DM 50-6Obn per year to its enterprises but little was directed to
capital investment. Where an enterprise sought a large sum for investment it was passed on to an
independent advisory committee to decide whether the funds should be made available.
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The environment was thus ripe for western investors to dominate and
refashion the industry thanks to the policy of the THA. Simultaneously, the THA
smoothed the path for western investors by socialising risk. Thus the agency divided
state property into profit centres and assumed responsibility for non-profit making
operations. Even in the cases where facilities were privatised, the Treuhand agreed to
take over responsibility for cutting the workforce (including the funding of 'social
plans' where it involved more than I Opc of the employees), the old debt liabilities and
9Opc of the cost of cleaning up pollution (Federal Ministry of Economics 1993a). For
their part the investors set about establishing production and with it began to re-write
the geography and practices of the German automobile industry. This was de facto
the industrial policy for the new Linder. As a result it raised suspicions amongst east
German managers and workers alike that the agency was determined not to aid the
creation of a vibrant independent east German automotive component sector which
would be in competition with one, already under severe burdens, in the west of the
country.
As the speed of privatisation slowed the THA played a more proactive role in
restructuring and reorganising its enterprises. In the course of doing so the TFIA
contributed to the privatisation of industrial policy as more and more external (west
German) consultants were employed to devise business plans for its enterprises. As a
result the TI-IA became more important in re-designing the product profile of
enterprises. Increasingly the restructuring involved the 'modularisation' of state
owned firms into many smaller firms. The next step in this strategy was for potential
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investors to indicate exactly what their requirements were, for example the type and
size of the building and site they required in addition to the number of employees,
upon which the THA would use its consultants to create such a package. As a result
the THA played an important role in refashioning the social division of labour as
firms were 'modularised' to meet the requirements posed by potential investors. This
led to the transformation of specialist assets, designed to produce specific auto-related
products, into little more than general business units for investors who offered to
employ people. As a result the THA contributed to the 'hollowing-out' of the auto
industry but also, more generally, to undermining the region's industrial capability.
At the same time the number of MBOs increased. However, because MBOs
were newly formed firms the THA was not permitted to provide financial support
(although there were other subsidy programmes (see below)). But the THA did give
start-up finance and in some circumstances interest free loans and other exceptional
grants. In addition, the THA granted investors capital to cover investment not
committed whilst enterprises were owned by the THA (another indication of the low
level of investment that the THA permitted).
In addition to the THA the most important industrial policy instrument was the
package of investment incentives that was offered by the Federal Ministry of
Economics to attract 'foreign' investment from west Germany and beyond. In 1992
the package of assistance and incentives was expanded and increased in value as part
of the 'Eastern Upswing' project (Federal Ministry of Economics 1992). There were
three types of incentive: tax concessions and investment subsidies, special lending
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programmes, and sales promotion schemes. They .wcre administered by the
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (the state owned bank created to administer Marshall
Aid after the Second World War) (see Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau 1992)'. The
most important type of incentives were the tax concessions and investment subsidies
comprising investment bonuses and subsidies (including regional economic incentives
for investment) and special depreciation allowances/tax concessions.
The most important form of assistance to investors was the regional
investment grant programme. This permitted a subsidy of 23pc of the cost of
constructing 'greenfield' manufacturing facilities anywhere in the new Lander in
accordance with the 'positive list', or in other words operations which contributed to
supraregional sales and enhanced the region's economic infrastructure20. Secondly,
investors were entitled to a tax free bonus worth l2pc of the value of capital
investment (excluding buildings) 21 . The third most important form of assistance
involved accelerated depreciation of capital equipment and buildings (up to 5Opc in
the year of the investment or any one of the four years thereafter) which reduced tax
liabilities. In addition there were a number of 'tax-holidays'. The fourth type of
incentive was the equity capital assistance programme which boosted an equity capital
base up to a maximum of DM 2 million via a 'soft' loan over 20 years. Also there
were a large number of 'soft' loan and loan guarantee schemes, including the European
Recovery Programme funded by the EU, for new and existing firms. The combined
19	 In total there were in excess of 24 different investment incentive programmes (Federal
Ministry of Economics 1993b).
20	 Where an investor expanded or converted existing operations it was entitled to a 2Opc and I 5pc
subsidy respectively. However, if an investor intended to save a failed or failing enterprise it was
entitled to a 23pc investment subsidy.
21	 The value of the tax free investment bonus was gradually reduced to Spc of capital investment
(excluding buildings).
116
effect of the incentives package meant that up to 53.7pc of an investment could be
paid for by incentives and tax savings where 7Opc of the investment was in capital
equipment and the remainder in buildings.
The final significant instrument of industrial policy in the new Lander centred
on the promotion of research and development. Following unification, research and
development functions were closed and many skilled worker migrated to western
Germany. To compensate for this the Ministry of Economics established the
Promotion of Innovation and Research and Development Personnel programmes. As
a result enterprises were entitled to 4Opc of the cost of R&D projects and staff costs
up to a maximum of around DM1 million per enterprise per year.
Thus, by the time the climate in Germany changed and the THA began to play
a more active role in industrial policy matters, the auto industry had either been
liquidated or, after a fashion, privatised. The most important industrial policy for the
auto sector was its closure, leaving the industry to depend on the market and the
industry in west Germany in general and three large firms in particular. This left an
industry divided into two types of firms. First, there were companies which had been
privatised. However, the dynamics of the privatisation process involved the sale of
'assets', rather than businesses or 'going-concerns', which may or may not have been
acquired by auto producers. In this way the industrial structure of the region was
dramatically altered which had important implications for its future regional
development. The second group comprised poorly financed enterprises sold in the
form of MBOs and those still owned by the TI-IA. The short term future of these
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firms had been secured but they lacked the capacity to adapt to the new conditions and
faced a future of marginalisation.
4.4	 Creating a car market in Hungary and eastern Germany
Under the soviet system there had not been a market for cars in either Hungary
or the GDR. As we have seen the production of cars was the outcome of political
bargaining between ministries and enterprises during the design and execution of the
plan. Similarly, the trade in and sale of automobiles was managed by a state
monopoly, called Merkur in Hungary and IFA-Vertrieb in East Germany 22 . Under the
soviet system the private consumption of goods such as motor cars was severely
restricted. The soviet system required rigid control of consumption to prevent markets
developing. This was achieved in two ways. First, the volume of products that could
be consumed was restricted by the plan in order that the balance of purchasing power
within the economy could be tightly regulated (c.f. Kornai's theory of a shortage
economy). The second way of controlling consumption was by restricting the number
of sales outlets and by enterprises remunerating workers in kind as a way of
socialising consumption.
In both Hungary and the GDR automobile ownership was poorly developed by
west European standards and would-be customers often waited between 10 and 15
years for a vehicle. Hungary had a history of low levels of car ownership even
compared with some other CMEA countries. In 1960 there were just three cars per
thousand of the population compared with 17 in the GDR. Car ownership increased
22	 In addition, in the GDR the VEBMaschinen und Materialreserve enterprise traded second
hand vehicles.
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considerably in both countries but Hungary continued to., lag behind the GDR. There
were 168 cars per thousand of the population in Hungary in 1989 - by which time car
imports had been liberalised - in contrast to 266 in the GDR (see Table 4.5). Both
countries continued to lag well behind the west European average of 431 (Pemberton
1991, 135).
Hungary
Once the soviet system began to unwind central control of consumption was
lost and a market for cars developed on the basis of vehicles as a store of value rather
than, as they had in the past, representing preferential - or in other words, politically
determined - access to a resource. However, a market could only begin to develop
once it was possible for cars to be supplied. Thus in the case of Hungary the most
important decision was made in 1989 when measures relating to the private import of
cars from western Europe were relaxed 23 . The immense frustrated demand under the
previous regime resulted in the private importation of 70,000 cars in 1989,
representing 4Opc of all the cars sold in that year, effectively breaking the monopoly
previously enjoyed by Merkur (Kapitány 1992). As it was car registration increased
from an average during the 1980s in the region of 120,000 per year to 215,000 in 1990
(see Kapitany 1992). As a result between 1989 and 1990 the level of car ownership
per thousand of the population increased 12.5pc from 168 to 189 (see Table 4.5).
The manner in which the government structured the market was significant.
Initially the majority of imports were of used cars and whilst that gave a much needed
23	 For an overview of import liberalisation see Nagy 1994.
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boost to the replacement market in continental Europe it postponed the integration of
the market into west Europe's. Thus the growth in the market was temporarily curbed
as the Hungarian government introduced a 25pc duty on the private importation of
cars. This temporarily renewed the interest of Hungarian consumers in east European
cars. The longer term effect, however, was the establishment of a new car market
under the control of distributors and dealers, selected or managed directly by the
motor manufacturers themselves, selling vehicles at prices not dissimilar from those in
the west. Thus demand in the market place was profitable and all the major
companies established widespread dealership networks in Hungary.
However, as the price of vehicles increased so did the other costs associated
with motoring. The reduction of subsidies and the restructuring of the tax system
resulted in a dramatic increase in petrol prices and the government's introduction of
compulsory insurance for all drivers resulted in a huge increase in the cost of
motoring. All these changes resulted in a decline in the total car market from around
215,000 in 1990 to approximately 150,000 in 1991 although there was an increase in
the number of new car registrations (Kapitány 1992; see also Table 4.8). At the same
time the trade in vehicles was transformed from being dominated by cars of CMEA
origin to one dominated by vehicles from the west. This undermined Hungary's
position within the CMEA trading system, which subsequently collapsed, and led to a
large dollar trading deficit.
One uncertainty remained: with the establishment by Suzuki and GM Europe
of vehicle assembly operations in Hungary, concern was expressed that the large
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number of imports might hinder the development of the ipvestments. As part of the
liberalisation of the market the Hungarian government had granted a quota of
duty-free imports which was duly fulfilled. For GM, in particular, this was especially
galling as its had only agreed to establish a car assembly operation in return for
preferential market access. Both GM and Suzuki successfully sought to have the
quota reduced in size to improve the prospect of them selling the vehicles assembled
on Hungarian soil in the domestic car market. This involved the unusual situation of
an east European state increasing the protection of its domestic market; the Financial
Times (30/31 May 1992, 2) commented at the time:
"Ironically, western multinationals have become eastern Europe's most
effective lobby for protection and their efforts to link investment commitments
to guaranteed markets have become all the more intense as local demand has
fallen below expectations."
As western manufacturers established dealership networks in Hungary the
government sought to put vehicle imports on a different footing by limiting the
volume of private import licenses. Thus between 1992 and 1994 the size of the quotas
was consistently reduced enabling the official importers of new cars a bigger market
share. By the end of 1994, in which year there were 15,000 imports, the rules were
such that the private importation of cars was made effectively impossible. As the
market failed to grow and local manufacturing of cars commenced the market was
skewed in favour of firms involved in local manufacturing, Suzuki and GM, which
were exempt from a 22.Spc tariff imposed on imports by other firms. As Suzuki, in
particular, had problems winning market share more pressure was placed on the
government to protect the market. This took the form of lobbying the government to
121
ntroducc new environmental regulations, and cash incentives to owners of polluting
two-stroke powered Trabants if they replaced them with a new
environmentally-friendly vehicle. It was no coincidence that at the top of the
government's list of approved vehicles - and therefore attracting the largest cash
incentive - was the Suzuki Swift.
Of equal importance to the domestic market was Hungary's trading
relationship with the EU (see Tovias 1991). The Association Treaty between
Hungary and the EU, signed early in 1992, was intended to create a free flow of
industrial goods within ten years, and included the abolition of most quotas and
phased reduction of tariffs (see Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1992). However,
the Treaty included restrictions on a number of Hungary's major exports, textile
products for instance, and also a quota for duty free exports of complete passenger
vehicles (ECU 44.1 million in the first year) and buses (ECU 1.1 million). Moreover,
the quotas included other provisions covering local content - which had to exceed
6Opc for a product to be counted as Hungarian and thus part of a quota allocation -
and technical standards. Equally significant was Article 30 of the Treaty which
included the provision for the re-erection of trade barriers if necessary to safeguard
threatened domestic industries. Crucially, however, whilst the treaty placed a quota
on cars and buses it did not so limit on the exportation of automotive components to
the EU market.
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East Germany
The fall of the Berlin Wall created a de facto market for automobiles in the
GDR. Immediately, thousands of second hand (including stolen) vehicles were
exported from West Germany to the east. Monetary union in July 1990 (which set the
exchange rate at one Ostmark to one Deutschmark) considerably increased the value
of east German savings. The result was a surge in demand as nearly one million
vehicles were registered in the new Laiider in 1990, including 800,000 used cars from
western Germany. In 1991 750,000 cars were purchased which meant that the number
of registered vehicles in the new German states had increased by one third to around
6.3 million units between 1989 and 1992. By the end of 1991 the automobile
ownership density in the new German states had increased in just three years from 232
per thousand inhabitants to 394, and yet remained some 100 less than in western
Geriiiany.
As with Hungary, eastern Germany was an important potential market (at a
time when the west German market was becoming increasingly saturated). It was
calculated that in order for automobile ownership in eastern Germany to match the
level in the west, production of at least 4.3 million automobiles would be needed
(Pemberton 1991). Whilst this was widely seen as an unrealistic scenario, buoyed by
surveys which showed the automobile to be the east Germans' most sought after
consumer product, forecasts made in the early 1 990s anticipated sales of between
300,000 and 600,000 units in 1995 (see, for example, Federal Office of Foreign Trade
Information 1991).
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4.5	 Transforming organised workplace interests: The industrial relations
system in the Hungarian and eastern German automotive industries
The third way in which the state shaped the transformation of the automotive
industry in Hungary and the former GDR was through the development of 'agency' to
create, articulate, organise and represent employer and employee interests. Pedersen
et al. (1995, 741-2) identified a three-stage transformation in interest representation
which usefully highlights the key developments and provides a comparative
framework. The first stage involved the gradual erosion of the classical soviet system
iii which interests were indivisible from that of the party-state. The second stage,
from around the middle of 1988, has involved the disintegration of the official system
of interest representation. The third, and final phase involves the reintegration of
tentative interests as new interests are (re)asserted and new modes of co-ordination
and bargaining are established. First we examine the erosion and disintegration of the
industrial relations system, beyond the workplace, which referred to the automotive
industry in the two countries. Second, we consider the extent to which 'agency'
created and interests articulated with respect to the two most important unions,
VASAS in Hungary and 1GM in east Germany, in the vehicle manufacturing sector24
4.5.1 The national industrial relations system
The post-war industrial relations systems in Hungary and the GDR closely
resembled the soviet system in comprising two main elements (see Petkov and
Thirkell 1991). First, centralised control over the economy, which included the
24	 This section primarily concentrates on the industrial relations system and trade unions from the
point of view beyond the workplace. Chapter six examines in detail the transformation of industrial
relations, and the role of unions, in the workplace.
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dispersal of the wage fund (see Kornai 1992), and the lack of autonomy for state
firms, limited the scope for enterprise strategy (Vickerstaff et a!., 1994) and therefore
the 'agency' for management-labour bargaining. Second, political and ideological
monopolisation by the ruling party precluded independent institutions representing
workers' interest. As a result trade unions and workplace labour bodies became
'transmission belts' merely conveying information and resources from the ruling elite
to the workers (Pedersen et al., 1995)
1-lowever, there were significant differences in the erosion and disintegration
of the industrial relations systems in Hungary and the former GDR which had
significant implications for the development of the auto industries in the two
countries. Whereas the GDR's Labour Code in 1978 granted formal 'co-determination'
rights without the means to exercise them, in Hungary the New Economic Mechanism
and the other post-1968 refonus established a new institutional structure which
granted workers a more effective participatory role and permitted the articulation of
employer and employee interests more-or-less independent from the state. Crucially,
the industrial relations system in Hungary eroded in the course of the end of the soviet
era whereas in the GDR erosion and disintegration only occurred after the soviet
system had itself collapsed. This had two important consequences. First, more
continuity with the soviet regime can be identified in Hungary, in the fonn of tripartite
corporatism, compared to the former GDR where the system of interest representation
was entirely destroyed and substituted by the West German one. Second, the
transformation of interest representation, although less dramatic was negotiated in
Hungary as compared to imposed in the former GDR. The outcome of these two
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paths of development was paradoxical: whereas industrial relations structures were
significantly more established in eastern Germany, interests were better represented in
Hungary. The different course of events in the two countries had far-reaching
implications for the development of the automotive industry.
Hungary
The communists took control of trade unionism in 1945 and established the
national council of trade unions (SZOT) comprising 19 industrial unions (Czakó and
Sipos 1990). Until 1968 the traditional soviet system of industrial relations, in which
the functions and interests of the state, employers, employees (and their representative
bodies) were indivisible from that of the political elite, was dominant (Hethy 1991).
As a result the trade unions were organised sectorally and included all grades of
workers and management (Gill 1990). However, the introduction of the NEM in
1968, which replaced direct bureaucratic central co-ordination of the economy with a
system of regulation through incentives and disincentives, resulted in greater enterprise
autonomy and the space for the articulation of management-labour bargaining (Héthy
1991). The state ideology acknowledged antagonism within society and permitted
unions to extend their 'transmission belt' role to include limited representation of
workers. As a result collective agreements stopped including plan targets and became
solely concerned with bureaucratic labour issues. At the same time, in formal terms
labour strikes were legalised. Also at the same time an employers' association was
formed, the Chamber of Economy. It remained relatively powerless but began the
process of separating the role of employers from that of the state.
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In the course of the 1970s and 1980s new institutions were created which
increased the role of workers in the management of state owned enterprises. These
changes culminated in the establishment of Enterprise Councils in 1985 (Government
Decree No 33/1984) which permitted workers the right to co-manage state firms.
However, despite the formal rights of 'self-management' in practice the traditional
managers in the firms remained dominant (Neumann 1993). At the same time a new
system of employment was introduced through the establishment of VGMKs - in
which work was subcontracted by the enterprise to 'core' workers (Neumann 1993).
The changes restricted the role of the centre in establishing wage rates. Nevertheless,
the state continued to play a significant role in wage determination right up until the
end of 1988 (Cukor and Kövari 1991). Overall the post-1968 period saw the
development of a corporatist system in which the major social partners compromised
to form a broad consensus behind the party-state's economic reforms (Hughes 1994).
This helped to prevent the articulation of separate interests within society from
generating conflict. Thus despite increased freedoms industrial conflict was minimal.
As the political system broke down the industrial relations system began to
alter dramatically. Of particular significance was the establishment in 1988 of the
Council for Reconciliation of Interests (CR1), with representatives from government,
employers' associations and trade unions. Its formation reinforced the continuation of
a broadly corporatist model but also underlined a desire to negotiate a broadly
consensual approach to transformation. However, until 1990, when there was a major
strike by taxi drivers, the council had little real influence on government but once the
council had been established the state withdrew from wage determination and
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permitted national level bargaining (Héthy 1991). Gradually, the powers of the CR1
increased to include the definition of minimum wages, and minimum and maximum
wage increases.
In the course of this period the trade union movement underwent radical
changes. In 1988 SZOT began to assert its independence and in 1990 it was
reorganised into the National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ)
(see also Gill 1990, Hughes 1992). As this occurred there was a pluralisation of the
trade union movement as new independent trade unions, led by the National Federation
of Workers Councils (MOSZ)25 and Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions
(LIGA), were established (see Gill 1990, Hughes 1992)26. However, the new unions
mostly comprised white collar employees and were slow to recruit manual workers,
where the traditional unions remained dominant. This influence was increased in 1990
when the government established the trade union Round Table, comprising the seven
major trade unions, to co-ordinate employee interest in the CR1. Thus the seven
members of the Round Table were permitted seats in the Council for Interest
Reconciliation27 . To reflect the changing role of the unions the government
reformed the legal situation. The government passed the Strike Act in 1989, which
permitted collective labour disputes and other interim labour legislation was
introduced which allowed trade unions to seek collective bargaining agreements with
25	 Workers' Councils were the force behind the anti-Stalinist movement in 1956.
26	 By the middle of 1993 there were between 70 and 80 trade unions operating but the vast
majority of them were very small.
27	 The seven unions/federations represented in the CIR were Autonomous Unions, ESZT
(intellectuals), LIGA, MSZOSZ, MOSZ, SZEF (Forum of Cooperation of Trade Unions), and
Solidarity.
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employers. The result was a proliferation of labour Qrganisations and a chaotic
environment for management-labour bargaining. Thus although the unions had
become more independent this had been at the cost of influence. Most important was
the repeal of trade union rights to co-management in 1991 by the Constitutional Court.
Also, in the course of these events the level of unionisation fell from 95-6pc to under
5Opc (see Table 4.9).
At the same time as the trade union movement was reorganised so too were the
employers associations. The existing associations were reorganised to concentrate on
sectoral interests and new ones, such as the National Association of Entrepreneurs
(VOSZ), were formed (1-léthy 1991).	 Later, the Hungarian Association of
International Companies (HAIC) was formed to lobby government on behalf of the
foreign investors in the country. The HAIC was led by the director of GE-Tungsrarn
but also prominently featured representatives from other major auto investors, Ford
and Suzuki. By the middle of 1993 there were nine significant employers
organisations with seats on the CR1.
The CR1 was granted additional powers to those of wage bargaining and set
about reconstructing the industrial relations system and rewriting the labour code
(Héthy 1995). In August 1992 the council proposed a six-year programme of trade
union elections and a procedure to distribute SZOT's property and other assets
amongst the new unions (see Szabo 1992, Borbély 1993). The proposal met with
much opposition and united the trade unions, which up to then had been bitterly
divided.
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At the same time as the industrial relations system was eroded, the newly
elected HDF government commenced privatisation (see above). The result was a
period of disintegration as the statutory industrial relations system bore little relevance
to the broader socio-economic changes. Thus the system failed to co-ordinate and
articulate interests with the result that events proceeded spontaneously in different
places. One result was the establishment of ephemeral workers' councils in state firms
(Burawoy 1992) and also an outbreak of strikes (Mako and Simonyi 1991). The most
important issue was that of privatisation. 	 In particular the organisation of
privatisation (see above) effectively excluded employees and their representatives
from playing a significant role (Neumann 1991, Hdthy 1995). After the creation of
the SPA in 1990 privatisation was taken out of the realm of the enterprise and into
bureaucratic hands which trade unions could only hope to influence through the CR1
by arguing in favour of employee ownership schemes (MSZOSZ 1993).
The government seemed unwilling to refashion the statutory basis of the
industrial relations system (Neumann 1991). However, in July 1992 following the
agreement of the CR1 the government introduced a new Labour Code (Act XXII of
1992) (see Ministry of Labour 1992)28. In the course of rewriting labour law the code
abolished any form of co-management in the form of Enterprise Councils and replaced
it with a system based on the election of works councils. In doing so, the code
established a 'hollowed out' version of West German labour law (see below)
28	 In total there were three separate Labour Codes, one each for the competitive (private) sector,
the state-owned sector and one for public servants. However, in key respects they closely resembled
each other.
1-,
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establishing some of the institutional forms but crucially .without the powers needed to
make them influential. Before codifying the new legal situation in detail the code
established three important principles as the basis of the new system of workplace
interest representation. Firstly, the code established its own legitimacy, not by
reference to the state but by underlining the primary role played by the CR1 in the
labour relations system and the formulation of labour law. Secondly, the code also
codified the social basis of economic enterprises. Thus whereas under the soviet
system both management and workers were regarded as employees of the state, the
new Labour Code established the separate roles, rights, duties and responsibilities of
employers and employees. Accordingly, paragraph three (section one) of the code
begins by demanding co-operation between the employer, the works council and
employees. It goes on to state:
[E]mployees must not behave in a manner during the existence of the
labour relationship which would jeopardise the legitimate business interests of
their employer." (Ministry of Labour 1992, 2).
Thirdly, the code specified the role to be played by trade unions and the sorts of
conditions they could expect within the workplace. In doing so, despite the
provisions to establish works councils (see below) trade unions remained the agent of
bargaining with employers.
The most important elements of the labour code were as follows. Firstly, the
rules of work identified the rights of employers and employees. Thus employers had
to organise work in a safe manner that did not preclude employee rights and had to
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ensure the provision of the necessary information and ki!ls required for the employee
to carry out the job, and pay according to the labour contract. Meanwhile an
employee must report to work at the place and time agreed, fit for work and must
work the entire shift. In addition an employee must "perform his [sic] work
[including preparatory and finishing operations] with expected skill and care in
accordance with the regulations provisions and instructions applicable to his job"
(Ministry of Labour 1992, 40). The code goes on to state that an "employee shall act
in accordance with the instructions of his [sic] employer" 29 (Ministry of Labour 1992,
41). To discourage 'moonlighting' employees were prevented from taking secondary
employment without the assent of their employer. In this way the code played a very
significant role in changing the statutory basis of the social relations of production.
Secondly, the code granted trade unions a statutory basis and/or consultative
rights within the workplace where either (a) its nominees gained at least lOpc of all
the votes cast by the workforce in the election of works councils (b) it gained I Opc of
the votes cast nationally or (c) where two-thirds of the employees in the enterprise
were members of the union. Where a trade union was recognised the employers were
duty bound to inform the union where 25pc of the employees (or 50 individuals) were
to be affected by a management decision. In addition trade unions could request
information from employers that affect employees economic and social interests
connected to their employment.
29	 Except for where doing so would involve violating the law.
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Thirdly, where a trade union's (or coalition of trade unions) nominees attained
at least 5Opc of the votes cast in works council elections they were entitled to
conclude a collective agreement covering the rights and responsibilities arising from
employment. In addition parties to the agreement were permitted to petition the
Minister of Labour to extend it to include an entire economic sector or sub-sector.
Fourthly, the code identified employee's 'participative rights' which were to be
exercised by a works council. All plants which employed at least 51 employees had
to institute a 'works council' (plants employing at least 15 workers but less than 51
had to elect a 'plant representative'). The size of the works council varied from three,
where the number of employees did not exceed 100, to 13 where employees exceeded
I ,000. Where an employer had more than one facility a central works council had to
he established. Despite the code enforcing the establishment of a works council a
degree of ambiguity developed concerning the process by which this was to occurs. It
seemed to place the onus upon trade union representatives, rather than the employer,
within each plant to set in motion the procedure for electing a works council. This
implied that in enterprises without trade union representatives or employees pushing
for a works council, there was no need for the employer to organise the election of a
works council. This permitted some employers, including for example Ford Hungaria
(see chapter 6), to argue that the code did not force them to establish a works council
since their employees did not seek one.
Although the code described the rights of the works council as participative, in
reality they were all consultative except with respect to the allocation of welfare funds
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and health and safety issues. With regard to .other matters (firm restructuring,
working norms/organisation, holidays) the employer had to merely 'elicit the opinion'
of the works council. The employer also had to inform the works council about the
firm's economic situation, major projects and remuneration system. In addition, the
works council was permitted to request other information connected to employees'
economic and social interests which the employer should provide. Crucially,
however, para. 70 of the code stated that the:
"... works council shalt remain unbiased concerning strikes organised at the
employer. Accordingly, it shall neither organise, nor support or preclude
strikes. The membership of the works council member that participates in a
strike shall be suspended for the duration of the strike." (Ministry of Labour
1992, 27).
Fifthly, the labour code also established statutory employment standards with
regard to working hours, remuneration, holidays, severance procedures, sick leave,
other conditions of employment and grievance procedures. The working day was set
at eight hours, including a minimum 20 minute rest, and an employee had to be
allowed eleven hours of leisure before commencing the next working day/shift. The
code established a ceiling of 14430 hours of overtime per year, including a maximum
U	 of four hours in any one day, eight hours in two consec tive days, and eight hours in
any one week. The code also laid down a set of supplements depending on
employment conditions; night work entitled employees to a 1 5pc bonus, and a
multiple-shift or continuous work schedule entitled employees to a I 5-2Opc bonus for
the afternoon shift and 30-4Opc for the night shift. The code also increased statutory
basic paid leave from 15 to 20 days. In addition, the code did not remove an
Under certain circumstances this could be increased to 200 hours.
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employee's right to 10 days uncertificated sick leave per year, an omission which
generated criticism from many foreign employers.
Enactment of the Labour Code prompted considerable criticism by western
firms which had invested in Hungary to escape west European labour regulations. In
particular, the rules governing overtime were claimed by employers as likely to result
in a substantial increase in costs. Revealingly, David Young of Price Waterhouse, a
consultant for foreign investors in Budapest put it: 'From an employer's point of view,
the move brings Hungary too close to Western standards too soon' (quoted in Business
Eastern Europe 21 August 1992, 458). Later a Price Waterhouse bulletin commented:
'Many foreign investors feel the law is much too liberal for a country at Hungary's
stage of development' (Price Waterhouse 1992, 3). One effect of this was to hasten
the creation of the HAIC which lobbied for the code to be amended (Business Central
Europe 1993). However, despite the response by foreign investors the impact of the
new code remained to be seen. Crucially, the role of the code depended on two
things. First, the extent to which the trade unions proved able to establish
organisational structures beyond Budapest and not least in gaining a foothold in the
new foreign owned plants. Second, the ability of works council representatives to
exercise their, admittedly moderate, powers. Thus it was unclear whether the creation
of works councils would focus and institutionalise trade union power within
enterprises or act to dissipate union influence even further with works council
becoming more akin to company councils. In the light of the weakness of trade
unions and their lack of regional organisation, there was widespread suspicion
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amongst many workers that the labour code wou'd further undermine their influence
and enable employers to use pliant workplace bodies to their advantage.
In May 1993 the majority of the first elections for the works councils, set up
under the labour code, were held in factories across the country. In virtually all the
economic sectors the traditional unions, affiliated to MSZOSZ, were most successful
in securing their representatives elected onto the councils 31 . Nationally, MSZOSZ
nominees won 7lpc of the vote, the autonomous unions l8pc and LIGA 6pc (Makó
and Simonyi 1995, 194). There were similar results in the automotive industry (see
below). One of the first elections in the country took place at GM Hungary's engine
and CKD plant in Szentgotthárd which attracted a lot of attention amongst other
foreign investors. In the course of late 1992 a dispute over wages and overtime
resulted in the establishment of a plant based trade union with 200 of the 500
employees as members (Magyar Hirlap 9 June 1993). By the time of the works
council election in March 1993, membership of the union had increased to 45pc of the
workforce, but union nominees secured only five of the eleven council representatives
thus denying it exclusive rights to collective bargaining. In response to these events
other employers, such as Suzuki, decided to establish a works council even though
there was little movement for one amongst the workforce as a means of pre-empting
31	 The popularity of the traditional unions over the newly established ones was underlined in
national elections (open to all adults) for the trade union representatives (of the seven unions with seats
on the Council for Interest Reconciliation) to sit on the bodies responsible for managing pension and
health insurance which also took place in May 1993. MSZOSZ won 50.lpc of the votes cast (around
4Opc higher than the next most popular union, MSOZ), entitling it to 18 of the 33 trade union
representatives on the pension insurance board. MSZOSZ's dominance was less marked in the vote for
the health insurance board but it still polled 45.2pc of the vote and secured 15 of the 30 trade union
representatives. The turnout for the elections was around 4Opc of the electorate (see MSZOSZ 1993b).
In addition, Héthy's (1995) study of three companies also indicated the popularity of the traditional
trade unions.
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militant demands that might have arisen later. It remained to be seen whether the
works councils would increase the power of employees in domestic and foreign
owned enterprises or not.
East Germany
The Confederation of Free German Trade Unions (FDGB) was formed in 1946
(see Dennis 1988). From 1947 onwards the SED gradually asserted control over the
trade unions and replaced independent workers' councils with controlled local trade
union branches within the enterprises (see McCauley 1983); a free trade union
movement was thus subverted into a 'transmission belt' for the SED (Deimis 1988,
105) and written into the constitution of the state. Thus article 44 of the GDR
constitution described the FDGB as 'the all-embracing class organisation of the
working class' (quoted in Childs 1983, 158). FDGB was a federation of 16 branch
based trade unions, including IG Metall Ost (IGMO) covering metaiworkers
(including employees in the automotive industry), but was very highly centralised.
Membership of FDGB peaked at 9.1 million (97pc of the working population) in
1982. Within FDGB, IGMO was the largest union with 1.6 million (97.7pc of all
metaiworkers) in 1976 (McCauley 1983, 162). State ownership and central control
over the economy precluded genuine trade union influence (McCauley 1983). In due
course after a series of industrial disputes reforms were introduced which undermined
the power and influence of labour. In 1961 the unions lost the right to strike.
However, the 1978 Labour Code formally granted trade unions additional powers of
'co-determination' exercised through the enterprise Betriebgewerkorganisation (BGO)
(Dennis 1988, 160), although in practice this did not increase the power of unions,
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since the BGO's had no influence over the appoiptment of senior management nor
economic decision making.
The absence of any changes to the economic system which would have
decentralised economic decision making and provided space for enterprise strategies
prevented labour-management bargaining. Indeed the organisation of industry into
Kombinate from the late 1 960s restricted further the decision making competence of
enterprises. In addition the absolute power of the enterprise director prevented
bargaining (von Beyme and Zimmermann 1984). Following the rise of the Solidarity
trade union in Poland a number of strikes were held in industrial centres in the course
of the I 980s. However, whereas there were reforms in Hungary, in the GDR the
labour relations system meant that trade unions remained little more than an
instrument of management and became more overbearing in that role as they sought to
compensate for economic stagnation. As a result interests within society continued to
be seen as indivisible from that of the party-state. Despite this workers in the GDR
were more militant, measured by industrial action, and 'ill-disciplined' (see Dennis
1988, 16 1-2) than in Hungary.
The industrial relations system disintegrated in late 1989 as the Berlin Wall
was breached and the state crumbled. The FDGB purged its old leaders and began to
assert its independence. In early 1990 it threatened to organise a general strike in
support of its demand for a new labour relations act. However, the FDGB was
irreparably split over how it should restructure itself. Some wanted to preserve FDGB
unions' monopoly within enterprises and favoured a statutory framework that would
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give them genuine 'self-management'. Others supported the introduction of a works
council system based on that in West Germany. At the same time independent trade
union bodies were formed and began to seek links with West German trade unions. In
the last parliamentary session before the first free elections in the GDR, held in March
1990, a new labour law (which permitted independent trade unionism and collective
labour disputes) and social charter (which guaranteed its citizens education, work and
housing) was passed. Whilst these changes occurred the level of labour unrest in the
country gradually increased. In July a series of strikes were held in the engineering
industry, including the automotive sector, over pay levels, hours, and the form of
privatisation - in which employees had little influence. Following the unrest an
agreement to restrict the working week to 40 hours, down from a statutory level in
excess of 43 hours under the soviet regime, was reached.
At the same time the representation of labour within enterprises was changed,
largely in an ad hoc fashion. BGOs were dissolved in many factories. In some places
new workers councils or committees were established (sometimes by management),
but with little effect owing to confusion as to the function and role of such institutions
(see Kreil3ig and Schreiber 1991). Thus the changes amounted to the replacement of
local trade union committees by grass roots workers' councils. Crucially, the driving
force behind the formation of these institutions was the desire of workers to exercise
their proprietorial rights which they had been told for so long that they held but had
never been able to realise. This led to some workers' councils entering into collective
agreements which covered not only the narrow 'labour interest' but also
'co-management' measures designed to make workers responsible for efficient as well
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as equitable production relations (see Kreif3ig and Schreiber 1991). These bodies
were therefore not simply demanding a new form of bargaining within their particular
enterprises but were based on a post-Stalinist vision of the GDR. For a time then,
there seemed the possibility that changes in the GDR might enhance the role of trade
unions and give them real influence in enterprises. However, the speed of German
integration and subsequently unification precluded that outcome.
It was monetary union which established the new statutory framework for
industrial relations in the GDR. The treaty, which came into effect on 1st July 1990
covered not only monetary and economic union but also social union. Thus article 17
referred to labour law.
"In the German Democratic Republic freedom of association, autonomy in
collective bargaining, legislation relating to industrial action, corporate legal
structure, codetermination at board level and protection against dismissal shall
apply in line with the law of the Federal Republic of Germany" (quoted in
Glaessner 1992, 185).
Following the implementation of this treaty the GDR industrial relations
system was dissolved and West German institutions were transplanted into what
became the new Lander. Most importantly this meant that the Works Constitution Act
(1972) (Der Bundesminister fir Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1990) was extended to
include the GDR. Thus in October 1990 the first round of works council elections
were held according to the transplanted West German legislation. In the previous
month the FDGB had dissolved itself and its 8,000 officials were made redundant
(payments were made following a loan from the DGB 32). This led to a problem as to
12	 The West German trade union federation.
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who was entitled to the FDGB's assets, which comprised around 300 properties in
addition to shares in major enterprises. At the same time West German unions sent
over financial and personnel support to their counterparts in East Germany and
gradually set up their own organisational structures (Fichter 1991). Following the
unity treaty unions implemented plans to replace their counterparts in the former
GDR. The speed at which this occurred reflected the fear amongst west German
unions that employers would exploit the opportunities offered by rapid integration and
use the GDR as a low cost location (undermining the competitiveness of West
Germany) and moreover as a pretext to undermine Germany's social market economy.
Whilst the unions established organisational structures in the east so too did
employers organisations, mirroring the system in West Germany. As the institutional
system was still in the process of being built, in mid-1990 a number of temporary
collective agreements were agreed in several sectors. Although the agreements were
between the FDGB unions (albeit with considerable support and advice from their
West German counterpart) and new East German employers' associations (supported
and advised by West German employers' organisations) they marked the beginning of
West German-style bargaining. The agreements attempted to compensate workers for
monetary union by increasing wages.
The first meaningful round of bargaining did not take place until 1991 when
wages were increased from 3Opc to around 4Opc of west German pay depending on
the sector. The metal industry agreement (see below) led the way in the establishment
of 'parity pay' between east and west, as the prime aim of bargaining; however, the
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[iniescale for achieving parity varied from sector to sector. As a result the agreements
were to last several years compared to the annual contracts in the west. More
importantly the need to cope with the conditions in eastern German stretched the
industrial relation system. The agreements, which increased costs substantially, were
heavily criticised by the government for not establishing the link between productivity
and wage increases in the new Lander.
The West German trade unions were so successful in establishing themselves
in the new Lander that by the end of 1992 there were 3.8 m members of DGB unions
(l3ispinck 1993, 310) Thus in 1992 union density was 53pc in the east compared to an
average of 35.8pc in western Germany (Bispinck 1993, 310). However, whilst the
unions created powerful organisations they were themselves increasingly the focus of
criticism of members. In particular a series of demonstrations was held by works
councillors against the government and the THA over their role in creating
unemployment. Significantly, 1GM and other unions did not support these examples
of dissent.	 Initially collective agreements had postponed making workers
unemployed until mid- 1991. At that time faced with the prospect of a dramatic
increase in the unemployment level there was an agreement between the DGB, the
THA and employers' associations (despite government opposition). The agreement
paved the way for the formation of companies for work promotion, employment and
structural development (see also chapter 6). The companies (in total 150 were
established) were owned by the TI-IA, employers' association, the unions, and local
and regional authorities. However the formation of these companies had an important
effect on the position of workers in the local areas and helped shape the strategy of the
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unions in the former GDR. Thus where employment promotion companies were
established the surplus workers were transferred from their original employer to the
new temporary company (the THA had argued that a failure to so would have made
the enterprises less attractive to investors). This meant that the original employers'
works council no longer represented their effectively unemployed colleagues. In
consequence the unions effectively contributed to the marginalisation of surplus
labour and prioritised the interests of those in work above those out of it. Thus
whereas Hungarian unions retained the membership of most of those made
unemployed, in the new Lander the unions became increasingly focused on those in
work.
In 1992 the collective agreements signed a year earlier increased pay to
between 60 and 7Opc of wages in the west. However, in doing so employers and the
government became concerned about escalating labour costs. As a result in mid-I 992
the government initiated legislation which permitted enterprise managements and
works councils to permit companies threatened with closure to pay lower wages than
those stipulated in the collective agreements. As the THA remained a very major
employer in the new Lander it played an influential role. In August 1992 the THA
angered trade unions by directing its companies to refrain from signing collective
agreements with employees. It indicated that any existing agreements were to be
terminated. The THA also prevented its enterprises from agreeing collective
redundancy/dissmissal terms with employees. The TI-IA threatened to cut investment
in firms that did not follow the directives. The THA claimed that many of its firms
had entered into commitments on job security without any concern for financial
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implications (which dissuaded potential investors, •according to the agency). In
response the DGB argued that unification costs had been placed disproportionately on
workers and that the THA should be given the tools to 'rehabilitate' enterprises. This
formed the basis of the trade union argument that a structural development plan was
needed for the east German economy which preserved so-called 'industrial cores',
including the cluster of automotive producers in west Saxony (see above).
In late 1992 negotiations began between the 'social partners' to agree a
"Solidarity Pact". An agreement was reached in March 1993 which involved financial
transfers to the new Lander funded by additional taxes on west Germans. The unions
and employers associations were not party to the pact but wage restraint and increased
investment in the east was expected. However, conflict between the social partners
over labour relations reached a peak in early 1993. The government and the THA
demanded wage restraint and sought the renegotiation of the 1991 collective
agreement in the metal industry (see below). The employers terminated the agreement
and after a series of strikes a new one was negotiated.
Thus monetary union and subsequently unification resulted in the
transplantation of the West German industrial relations system into the new Lander.
However, in the course of doing so the system was shown to have been undermined as
collective agreements were terminated and dissent amongst east German members
(who found it unable to preserve jobs or increase pay) increased. The tradition of
independent industrial bargaining was also stretched as the government became
increasingly influential, not least through the THA. Thus the German industrial
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relations system, following unification, became the object of much criticism (see for
instance Kern 1993). However, more significantly rapid unification prevented the
establishment of a new form of industrial democracy which seemed possible in the
early months of 1990.	 Nevertheless, trade union organisations were successfully
established in the Lander. However they were undermined by the deindustrialisation
of the region. Thus DGB union membership in east Germany fell from a peak of 4.2
million to under 3 .4rn (many of which were not active in the labour force) by the
middle of 1993. Overall, the institutions were created but often without the associated
habitus with the result that they operated quite differently than in west Germany (see
Etti and Wiesenthak 1994; Jurgens et al. 1993).
4.5.2 Trade union strategies in the automotive industry
VA SA S iii Hungary
The trade union covering the automotive industry in Hungary before and after
socio-economic change was VASAS. Formed in 1877, after the communist take-over
the metalworkers' union became one of the 19 industrial unions that comprised SZOT.
The union was reorganised along the soviet model: it was highly centralised and
represented both management and workers since both were employees of the state.
Thus VASAS became a federation of enterprise-based local trade unions in the metal
industry. The union was led by a President (and his two deputies) who were elected
by the annual Congress of the union which comprised 586 delegates elected by the
local union's membership (see Figure 4.1). The executive body of the federation was
the Presidium which consisted of 21 representatives of the sub-branches, the regions
and special category members. In addition the Presidium included one representative
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from Dunafer, the giant Hungarian iron and steel maker. The union also had an
advisory institution, the Federation Council, which comprised 150 representatives of
the affiliated local unions (1 representative for every 5,000 members) and delegates
from the largest enterprise unions. The council met up to five times a year (more
during industrial disputes) to approve important union matters, such as the annual
budget.
VASAS's headquarters in Budapest acted as a central agency for the affiliated
local unions. As a result the union had no regional organisation of its own, such as
regional offices, and so it could only exercise influence through the local unions in
individual enterprises. Thus although Hungarian trade unions became less like
'transmission belts' for the party-state, their organisational structure did not change to
reflect the new role. The membership was organised according to three dimensions,
branch, region and type of member, which was reflected in the Presidium. The
affiliated local unions were organised into branches. There were nine main
sub-branches; the metallurgy branch was the largest and most influential in the union.
The vehicle manufacturing branch comprised the eight largest finns including
IKARUS, RABA, Csepel Auto and a number of military sector producers. The tenth
branch was an amalgamation of other smaller sectors. In effect when local unions
affiliated to VASAS they joined a branch of their choice. Local unions in each branch
elected a President who sat on the Presidium (the tenth amalgamated branch elected
three people). In addition the Presidium also comprised three presidents who
represented three 'super-regions'. The final three members of the Presidium
represeiited particular types of members (women, pensioners, white collar workers).
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Although the independence of the union increased in the course of the I 980s it
remained wedded to the ruling party and continued to be identified as a mouthpiece of
management since the union-management coalition was most powerful in the
metalworking industry. Thus whereas the union was unable to represent worker's
interests' as an organisation it was powerful. This was symbolically reflected in the
level of unionisation. The union's membership peaked at around 500,000 in the early
I 980s (of which around one-third were pensioners), which represented some 85pc of
the workforce in the engineering and metallurgy industries.
As the role of the trade unions changed in the late I 980s and early I 990s the
union's organisational structure was not substantially reformed. The size of the
Federation Council was reduced from 150 to 88 to reflect the union's falling
membership. However, whilst the structure of the union remained unchanged, the
personnel altered substantially. Some 7Opc of the delegates to the Federation Council,
and 9Opc of the Presidium members were first elected after 1989. Significantly,
however, many of the union officials working at the head office remained the same
from the earlier era. However, several other changes took place as the union
transformed itself from being an adjunct of the ruling party and enterprise
managements into an independent trade union. First, party secretaries were forced to
leave the union (ordinary party members were unaffected). Second, all the union's
members had to reaffirm their membership in 1990. Third, the union rewrote its
constitution to bring it into line with west European union and affirmed its party
political neutrality and its acceptance of a social market economy.
147
Through its external links the union had some influence over broader changes.
It remained a member of SZOT as it transformed itself into MSZOSZ (see above)
which gave it an opportunity to help shape the restructuring of trade unionism. The
VASAS President was not only a member of the Hungarian parliament for the MSZP
(The Hungarian Socialist Party and successor to the Communist Party) - and thereby
somewhat undermining its claim to party political neutrality - but also one of
MSZOSZ's representatives on the Council for the Reconciliation of Interests (CR1)
(see above).
In the course of the socio-economic changes in Hungary VASAS, along with
other unions, was confined to reforming itself and playing a part in establishing the
new basis of trade unionism (such as disputes over property). Thus prior to the
introduction of the Labour Code in 1992 (see above) the union played a minimal role
in attempting to defend the interests of its members. The exceptions were at the very
prominent visible state owned enterprises such as IKARUS and Dunafer where the
continuity in personnel delegated from such firms permitted the union to continue to
play its traditional collaborative role with management. As a result the old alliances
between management and trade union officials continued which postponed the
transformation of enterprises (see chapter 6). However, the weakness of the union
elsewhere, particularly in the smaller firms, indicated its inability to adapt to the new
circumstances. This was in large part due to the union's organisation as a federation
of local unions. The local unions were unable to cope with the rapid changes in firms
as they were reorganised and privatised and VASAS was unable to keep track of all
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the developments let alone establish strategies to try to counter them. Just as the
break up of the plan cast enterprises adrift, so too were union's headquarters removed
from developments in workplaces. The result was that VASAS was like a 'hollowed
out' union with a headquarters without an organisation.
The union's membership fell from a peak of 500,000 in the early 1 980s to
200,000 (of which 4Opc were not active in the workforce either because of age/health
or unemployment) in mid-1993. This meant that union density in the industry,
according to VASAS, fell from 85pc to 62pc 33 (see Table 4.10). However, as the
number of grass root members decreased the number of affiliated local unions
increased. Thus the metallurgy branch increased to 37 local unions and the vehicle
manufacturing branch increased from eight to 33 in the course of the early 1 990s.
I lowever, these figures have to be treated with some caution. In the majority of cases
the new affiliates did not represent the establishment of new unions in new enterprises
but reflected the subdivision of existing enterprises and their local unions. Thus
RABA, the engine and axle maker, transformed itself into a holding company in 1993
with 21 subsidiaries and divisions, each one with its own local union. In this way
privatisation and the restructuring of state owned enterprises diluted workers'
solidarity and the influence of local trade unions.
The reduction of union membership was partly due to having lost its
monopolistic position to represent metaiworkers in the late 1980s. As a result the
This is almost certainly a considerable over estimation since it does not include those
greenfield factories set up by foreign investors in the engineering sector which were in mid-1993 mostly
non-un jonised.
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Federation of Workers' Councils (MSOZ) and League of independent trade unions
(LIGA) gained some members in the industry. However, they remained relatively
insignificant registering between them just 10.33pc of the vote for works councils in
May 1993 (see Table 4.11). Far more important in causing VASAS's membership to
fall was the high level of redundancies in the industry in general, however some
branches were particularly affected. One of the worst hit branches was agricultural
machinery, whose membership fell from 17,000 in the late 1980s to 3,200 in
mid-I 993. The trade union also suffered from being associated with the soviet backed
regime despite the fact that the unions embarked on a substantial public relations
campaign designed to emphasise the dissident role they had played under the old
system. The result was that once managements stopped deducting union fees prior to
distributing wages many workers failed to renew their membership. The growth of
short-time and part time working in the industry also helped to reduce union
membership. In addition, whereas VASAS membership had included workers and
managers, in the course of the changes many middle management white collar
members left as those who remained in employment were well rewarded (as pay
differential were increased (see chapter 6)) and began to identify themselves as
employers rather than employees. However, this process also reflected VASAS's
connivance in the system which undermined the authority of white collar workers.
Having spent much of the time defending its existence VASAS then began to
establish a tentative campaign strategy, in part in response to the introduction of the
Labour Code. The union wrote a 32 point code of aims and objectives for the medium
term. The union's highest priority was to train representatives and to assist in this task
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it entered into a co-operation agreement with IG MeFall, its counterpart in Germany.
Based on German finance and expertise the union drew up a plan to place 10,000
representatives on training programmes ranging from one day to two weeks. In
addition to language training courses - to enable union officials and representatives to
negotiate directly with foreign managers - the training was to cover economic,
industrial, labour and political education, financial issues, and health and safety at
work. Despite being geared to enable representatives to adapt to the new
circumstances, an indication of the sort of training envisaged was provided by the fact
that it was to be led by a former director of an enterprise 'belonging to this union'.
However, a indication of the size of the task that faced the union was that it could
only afford a pilot training scheme in one county.
The training programme was a response to the challenge posed by the
introduction of the Labour Code. The establishment of works councils implied a
redefinition of the role of local affiliated unions. It thus offered the union an
opportunity to establish itself in the new institutions but also the danger that the works
councils would result in the marginalisation of the trade union, even though they
remained the agent of bargaining. For the union therefore it was essential to develop
links with the works councils. The first elections for the works councils were held in
May 1993. In those elections VASAS won 655,921 votes or 85.16 Pc of the vote
whilst its opponents won only 14.39pc in the engineering and metallurgy industry (see
Table 4.11; Map 4.3). This meant that 92pc of the works councillors that were elected
were members of VASAS. Still more were members of the Federation of Workers
Councils or LIGA. Whilst the exact figure was unavailable the first round of works
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councils elections resulted in a very strong link between the unions and the councils,
at least in the engineering industry, in which very few works councillors were not
members of one union or another. With such dominance VASAS was in a good
position to negotiate collective agreements with employers. To facilitate that VASAS
head office drew up a standard collective agreement that it intended to use as its
bargaining position in negotiations. The model agreement, drawn up with the
assistance of 1GM, was based upon Germany's system of co-determination and sought
to give more participative rights to works councils and greater benefits than permitted
by the Labour Code. A major strategy was to develop further its links with
counterpart unions in western Europe, including the AEEU in the UK and 1GM.
VASAS hoped that the Labour Code and moves towards pan-EU bargaining in the
west European automotive industry would assist it in rapidly raising the standard of
bargaining and workers benefits in Hungary.
Crucially, the future of industrial relations in the engineering industry in
Hungary depended on the relationship between VASAS and the works councils. In
the months following the works council elections both unions and councils began to
learn to use the new rules but much confusion remained. For example, the union was
some way from establishing a clear division of responsibilities between itself and the
works councils, particularly in the field of redundancies and health and safety issues.
Despite the introduction of the Labour Code, which made management
responsible for informing employees (via the works council) about important business
matter, employees remained largely excluded from debates over privatisation. For
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VASAS two issues surrounding privatisation were especially important. The first
concerned the lack of employee consultation in the development of privatisation
plans. As a result the union organised a series of meetings with the State Property
Agency (SPA) and the relevant government ministries to demand workers be given a
bigger say in the privatisation of their enterprises. As the level of interest in state
owned enterprises declined, the majority of engineering enterprises considered
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) as the only means of joining the private
sector. On the face of it such schemes seemed to offer employees the opportunity to
play a new role in the enterprise and possibly act as a vehicle for VASAS to develop a
more influential relationship with management. However, the impact of ESOPs on
trade union bargaining remained to be seen. Early examples of ESOPs in the
automotive component sector, such as Perion Battery Company and Armafilt (both
located in Budapest), suggested that ESOPs were unlikely to increase the influence of
employees or the union in bargaining. The second issue centred on the impact of
privatisation on existing collective agreements. The union struggled to maintain the
terms and conditions of employment offered by existing agreements following
privatisation but faced pressure from incoming managements which tried to terminate
them. In some instances the union resorted to strike action to support existing
collective agreements. The disputes frequently focused on working hours with
managers often seeking to place employees on short-time or part time contracts. As
well as undermining employees' bargaining position (it was often the prelude to
redundancies) it undermined the union's efforts to retain members.
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VASAS had a twin strategy to preserve arid extend unionisation in the
automotive industry. It sought first to maintain its position in the traditional state
owned enterprises, such as IKARUS and RABA, and second to attempt to mobilise
workers in the new 'greenfield' foreign owned facilities. The union successfully
concluded a significant collective agreement with IKARUS's management which was
seen as a success for the union because it contained terms and conditions which
considerably exceeded the minimum standards contained in the Labour Code (see
chapter 6). Whereas the IKARUS management and union formed a coalition, at
RABA the union was far less successful in maintaining its previously strong position
in the face of an aggressive and hostile management. Significantly, the management
at R'\BA had successfully distanced the local union, which increasingly showed
willingness to co-operate with management's restructuring plans, from VASAS which
argued that management was attempting to undermine the power of employees and
their representatives in the enterprise. Thus once the strength of the union had been
reduced RABA's management terminated the existing generous collective agreements.
Of particular concern to VASAS was the gradual separation of the local unions from
head office. This was reflected in RABA's employees maintaining their local union
membership whilst failing to renew their membership of the national organisation.
The prospect of management driving wedges between local unions and VASAS
clearly had significant implications for trade unionism in the state owned industry.
In the course of 1993 VASAS embarked on a concerted effort to develop links
with the new workforces at the newly constructed 'greenfield' foreign owned factories.
As a result the union organised a conference of labour representatives from the
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automotive sector to plan their mobilisation strategy.- VASAS was most successful in
developing links with workers at GM Europe's plant at Szentgotthárd where a local
union was formed in late 1992 (see above). By mid-1993 the local union remained
outside VASAS's federation but management had permitted VASAS officials to
develop links with local leaders within the plant. Elsewhere, the union was hampered
by hostile management. Not least, the management of Suzuki, despite entering into
negotiations with VASAS, tried very hard to prevent the recognition and growth of a
small local union (see chapter 6). The union's success in mobilising workforces at the
component factories was equally mixed. The union was most successful at
Kromberg-Schubert Kft (Kurszeg), a wiring harness factory supplying Mercedes
Benz, where a local union rapidly recruited 2Opc of the 500 strong female workforce
aiid quickly affiliated to VASAS. At another wiring harness plant, Packard Electric (a
subsidiary of GM) (Szornbathely) VASAS were permitted to make a presentation to
the workers at the plant after some employees contacted the local \'ASAS official. By
mid-1993 a local union had been established, with the assistance of VASAS and a
union at a sister Packard Electric plant in Borgalu, just over the Austrian border. With
8Opc of the workforce as members, VASAS succeeded in forcing the management to
replace the existing individual contracts with a collective agreement 34 . However,
management at United Technologies Automotive's (UTA) wire harness factory
(Gödöllö) and at Ford's plant (Székesfehévár) refused to permit the union even to
make a presentation to the employees (see chapter 6). Elsewhere, at Michels Kabel
(Mór) for instance, the union had yet to make any attempts to organise the workforce.
Where the union was able to defend employee interests' replacing individual contracts with a
culkctive one was the uppermost priority. Other important issues included pay levels and overtime.
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Where the union sought recognition its first aim lay in replacing individual with
collective contracts and only secondly was it concerned with pay.
By mid-1993 VASAS had had mixed success in establishing a presence in the
new foreign owned automotive plants. Not least, it still had some way to go to create
an effective basis for trade unionism at Suzuki and to a lesser extent GM Europe.
However, the prospect of union recognition at GM Europe's plant raised the
possibility of VASAS becoming linked into the valuable GM international trade union
network. But in trying to win recognition the union provided a significant indication
of the likely role it would play in the future. In its dealing not only with GM Europe's
management but also others, such as Suzuki, VASAS leaders stressed that recognition
of the union and the conclusion of a collective agreement would make the staging of
collective labour disputes much harder and would reduce the level of unofficial
'lightning' strikes 35 . Thus as part of institutionalising labour interest the union held
out the possibility of being able to control it for the benefit of employers. Overall the
development of the union in the domestically and foreign owned automotive sector
stood very much at a cross roads. Not least the Labour Code posed both opportunities
and threats to VASAS. Thus VASAS officials argued that the code could permit the
union considerable influence but at the expense of weak works councils, the very
institutions the union had to depend upon to organise local branch organisations to
enable it to win sufficient local support to permit it to negotiate collective agreements.
There was thus a feeling in the union that the Labour Code placed the burden of
The Strike Code (1989) made labour disputes against a collective agreement between
ma;agenient and employees illegal.
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organisin and articulating worker interests on trade unions which had yet to
re-establish themselves in the new circumstances.
Thus VASAS's future influence depended on the outcome of individual
conflicts between the union, employees (as represented in the works council) and
management. As there was just as much chance of individual works councils siding
with management as opposed to the union, VASAS's immediate task was to develop
firm links with works councillors. Their election in May 1993 seemed to indicate
such a development was possible but it required the union to turn itself into an
effective organisation in order to articulate employee interests. However, the union's
federal structure, lack of a national organisation, and indications that its officers had
retained the old mentality, symbolised in describing enterprises as 'belonging to the
union', suggested that the union might lack the necessary resources to turn its position
into one of real influence. It remained to be seen whether the Labour Code would
institutionalise a German style industrial relations system in the automotive industry
or whether a 'hollowed out' version in which the union was marginalised and works
councils collaborated with management would develop.
IG Metal! in eastern Germany
Whereas there was institutional continuity in the form of trade unionism in the
Hungarian auto industry, in the former GDR there was discontinuity as the former
organisation was dissolved and replaced by a west German union. On 6th December
1989 1GM signed a co-operation agreement with its counterpart in the GDR, IG
Metal! (Ost) 36. Underlying the initial contact was 1GM 's wish to ensure that effective
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trade unionism developed in the engineering industrj in eastern Germany. The two
unions agreed to co-operate in the field of training and to co-ordinate their bargaining
strategy. In addition, 1GM encouraged twinning agreements between individual
plants in the old and new Lander. This co-operation culminated in the unions
presenting a joint draft proposal to the GDR government concerning the privatisation
and subsequent corporate governance of state-owned firms which went beyond the
West German Works Constitution Act (see Der Bundesminister für Arbeit und
Sozialordnung 1990). In it the two unions argued that manufacturing firms be
privatised by transferring 75pc of the enterprise's capital to the employees and the
remaining 25pc to the THA (see above). The plan also involved the implementation
of a co-determination corporate governance system comprising a supervisory board
with an equal number of employee and external shareholder representatives and a
worker director37 . Although the joint proposal had little influence in shaping
privatisation policies it paved the way for 1GM effectively to take over IGMO as
German integration proceeded apace.
By May 1990 1GM had set up eight advisory offices in the new Lander, staffed
primarily by westerners. In July 1990, shortly after monetary union, the two unions
agreed to dissolve IGMO and transfer its members to 1GM. This change was enacted
Ofl 1St January 1991. IGMO was liquidated and its officials were made redundant but
former SED members (who could demonstrate that they had not had links with the
STASI) were free to join and represent 1GM. To symbolise the discontinuity IGMO
36	 This account heavily relies on reports in the monthly European Industrial Relations Review.
This proposal was drawn up with reference to VEB Robotron (the GDR's manufacturer of
household goods) which was subsequently sold by the THA to Siemens which reduced the workforce
from 68,000 to 5,000.
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members had to reregister their membership of 1GM. As a result some 1.1 million of
I .6m IGMO members joined 1GM. However, by the end of 1991 1GM membership
had fallen in east and west Germany as the recession proceeded but even so the
union's membership increased almost overnight from 2.7 million to 3.6 million
making it easily Europe's largest trade union. In December 1991 there were 944,082
members of 1GM in the new Lander. However by the end of 1992 the figure had
fallen by 13,000 largely owning to deindustrialisation (European Industrial Relations
Revie1i', March 1992, 6). In total 1GM set up 34 local offices38
 in the new Lander,
established a new region (Dresden) and enlarged other west German regions,
including West Berlin to include east Berlin and Brandenburg, to include the other
east German Lander39 . To assist in the establishment of the local branches 1GM
manipulated the election for local office leaders by planting westerners (those that had
worked in the advisory offices) and campaigning that the easterners should vote for
them. After the elections the westerners were elected in all offices although there
were problems in one office where the easterners objected to IGM's strategy.
As 1GM established itself in the new Lander the BGLs and BGOs in
automotive enterprises were dissolved and replaced by works councils. Despite the
institutional changes, in many enterprises the personnel on the new councils were the
very same people who sat on the BGL and in some cases the chair of the BGL was
reinvented as the chair of the works council (see Jürgens et a!. 1993). Thus 1GM
38	 In many cases the offices were established in buildings which 1GM had occupied until 1933
when the incoming NAZI regime confiscated them. At the end of the second world war the Soviet
army authorities set up a new trade union in them, such as IGMO. However, the question over the
distribution of property belonging to FDGB and its unions, including IGMO, was very controvertsial
and had not been resolved by the end of 1994.
As a result of the changes the Berlin office became responsible for two tariff regions, west
Berlin which was linked to west German bargaining and east Berlin/Brandenburg linked to the east.
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sQught to develop links with the new councils. Whereas there were no official figures
it was widely believed that the majority of works councillors elected in the
engineering industry after October 1990 were members of 1GM. 1GM set up training
programmes to educate the councillors in the workings of the new legal environment.
1GM sent key individuals to one of its six training centres (all in the old Lander) who
were subsequently sent into enterprises to talk to workers on the shopfloor and to
organise shop stewards. However, even where works councils were rapidly
established their influence remained limited in the face of the economic crisis that the
majority of firms faced. As a result councils soon found themselves co-managing
their firm's decline. Elsewhere, the continual break-up of firms by the THA, creating
smaller and smaller works councils, resulted in the weakening of employee power.
At the same time the employers organisational structure was also transplanted
into eastern Germany. Following the disintegration of the state-led system a number
of metaiworkers employers' associations were established in the GDR which covered
the majority of the 1.4rn engineering workers in the country. In May 1990 these
associations signed a co-operation agreement with their West German equivalent,
Gesamtmetall, which aimed to prepare them for their accession to Gesamtmetall. This
allowed Gesamtmetall to play a significant role in the establishment of industrial
relations in the new Lander. Later in that year Gesamtmetall used the pretext of
unifying the industrial relations system to argue that nation-wide collective
agreements would not be possible in a united Germany and that the employers would
pursue a differentiated bargaining policy. In September 1990, crucially after the first
generous collective agreement in the east German engineering industry had been
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negotiated (see below), Gesamtmetall became the firsremployers' association to admit
east German regional employers' associations. To support the establishment of
Gesarntmetall in the new Lander, the THA directed all of its firms to join.
Following monetary union, negotiations to establish the institutional basis of a
new collective bargaining system began. Initially, the talks were held between the
GDR's IGMO and the engineering industry's employer associations which delineated
the bargaining regions (the five Lander), and proceeded to harmonise the system with
that of West Germany. To assist with this the five bargaining regions in the east were
'twinned' with five in the west40 . At the same time IGMO, backed by 1GM, submitted
a series of demands from which to begin to negotiate the east's first interim collective
agreement. These included a DM400 monthly pay increase to take manual workers'
pay in the east to 65pc of equivalent workers in the west, basic holiday entitlement of
20 working days, a two-year employment guarantee and a 40 hour week. After
several months of negotiation an agreement was reached. As part of the agreement
wages were increased by up to DM250 per month (taking pay to 62pc of that in the
west) and employers agreed not to implement redundancies until July 1991'. The
other two demands, working time and holiday entitlement were agreed. 1GM
indicated satisfaction with the agreement but Gesámtmetall and government
representatives feared increasing wages far above productivity gains would hinder the
region's recovery.
40	 Thus east Berlin/Brandenburg were twinned with west Berlin, Mecklenburg Vorpommern was
linked to Schleswig, Saxony with Bavaria, Saxony-Anhalt with Lower Saxony, and Thurigen was
twinned with I-lessen.
However, owing to the short-time working compensation scheme (see Auer et a!. 1992)
workers were allowed to be put on zero-hours but still entitled to 9Opc of their normal pay (and
employers were exempt from paying social security contributions for them). Thus unemployment was
merely hidden.
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In 1991 the interim collective agreement was replaced by a three year
agreement which was to increase metalworkers wages in the new Lander to the level
enjoyed in west Germany by 199442. The agreement was based on political rather
than economic considerations (such as productivity) and was particularly designed to
dissuade workers from moving to western Germany to find higher paid work. Despite
the move to parity pay, real wages remained lower in the east as the working week
was to remain at 40 hours (declining to 39 in 1994 and 38 in 1996) compared to the
planned 35 hours in the west. Also, paid holidays in the new Lander were only
gradually to increase from 20 to 30 days per year (the same as in the west) in 1996.
As a result workers in east Germany had to work around 272 hours a year more than
workers in west Germany for considerably less pay. Even so at the time of the
agreement the Bundesbank and the government complained that the agreement
undermined east Germany's competitiveness. However, even after the pay increase in
April 1991, the DGB estimated that east German engineering workers were paid 4Opc
of that in the west (when all benefits were taken into account) (European Industrial
Relations Review, September 1991).
Controversy surrounded the 1991 agreement but it did not become an issue
until late 1992. As part of the collective agreement pay increases in April 1993 were
due to be 26pc to bring wages up to 82pc of the figure in the west. However, if all
elements of workers' remuneration were included in the calculations the 1993 pay
42	 Given the course of subsequent events, it was significant that Gesamtmetall initially sought a
12 month contract (as is the norm) before it argued that a three year tariff would permit greater stability
given the nature of the economic situation in the region.
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increase would have increased wage costs in Saxony to 56.5pc of those in its twinned
bargaining region, Bavaria (Bispinck 1993, 326). Despite that, Gesamtmetal!
demanded a renegotiation of the agreement which 1GM rejected arguing that east
Germans could not put up with 'socialist wages and capitalist prices' (European
Industrial Relations Review, March 1993, 8). Negotiations took place in early 1993
but they broke down without agreement. In the meantime the engineering employers'
federation in Saxony (where the majority of the automotive industry is located)
terminated the agreement -. the first time such an event had happened since 1 928. In
the course of these events the THA had played an important role. At the time the
THA still owned companies which employed 2Opc of the 450,000 workers in the
engineering industry in the Lander with the result that its directive to its firms not to
pay more than a 9pc increase had a big impact on the dispute. In addition, one of the
voices pushing hardest for a renegotiation of the tariff was a director of the THA who
also sat on Gesamtmetall's board.
The termination by Gesamtmetall of the collective agreement in Saxony was a
turning point in the dispute. 1GM claimed that the move was illegal whilst the
employers claimed it was a special situation because no one had foreseen the
recession in east and west Germany when the agreement had been concluded. Thus
the employers argued that they could only afford a 9pc wage increase, compared to a
26pc increase stipulated in the agreement, because unit labour costs were 4Opc higher
than in west Germany. In turn 1GM argued that unit labour costs had fallen from
179pc of western levels in 1991 to 123pc by the end of 1992. Significantly,
Late in 1993 Gesamtmetall also symbolically terminated the collective agreement in west
Germany.
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Gesamtmetall also demanded that in the renegotiated- agreements so-called 'hardship
clauses' should be included which allowed firms threatened with closure to pay under
the agreed pay rates for a specified period of time.
More than anything else the course of action pursued by Gesamtmetall
illustrated the strains on its own organisation, which in turn threatened the industrial
relations system. Following the 1991 agreement dissent within Gesamtmetall
developed. Smaller employers were particularly angered by the larger ones, which
were unwilling to challenge 1GM and agreed to politically motivated wage
agreements which placed smaller employers in considerable financial difficulty. Once
the German economy entered recession concern became even more widespread. As a
result the leader of Gesamtmetall was replaced by someone more amenable to the
interests of the Milteistand (small and medium sized enterprises). However,
Gesanitmetall continued to be split in the course of the dispute over the 1991 accord
given that some employers indicated willingness to abide. Perhaps more significantly
GesamtmetalYs coverage in eastern Germany was challenged. Even from the outset
the proportion of employers in the engineering industry in the east that became
members of Gesamtmetall was much lower than in the west. It was estimated that less
than half of all engineering employers in the new Lander were members of
Gesamtmetall compared with over 7Opc in western Germany (Economist 21 May
1994). This prompted suggestions that Gesamtmetall's regional organisations in the
new Lander were not representative of the region's employers (see Ettl and Wiesenthal
1994). Moreover, as the recession proceeded more and more employers left
Gesamtmetall as a way of avoiding the collective agreement, even though they were
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unable to pay below the tariff rate for 12 months after leaving. There was thus a
growing trend amongst employers to move away from regional contracts towards
plant based ones. The most important example of this sort of agreement was at GM
Europe's automobile assembly plant in Eisenach where pay levels were not linked to
the regional tarifft4.
The dissolution of the tariff contract led to a series of warning strikes in
Saxony in early May 1993 and later a 12 day strike, the first legal strike in the region
for 50 years. In total the official strike strategically targeted 44 different enterprises,
employing between 50 and 2,000 workers each and some 25,000 in total. In the light
of the THA's role in the dispute 1GM focused its strikes on firms which remained
owned by the THA but also included some private companies, including, for
example, VV Sachsen GmbH (see chapter 6). An agreement was finally reached
between 1GM and Gesarntrnetall in Saxony, which subsequently became the basis of
agreements in the other Lander. As part of the agreement planned wage increases
were reduced which meant that parity pay would only be reached in July 1996 (rather
than April 1994). The reduction of working hours and the increase of holiday
entitlement were also delayed. Thus the 26pc increase in April 1993 was replaced by
a increase of 1 5pc in July 1993, plus two subsequent increments taking total pay
increases in the course of 1993 to 21 .7pc. By July 1994 wages in the industry had
risen to 87pc of those in the west and in July 1995 had increased once again to 94pc.
The agreement also permitted renegotiation of the date at which parity would be
reached within a period of 6 months either way of the planned date.
The plant at Eisenach was a subsidiary of GM Europe and not its German subsidiary Opel AG.
4R	 This compared to a 3.5pc pay increase in the metal industry in the west in 1993.
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The final element of the agreement was the 'hardship clause' which permitted
firms that faced bankruptcy because of the pay increases to pay wages below those
stipulated in the collective agreement for a specified period of time not greater than 24
months. However, before the clause could be enacted the union and Gesamtmetall
had to examine each individual case closely, including looking at items of corporate
strategy beyond wages, before agreeing. Where firms were permitted to follow this
course of action they were forced to pay back the money owed to their employees
over an agreed period of time. Thus 1GM demonstrated to its eastern members, some
of whom began to see 1GM destroying jobs, its willingness to be flexible to achieve
its goal of preserving east Germany's industry and its members jobs. In the face of
criticism from members in the west that the clause would undermine the labour
relations system, 1GM likened the procedure to granting the company a short term
credit whilst its finances recovered. In this way the 'hardship clause' more than
anything else indicated the tensions implicit in a single union and industrial relations
system operating in two very different economic and social spaces. Thus the
industrial relations system in the automotive industry in eastern Germany was under
considerable pressure.
The application of the hardship clause varied from regime to regime. In the
case of the 1GM Berlin/Brandenburg office 80 firms approached the union for
permission to enact the 'hardship clause'. After examining the cases the union rejected
70 of them without negotiation. With the other ten the office entered into negotiations
with employers but in the end none of them proceeded with under-tariff payment.
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However, other 1GM offices were not as tough and were more willing to accept
managementts demands. Thus whilst there were no official figures it was widely
believed that the Dresden office, covering Saxony and including the majority of the
east German automotive industry, had permitted between 20 and 25 firms to enact the
'hardship clause'. In three cases the union had not even succeeded in ensuring that
there was a 'payback clause' in the agreements.
In addition, 1GM also campaigned for a different set of policies than those
pursued by the government and the THA. In particular, motivated by the
transformation of the former GDR from a production to a consumption-led economy,
the union sought to preserve the region's 'industrial cores' (see above). 1GM supported
the continuation of a reduced state owned sector arguing that continuing to pay
subsidies was preferable than paying workers to be unemployed. In particular, 1GM
argued for the creation of employment (qualification) companies to prevent surplus
labour from becoming unemployed, instead retraining them for future jobs (see also
Chapter 6). After negotiations the THA and government decided to back their
formation. By June 1991 there were 150 employment companies but subsequent
attempts to set more up were blocked by the TI-IA. However, the employment
companies were undermined by the absence of jobs for the trainees once their period
of training had been completed.
The pace of industrial change, and the sheer number of firms either liquidated
or under the threat of being so, made it very difficult for the union to defend its
members' interests46 . In addition, employers pursued strategies designed to avoid the
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terms and conditions in the tariff agreement. Whereas some employers left
Gesamtrnetall altogether some simply refused to pay the tariff agreements. Where
there were no 1GM members in the enterprise or where they failed to bring it to the
attention of the local 1GM office, the union was powerless to do anything to alter the
situation. Elsewhere, works councils, some of which were dominated by 1GM
members, entered into plant based agreements with management which often involved
the firm giving some form of employment security guarantee in return for the workers
accepting a level of pay beneath the tariff agreement. The industrial relations system
in the east was also undermined by the preponderance of subsidiaries located in the
region which were connected to western bargaining regions. Thus many firms in the
new Lander were not bound by the tariff negotiations in eastern Germany.
Whereas 1GM successfully established a presence in eastern Germany it also
generated some resistance from its own members. Not least members in the east were
disappointed at IGM's inability to win its demands in negotiations with Gesamtrnetall
and prevent redundancies. This led one east German worker to say: 'I think IG Metall
is happy that German industry can profit from the East's lower wages' (quoted in TIE
1991). The result was that in a large number of instances members embarked on
unofficial lightning strikes which placed 1GM in an illegal position 47. IGM's strike
strategy in May 1993 also created problems because although it was based on
targeting particular firms, strikes took place in firms where they should not have done.
The result was that there were occasions where 1GM representatives breached the law
46	 In particular the large number of privatisations by the THA via the vehicle of management
buyouts (MBOs) created a large number of poorly financed firms teetering on the brink of bankruptcy.
The West German labour law transplanted into the new Lander enforced a lengthy period - up
to six months - of procedures that had to be activated before strike action was legally permissible.
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and were taken to court. In such circumstances the union had to back the employer's
legal case against that of its members. This created a lot of criticism from the
membership.
The pressure that unification put on the industrial relations system permitted
management to experiment with innovative forms of labour organisation which had
important implications for trade unionism in the automotive sector (see chapter 6).
The absence of a tradition in the west German style of bargaining within firms
encouraged management continuously to test and extend the boundaries of acceptable
management practice. In the field of employee representation employers were much
less willing to grant works councils and shop stewards time and resources to fulfil
their responsibilities. In addition, management sought to gain more control by
reducing the influence of works councils over the crucial issues of manning levels and
work intensity. Often such strategies accompanied the introduction of elements of
'lean production' and team working and outsourcing in particular (see chapter 2).
Thus the adoption of team working had important implications for 1GM and the role
of works councils and shop stewards. Also the growth of outsourcing raised the
prospect of the de-unionisation of the industry by stealth as value adding processes
became subcontracted to un-unionised suppliers.
Thus the unionisation of the automotive industry in the new Lander was
secured by IGM's move into eastern Europe. However in the course of doing so the
industrial relations system was undermined (see Sadowski et a!. 1994); the union
faced problems and management secured a more dominant position than in western
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Germany. Thus the east German automotive industry.had the same institutional set up
to that in the western part of the country but the different circumstances meant that the
institutions worked in a different way. For some there was a 'representation deficit' in
the procedure which led in a high wage strategy which undermined the new Lander's
competitiveness (Ettl and Wiesenthal 1994). For others the system led to the erosion
of co-determination and the influence of 1GM.	 This was due to the
de-industrialisation of eastern Germany and the reduction of trade union membership;
in just the first six months of 1993 1GM lost 75,000 members taking its membership
to 680,000. Trade unionism in the auto industry had been established but its future
remained in doubt.
4.6	 Conclusions
In the course of the late 1 980s and early I 990s the regulation and governance
of the automotive industry in Hungary and eastern Germany was transformed. Two
significant points arise from this examination. First, the legacies of the soviet
automotive industry and the different way in which they were organised in the two
countries were crucial in shaping the industry's development. Thus the relatively
loosely organised industrial structure in Hungary contrasted greatly with the tight
system in East Germany. Second, although the state played a significant role in both
countries, the different legacies helped to shape two contrasting paths of
transformation. Change in Hungary was gradual and evolutionary owing largely to a
weak state being unable to pursue rapid privatisation nor embark on widespread
co-ordinated industrial restructuring. As a result the auto industry survived but was
only slowly privatised. The inability to find new owners forced the government to
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reintroduce some forms of industrial policy other than simple privatisation. In
contrast, change in east Germany was statist and rapid, owing to the legacy of the
centralised GDR state and the power of the West German state. As 'a result the auto
industry was privatised but in the course of being so was effectively closed and
restarted from scratch based on significant investment from west Germany. Thus the
effect of the disintegration of the plan and the marketisation of relations between
producers and consumers was in the case of Hungary to leave producers adrift and in
east Germany to close them down and force them to compete for (mostly) west
German investment and custom.
At the same time the state not only played a significant role in creating a
market for automobiles - in which demand for cars such as the Trabant fell
precipitously - but also in shaping and responding to the transforming social basis of
production. Both in Hungary and east Germany the state played an important role in
the establishment of new mechanisms for managing labour relations which in the
context of deindustrialisation and unemployment contributed to the weakening of
labour. In Hungary trade unions were slow to adapt to the new market environment
but the evolutionary pace (and state intervention) of change protected employees from
more severe effects of marketisation. Crucially, trade unions were party to the
changes to the system and in this sense were represented. However, it remained to be
seen how effective trade unions would become in the workplace. In contrast in east
Germany a system of labour relations was adopted wholesale which resulted in the
establishment of apparently strong trade union institutions. However, these did not
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seem able to defend its members very well and threatened the German industrial
relations model.
172
Table 4.1	 Exchange ratio of Ikarus buses against different cars of CMEA
origin, 1980-88
IKARUS 280	 1980	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988
compared to
SKODA 120L	 36.3	 32.4	 31.4	 31.4	 28.5
P. Fiat 125	 26.7	 27.6	 27.5	 27.6	 26.6
Trabant	 56.5	 48.9	 46	 47.7	 47.9
Wartburg	 38.4	 35.2	 35.4	 35.9	 35.4
Lada 2101
	
36.4	 30.4	 30.1	 30.1	 29.6
Source:	 Mogurt in Kapitany, 1992, 51.
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Table 4.2	 Hungarian vehicle production
Year	 Trucks	 Buses	 Cars	 Total
1981	 1,323	 13,559	 _________	 14,882
1983	 1,461	 14,313	 _________ 15,774
1984	 1,279	 14,341	 _________ 15,620
1985	 1,890	 13,226	 _________ 15,116
1986	 1,833	 13,586	 _________	 15,419
1987	 1,580	 12,923	 _________ 14,503
1988	 2,063	 12,350	 _________ 14,413
1989	 1,087	 11,930	 _________ 13,017
1990	 1,000	 8,025	 _________ 9,025
1991 k	1,000	 5,000	 6,000
1992	 1,300	 3,670	 10,600	 15,570
1993 k	3,000	 32,000	 35,000
1994k	3,500	 55,000	 58,500
1995 k	 __________ 4,500	 75,000	 79,500
* estimate by Kapitány 1991
estimates by present author
Source(s):	 after Kapitány 1991:7; industrial sources
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Table 4.3	 The Hungarian transport equipment industry
	
1980	 1985	 1990
Jo. of enterprises 	 43	 125	 416
mp1oyment	 104,300	 95,000	 63,700
et sales (HUF m)
	
59,405	 85,993	 85,434
Exports (HUF m):
rouble account	 24,831	 39,757	 22,872
convertible	 8,460	 11,268	 11,229
3ross value of fixed	 37,295	 46,001	 57,603
issets
Production
multiple-unit trains	 17	 30	 12
buses/coaches	 14,032	 13,226	 8,025
trucks	 1,608k	 1,890*	 l,000*#
bicycles	 372,000	 249,000	 130,000
estimate
Source(s):	 Ministry of Industry and Trade 1991a,33; Kapitány and Kállay 1991;
* Kapitány 1992
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Table 4.4
	
Automobile production in east and west Germany
Year	 East Germany	 West Germany
_______ (000s)	 pc change	 (000s)	 PC change
1985	 210	 3,862	 __________
1986	 218	 3.7	 3,984	 3.2
1987	 217	 -0.5	 4,027	 1.1
1988	 nd	 nd
1989	 217	 0.0	 4,125	 2.4
1990	 152	 -30.1	 4,197	 1.7
1991	 76	 -50.0	 4,011	 -4.4
1992	 85	 11.8
1993	 170	 100.0
Estimates
Source:	 VDA 1992a; VDA 1992b
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Table 4.5
	 Expected contracting and expanding industrial branches according
to the Ministry of Industry and Trade 1993
1995	 2000	 2010
Contraction Mining, metallurgy, mining, casting, textiles restructuring
textiles, timber	 complete
processing
Expansion food processing	 food processing	 biotechnology
equipment, car	 equipment, machine	 equipment,
assembly,	 tools, automotive	 agricultural
environmental 	 components industry, machinery,
protection	 aftercare engineering, non-consumer
pharmaceutical	 household appliances, electronics, aftercare
industry, construction, non-consumer 	 engineering, vehicle
printing, plastic	 electronics,	 industry,
processing,	 environmental 	 environmental
textile-garment	 protection, construction, protection,
industry	 printing,	 pharmaceutical
pharmaceuticals,	 industry, fine
fine-chemicals, textile- chemicals, garment
garments	 industry, construction
Source: after Ministry of Industry and Trade 1993, table 5 and 6, 15.
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Table 4.6
	
Companies covered by the Ministry of Industry and Trade's crisis
management programme
Sector	 Company
Mining	 Mecsek Ore Mines
Metallurgy and steel industry 	 DV Group
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals Borsodchem
____________________________ Nitrogen Works
Engineering	 IKARUS + Csepel Auto
RABA
Ganz Engineering Works
BHG Telecommunications Co
VILATI
Hungarian Atrification Bearing Works
Glass industry	 Glass Industrial Works
Pannonglas
Source: Kapitány 1993, Table 2, 5-6
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Table 4.7	 Automobile ownership per 1000 of the popuJation in Hungary,
GDR and West Germany, 1960-1990
Country	 1960 1968 1970 1975 1977 1980 1985 1989 1990
Hungary	 3 - 7.5	 22	 54	 70	 95 135 168 189
GDR	 17	 131	 266
WestGermany	 194 230 290 ____ ____ ____	 - ____
Sources:	 Kiss 1992, 15; Kortus and Kaczorowski 1981, 134; Pemberton 1991,
150.
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Table 4.8	 Passenger car sales in Hungary
Year	 Units
1985	 103,338
1986	 117,709
1987	 139,618
1988	 128,212
1989	 127,921
1990	 205-215,000
1991	 115-155,000
1992	 120-160,000
Source(s):	 Kapitány and KálIay 1991; Kapitány 1992
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Table 4.9
	
Trade union membership in Hungary 1990-1993 (estimates;
thousands)
Trade Unions	 end-1990	 end-1991	 mid-1993
MSZOSZ	 2,683	 2,000	 1,300
ForumofCooperationof 557	 750	 500
TradeUnions (SZEF) 	 ____________ ____________ ____________
Autonomous Trade
	
374	 350	 400
Unions(ASZOK)	 _____________ _____________ _____________
League of Independent	 130	 250-300	 200
TradeUnion (LIGA)	 ____________ ____________ ____________
Federation of Workers t
	106	 45	 120
Councils(MOSZ)	 _____________ _____________ _____________
Solidarity	 75	 150	 nd
Association of intellectual 63
	 90	 80
Workers(ESZT)	 _____________ _____________ _____________
TOTAL	 3,988	 3,635-3,685	 2,600
Notes: The figures for 1990 and 1991 were provided by the unions themselves (and
must therefore be treated with some suspicion). Alternative estimates for 1991 are
presented in Hughes (1991, 294) as follows: MSZOSZ 2-2.Smillion, LIGA 170,000,
MOSZ 100,000 and Solidarity 50,000. The 1993 data are estimates by the ILO office
in Budapest. All figures include members who are not necessarily active workers.
Sources: Borbély 1993, 2; ILO in Business Central Europe 1993, 23
Table 4.10 VASAS membership 1989-1993
Year	 membership pc in work unionization in
the sector (pc)
	1989 500,000	 66	 85
	
1993 200,000	 60	 62
Source:	 VASAS
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Table 4.11
	 Results of the works counciJs elections in the engineering and
metallurgy industry, May 1993
Trade Union	 votes	 percentage
VASAS	 655,921	 85.16
Federation of Workers'
	
nd	 5.17
Councils(MOSZ)	 ____________ ____________
LIGA	 43,213	 5.16
Others	 nd	 4.O6
Notes: Assuming all VASAS members voted for the union's nominees, some 1 7pc of
the votes cast for the union were by non-members.
Source:	 VASAS
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Chapter 5
	
The transformation of production: automotive capital in Hungary
and eastern Germany and the Hungarian and east German
automotive industries
5.1	 Introduction
The most significant process in the transformation of the auto industry in east
and central Europe was 'marketisation'. An industry organised according to the soviet
industrial model was transformed (in part) as new forms of governance and regulation
were established. Central to this process was the subordination of production to the
capitalist law of value as money was transformed from a currency of account (for the
purpose of bureaucratic redistribution according to the state plan) to a currency of
value (for the purpose of capital accumulation).
This chapter examines the transformation of production in the auto industry in
Hungary and eastern Germany. This involves two issues: the process of
'marketisation' itself; and the strategies for capital accumulation subsequently
employed by firms. Significantly the transformation of production differed between
and within the two countries. In Hungary 'marketisation' involved 1) the
transformation of state owned enterprises wedded to the plan into firms governed by
the capitalist law of value and 2) the creation of new foreign owned companies as
automotive DFI flowed into the country. By contrast, in east Germany 'marketisation'
was far more dramatic as the sector was not so much transformed as closed down, and
substituted by a 'foreign' one almost entirely dependent on west German capital.
First, the chapter examines the transformation of production in Hungary and
east Germany as the planned industry broke up. Second, it investigates direct foreign
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automotive investment in the two countries. In doing so it introduces six case studies
four foreign investment projects and two indigenous producers. It considers the
strategies employed by automotive firms, and focuses in particular on their regional
development impacts since it is important to emphasise that the restructuring of the
industry was shaped by and in turn helped to shape the development of regional-space
economies. Thus the chapter concentrates on capital-capital relations by examining
the extent to which the restructuring of the automotive industry altered the social and
economic embeddedness of the industry and in doing so helped to shape the uneven
development of capitalism and the generation of new patterns of uneven regional
development.
5.2	 The transformation of automotive production
As the I 980s proceeded it became increasingly apparent that economic
stagnation was the consequence of inherent weakness in the soviet industrial model.
The lack of mechanisms and institutions which could enable evolution or creative
destruction, and more specifically the fusion of the economic and political realms,
resulted in an economic system which not only failed to meet the expectations of
populations and provide the political legitimacy which might have provided the
opportunity to experiment with new forms of economic governance, but also
precluded reforms which might have affected the very fabric of the system (see
Altvater 1993). Crucially, this realisation occurred to different degrees and at different
times across industries and countries resulting in forces for change that were beyond
the control of any one set of authorities. The result was a complex transformation
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which owed as much to the fact that reform was uncoprdinated as it did to the changes
themselves.
Towards the end of the 1980s the soviet industrial model was under severe
pressure having failed to transform itself from an extensive to an intensive system of
growth. Some of these tensions were particularly evident in the governance and
production of the auto industry. Even before the mid-1980s there had been growing
signs that the CMEA planning system was no longer satisfying the strategic
requirement of individual state projects. Hungary in particular had gradually begun to
pursue policies designed to loosen itself from the Soviet controlled economic system
by entering into negotiations with Japanese car makers with the goal of giving
1-lungary a car making capacity and thus reducing its dependence on the plan (and in
some ways increasing its stock in wider CMEA trade negotiations). East Germany too
had failed to find a way of modernising its industry in conjunction with CMEA
partners and was forced (for financial rather than technological reasons) to look for a
western partner.
As uncoordinated measures to reform the economic system proceeded the
result was to create even more increased irrationalities in the system. The complex
commodity trading system began to generate anomalies as the Hungarian state began
to liberalise prices before the customer (the USSR). Consequently the terms of trade
altered in such manner as to squeeze Hungarian producers. Assembly became a
loss-making activity since the prices agreed in bilateral commodity negotiations did
not cover the cost of purchasing components locally (Kapitány and Kallay 1991). For
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example, towards the end of the 1980s IKARUS, .hose state subsidies had been
reduced, suffered from the unwinding of the planning system which resulted in an
increase of the cost of components, as price controls were lifted in Hungary, but the
USSR was unable and unwilling to pay the increased cost of buses. In 1988 some
78pc of the price of an IKARUS bus was accounted for by the purchase of
components with the result that the assembly process was uneconomic. Thus the
international planning system depended on similar regulatory regimes being in place
in constituent members. Once discrepancies in regulation occurred amongst CMEA
members it led to an increasingly incoherent plan. The internationalisation of the auto
industry and its considerable significance to domestic economies meant that the
transformation of the auto sector had effects well beyond the confines of the industry.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent events completely reshaped the
social landscape. The combination of lost markets, lost subsidies and import
liberalisation disrupted economic systems. Most crucially however, the penetration of
the capitalist law of value, initially through the creation of markets for consumer
goods, implied an entire re-evaluation of the rationality behind economic activities.
The result was that individual enterprises and production systems began to operate in
different ways and ceased to abide by the state plan. The planning system collapsed
from below and only subsequently did the CMEA abandon the plan as intra-CMEA
trade was converted from being denominated in the rouble to being accounted in the
dollar. This disrupted production systems, including the automotive sector, and led to
the uneven deployment of market-inducing strategies by governments and firms. This
resulted in the inability of customers to pay for inputs as prices rose towards world
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market levels. Thus markets were not so much lost, in the conventional sense, as
deprived of much needed products.
As the plan, and the informal networks which sustained it, were disrupted and
money began to take a regulatory role, enterprises in Hungary and East Germany were
forced to valorise capital, or in other words had to begin to consider money less as a
measure of account and more as a representation of value and means of capital
accumulation. The creation of capital thus depended on ascertaining the costs of
production and relating prices to that figure. This involved relating wages to
socially-necessary labour time. However, the submission of production to the law of
the value was undermined by the disintegration of the plan. As the plan stopped
functioning, enterprises were cast adrift which left them isolated as forward and
backward linkages were disrupted. The 'value' of enterprises in the planning system
depended on their ability to activate formal and informal levers of political power.
Thus once the system had broken down enterprises were deprived of the 'network
capital' that they had once possessed.
Hungary
The break down of the planning system between CMEA countries had grave
consequences for the Hungarian automotive industry. This was particularly the case
for the bus production system which saw bus output fall by 7Opc between 1988 and
1992 to just 3,670 units. This was largely a function of the inability of customers from
the Soviet Union to be able to continue to pay for their orders. Hence between 1989
and 1992 the export of buses to the Soviet Union fell 83pc from 7,000 to 1,200
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(Kapitány 1993). IKARUS alone shed over 2,500 jobs and countless other workers
were made redundant by supplier firms (see below). The most well known casualty of
the crisis was Csepel Auto which was placed into liquidation with the loss of 5,000
jobs out of a workforce of 7,000. However, many other smaller suppliers, such as
Ujpest Gepelgyar, which supplied IKARUS with shock absorbers, had to lay off up to
4Opc of their employees.
The automobile component producers were also severely affected by the
disruption and reduction of trade within ECE. However, they were in a stronger
bargaining position due to their higher quality production which VAZ' needed to
maintain its export of a third of its production to the west for desperately needed
dollars. Even so, MMG, which during the 1980s supplied 400,000 sets of dashboard
instrumentation to VAZ per year, found that its orders were cut by more than half.
Likewise Bakony, a major supplier of windscreen wiper motors and other electrical
parts, suffered a 4Opc fall in its automotive orders and, in 1990, the termination of its
subsidy. Between them MMG and Bakony shed over 2,500 workers between 1990
and 1993.
The transformation of the Hungarian automotive industry, in the sense of its
submission to the law of value, was highly uneven. The ability to raise prices to world
market levels depended on an enterpris&s position in the production chain. The result
was an inevitable liquidity crisis as the price of raw materials increased without a
corresponding increase in the price of finished products. In the first instance inter-firm
The Russian producer of Lada cars.
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links continued as there was a widespread belief that.customers would find the money
to pay in the future. To keep the entire production system operating the government
offered IKARUS and Csepel Auto credits worth 6bn HUF in order to pay their
suppliers (Kapitány 1992). All this did was to postpone the crisis in the industry and
saddle firms with debt and the burden of large inventories of unsaleable finished
goods. In time producers were forced to cut production and faced pressure to reduce
their manpower. However, the legacy of the paternalistic state-owned enterprise firms
(whose role was to reproduce the labour collective) meant that some firms moved to
internalise production to reduce the number of redundancies. IKARUS for example
increased its share in the bus production filière from 20 to 4Opc by internalising
production of the chassis resulting in an unsuccessful legal challenge from Csepel
Auto which had been the supplier up to then.
The gradual break down of the state system resulted in the weakening of the
hierarchical mechanisms of economic integration and co-ordination which had
provided the all-too-limited discipline that had existed in the economic system. These
mechanisms were not immediately replaced by the discipline of the market with the
result that individual enterprises were cast adrift, insulated and isolated from both
hierarchical planning and embryonic market signals. Without the policy or market
signals needed to convey the need to restructure, individual firms embarked on
defensive strategies designed as much to prevent change as to encourage it (see
below). In time so-called market discipline was in fact enforced by the state and
conveyed by privatisation policies. The ownership of auto enterprises was transferred
to the State Property Agency (SPA) prior to their privatisation. IKARUS and RABA,
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owing to their size and the political sensitivity that surrounded their future, were
placed in the hands of a separate body, the State Holding Company (AV). In effect the
top-down transformation effort was governed by the perceived requirements of
privatisation - namely the need to attract investment. Thus enterprises were
encouraged to reduce overheads by selling off - where possible - distant plants and
reconcentrating production at headquarters plants (mostly in Hungary's five largest
cities). Rationalisation also involved efforts to reduce diversity and an increased
emphasis on core production. Despite these efforts the privatisation of the sector
proceeded slowly.
East Germany
Whereas the Hungarian automotive industry was transformed by the process
of CMEA disintegration, the sector in the GDR was not so much transformed as
dismantled as part of the country's disintegration and unification with West Germany.
The fall of the Berlin Wall resulted in a huge shift in demand away from the Trabant
and Wartburg to western, mainly second hand, models. At the same time monetary
union and the introduction of the Deutschmark and new accounting procedures
exposed, for the first time, the relatively high costs involved in the production of East
German cars. Despite this the West German state pledged to continue assembly of the
Trabant and Wartburg, in acknowledgement of their importance to national and
regional economies. However, rising costs, increasingly weak demand and a change
in policies as the Treuhandanstalt became more fully integrated into the West
German state machinery resulted in a significant change of approach to restructuring
east Germany, which had a profound effect on the transformation of the auto sector.
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The rise of a neo-liberal approach to transforming East Germany was accompanied by
the government decision to renege on its earlier promise to subsidise East German car
making by contributing the difference between the cost of production and the market
price.
Having decided that there was no potential in reforming the existing industry
the entire east Germany automotive industry was dismantled by the Treuhandanstalt
under the guise of privatisation (see chapter 4). There followed a period in which the
heart was ripped out of the East Germany automotive industry as the JFA-Kornbinat
was broken up and offered for sale to western investors. With the decision that SAW
and AWE had no future as going concerns, production of the Trabant ceased on 3rd
April 1991 with the loss of 9,000 jobs. This was closely followed by the assembly of
the last Wartburg on 10th April, resulting in the loss of 11,500 jobs. As a result
vehicle production in eastern Germany fell from 217,000 in 1989 to just 17,000 in
1 991. This had enormous consequences not only for the vehicle assemblers but also
for the component producers who were stranded with worthless inventories and
obsolete products and machinery. In this way the West German state untied the links
which constituted one of East Germany's most significant industries by first breaking
up the forms of integration which linked individual firms within the confines of the
plan and later by breaking up the firms themselves. As a consequence two-thirds of all
automotive jobs in eastern Germany were lost in 1991 as employment in the industry
fell from 128,000 in 1989 to just 54,000 at the end of 1991.
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Employment continued to decline as the privtisation process continued. The
Treuhandanslall, the de jure owner of the industry, sent in new (west German)
managers into the firms to prepare them for sale. The result was the introduction of
huge rationalisation strategies as new management was forced to find ways of
increasing turnover per employee. In addition the Treuhandanstalt dispatched teams
of management consultants to develop management and accountancy systems which
permitted the establishment of profit centres which could subsequently form the basis
of privatised independent firms. The effect was to preserve the traditional names of
state owned enterprises (even though some of them were only legal successors) but in
reality the business had in the most part been completely re-engineered. Further
transformation of the industry depended largely on the attraction of West German
investors.
5.3	 Automotive capital in Hungary and east Germany
At the same time as existing firms were transforming their social basis through
the valorisation of capital and labour power, foreign capital began to flow into
Hungary and east Germany.
	
Auto-related investments in Hungary formed a
significant proportion of DFI in the country. They represented 1 6pc of all planned
investment and four of the largest ten single projects announced up to 1994 (see
Sadler and Swain 1994). Up to 1994 in excess of USD 1 .4bn had been committed as
part of 29 different auto-related investments which stood to create or protect 24,000
jobs (Table 5.1). This contrasted with USD5.5bn earmarked for investment in east
Germany by auto firms in 73 projects creating up to 23,000 jobs. Beyond the volume
of investment there were some significant differences in the nature of the investment
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attracted to the two countries. The majority of automotive investment in Hungary
involved the manufacturing of components whereas in east Germany investment in
assembly was prominent (see Table 5.2). Another important difference was the origin
of the investment. Thus whereas the largest source of investment in Hungary was US
owned companies, in east Germany almost 9Opc of investment was from west
Germany (see Table 5.3). These differences, and a break down of the sorts of
investments in component production (see Table 5.4), served to illustrate how auto
DFI integrated the two countries in production systems in very different ways.
Although both countries attracted significant automotive DFI, in quantitative
terms the flow into east Germany was substantially greater than that into Hungary.
However, the flows into both countries were economically and politically significant
in shaping the transformations in their respective societies. First, DFI established
industrial activity which operated according to the law of value and introduced
specific bundles of capitalist social relations and class practice within the confines of
the plants. This involved the establishment of a capitalist labour process in which
workers became accustomed to new forms and degrees of control over work under
which capital was appropriated and accumulated (see chapter 6). Secondly, DFI also
established a new basis for inter-firm relations based on prices related to the costs of
production. Thirdly, DFI helped to shape broader practices throughout society
ranging from the creation of privileged groups within the labour market to the
generation of western consumption norms, to lobbying government to introduce
specific legislative measures. In these ways DFI had a crucial effect on the uneven
emergence of capitalist social relations and uneven regional development.
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Hungary
Between 1989 and 1994 USDI.45bn of auto DFI flowed into Hungary - most
of it in the years 1991 to 1993. Of the total 29 investment projects (see Table 5.5 and
5.6) 18 involved the creation of new companies with greenfield facilities which
collectively planned to create 7,100 jobs. However, in 1994 these plants employed
just 3,370. Including investments which safeguarded jobs in existing enterprises, the
employment effects of auto DFI increased to 21,500 actual and 25,500 target
workplaces (see Table 5.7)2. The majority of investment in Hungary involved the
production of components in a small number of 1 OOpc foreign owned (mostly US)
large greenfield projects which formed parts of pan-European production structures.
Together they represented the location of capital and labour intensive elements of
production systems. As a result capital intensive engine production (requiring
flexible pliant workforces) and the labour intensive assembly of electrical parts - in
particular wire harnesses - (which required cheap workforces) was predominant. In
addition to the investments, there were a number of license agreements between
Hungarian enterprises and foreign, mainly Japanese, component firms (see Table 5.7).
The geography of the investments was also significant. The largest number of
investment projects and largest volume of investment was located in Budapest (see
Table 5.9 and Maps 5.1, 5.2). In addition, investment and job creation was
concentrated in the northern and westerly regions close to the bo'rders with Austria
and Slovakia (Map 5.3). When just 'greenfield' investments were taken into account
2	 These figures include GE's investment in Tungsram. Although Tungsram was a diversified
lighting producer in the years after its take over by GE it became increasingly dedicated to the
automotive sector.
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the trend towards locating in the western counties was further pronounced (Map 5.4).
This included some plants located in rural areas just a few kms from the border.
Others, such as Ford, invested in large towns with a tradition in the engineering
industry.
Eastern Germany
In eastern Germany USD 5.45bn was earmarked for investment in the new
Lander by auto firms in the first half of the 1 990s. In total it was estimated that auto
firms had earmarked 2Opc of all investment earmarked for east Germany by west
German industry (Table 5.10). (These figures refers to announcements made up to
1992 which involved investments over a number of subsequent years. However,
following the German recession in 1993 investment plans were postponed or scaled
down). In total DM 1.5 billion was invested in 1991 and DM3 billion was earmarked
for 1992 as investment up to 1995 was expected to total more than DM 10 billion (see
Table 5.11). Also VW1 s commitment was the largest single investment in the new
Lander. By comparison total corporate investment in 1991 was estimated at DM 26
billion and was expected to rise to only DM 45 billion in 1992 (IFO 1992).
Two-thirds of all auto DFI that flowed into east Germany went into two major new
assembly plants (see Table 5.12). In addition, there were 71 other investments in
component assembly (see Table 5.13). Whilst engine assembly was, like in Hungary,
important the break down of DFI involved in component production revealed greater
levels of diversification than in Hungary. Thus in addition to parts production, there
was investment in research and development, tool building and logistics management
(see Table 5.4). In contrast to Hungary the capital attracted to east Germany
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involved, at least superficially, taking over state owned enterprises and utilising
existing facilities, rather than the construction of new greenfield factories or the
establishment of joint ventures. However in practice, the west German take over of
east German industry was more akin to the establishment of a new industry involving
the creation of new legal entities albeit in some cases using the names of the old state
owned enterprises and buying property which previously belonged to them.
Nevertheless, the utilisation of exiting facilities (often just the buildings) meant that
automotive investment reinforced the geography of the existing auto industry in east
Germany as 62 out of 73 projects were located in Saxony and Thuringia. Moreover
more than half the investment and planned employment was in Saxony alone (see
Table 5.14, Maps 5.5 and 5.6). As a result investment was highly geographically
concentrated.
5.3.1 Automobile assembly capital in Hungary and east Germany
In response to the stagnation of Hungarian industry in the 1980s the
government sought a western company to set up a modern facility and two projects
were at the planning stage at the time of the break up of CMEA. The two
investments, by Suzuki and GM-Opel, involved the investment of USD 301m and the
creation of 2,350 jobs in the assembly of up to 90,000 cars by 1997. Suzuki's project
included a commitment to develop a local supplier network and depended on
achieving a minimum of 6Opc 'local content' for duty-free export to the EU. The
motivation behind Opel's investment lay not in the ckd assembly of a maximum of
30,000 Astras per year but in the assembly of 400,000 engines. In evaluating these
two projects it is crucial to distinguish between Suzuki, which sought to establish a
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'Iocalised integrated production system, and Opel's more cautious 'branch' plant
approach. Not least, the distinction is significant in pointing to the different regional
and industrial impacts of the projects.
As the east German auto industry wound down west German companies set
about the task of installing new capacity, improving productivity and quality
standards in those existing facilities which could profitably be modernised, and
generally reconstructing the auto sector in the former GDR. Investment was led by
VW and Opel (GM) which between them committed DM 6 billion (including
government subsidies worth in excess of DM 1.6 billion) in the construction of two
assembly plants, with a combined capacity of 400,000 units annually and a projected
workforce of 7,800, and geared towards applying 'lean production' concepts (see
chapter 2). Tn evaluating these developments, it is crucial to distinguish between VW
and Opel whose plans explicitly aimed to extend and reform their pan-European
regionally integrated production systems into central Europe (and beyond), and those
of the suppliers. At the same time German component producers sought to establish
themselves in the new market conditions, acquiring and installing new capacity in
those factories which could be profitably modernised or in some cases building
greenfield facilities. Still others used the new situation to subcontract work to
cheaper east German firms. The speed and the scale of auto-related involvement in
eastern Germany was indicative of the way in which larger producers, at least, were
intent on using the anticipated re-industrialisation of the region as a tool radically to
restructure their pan-German and pan-European operations. This strategy depended
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on an environment which allowed the introduction of new forms of work organisation
and the (re-)creation of the supply chain.
In order to examine in more detail the role and significance of auto DPI
involved in car assembly, the rest of this section considers two contrasting projects,
Suzuki in Hungary and VW in eastern Germany. In doing so it concentrates on
relations between different supply chains as a means of considering the embeddedness
of the investments.
Magyar Suzuki Corporation
The creation of Magyar Suzuki Corporation dates from negotiations which
began in 1985. At that time Suzuki's involvement in Hungary represented an
opportunity to tap into a protected market in return for acting not only as a catalyst for
the modernisation of state owned industry but also to improve the country's balance of
trade. The project was conceived as a dirigiste state-led project to impose
transformation from above. However, subsequent political changes altered the
rationale, for Suzuki at least, behind the investment even though it remained very
closely linked to the state. The project became an integral part of Suzuki's broader
globalisation strategy as it sought to move vehicle assembly out of its high-cost bases
in Japan to cheaper locations close to its targeted markets (see Swain 1992a).
Whereas its Japanese competitors focused on the major North American and west
European markets Suzuki focused on supplying small cars to developing markets,
frequently establishing joint ventures with governments, such as in India. Thus
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Hungary offered a platform from which to supply western Europe and placed it in a
good position to prosper once the east and central European car markets revived.
A new joint venture company was established, Magyar Suzuki Corporation, to
oversee the construction of the new facility and the subsequent assembly of the
vehicles at Esztergom. The company was established with HUF 5.5bn registered
capital owned 4Opc each by Suzuki and Autokonzern, a consortium of 62 state-owned
enterprises (including component producers), I lpc by the Japanese finance house C.
Itoh and 9pc by the International Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank). In
addition the company arranged HUF 1 lbn worth of credit in order to construct the
plant (Kiss 1992). In short this meant that the initial capital injection by the Japanese
firm was HUF 2.l2bn or just 16.6pc of the cost of constructing the plant (Kiss 1992).
However, in 1994 the amount of registered capital was increased by HUF O.9bn (of
which some HUF 400m was paid for by the state) to HUF 6.4bn and the equity ratio
altered giving Suzuki a greater share.
Thus it is somewhat ironic that Magyar Suzuki, heavily connected to the state,
became a symbol of Hungary's re-entry into the capitalist world economy. The
project was closely linked to the state in a number of ways. First, it was the state
authorities which invited the Japanese firm to locate a plant in Hungary and they did
so by offering state owned enterprises as partners in the project through the holding
company entitled Autokonzern which was managed by people previously working for
IKARUS. In different ways the state paid HUF 2.5bn for its 4Opc share in the
company. Second, the project received considerable state allowances. In addition to
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the general tax holidays offered to foreign investments the project was the recipient of
1-IUF lOOm from the investment stimulation fund and HUF 150m from the
employment fund. The government also undertook to pursue a trade policy aimed at
promoting exports. Other state assistance included exemption from import duty in
order to create a 22pc customs preference over other vehicle importers, and the
eaimarking of a portion of a commercial loan from Japan's Eximbank for the
modernisation of the car parts sector (see also Kiss 1992). In this way the Suzuki
project was, defacto, a major instrument of industrial policy.
The USD 235 m investment involved the construction of a car assembly plant,
expected to produce 15,000 Swifts (a model first launched in 1983) in the first year,
rising to 60,000 annually by 1997 employing a workforce of 1,300. This represented
a significant reduction on the 200,000 capacity figure which had been widely
mentioned during negotiations between the company and the former Soviet-backed
government. The limited scale of the operation barely made the investment
worthwhile leading to speculation that Suzuki would have to increase the size of the
project in order to make it economically viable. The utilisation initially of only IOpc
of the 350,000 square metre site possibly indicated the scale of the plans that Suzuki
had for the development of the project. In addition to the small scale of the project
the factory was notable for the fact that it did not represent a large capital investment
relative to car assembly plants elsewhere. The plant comprised a panel stamping
shop, a body assembly shop, painting and final assembly but the production process
was relatively labour intensive and did not involve robots. It seemed that for Suzuki,
the project was a long term commitment that would develop according to local
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circumstances. Those local factors altered during th negotiation of the project. Of
particular significance to Suzuki was the liberalisation of and subsequent recession in
east and central European economies and the trade agreement between Japan and the
EC which limited the import of Japanese produced cars into the Single European
Market.
Following the political changes in Hungary and recognising the small
domestic market, Suzuki conceived of the project as a way of breaking into the west
European market. Suzuki planned to turn the burden of having to modernise the
Hungarian supplier sector into an advantage which could allow duty-free exports to
west Europe by-passing the 'voluntary restraint' agreement between the EU and Japan.
Therefore, planned 'local content' changed from 3Opc to 6Opc and crucially the notion
of local was widened to include components from the EU. What made this project so
distinctive from those elsewhere in Hungary and east and central Europe (apart from
the fact that it was the only major auto-related investment involving a Japanese firm)
was the emphasis placed on the development of the existing supplier sector and its
potentially far reaching regional development impacts. Thus the Ministry of Industry
and Trade (1991b) expected that the 'localised' production system that Suzuki
required would itself generate more than 18,000 jobs.
Assembly of the Suzuki Swift began in October 1992 and production was
scheduled to rise to 20,000 in 1993 and 50,000 in 1995. However, the schedule had
not anticipated the weak state of the Hungarian car market which meant that in 1992
Suzuki sold just 6,000 units. Sales remained depressed in 1993 and it seemed
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unlikely that the target of 15,000 sales would be rçached. Likewise the hoped-for
sales of 30,000 in 1994 rising to 40,000 in 1995 were not realistic. This was due to
the absence of a middle class with the purchasing power to afford a car. In the
summer of 1993 the cost of a Swift ranged from HUF 775,000 to HUF 1,098,000
depending on the model which Suzuki calculated amounted to 30 months of the
average Hungarian salary. Weakness in the domestic market and the inability to
export to either western Europe - because the 'local content' had not reached 6Opc -
nor eastern markets - because of tariffs and the absence of a dealer network - meant
that production did not rise above 60-70 units a day until the end of 1993; sometime
later than had been scheduled. As a way of trying to improve its position in the
market place - and recognising that many Hungarians did not perceive the Swift to be
a 'modern' vehicle - Suzuki announced plans to increase the number of variations of
the model, including a Sedan version, to be produced in Hungary. In 1994 Suzuki
announced that it had signed an agreement with Subaru to assemble vehicles in
Esztergom. In the light of problems in the market place it became imperative that
Suzuki localised production inorder to increase 'local content' to permit duty-free
export to the EU.
Supplier relations
Following the political changes in Hungary in the late 1980s Suzuki planned
to export 6Opc of the cars to western Europe. This strategy depended on achieving a
minimum 60pc3 'local' (i.e. Hungarian and west European) content to allow the cars to
qualify as Hungarian products under the Association Treaty with the EC (signed in
When negotiating investment incentives with the Hungarian government Suzuki initially
pledged to reach 7Opc 'local' meaning Hungarian content.
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1992) and thus exempting them from duty. Therefore the success of the project
depended on the creation of a reliable low cost high quality supplier base within
Hungary. However, despite Suzuki's strategy to 'localise' production it had no plans
to alter its commitment to source high value-added parts such as the transmission and
the engine from Japan.
From the outset Suzuki sought to encourage co-operation between its suppliers
in Japan and component producers in Hungary. Suzuki organised its first conference
for suppliers in 1990 when it invited firms to offer to produce particular parts.
Subsequent supplier conferences resulted in 129 companies showing interest in
supplying the Japanese plant but only 25 of these were considered by Suzuki to be
potential suppliers. After further auditing only 15 were deemed to be genuinely
possible suppliers and only then once they had invested in Japanese technology. The
first supplier to be offered a contract was IMAG (IKARUS's subsidiary and seat
supplier) which supplied seats and a number of other minor parts. It was not
insignificant that one of IMAG's senior managers left to become Suzuki's purchasing
manager. Through IMAG Suzuki was put into contact with other firms which formed
part of the bus production system.
By the end of 1992 Suzuki's efforts had had only a limited effect. Only four
of Suzuki's Japanese suppliers had either begun or had announced the intention to
co-operate with Hungarian companies. This was a central factor since Suzuki had
decided that it would only offer contracts to Hungarian firms which agreed to
purchase licences from its suppliers in Japan. However, a major problem was that for
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many I lungarian component producers, the small .cale of Suzuki's project (60,000
units by 1997) and a lack of capital prevented the purchase of licenses.
Production at Esztergom began in late 1992 with a 'local' content of less than
35pc. Even this low figure was calculated on the basis of the ex-works price and thus
included all costs related to production, including for instance depreciation on the
buildings. Thus the local content figure included 21 pc from the production process
(stamping, assembly and painting) in the factory. As production began only two
Hungarian firms were supplying Suzuki. Another ten Hungarian enterprises had been
given official supplier status by Suzuki but that number included suppliers of goods
and services peripheral to the assembly of automobiles, such as publicity materials.
However vehicle parts that were manufactured locally included low value-added parts
such as wiring harnesses and seats.
In April 1992 Osamu Suzuki, the president of Suzuki Motor Corporation,
expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress over the local production of
components. He cited three specific problems that Suzuki was having in identifying
and contracting potential suppliers. First, he commented on Hungarian enterprises'
unwillingness to make firm commitments and attributed this not only to a lack of
western business skills but also to the uncertainty stemming from the tortuous
privatisation process that state owned companies were undergoing. One outcome of
this contributed to the second problem: the near-insolvency of many of the potential
suppliers, which hindered attempts to access credit to invest in new technology and
licensing agreements. Thirdly, the Japanese company was disturbed by the high
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prices that potential suppliers were quoting, reflecting the difficulty they were having
iii trying to meet the much more stringent standards that Suzuki demanded.
To meet the target 'local content' Suzuki encouraged its suppliers in Japan to
co-operate with Hungarian suppliers and arranged credit for them to purchase licensed
technology. In practice Suzuki would only offer contracts to Hungarian suppliers
which had agreed to purchase licenses from its Japanese suppliers. In this way Suzuki
was able to devolve responsibility for developing the local supply base to its major
first tier suppliers in Japan. By the end of 1992 only four such agreements had been
finalised and all involved the production of standardised low value-added parts. The
most significant agreement was the purchase by Imag of Mór, of a license from
Houwa Kogyo to produce seats for Suzuki. Imag, once one of Europe's largest
producers of seats, with a capacity to manufacture 500,000 units annually, had been
suffering from lost markets in east and central Europe as well as the contraction of
bus production at IKARUS itself. However, as was common in Hungary's state
owned industry Imag was highly indebted and the agreement only went ahead after
Houwa Kogyo agreed that half of the payment for the technology could be deferred
by one year. The Hungarian company also agreed to pay a royalty for the right to
produce the components. The other licensing agreements between Japanese and
Hungarian suppliers involved the local production of shock absorbers, electric cables
and windscreen wiper motors. By the end of 1993 a further two licensing agreements
had been signed. One involved Nippondenso which sold a license to MMG, based in
Budapest, for the supply of instrumentation panels. Perion (Budapest) also purchased
a license from Furukawa Battery Co. for the supply of batteries. (See Table 5.8).
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Despite the signing of these agreements the problems surrounding Suzuki's
supply base did not dissipate. This was largely because the Hungarian partners were
unable to purchase the licenses or the technology required owing to a lack of capital
and difficulty in accessing credit. Thus Berva (Eger) signed an agreement with
Showa in 1991 but by the middle of 1993 the financing of the agreement had still not
been resolved. As Suzuki became more desperate to increase 'local' content it began
to contribute towards the cost of purchasing licences and technology. By the middle
of 1993 'local content' stood at 51.7pc comprising 2lpc from the assembly process,
26.3pc from Hungarian suppliers and 4.4pc from suppliers in the EU. The 26.3pc
sourced from Hungarian suppliers comprised the local production of 526 parts by 32
suppliers. Of these 32 local suppliers just 13 were genuinely involved in supplying
car parts. Others supplied peripheral products (see Table 5.15 and Map 5.7). A
further five suppliers were located in the EU. In addition the majority of the parts
sourced in Hungary were either simple, low value added products or in effect
represented the assembly of components manufactured in Japan and shipped to
Hungary.
Despite these agreements the 'localisation' of the production process
proceeded slowly for two reasons. There was considerable delay in bringing
contracted suppliers into the production system owing to financial and other
difficulties. The second reason was that even where local sourcing agreements were
concluded and activated the activities involved amounted to local assembly of parts
imported from Japan rather than genuine local manufacturing. Thus the local impacts
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of the licensing agreements were limited as the value-added in Hungary remained low
as the focal content of parts sourced in Hungary was small. Nevertheless both Suzuki
and suppliers were keen to proceed with the 'localisation' of manufacturing as soon as
possible as the costs of production in Japan rose (due to the increase in the value of
the Yen) and the cost of transportation from Japan increased to between 20 and 3Opc
depending on the nature of the part. However, localisation continued to be slow
owing to a lack of capital investment and the low volumes of production required by
Suzuki. In the light of the problems Suzuki had in developing a local supply base it
was crucial that Japanese parts assembled in Hungary counted as Hungarian parts in
order for it to reach its local content figures.
One reason for the slow development of the supply base was Suzuki's
approach to auditing, selecting and managing its suppliers. Most Hungarian suppliers
were unprepared for the rigorous and time consuming audit process that Suzuki
established. Suzuki repeatedly audited potential suppliers demanding information on
all aspects of their activities. Suzuki's auditing team were not only interested in
technical capacity but also labour organisation, industrial relations, training
procedures and long term business plans. Of particular sensitivity was Suzuki's
demand to see detailed financial information which firms had not had to compile let
alone supply to a potential customer before. In addition Suzuki was also very
interested in the privatisation process of the firms concerned.
For Suzuki price, quality and reliability were equally important. 	 In
negotiations Suzuki pursued a line which in effect meant that the prices were
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non-negotiable. Thus Suzuki, based on its productiQn of the Swift in Japan, would
declare what proportion of the car a certain part comprised and used this to calculate
the appropriate price. Thus the starter motor was deemed to amount to 3pc of the
value of the car so the part was to cost no more than 3pc of the price of the car in the
market (around HUF1m in the middle of 1993) including a charge for the suppliers
profit (officially around 5pc). In effect therefore, Suzuki used costs in Japan as a
bench mark for costs in Hungary.
Suzuki demanded that its suppliers costed everything connected to the
production process. Costs were calculated on the basis of social costs per minute
(wages and non-wage costs) in addition to material, process and transport costs. For
the first time state owned producers had to calculate the costs of various activities
with the result that overhead costs were revealed to be extremely high, so much so
that Suzuki was unwilling to include them in calculating costs. The result was that
suppliers felt Suzuki was not willing to pay the true cost of the activities they were
contracted to do. As both sides were increasingly desperate for the agreements to
succeed, compromises resulted in which Suzuki either paid more than it had
previously been prepared to or disguised costs by leasing suppliers technology or by
paying for the purchase of licenses, and on the other side the 5pc profit charge was
squeezed to nearer 1 or 2pc as suppliers were keen to secure the business. Where the
localisation of production was envisaged the contracts would include specific cost
reductions to account for the cheaper costs associated with local manufacturing rather
than importing parts from Japan.
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With respect to quality Suzuki examined its potential suppliers very closely.
In general Suzuki stipulated as a condition of contracting a supplier that it introduced
quality assurance systems such as the ISO 9000 series. However, in reality quality
control of suppliers was devolved to its Japanese suppliers from which the local
suppliers purchased licenses. Thus licensers were responsible for testing and
checking the quality of parts assembled in Hungary. Also all agreements included a
clause that if the quality of supplies from the local firms was inadequate the Japanese
partner would fly in replacement parts at their expense. This meant that Suzuki's
Japanese suppliers showed a close interest in their licensees and sent over experts
several times a year (at the expense of the Hungarian firms) to check the quality of
local assembly operations and also of sub-suppliers. Clearly concerns over quality in
local firms delayed the localisation of production and where localisation took place
the Japanese firms had to guarantee quality. In practice the Japanese partners
controlled the machines and the production processes in the Hungarian firms.
Suzuki's Hungarian suppliers were also struck by the Japanese approach to
reliability and other supply issues. The contracts between Suzuki and its suppliers
stipulated 'just-in-time' delivery (the frequency depended on the volume of production
at Esztergom). The contracts also included a clause that the supplier was liable for all
costs resulting from a disruption of production due to late delivery. As a consequence
all the local suppliers maintained a reserve inventory of finished products (of up to 4
days of production) in case of production problems, a cost they were unable to pass
onto Suzuki directly. Through its relations with its suppliers Suzuki was also able to
place the burden of storing unfinished goods on local firms. Thus those firms which
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assembled components from parts shipped from Japan were squeezed by their
suppliers and Suzuki. As the volume of production increased more slowly than was
intended, shipments from Japan to local suppliers occurred at infrequent intervals -
often once every three months - but they were required to supply just-in-time'. In this
way Suzuki passed on the cost of storing unfinished components on to its Hungarian
suppliers - which were not well positioned to account for the financial burden.
Hungarian firms were also struck by some of the other conditions that Suzuki placed
on them. In all cases the supplier was responsible for the transportation of the parts to
Suzuki's factory and in some cases suppliers were requested to alter or design
completely new forms of packaging and storage to permit ease of transportation and
enable parts to be shipped straight to the line without the need for additional handling.
In addition to the licensing agreements, at the end of 1993 the first joint
venture involving a Japanese component firm was announced. Its significance was
further enhanced as it was the first agreement with a private Hungarian company as
opposed to all the others with large state enterprises dating from the soviet era. The
joint venture established Daikan-Bakany in Tatabanya to assemble clutches for
Suzuki. However, whilst there were plans to manufacture some of the parts for the
clutches in Hungary in the future the business plan involved the assembly of parts, all
of which would be imported from Japan. It remained to be seen whether a joint
venture would result in more genuine localisation than seemed likely with the
licensing agreements but Bakany held out the long term hope that it would
manufacture some 9Opc of the clutches in Hungary.
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To those firms which were designated as offipial suppliers, the Japanese firm
offered the prospect of a long term mutually beneficial business relationship. The
suppliers characterised the relationship more as a technical assistance agreement
rather than a standard contract between an assembler and a component producer.
Thus the contracts that were signed between Suzuki and local suppliers were
open-ended and efforts to develop a co-operative relationship were evident. Suzuki
set up a three month long supplier development course funded jointly by IJNIDO and
the Japanese government to work especially closely with 12 suppliers which aimed to
develop Japanese production methods in the fields of quality assurance and team
working in particular. More generally Suzuki was also a leading force behind the
establishment of the Hungarian Association of Automotive Component Companies
which was designed to raise the quality standards of the local supply base.
Intriguingly the other stated purpose of the Association was to facilitate Hungarian
suppliers to find customers other than Suzuki to enable them to become more
financially secure owing to larger production runs. The Association - which was
entirely funded by the fees of the 30 members (comprising traditional as well as new
component producers and consultants) - provided advice and services connected to
quality assurance systems, investment financing, and foreign business contacts.
Suzuki hoped too that the Association would lobby the Hungarian government for
assistance and would co-ordinate applications to the various industrial development
funds that existed.
The relationship between Suzuki and its local suppliers became closer in the
face of adversity. To assist local firms to finance capital investment so that Suzuki
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could develop a local supply base the Hungarian government underwrote a Japanese
loan through Eximbank which was to be disbursed by Hungarian commercial banks to
Suzuki's suppliers. However, owing to the risky business environment the Hungarian
banks did not pass on the 'soft' repayment terms connected to the loan which meant
that Hungarian suppliers dare not take the loans at such high interest rates whilst
Magyar Suzuki had yet to increase the volume of production. The result was a
chronic shortage of capital amongst the suppliers which hindered the purchase of
licences and technology. In response Suzuki began in certain circumstances to offer
to pay for the purchase of licenses to enable local sourcing of significant products
such as the starter motor. In addition Suzuki started a scheme of purchasing capital
goods (machine tools) and locating them in supplier factories to increase local
content. Where this took place the costings of supply contracts took this into account
and included a clause that after a certain production volume the ownership of the
capital goods were to be transferred to the supplier.
However, despite the closeness of the links and the prospect of a long term
relationship, many of Suzuki's Hungarian suppliers were critical of the behaviour of
the Japanese firm. First, many were critical of Suzuki's insistence that they had to
purchase licences before being given official supplier status, feeling that in many
cases they were capable of producing the part to the required standard. Some felt that
this stipulation undermined Hungarian businesses by sucking them dry of precious
funds for capital investment. They expressed concern too that Suzuki was more
interested in protecting its Japanese suppliers' businesses rather than assisting in the
creation of a low-cost high quality supply base that would be in competition with its
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existing suppliers in Japan. It was noticeable in the light of this that where licence
agreements were reached they placed restrictions on local firms. In almost all cases
the contracts made between Suzuki, its Japanese supplier and the Hungarian supplier
in practice, if not in theory, prevented the Hungarian firm from supplying other
Suzuki plants across the world. Other licence agreements for the production of
generic products which could be sold to other car manufacturers, such as shock
absorbers, prevented Hungarian suppliers from supplying customers in western
Europe. In effect the licences meant that the European market was divided into two,
permitting the I lungarian firms the chance to develop markets in east and central
Europe but leaving the Japanese firm free to supply customers in western Europe.
The result of such a procedure was to place limits on the development of Suzuki's
Hungarian suppliers. Thus it remained to be seen whether the Hungarian firms which
had purchased Japanese technology would be in a position to derive the maximum
advantage from it.
Thus much remained to be done to create a low cost high quality supplier
network in Hungary. However, Suzuki pledged to continue with the development of
a local supply base and reach 6Opc 'local content' but it would not predict when it
would reach that figure. The overwhelming need for Suzuki to achieve this figure, to
allow preferential access to the EC market and to cut the costs of transporting parts
from Japan, led it to put pressure on the Hungarian government to help potential
suppliers open lines of credit from Japanese Eximbank worth HUF 3.5 billion.
Suzuki felt that the uncertain privatisation process and the banks, which were not
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passing on the benefits of the soft loan facility to manufactvring firms, were hindering
the development of the supply base.
In turn the Japanese firms' cautious approach involving licenses rather than
acquisitions stood to limit the sector's development. The indebtedness of most state
owned firms and the cost of purchasing a Japanese license to produce sufficient parts
for only 60,000 vehicles in the medium term at least, meant that for many the
agreements were not considered to be viable. Despite the offer of credit from
Japanese finance houses, including C.Itoh which had an ii Pc share holding in
Magyar Suzuki, the privatisation process made the securing of credit difficult. A
further problem that might yet develop for Suzuki arose from the agreements' limited
scope emphasising technology transfer without the associated practices and methods
that it expected from its suppliers in Japan. Therefore, the extent to which the
Hungarian firms would be able to meet Suzuki's requirements and, indeed, the power
that Suzuki would have to enforce them remained in doubt.
Volkswagen Sachsen GmbH
Volkswagen's early and rapid expansion into eastern Germany formed an
integral part of its broader, pan-European strategy, as it sought to move not only car
assembly but also component manufacture and procurement out of its high-cost bases
in west Germany. But it also played a politically significant symbolic role (see Swain
1992a). However, as the project developed VW began to present it as not only the
latest re-location from a high- to a low-cost economy but also the establishment of a
new' (at least to Germany) production system. In particular VW publicised its
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investment in the new Lander as an exercise in 'lean pro.duction'. Two innovative
strategies were woven into its plans. First, the assembly plant was to have a low level
of vertical integration and place emphasis on developing a cluster of local suppliers
around the plant to supply modules just-in-time to the assembly line. Second, the
plant was to introduce a new system of labour organisation (see chapter 6).
With links to the IFA-Kombinate, and SAW in particular, dating from the
mid-I 980s, and as political change accelerated, VW began to look for potential
investment opportunities. However, instead of acquiring SAW with its 11,500
workers and obsolete product it began an elaborate strategy designed to 'green' a
'brownfield' site and to invest in Zwickau without assuming the liabilities of the
Trabant maker (see below and chapter 6). In December 1989, a month after the fall
of the Berlin Wall, VW established a joint venture, VW-IFA-PKW GmbH, in which
it had a 5Opc stake, with IFA-PKW to prepare passenger car production in Zwickau.
In due course the joint venture was transformed into a wholly owned subsidiary of
VW. At the same time VW Sachsen Immobilienverwaltungs GmbH was established
to purchase a site next to SAW's most modern facility in Mosel (Mosel I) and to begin
the construction of a DM4.6 billion integrated car assembly plant (Mosel II) to
employ 5,800 and produce 250,000 vehicles per year from 1994 onwards.
Also in December 1989 a joint venture, Sächsische Automobilbau GmbH
(SAB), was formed by the THA and VW to establish a temporary assembly operation
in Mosel I. Although VW had management control of the joint venture the THA had
In the mean time SAW was broken up and ultimately liquidated by the THA (see below and
chapter 6).
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an 87.5pc stake in it. SAB commenced the assembly of CKD VW Polos on SAW's
Trabant assembly line beginning in May 1990. Initially just 50 vehicles a day were
assembled but the volume increased to around 380 per day employing 1,860 on three
shifts. In addition in 1991, two further companies, wholly owned by VW Group,
were established to take over some other IFA-PKW facilities. In June 1991 VW
formed Motorenwerk Chemnitz to acquire and operate the Barkas engine plant that it
had equipped in the mid-1980s (see chapter 4). In addition to the site in Zwickau,
VW Sachsen Immobilienverwaltungs purchased a site adjacent to the Chemnitz
factory and began to construct a new engine plant. Also Zylinderkopffertigung
Elsenach GmbH was formed in December 1992 to acquire and operate a cylinder
head facility formerly owned by AWE (see Automobil-Produktion 1993).
In the summer of 1992 the first part of the new assembly plant, Mosel II, was
opened and accompanied the establishment of another wholly owned company, VW
Sachsen GmbH (incorporating the plants at Chemnitz and Eisenach), to operate the
new production facilities. However, in early 1993, with VW having embarked on a
huge investment programme not only in eastern Germany but also in the Czech
Republic, the German recession forced it to delay investment and postpone the
complete opening of Mosel II until 1997.
The presence of the West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, at the laying of
the foundation stone of Mosel II in September 1990 (prior to unification) indicated
the political significance of the investment. Not least the speed of VW's investment
in Sachsen helped, in part, to underpin the West German government's demands for
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rapid unification. Crucially VW's commitment to east Gejmany helped to legitimise
the privatisation process and the THA (see Hahn 1992). In particular the assembly of
VW cars in a plant which had only just stopped production of the Trabant signified
the prospect of a painless transition from a planned to a democratic market economy.
VW's investment was thus a 'carrot', an early tangible result of the process of German
unity and symbolised the bright future that lay ahead for the new Lander in a united
Germany as they sped towards the levels of prosperity enjoyed in the west. The
investment was therefore closely linked to the west German state. First, the THA
guaranteed to cover any losses resulting from the temporary CKD operation. Second,
various state bodies contributed DM 1.3 billions worth of subsidies and incentives
towards the cost of building Mosel II. In total the west German state agreed to
contribute 4Opc of VW's anticipated DM 5 billion investment in eastern Germany
(Indusiriernagazin 1990)
VW's symbolic role was not lost on the company either; Carl Hahn, VW's
chairman at the time, and himself from the Zwickau area, believed the project enabled
VW 'to fulfil a role that is not only industrial but political too' (quoted in Financial
Times, 13 March 1990). After VW had been accused of being guided by a
philanthropic logic, Hahn defended VW's investment in Saxony as follows:
'We have taken on a commitment in eastern Germany... for reasons close to
our hearts in all respects. We were not guided by altruism - rather by feelings
of national, or better national economic, responsibility. Something which all
of us as entrepreneurs have to accept. But basically it was sober calculation
which induced us to go into... Saxony'. (Hahn, 1992, 2)
221
i]uis statement could not hide the extent to which VW's involvement in the
new Lander was more than just another investment project. However, VW was also
committed to the introduction of 'lean production' in the new plant. Not least this
centred on the establishment of an efficient local supplier base. Thus VW Sachsen's
symbolic and industrial role was fused in a commilment to the region under the
banners of VW in Sachsen and Eine Region formiert sich neu (A region is rebuilding
itself). In addition VW invited local people to identify in the company under the
banner of Ich gehore dazu (I belong to it). As a result the company publicly
emphasised its close and co-operative relationship with local Mayors and the local
authorities. VW involvement in and commitment to the region was highly publicised
(see for example VW Sachsen GmbH eta!. 1992, Autornobil-Produktion 1993).
By 1993 the VW Group claimed to employ directly and indirectly 28,550
people in eastern Germany. This figure comprised 3,300 working for VW Sachsen,
12.207 other employees in the new Lander working in dealerships and transportation,
660 in direct suppliers to Mosel and another 12,300 in component producers which
supplied the VW Group. VW also particularly emphasised the role it played in
improving the local infrastructure for the benefit of the entire region. Thus by March
1993 VW had earmarked DM5O3m for seven different local infrastructural projects.
VW's role in eastern Germany illustrated the way unification depended on
'foreign' investment to establish not only a new industrial structure but also a new and
It was also instructive that in the course of the early 1990s VW played down its co-operative
relationship with the increasingly unpopular Treuhandanstalt.
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dillerent pattern of state responsibilities and a new politics of the workplace (see also
chapter 6). 1 lere however we consider the logistical system pursued in Saxony.
Supplier relations
From the mid-1970s onwards VW began to source components from the
GDR. Between 1975 and 1989 VW procured components worth DM718 million. In
1990 parts worth DM175 million were purchased from suppliers in the (ex-)GDR. As
a result VW already had established links with GDR suppliers at the time of the
We,ide. However, the disruption to the production system arising from the
termination of passenger car assembly and the TI-JA's reorganisation of the sector
forced VW effectively to start from scratch. With production halted and with
suppliers in rapid need of alternative business, VW enjoyed a monopolistic position
and an opportunity to refashion the assembler-supplier relationship. At the same time
there developed a group of dependent suppliers that sought VW's largesse. VW,
initially with IFA-Kombinate, arranged a series of conferences for suppliers at the
same time as persuading its traditional suppliers in West Germany to acquire THA
owned eastern producers or establish greenfield facilities. In this way VW played a
highly important role in encouraging investment in component suppliers but also a
highly interventionist role by establishing the preconditions for the future
development of the industry. In particular VW legitimated the positions taken by the
THA regarding reorganisation and restructuring, agreeing in some cases only to
contract suppliers after 'satisfactory' rationalisation and restructuring plans had been
implemented.
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In total VW helped 97 east German firms to find str. tegic investors. This was
achieved in four ways (see Autornobil-Produktion 1993). In the first half of 1990 VW
established a know-how-transfer programme between 109 of its west German
suppliers and 73 parts producers in the GDR. Second, VW increased its procurement
from east Germany from DM175 million in 1990 to DM1.lbn in 1991. In 1992
procurement increased to DM 1 .9bn. Third, VW signed letters of intent relating to
future supply contracts with some producers. Fourth, VW sought western partners for
east German producers. By the end of 1992 VW had granted official supplier status
to 54 firms in east Germany. Collectively these firms supplied DM458 million worth
of original equipment material. By March 1993 the number of official VW suppliers
in the new Lander had increased to 87. In sum these enterprises employed 12,300
workers and supplied all four VW marques. Over half of the suppliers were located
in Saxony (45), east Germany's industrial heartland and historic centre of the
automotive industry. A further 24 suppliers were located in Thuringia (see Map 5.9).
This gave an indication of the concentration of automotive firms in the south-west of
eastern Germany. However, the industry was also concentrated at the local scale.
Thus in 1993 there were 13 component producers (there were others supplying
auto-related services) located in the Zwickau region alone. Collectively these
employed 2,493 workers and had earmarked investment worth USD 141 million in
the local area (see Table 5.16). Of these 13 auto-parts firms in Zwickau region, ten
supplied VW Mosel and one other supplied other VW plants. In the light of VW's
emphasis on mimicking Toyota's logistical system the clustering of suppliers in
Saxony in general and the Zwickau region in particular was significant (See map 5.8)
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Owing to the construction of a 'lean' plant (vertical integration was 25pc at
Mosel compared to 43pc at Wolfsburg) the supply base and logistical system was
particularly important to the project. In particular VW Sachsen placed great emphasis
on modular sourcing and just-in-time' production and delivery. Crucially, at the time
of the project's formulation VW equated just-in-time' logistics with the need to have a
cluster of subassembly suppliers located around the assembly plant. Whilst this
approach was in part a reflection of east Germany's poor infrastructure (supplies
shipped by rail from Wolfsburg were frequently disrupted in the first two years of
operation), it also reflected VW's view that a Toyota-style clustering of suppliers
would increase efficiency. As a result VW stated that:
"The development of an efficient supplier industry in the region is... essential
to enable production to be optimised to the fullest extent possible, for our
advanced manufacturing concepts and high quality standards can be realised
only if our operations are backed by reliable suppliers."
VW Annual Report 1991,27 (emphasis added)
Initially, VW intended to establish the just-in-time' supply of 60 parts and
sub-assemblies. However, once investment was postponed and VW altered its
purchasing strategy the number of JIT projects was reduced. As a result only eight
sub-assemblies were produced synchronously and delivered to the line just-in-time'
by 1993 (see Table 5.17). Mosel's own logistics department was responsible for the
eight JIT projects and the other supply contacts were managed by VW Wolfsburg. In
most cases VW externalised parts of the assembly operation, such as the front-end and
the instrument panel, which were intemalised within other VW assembly plants.
Given that externalisation placed great responsibility onto suppliers, VW selected its
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most long standing partners, such as Hella and VDO, to participate in the JIT projects.
However, externalisation was only partial. As the suppliers carried out operations
that VW did itself elsewhere, VW remained closely involved. Thus VW in some
cases organised and managed the suppliers' logistics, including for example
negotiations and contracts with sub-suppliers. This meant that VW had an intimate
knowledge of the costs of each operation which made it difficult for the suppliers to
increase profit margins without VW noticing and demanding a corresponding
reduction in prices. The suppliers did not have standard contracts with VW but were
given guarantees that they would supply the part for the length of the production run
of the Golf III. The price VW paid was not agreed on a cost per unit plus profit basis
but rather on an anticipated volume over a period of time plus profit. Thus
agreements were made on the understanding that VW would open the new plant in
1994 and increase production from 400 units per day to 1,200. However, as
production volumes did not increase in line with expectations, suppliers found
themselves in a difficult financial situation as unit costs remained high. This was just
one example of the way the extemalisation of production transferred risk and
uncertainty from VW and on to its suppliers. Crucially however, VW had to pay a
cost for this advantage. Thus when the JIT project agreements were signed VW did
not always pick the firm which offered the lowest price.
To ensure security of supply the company encouraged suppliers to locate
within a 30km radius of Mosel. However, given the emphasis that VW placed on the
modular sourcing of bulky sub-assemblies, such as the dashboard and the front-end,
and the transferral of the responsibility and the cost of delivery on to suppliers, there
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were some traditional reasons, based on neo-classical economics, for suppliers to
locate close to Mosel. Moreover, proximate location forced the suppliers to depend
upon VW Sachsen which permitted VW to dictate strict supplying conditions (see
Jagler 1990). However, VW was also fearful of over-concentration. As a result it
instructed its suppliers not to locate too close to Mosel and thus risk creating a labour
shortage and wage inflation. In addition to the eight JIT projects a further eight
components and subassemblies were delivered just-in-time to a Logistics centre,
owned and managed by the suppliers, that was located in Gauchau, 5km north of
Mosel. Components were stored at the centre before being delivered just-in-time to
the assembly plant.
I laying established a cluster of suppliers around the assembly plant, VW
Saehsen procured a portion of its inputs from the local area and beyond, elsewhere in
east Germany. Thus VW Sachsen procured DM20 million (including DM4m on
services) worth of components from eastern Germany in 1991; in 1992 this increased
to DM40million (including DM8m on services) (Automobil-Produklion 1992, 68).
However, whilst the volume of production remained small, the impact of local
sourcing was relatively insignificant. Thus the eight modular just-in-time suppliers
employed just 380 people on production for VW Mosel in 1993 and collectively had
invested DM25.3million (see Table 5.17). This meant that when added to the 2,400
employees at VW Sachsen's Mosel plant the investment employed 2,780 in the
Zwickau region. The importance of these modular suppliers was further undermined
as they were assembly plants with low levels of value added. In addition, the supplier
plants carried out operations that elsewhere would be undertaken in a conventional
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assembly plant. Thus these suppliers merely compensatçd for the lower level of
activity in VW's assembly plant. In addition the logistics centre employed 100 people
and represented a DM3.5million investment. VW Mosel also sourced parts from 20
other plants in east Germany which collectively employed 3,710 at the end of 1992
(see Table 5.18). This meant that at the beginning of 1993 VW Sachsen's
procurement from the new Lander employed 4,090, or around one third of the total
for VW Group as a whole. It seemed unlikely therefore that the project would ever
create the 35,000 jobs that VW anticipated in 1990 (Swain 1992a).
VW thus established a cluster of suppliers around the assembly plant and
developed very close links between itself and its favoured suppliers. To achieve this
VW had to reduce market co-ordination (based on price) and in some respects
introduce elements of a planned approach; co-ordination of its key suppliers was
separated from the market and was bureaucratised. Thus in the course of trying to
impose 'lean production' from above it established an unwieldy and inflexible
organisation that was not as efficient as had been expected. One example of the
inefficiency of the system was the way suppliers were encouraged to operate on a
three minute cycle time (since this was how the VW assembly line worked) even
though the assembly of some modules could have been more rapid and more efficient
as a result. Thus synchronous production mean that suppliers were too closely
integrated with VW's assembly line. As a result of a change in VW Group's
purchasing strategy in the course of 1993, in which 'global sourcing' was adopted, the
emphasis placed on clusters of suppliers was reduced.
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5.3.2 Automotive component capital in Hungary and eastern Germany
Hungary
To capitalise upon its tradition in component production, and as part of its
strategy to become a car manufacturing country, Hungary sought to attract automotive
component producers which would establish it as a centre of automotive production at
the periphery of the EU and at the bridgehead to new potential markets further east.
In addition to Suzuki and GM-Opel's investments in car assembly, USDIbn was
invested in component production between 1990 and 1994 in 24 separate ventures.
Collectively the investments represented 76pc of all auto related investment attracted
to the country. Individually the investments and ventures varied considerably both in
the way they were embedded into the local economy and in the way they fitted into
international productionfiuières. In this way the projects indicated the way Hungary
became integrated into the global capitalist economy.
In terms of their relationship to the local economy two very different types of
ventures were established, indicative of two quite different development paths. The
first type of venture was the (mostly) license agreements which involved Japanese
firms and local producers as part of the Suzuki project which aimed to establish a
localised production system (Table 5.8). The second type, by far the most significant
in terms of capital and jobs, was largely 1 OOpc foreign owned production facilities
linked into pan-European production systems with few local industrial linkages, or in
other words the development of a classic branch plant economy. Having examined
the attempt to establish a localised production system above, this section considers the
significance of the branch plants.
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Amongst the second type of investments there were two noticeable trends: a
specialisation in the production of engines/parts and of electrical components. The
manufacturing of these two very different types of part implied quite different
production processes with different local implications. The production of engines and
engine parts involved capital intensive production processes which required
continuous rostering systems and a labour market able to supply a core of skilled
workers and pliant labour which could be trained as operators. In terms of job
creation, the electrical plants were far more significant than engine production. These
plants involved the production (mostly) of low value-added labour intensive electrical
and lighting components largely employing low skilled, female workers. The
predominance of these two sorts of ventures had important implications not only for
regional development but also for the sorts of regulation demanded by a private sector
dominated by influential foreign auto firm managers which in turn helped to shape
perceptions of 'realistic' economic development strategies.
The two largest component investments by value were the two engine
ventures by GM and Audi. In 1992 GM Hungary, in addition to its CKD car
operation, began manufacturing up to 200,000 units per year of a new model of
engine at Szentgotthard to be supplied to GM Europe's production system. This was
followed by a USD213m investment by VW-Audi in a new engine plant at Gyor to
produce 220,000 engine cylinder heads employing 200. In a similar vein to GM,
Audi imported the castings from its forges in west Germany and exported the
finished cylinder heads back to its plants in Germany. Both these plants were
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grccnlicld' 'enclaves' isolated from the industrial transformation of the country with
fiw industrial or local linkages of significance. In the case of GM this was poignantly
indicated by its status as a custom free zone just metres from the Austrianborder.
The investments involving the production of electrical components were
dominated by four plants which produced car wiring harnesses with imported inputs
for west European customers. The largest investment was made by United
Technologies Automotive (UTA) which built a USD10 million wiring harness plant
in Gödöllö near Budapest which began production early in 1993 employing 500
workers, producing primarily for Citroen. Packard Electric (a subsidiary of GM) also
established a plant to assemble wiring harnesses for GM Europe in Szombathey near
the Austrian border employing 400 people. A German cable company, Michels, built
a USDIm greenfield plant in Mór employing 350 people. The final wire harness
plant was established by an Austrian-Hungarian joint venture called
Kromberg-Schubert Kft located in Koszeg, also on the Austrian border, which
supplied Mercedes Benz in Germany.
There were two other investments in electrical components which differed
from those mentioned above. Ford's greenfield plant involved the production of more
modern and higher value-added products and combined it with innovative business
practices (see below). In some respects then the investment mirrored those by GM
and Audi in requiring an environment suited to capital intensive continuous flow
manufacturing. The largest electrical investment was made by General Electric when
in 1990 it took over Tungsram, one of Europe's largest light bulb producers, and
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I lungary's most successful state owned enterprise. Following the take over, GE
concentrated its automotive lighting division, incorporating Thorn EMI Lighting, at
the company in order to turn Tungsram into GE's European-wide centre of automotive
lighting manufacture. This was a rare example of a foreign investor attempting to
modernise a former state-run firm.
All these plants were established as responses to the restructuring of the
supply chain as west European car assemblers sought to reduce the number of direct
suppliers, resulting in the emergence of a small number of large plants capable of
supplying the entire industry. At the same time automobile manufacturers were
comparing the advantages of sourcing parts internally or externally from independent
suppliers. Within those two broader trends the plants in Hungary represented the
location of capital intensive and labour intensive stages of the supply chain. They
were largely separate from the indigenous engineering sector and did not foster an
environment likely to have much modernising impact on it.
In these ways foreign investment helped to shape a Hungarian automotive
component industry which could be seen to fit into three divergent development
paths. The first was the portion of the sector which was bypassed by foreign
investment and which struggled to adapt to the new economic environment. The
second development was the establishment of a supply base which lacked capital
inputs and which was very dependent upon just one relatively small customer,
Magyar Suzuki. The third development was the formation of a new foreign owned
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component sector in 1-lungary which was functionally integrated into and sustained by
pan-European production systems.
Eastern Germany
Eastern Germany differed from Hungary in crucial ways which helped to
shape the sorts of investment that were located in the country and the local effects
they subsequently had. Unlike Hungary, East Germany had a component sector that
comprised 30 small producers which formed part of a national industry controlled by
the IFA-Kombinate. The privatisation process (which resulted in the dismantling of
IFA and the termination of production) cast adrift supplier firms from the production
system. With the complete disintegration of the old GDR automotive industry, the
only option open to hard pressed managers, other than liquidation, was to seek
integration into (principally) the west German component sector. In the absence of
any other alternative there followed a tbeauty' contest in which individual plants
sought to attract the affection of foreign (mostly west German) firms. The outcome of
this competition in large part reflected both the different positions the plants filled in
the Kombinale (facilities had different access to foreign technology, investment and
foreign trade rights) and restructuring in the west German component sector. There
were two rounds of investment which differed in volume and the ways in which they
fitted into corporate strategies as opinions on both the likely course of development of
the new Lander and the strategic restructuring of the European car industry altered.
The first round of investment by car component producers, between
1989-1992, was buoyed by the investments by VW and GM-Opel, and expectations
233
that the new Lander would become and remain for some tjme a low cost production
location within a high cost Germany and a gateway to potential markets further east.
In addition the west German car component industry was expanding rapidly,
following the surge in car sales generated by monetary union, with employment in the
sector rising to a peak of 788,000 in 1991. In such a period of enthusiasm, during
which firms either relegated the prospect of rationalisation as part of Europeanwide
restructuring or used it as a pretext for investment, large European component
makers, such as Bosch and GKN, moved quickly to purchase attractive, relatively
modern, large production facilities, in these cases FER and GWM respectively, with
sales across both parts of Europe. Such investments tended to form part of corporate
strategies which aimed to establish large production centres in relatively low cost
locations which could be used to supply assemblers directly (or through subassembly
plants) across the whole of Europe. At the same time there were a number of smaller
investments by some of the larger traditional VW suppliers, for example Siemens,
I lella, and VDO, which established small facilities for the sole purpose of supplying
modules and systems in small volumes to VW Sachsen at Zwickau (see below). In
many cases these projects involved the purchase or leasing of small existing buildings
but in some cases, such as the seat manufacturers Naue and Lear Nossag which
combined both the pan-European and local strategy, built large new facilities on
greenfield sites. It is instructive to note too, that both Naue and Lear, established US
firms, used these opportunities to enter the European car sector for the first time.
The second round of investment, in the period after 1992, took place after the
most attractive enterprises had already been sold by the Treuhand and after VW had
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indicated that its scheduled investment in Saxony wou'd be postponed until the
German car market recovered. In spite of the investment that took place shortly after
unification the sector in the new Lander remained peripheral to the west German
automotive industry. In large part this reflected the distinctive structure of the
German components industry in which the Mitteistand predominated. The size, the
regional concentration, and their loyalty often to just one car manufacturer, meant that
the Miuteistand tended to avoid risk and were hence reluctant to invest in volatile east
Germany. At the same time, the distraction posed by the post-unification boom began
to wane and force firms to consider some structural problems that faced the industry
in Germany as a result of being in a high-cost country increasingly under pressure
from lower cost competitors. Thus it was significant that two concerns which
particularly troubled west German suppliers, high labour costs - in 1992 labour costs
per hour in west Germany were DM47.04 per compared with DM33.30 and DM26.16
in Japan and the UK respectively - and hours of work - 1,487 in west Germany
compared to 2,181 and 1,830 in Japan and the UK - could be overcome, at least in the
short term, by shifting production to the new Lander (VDA 1993). To facilitate
investment, especially by the west German Mitteistand, both state owned firms and
the selling procedure were transformed to make new Lander seem more attractive.
The dynamics of the second round of investment were significantly different
from earlier ventures in that they often involved the purchase of 'empty shells' rather
than going concerns (see chapter 4). The 'empty shell' investments involved foreign
firms purchasing the name of a state-owned producer in east Germany but without
becoming the official successor of the firm in the eyes of the law. This type of take
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over allowed investors to buy buildings at knockdown price, and with considerable
state support; to choose the size of the workforce, which in legal terms became a new
workforce with fewer employment rights than would otherwise been the case; to
escape responsibility for the rest of the original employees - such as paying
redundancy benefit; and to avoid the burden of environmental liabilities. In these
respects 'empty shell' investments resembled greenfield projects albeit often utilising
existing buildings.
The advent of the sale of 'empty shells' to foreign investors coincided with not
only political pressures to tighten up the sales procedures used by the Treuhand but
also a severe recession in the west German car industry. These conditions, and the
business culture of the Milteistand which inclined them to look to invest in
'going-concerns' (which effectively did not exist), reduced investment and
undermined the integration of the east German sector into the German and European
car industries.
In total some USD 1 .2bn of automotive component investment flowed into
eastern Germany in the early 1 990s, representing some 22pc of all auto investment
and creating or safeguarding more than 13,651 jobs 6. The vast majority of investment
was made by German firms which either saw their ventures as concrete evidence of
the efficacy of unification for east German citizens, or were simply cost-led, seeing
the new Lander as a low cost location without the labour market rigidities found in
6 Precise calculations of investment in the component sector in the new Under are impossible
owing to the Treuhandanstalts willingness to include non-binding investment guarantees in the data it
provides.
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western Germany. The next largest source of capital was JS companies which used
unification to gain a foothold in Europe's largest car market. Other investments by
non-German firms were made by large component firms, such as GKN (UK) and
Valeo (France), as part of the Europeanisation of the component industry.
In contrast to Hungary, the geographical spread of investment in the new
Lander was highly regionally concentrated. In large part this reflected different paths
of transformation in the two countries. Whereas investment in 1-lungary largely
bypassed local producers, in East Germany of the 67 main investments only seven did
not involve taking over or forming a venture with a local production facility. As a
result the investment flowed to locations with a tradition in the industry. The irony of
this situation should not be lost: it was the total dismantling of the GDR production
systems that made investment attractive in the traditional automotive regions of
eastern Germany. In consequence investment in the component industry in the new
Lander mirrored the pattern of regional concentration in western Germany, with
concentrations around Dresden, Zwickau, Leipzig and western Thuringia.
As in Hungary the largest volume of capital (39pc) that flowed into the
country involved the production of engines, engines parts and clutches. However, the
electrical and lighting sector represented only l4pc of capital but involved the
creation of 2,600 jobs. Other sectors which were significant job creators were tool
making, suspension and steering and forged part making. Another important
difference from Hungary was the scope of the investments. Collectively the
investments were more varied in terms of the products - which included research and
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development and logistics functions - and the way they fitted into transnational
production structures. The developing component sector was thus very different from
that in 1-lungary and would have significantly different implications in terms of paths
of economic development.
The biggest investment in terms of capital was made by VW which began
building a USD400m engine plant in Chemnitz employing and intended to employ
550 people. However, as was the case with the assembly plant in Zwickau, problems
specific to VW and the recession in the car market forced the company to delay the
investment schedule. The second largest project was Bosch's take over of FER, a
producer of electrical components with facilities in Eisenach and Brotterode. In
addition it constructed a new greenfield plant at Eisenach and employed in total 2,200
in eastern Germany. Phoenix purchased Gummiwerke Thuringia and invested
USD86 in the third largest project in the region and gutted and reclaimed the
buildings and installed new technology to improve the production of rubber parts and
to increase production and create up to 1,000 jobs.
As has been indicated throughout this section the investments in Hungary and
eastern Germany by component producers were connected to the restructuring
processes in the European auto industry (see Chapter two). The investments posed an
opportunity to introduce and experiment with new management techniques, not least
with respect to supplier relationships and logistics. To examine in more detail some
of the ways in which investors used the conditions generated by transformation
processes to refashion local and global supply linkages we examine in depth the
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investments by GKN which purchased GWM from the 7-euhandansial! in eastern
Germany and first, Ford's greenfield plant in Hungary.
Ford Hun garia
Ford was alone amongst the large car assemblers in not investing in car
manufacturing in ECE (Sadler et al., 1993). This was due to over capacity and its
'After Japan' restructuring programme at its west European plants. The company had
however already decided to produce in-house a new generation of electrical
components, including fuel pumps, ignition coils and starter motors, which had
previously been supplied by Bosch and Nippondenso, when location in ECE became
a possibility. Instead of locating the plant in Portugal, which had been provisionally
agreed, the company sought to use the new opportunities to locate in Hungary on
favourable terms. Thus locating in Hungary was not simply an example of moving
production from one higher cost location to another cheaper one but was integral to
Ford's sourcing strategy in which the boundaries between firms within supply chains
were shifted7 . Nevertheless, investment in Hungary offered the prospect of cheaper
labour than anywhere in western Europe and, in the short term at least, preferential
access to a virgin market. In a further innovative move Ford's investment in Hungary
for the first time brought together the firm's manufacturing and sales organisations in
the same subsidiary.
In the general process of increasingly outsoucing components by all major car assemblers Ford
pursued a strategy of strategically internalising the production of certain parts, including for example
seats. that were previously outsourced.
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Ford's USD120 million investment in a greenfielçl plant on the edges of
Székesfehérvár, to the west of Budapest, was agreed at the end of 1989 when the
Hungarian government still insisted that foreign firms' investments had a neutral
effect on the country's balance of trade (in hard currencies). Thus Ford's access to the
protected Hungarian market depended on generating counter-trade by investing in
local manufacturing for export. Despite this condition, which begs the question as to
whether Ford would have invested in local manufacturing in the absence of the
counter-trade rule, some rules on investment had been altered. Thus whereas Suzuki
and GM-Opel had been forced to set up joint ventures, Ford was permitted to build a
greenfield plant without a local partner. It was this 'freedom' to exclude a local
partner which made Hungary the favoured location as it was the only ECE country to
allow such an investment at the time. The success of the project depended on Ford's
ability to insulate the plant from Hungary's low quality state owned industry. Ford
was offered a suitable 'greenfield' site with relatively good communications adjacent
to Videoton, Hungary's largest state owned manufacturer of consumer electronic
goods and components, with a local labour market over-supplied with skilled
engineers and operators.
A further inducement to Ford was the government's offer of a 10 year tax
exemption, a deal it had also offered Suzuki and GM-Opel. This was on top of the
market access agreement that gave all three investors a 23pc price advantage in the
market, in the form of an import duty exemption in return for establishing local
manufacturing facilities. However, after the EU complained about 'unfair' market
access the Hungarian government removed the advantage for local producers. This
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severely harmed Ford since of the three major investors itwas the only one without
local car assembly capacity and had no way of avoiding import duty. As a
consequence Ford complained that the government had disproportionately
discriminated against it since Suzuki and GM-Opel continued to enjoy certain tax
advantages. In turn the government sought to placate Ford by drawing up regulations
for the import of vans which effectively meant that Ford Transit vans could be bought
into the country exempt from the duties which applied to similar products. Following
complaints from Ford's competitors through the EU the government was forced to
withdraw the advantage to Ford which continued to negotiate for compensation from
the government.
The factory began producing ignition coils and fuel pumps in early 1992 with
a workforce of 120 building up to 500 by 1995. Soon after production began it was
decided to add starter motors to the product range. The company also held out the
prospect of the eventual production of generators at the factory. The size of the site
certainly allowed for a considerable expansion on the 3 million ignitions and 1.4
million fuel pumps that were produced on three shifts. The plant represented a
strategic shift by Ford from out-sourcing fuel pumps and ignition coils from suppliers
in Japan and Germany to establishing one internal source to supply all of Ford's
requirements throughout Europe. This was counter to the general trend amongst car
manufacturers of increasing out-sourcing. Thus all production was exported to Genk
and Enfield, Ford's two major engine plants in western Europe. In a similar vein late
in 1992 Ford announced plans to remove seat assembly from its various vehicle
assembly operations in western Europe to one plant in Poland.
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Ford used the new plant as a chance to introduce innovative production
techniques in the field of production organisation, logistics and the allocation of
labour (see also chapter 6). In organising production the management introduced
market-type transactions within the plant. Thus different production lines represented
distinctive economic units whose performance was judged according to value-added
and cost. As a consequence relations within the plant became more visible and
governed by the logic (within certain limits) of the market. However, in the field of
logistics crude market based relations were somewhat relegated as elements of
supplier relationships came to the fore. As a result there was the paradox that within
the plant market relations were emphasised whereas its dealings with its suppliers
became more hierarchical as elements other than price were included in management
calculations.
As all the components were imported and all the output exported the plant was
purely an assembly operation. As a result the value-added in the plant was low, with
labour costs a mere 4pc and material costs contributing the vast majority of the
remainder of the plant's costs. At the time of opening the inputs were sourced mainly
from the US (6Opc by value), and Japan with only two suppliers in western Europe.
Ford established a four person auditing team to inspect Hungarian firms but there was
no prospect of contracting Hungarian suppliers which were regarded as years from
meeting Ford's standards 8. The company sought to encourage the localisation of
production, but it regarded localisation as production anywhere in Europe. Thus Ford
A number of contracts with local non-production related suppliers had been terminated by
Ford.
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aimed to have 6Opc European content by the end of 1994. Proximity was, however, an
important consideration since it believed that close suppliers resulted in lower
logistical management and transport costs and a higher level of reliability. In
addition, Ford sought to force suppliers to assume more and more responsibility in the
production process, even to the extent of suppliers managing elements of the process
in its own plant. The rapid development of localisation was promoted by the small
number of major suppliers to the plant. As a result the location of only one or two
suppliers was needed to achieve the target. Ford approached its suppliers and 'invited'
them to consider establishing European (preferably in Hungary) production facilities.
The company also began to co-operate with local authorities and a local industrial
association, primarily in the production of publicity materials, to promote the local
area as a site for inward investment particularly in the auto sector.
At the end of 1992 these efforts culminated in the announcement that the
plant's largest supplier, Loranger, accounting for 6Opc of the value of all inputs, was
to establish a production facility elsewhere in Székesfehérvár. Loranger was a
relatively small firm but Ford's single US source of parts for the major components
needed to produce ignition coils and had a long tradition of supplying Ford. An
indication of the close relationship between the two firms was Ford's participation in
the recruitment and training of Loranger's workforce. Despite localisation, it
remained to be seen exactly how much value-adding process would be located in
Hungary as part of Loranger's investment. What was certain was that whilst
Loranger's plant increased the proportion of the process conducted in Hungary, it did
not increase interaction with indigenous industry. After all the need to 'invite'
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Lorangcr to locate in I lungary was in large part a reflection of the difficulty in
establishing links with domestic producers.
In addition to seeking local supply of parts for the ignition coil, Ford sought to
localise the fuel pump production process. Not least the rise in the value of the Yen
meant that the parts for the fuel pump, which were all sourced from Japan, increased
in price. As a result Ford began to seek suppliers in Spain, Austria and Germany.
The company also intended to source all the components for the starter motors from
firms in western Europe.
Thus Ford continued to have very few linkages with the local economy and as
such resembled a traditional 'branch plant' even if production was divided between
two plants owned by two different companies. The course of events also illustrated
the changes to supply relationships, in which trust and other non-monetary factors
became increasingly significant. This resulted in a 'clan-like' network which posed
almost insurmountable resistance to local producers. In this way Ford experimented
with new forms of mass production which indicated that the dynamic behind
'localisation' implied that local content might not be an adequate reflection of a firm's
local embeddedness. Local sourcing did not necessarily imply a dramatic increase in
local value-adding processes. The project also indicated that its stance would have
wider effects on Ford's supply base in Europe. Thus the planners responsible for
building and managing Ford's new gear box plant at Bordeaux (France) visited
Székesfehérvár to learn from the experience of applying new production philosophies
in Hungary.
244
Gelenkwellenwerk Mosel (GWM) - GKN
GKN, the UK's second largest independent component manufacturer, invested
in eastern Germany as part of its strategy designed to equip it to cope with the
Europeanisation of the car assembly and component sector (Swain 1992a). In the
course of this strategy GKN reorganised itself to establish pan-European centres of
production which specialised in the manufacture of particular parts for supply to the
whole of Europe. In doing so it invested in western Germany to provide a source of
drive shafts - in which it was the world leader - for the west European market.
Following the socio-economic changes in eastern Europe GKN sought to establish a
base to supply drive shafts for the central and east European market.
In early 1991 GKN acquired Gelenkwellenwerk Mosel (GWM) which had
been created by the THA by separating it from SAW (physically and legally). GWM
had been built and equipped in the early 1980s by Peugeot and as such was SAW's
most technically advanced division. However, before GKN's take over, GWM had
been incorporated as an independent company with its own management (which had
come from SAW) which subsequently hindered GKNs plans. GKN paid the THA
DM 4 million for GWM. GWM was one of a vely small number of automotive
producers in the GDR which had an export market in eastern as well as western
Europe. Thus it not only supplied SAW but also Peugeot (a legacy of the GDR
having paid for the plant by supplying the French firm), SKODA, ZAZ and ZCZ
(amongst others). In addition VW, one of GKN's traditional customers, had already
announced its investment next-door at SAW's assembly facility and its intention to
245
construct a new integrated car manufacturing plant. As a resplt VW signed a letter of
intent with GKN indicating its intention to source driveshafts from GWM for the
Mosel plant and also SKODA (by then part of the VW Group).
GKN was thus one of the few investors that acquired a going concern which
still had links with the planned auto industry across eastern Europe. Attached to this
was a considerable level of risk, for even though the THA used links to eastern
Europe as a selling point, the unwinding of the CMEA posed the danger that
customers would be lost. In consequence the THA designed a risk-free package for
GKN. As a result GKN acquired GWM for DM8 million below the value of the
assets - even taking into account the UK firm's willingness to fund 20pc (up to
DM300,000) of ecological clean-up costs. In addition, THA assumed GWM's debt
liability and offered to fund some capital investment. However, more significantly
GKN did not buy the site but leased it from SAW through a property company. Thus
although GKN took responsibility for the buildings it did not sink much capital into
the project. It was thus in a much better position to divest itself of the plant, without
significant costs, if that became necessary. The THA therefore contributed to ensure
that any 'investment' remained relatively mobile. Also being an early acquisition
from the THA, the privatisation body did not include contractually-binding
guaranteed investment and employment levels.
Whilst GKN invested only DM3m of its anticipated DM40 million, it set
about reorganising the plant in order to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
However, the nature of the restructuring was contradictory. This seemed to indicate
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that GKN had not decided exactly how, or indeed whether, the plant would fit into its
pan-European production system. Three different development paths were evident.
First, the initial plan to develop an east European centre of semi-integrated drive shaft
production; second, a revised plan to turn the plant into a relatively low cost parts
producer for its drive shaft plant in Offenbach in west Germany; and third, to turn the
plant into a dedicated operation to supply just-in-time to VW next door.
The reorganisation took the form of concentration on core operations and the
disintegration of the highly vertically integrated production processes.	 Most
importantly, in 1992 it closed the forge and began to source forged parts from GKN's
capacity in western Germany and the UK. As a result the number of value-adding
processes in the plant was reduced but remained high compared to Ford Hungaria;
labour costs were 33pc whereas material costs were 4Opc. In addition within the firm
the production process was disintegrated, as machines were disconnected to overcome
balance-delay problems and devices introduced to ensure that work in process was
'pulled-through'.	 Despite this, inventories remained large because of past
over-buying. However, technical dislocation accompanied the physical concentration
of productions as machines were moved closer together and the firm tried to let
excess space. Nevertheless, overheads contributed around 3Opc of the plant's costs.
The overall effect was to replace rigid continuous-flow with more flexible batch
production techniques. The organisation of labour was also changed (see chapter 6).
As part of this, processes and products were standardised and the number of variants
produced was dramatically curtailed. Whereas all these changes could be associated
with the first plan (see above) the plant also became increasingly used to supply
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simple low value-added parts for assembly at GKN's plants in western Europe. The
only substantial new investment, worth DM3m, made by GKN was in the
construction of a modern production line to supply VW. The line was designed to
produce 1,200 units per day, and thus quadruple the number required for the CKD
operation, in keeping with the planned volume of VW's new plant. Overall the results
of these changes were substantial cost savings and a doubling of productivity.
Although the project was very different from Ford's in Hungary GKN, like
Ford, sought to introduce market-type relations within the plant. As a result the plant
was divided into three profit-centres, increasing the transparency of the plant's
performance. However, these operated like little companies, sometimes, according to
management, at the expense of the plant's overall efficiency. Thus having unleashed
market-type forms of co-ordination within the plant the management sought to
introduce mechanisms, including workshops, to foster co-operation.
Whilst it reorganised production internally, backward and forward linkages
were also altered.	 GKN's take over and subsequent closure of the forge
fundamentally altered GWM's position in the supply chain. Whereas before it had
sourced steel directly from producers in eastern Europe it began to source steel from
other GKN plants in western Europe. In addition other parts were also sourced from
GKN plants. Some other parts were sourced from west German firms and only one
major part, a low value added rubber component, was sourced from the new Lander.
However, in total there were six suppliers in eastern Germany, three of which were
owned, at least in part, by the THA, and the remainder had been acquired by foreign
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lirms. The high level of supplier turnover permitted GWM to refashion supply
relationships. Supply standard became more rigorous and parts delivered more
frequently in smaller batches, even though in some instances this was more
expensive. In this way the plant became increasingly integrated into a west European
supply chain at the expense of 'local' producers. As the standardisation of
components across GKN developed this trend increased.
However, its forward linkages remained essentially similar.
	 Foremost
amongst the plant's problems was a loss of customers, and irregular orders from those
that remained. Thus the break-up of the CMEA system, and war in Yugoslavia,
resulted in the loss of all its east European customers except for SKODA. As a result
production fell 25pc in 1991 and capacity utilisation fell to between 50 and 6Opc. In
consequence GWM become increasingly dependent upon orders from Peugeot,
SKODA (which began to demand lower VW prices) and VW1s CKD operation next
door. However, VW's postponement of the new Mosel plant had important
implications for the viability of GKIN's investment.
GKN was one of VW's eight just-in-time projects which were developed when
it began its investment in Mosel (see above). As in the other cases there was no
formal contract between them but an understanding based, ultimately, on letters of
intent whose value lay not so much in their legal significance as in the trust embodied
in them. This form of relationship created problems for GKN because the price was
rigidly agreed, including 6pc price reductions per year, but the volume of the orders
was not. Moreover costs were increasing. GKN was further weakened in its dealing
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because VW had a large capacity to produce the driveshafts in-house at its west
German plants if GKN tried to increase the price. This meant that it was difficult to
reduce costs without VW noticing and seeking a corresponding price reduction. The
result meant VW's part of the bargain was flexible, namely the volume of the order,
whereas GKN's, the price per part was not. The proximity of the plants (they were
situated side by side with a travel time of half an hour) eased the logistical problems.
However, as the relationship developed (in the form of workshops between
employees of both firms) it became clear to GKN that VW was more interested in
easing its logistical problems even at the expense of increasing their supplier's. Thus
the logistical system permitted delivery straight to VW's line eliminating the need for
additional handling there, but by doing so demanded additional handling by GKN
employees before delivery9.
GKN was unsuccessful in finding new customers to replace those lost in
eastern Europe and instead relied on credit (designed to facilitate trade between the
former Soviet Union and eastern Germany) and other forms of financing to maintain,
after a fashion, traditional links with ECE. However, in doing so it faced high
transaction costs. Logistics became more irregular, owing to variable volumes, and
unreliable and consequently more expensive to manage. Thus the plant remained
dependent on the remnants of the state planned automotive industry elsewhere in east
and central Europe and when orders dried-up it had to make do with lower capacity
utilisation. In addition, GWM gradually specialised in producing components for
GKN's plants in western Germany and Spain, from which it also received
Only later were measures introduced to alleviate this situation.
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components. In this way GWM became integrated into the-web of GKN's European
production system.
GKN had yet to sink much capital investment in its plant and its future
remained in doubt. At the heart of the plant's future lay a paradox. Whereas the
plant's management hoped GKN would dedicate GWM to the east European market,
eliminating competition from other GKN plants, it feared that in so doing some of its
current production would be relocated to higher cost plants in western Europe.
I lowever, if competition between GKN plants continued, it remained to be seen
whether GKN would permit the relocation of production to GWM even though it had
a cost advantage over GKN's plants elsewhere in Germany. Either way GWM
depended to some extent on the development of new car capacity in ECE. To that end
it began to negotiate to supply Magyar Suzuki, albeit its offer was 25pc above the
figure Magyar Suzuki was willing accept.
5.4	 Strategies of Hungarian and east German automotive capital: IKARUS in
Hungary and Sachscnring in east Germany
IKARUS
IKARUS was one of Hungary's largest and most important companies,
employing 10,500 directly and an estimated 90,000 indirectly, and accounting for
I Spc of the country's rouble-denominated trade. As a result its restructuring reflected
and in turn helped to shape the reorganisation of the entire automotive sector and
beyond (see chapter 4). Compared to automotive producers in the GDR, and
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elsewhere in ECE, IKARUS had a relatively low level of verlical integration. Thus in
the I 980s the cost of purchasing parts amounted to 78pc of the price of the final
product (Kapitány 1993). Outsourcing included the external production of the engine
and transmission and in total IKARUS had 50 major suppliers in Hungary.
Once the Hungarian state was unwilling to continue to subsidise IKARUS and
therefore the price of buses for the Soviet Union, to which 8Opc of output had
traditionally been exported, the bus maker was forced to try to raise the overall price
of its products and secure a greater proportion of that price in order to pay for
increasingly expensive components. In the course of 1988 price disputes developed
between IKARUS and its suppliers and customers which disrupted production. Under
the old system such disputes were overcome by IKARUS supplying kits for local
assenThly as a way of reducing the price for the customer. However the disintegration
of the trading system meant this was no longer feasible, at least in the short term (see
below). Thus in 1989 exports to the Soviet Union fell because of the customer's
inability to pay higher prices. IKARUS's lower earnings had a negative impact on the
entire Hungarian automotive industry. In consequence in 1989 output in the
automotive industry fell by around 4Opc. At the beginning of 1990 the Hungarian
government stopped IKARUS's exports to the Soviet Union which resulted in the
halting of production and workers being laid off. The workers and management then
began to demand renewed state support to prevent closure. IKARUS, by then
bankrupt, was saved by the Finance Ministry which initiated the reflotation of the
enterprise in late 1990. This in turn allowed the state a chance to shape the company's
future development.
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During 1991 the state sought a strategic investor to participate in the
reflotation of IKARUS. Mercedes-Benz, MAN, Renault, DAF and IVECO all made
bids to take a stake in the 'new' IKARUS. However they were rejected by the
government. In addition a bid by a domestic consortium led by RABA (IKARUS's
state owned engine supplier) was also rejected. Having failed to find new substantial
markets to replace its lost customers in the Soviet Union (Soviet orders fell from
8,900 to 5,000 in 1991), the government decided to accept a Soviet consortium. The
consortium was led by ATEX, a holding company of 10 automotive enterprises
owned by the Soviet automotive ministry, Avtobank (the state owned auto sector
bank), and the Soviet oil, gas and coal industry ministries. The Hungarian
government accepted the Soviet consortium believing it most likely to be able to
maintain exports to the Soviet Union.
At the end of 1991 the reflotation of IKARUS was complete and the bus
maker was transformed into a new joint-stock company with HUF 11 .5bn (around
USD200 million) founding capital. Although the company retained the name it was
not a legal successor and therefore did not inherit any debt liabilities. The 'old'
IKARUS Chassis and Vehicle Factory effectively owned a 60.87pc (worth HUF7bn)
stake in the new firm. Thus 'new' IKARUS's largest share holder was the technically
bankrupt 'old' IKARUS owned initially by the State Liquidation Agency, and then
subsequently the State Property Agency (SPA) and the State Holding Company (AV)
(see chapter 4°. However, the most important member of the consortium was
The transactions that permitted this were technically complex. Both IKARUS and Csepel
Auto, its chassis and gearbox supplier, were liquidated in 1990 under the defaclo ownership of the
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ATEX. It purchased a 30.43pc (HUF3.5 or USD5Om) share not in cash but in real
estate and service facilities in the Soviet Union. More importantly it helped to
secure a guarantee from the Soviet prime minister that the government would order
30,000 buses (plus spares) over a five year period worth in total some USD2.1 billion.
The other owners of 'new' IKARUS were the state owned Hungarian Credit Bank
(4.35pc worth HUF500m), Mogurt (the former monopoly vehicle retailer and trader)
(3.O5pc, HUF351m) and a Soviet owned Canadian investment house called the
Central European Investment Company (1 .3pc, worth HUFI49m).
As part of the reflotation 'new' IKARUS was reorganised into a holding
company (see fig. 5.1). Its operations were reported to have been divided-up into 16
subsidiaries (see Business Central Europe November 1994). This process involved
hiving off parts of the production process into 'internal' limited liability companies as
a form of decentralised reorganisation (see Stark 1993). Thus companies remained
part of the state sphere but operated like private companies with their own boards of
directors and balance sheets. As a result relations between subsidiaries were
marketised and each one was forced to seek customers beyond IKARUS. As a result
of the decentralisation, the 'corporate satellites' pursued different product development
and diversification strategies. The bus body manufacturer diversified into the
production of chassis and freight containers. In addition the huge press shop began
State Liquidation Agency (SLA). Subsequently the SLA merged Csepel Auto with 'old' IKARUS to
increase its value to permit it to participate in the reflotation. IKARUS thus took over Csepel's factory
near Budapest and around 1,200 workers. The merged company was valued by the SLA at USD90
million or HUF7bn (based on a 1990 valuation by Price Waterhouse which was adjusted for inflation).
This HUF7 billion was then used to buy a 60.87pc share of the new company which was subsequently
transferred to the SPA and then to AV (see fig. 5.1). The former Csepel factory was closed.
ATEX also had an option to increase its stake by I 8pc within one year. However, it did not
take up the option.
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production of automobile components, including smail pressed body parts, for
Magyar Suzuki. IKARUS's largest subsidiary, IMAG, became closely involved in the
supply of various automobile components to Magyar Suzuki and other automotive
firms.
Crucially, the reflotation linked IKARUS's future to the maintenance of its
traditional trade links with the successor states of the former Soviet Union. In
connection with this it was significant that IKARUS's senior management were the
same personnel in charge under the planning regime. However, shortly after ATEX's
investment the Soviet Union was wound up and succeeded by the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). This meant that the Russian authorities became the
minority owner of IKARUS and resulted in severe disruption to trade. Most
importantly the guaranteed order made by the Soviet prime minister was worthless.
In addition, procurement of buses was transferred from a central Soviet agency to 89
regional ones; within months CIS customers had defaulted on their payments. As a
result IKARUS repeatedly produced ever more pessimistic business plans. It
continued production in the hope that payment would materialise and to meet a few
domestic and foreign orders.
However, with its links to the CIS in chaos the company entered into
negotiations with Mercedes-Benz which indicated its interest in investing in
IKARUS' 2 . After two years of negotiations they were concluded without an
2	 Mercedes-Benz was the most active west European commercial vehicles producer in seeking
investment opportunities in east and central Europe. However, in addition to its withdrawal from
negotiations with IKARUS it also cancelled a planned new plant in eastern Germany (see chapter 4)
and pulled out of acquiring two Czech truck makers, TATRA and AVIA.
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agreement. This was for two reasons. First IKARUS suspected that Mercedes-Benz
wished to eliminate competition from the market and to turn it into an assembly
operation importing engine and rear axles utilising Mercedes spare capacity in
Germany. IKARUS and the Hungarian government were therefore unwilling to
permit Mercedes-Benz to take a majority stake. Second, Mercedes-Benz hoped that
IKARUS, with its large sales and servicing network, would enable it to capture a
share of the huge potential market in the CIS' 3 . Thus once IKARUS's links with the
CIS began to break down Mercedes-Benz lost interest in it. Mercedes-Benz
withdrawal from negotiations tended to indicate that IKARUS was correct in
suspecting that the German firm sought to capture its market and transform it into a
low cost assembler. Mercedes did not offer a replacement market for IKARUS.
However, the German firm's U-turn also confirmed that IKARUS's value lay in its
traditional forward linkages.
Thus IKARUS continued to reduce production, in order to prevent the
generation of inter-firm debt, and laid off workers. At the same time it sought harder
to identify ways of financing trade with the CIS. It thus abandoned its business plan
which involved the export of only 4Opc of production to ECE, and 5Opc to west
Europe, and became increasingly dedicated to the CIS' 4. As a result IKARUS
attempted to develop barter trade involving Russian oil and gas. This meant that
IKARUS had to find a buyer for the oil and gas, since it had no use for it itseLf, before
it could sell buses to Russia. Exports to the CIS continued to fall, to around 1,000 in
13	 Mercedes-Benz had already begun to assemble a small volume of touring coaches at Golizyno
on the outskirts of Moscow but faced difficulties selling them.
4	 The remainder of production was intended for the domestic market.
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1992. In 1993 sales to the CIS increased to nearly 2,000,. thanks to a cash payment,
but the long term future was insecure.
In consequence IKARUS increased its attempts to maintain links with its
traditional market. In early 1993 it announced the intention to open up to 20
completely-knocked-down (ckd) assembly plants across the CIS. Each one was to
assemble between 100 and 500 units per year. IKARUS was to supply the assembly
technology as part of its contribution to the joint ventures. The joint ventures were
then to import kits of IKARUS's cheapest and oldest model in exchange for the export
of oil. After assembly the municipal buses were to be supplied to local authorities. It
was anticipated that in due course the proportion of locally sourced components
would gradually increase. This apparently innovative move, designed to turn it into a
multinational company, was in fact a traditional solution to traditional problem; to
ease trade in the past IKARUS had established a number of ckd assembly plants in
CMEA countries. The first joint venture was established in Kazan in Tartarstan (an
autonomous region in the Russian Federation) and was owned by Tartarautrans
(69pc), IKARUS (25pc) and CEIC (6pc) (see Kapitány 1993). By the end of 1993
five such ventures had been established, including one in Moscow, with local state
owned partners in the automotive or defence industries. However, owing to the old
insolvency problems, by November 1994 no kits had been purchased nor assembled
in any of the five ventures (Business Central Europe November 1994). Moreover, the
joint ventures illustrated the way in which nominally 'private' limited liability
companies, owned ultimately by the Hungarian and post-Soviet Union states, were
established to protect its owners from the spread of the law of value.
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In addition to the joint ventures, IKARUS in general illustrated the way state
and private property relations had become interwoven and the properties of each
dissolved to form 'recombinant' property relations (see Stark 1993). A close
examination of IKARUS's ownership structure, its subsidiaries and joint ventures
revealed the complexity of the property relations and the blurring between state,
private and foreign 'capital' (see Figure. 5.1). Thus, for example, 'new' IKARUS was
majority owned by AV Rt. (the State Holding Co.) which like the bus maker had a
slake in the Hungarian Credit Bank which in turn had a minority stake in IKARUS
and a majority stake in RABA which had a minority stake in GM Hungary. Two
oilier examples of the complex ownership pattern were instructive. First, IKARUS's
largest subsidiary, IMAG, in addition to one 'internal' limited liability company and
one joint venture (in which IKARUS also had a direct stake), had a minority stake in
Autokonzern (IKARUS also had a stake) which had a 4Opc share of Magyar Suzuki.
Second, the joint venture in Kazan (TartarstanlRussia) was 2Spc owned by IKARUS,
69pc by the Russian state owned Tatautotrans, and 6pc by CEIC the Canadian based
Russian investment house which also had a stake in IKARUS.
Although IKARUS's main strategy had been to try all means possible to
preserve more-or-less intact the old forward and therefore backward linkages (because
of the need to avoid the over engineering of products) it also sought to restructure
production so that it could find new customers. In order to attract new customers a
sales operation was established and production was reorganised (see also chapter 6).
The search for west European customers was accompanied with a shift of emphasis
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away from the production of municipal buses toward ..touring coaches. However,
most immediate was IKARUS's need to internalise the sales and marketing function
which had previously been done by Mogurt foreign trade company. As a result a
number of sales subsidiaries were established including in the UK and Germany.
However, they were not successful in winning new market share and IKARUS
remained dependent on sales from former CMEA organised by Mogurt.
Assembly line techniques were replaced by dock production and production
was largely relocated from its headquarters plant in Budapest to Székesfehérvár. This
was part of a centralisation strategy which involved the divestment of two 'branch'
plants. These changes permitted greater flexibility (the number of models and
variations increased dramatically from the 22 and 86 respectively that were produced
in 1988) but it made the intensification of production more difficult to impose.
Equally important was the restructuring of IKARUS's backward linkages as
the planned production system was undone. Production of the chassis, which was
formerly outsourced from Csepel Auto, was internalised increasing vertical
integration to 4Opc. In addition, relations between IKARUS and RABA became very
strained when the engine supplier quadrupled its prices. As the automotive
production system became increasingly disrupted IKARUS's suppliers, many of
which only had a minority interest in the auto industry, became less and less reliable.
However, without alternative means of supply IKARUS became increasingly
dependent on its 50 major Hungarian suppliers which provided 8Opc of all inputs.
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Gradually, IKARUS tried to alter the power relationship between itself and its
suppliers in three different ways. First, it began to increase the frequency and reduce
the volume of orders. Generally, the old one year contracts were reduced first six
months and subsequently to one month. Second, whereas IKARUS had been
compelled to single source components under the planning system, it began to
introduce a market by seeking dual sourcing. Thus following Guardian Industries
(US) take-over of the Oroshaza Glass Factory in 1989 IKARUS sourced glass from
both its traditional supplier, Saigglas, and the joint venture. Third, IKARUS sought
to niake its suppliers more involved in the automotive sector and thus dependent on
the bus maker. In short IKARUS sought to replace hierarchies with market forms of
regulation and co-ordination in its domestic supply base. However, this proved a
difficult task. First, the reduction in demand for buses meant production was
continuously reduced, creating inefficiencies. This in turn threatened the survival of
the suppliers which increased IKARUS's dependency on them. Second, the absence
of alternative sources of supply hindered the development of competition amongst
suppliers. As a result the reliability and the quality of its suppliers remained poor
whilst prices spiralled out of control. In an effort to increase reliability IKARUS
internalised the import of components from other ECE countries which had formerly
been managed by MogUrt, the foreign trade company.
The overall effect was that the marketisation of the supply chain was only
partially successful. Although transactions between suppliers were marketised in the
sense that prices began better to represent production cost, this was yet to have a
significant effect on production relations. This was because the planned production
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system became more clan-like and inter-enterprise links remained essentially closed.
This was best illustrated by the absence of alternative sources of component supply
for models to be exported to the CIS on which IKARUS had pinned its future. Thus
the greater the disruption to the production system the more inward looking it
became, which made it harder for it to restructure. As a result the production system,
including some major suppliers and customers, attempted to insulate itself from the
effects of marketisation.
However, there was also a counter trend as IKARUS began to import
components from western Europe, depending on customer specifications. Non-CIS
customers increasingly demanded west European engines, which were sourced from
MAN, and chassis which undermined the position of RABA. Other less important
components were also imported in larger and larger volumes which made IKARUS
less dependent on its domestic suppliers. As a result the local (Hungarian content)
fell from virtually 1 OOpc before the changes to between 55 and 95pc depending on the
model and customer specifications. The average value of imported components was
25pc. In addition, IKARUS set up a joint venture in the US which produced IKARUS
models but with 6Opc US content. There was a danger then that IKARUS would
become increasingly confined to assembling buses whose major components were
imported. To prevent that it entered in negotiations with Renault to permit the local
production of its engines, chassis and gearboxes. However, without an increase in
orders from new customers, integration into the west European sector would remain
marginal to IKARUS's operations.
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In the course of the early 1990s, IKARUS ..attempted to marketise its
operations but essentially remained wedded to the legacy of the plan and tried to
insulate itself from the law of value. This seemed likely to continue since Russian
authorities had purchased an option to take a majority stake in 'new' IKARUS which
hindered attempts to attract a strategic investor from western Europe or North
America. In addition the state indicated that it would retain a 25pc stake and a
'golden share' to veto any strategic investors' plans. However, at the same time there
was significant decentralised reorganisation which indicated the contradictory
development of IKARUS. First, decentralised reorganisation reflected and in turn
shaped the establishment of increasingly clan-like closed linkages which made the
production system resistant to the more far-reaching effects of marketisation, namely
the restructuring of production relations. Second, decentralised reorganisation also
involved the selective and partial intensification and restructuring of productive
relations as marketisation impacted upon the conduct of production. However, it
remained to be seen whether the coexistence of these trends would be sufficient to
facilitate the evolution.
Saclisenring A utomobilwerke Zwickau GmbH
In contrast to the restructuring of IKARUS, the manufacturer of the Trabant
was centrally reorganised by the THA, but the outcome, decentralisation, was to some
extent similar. However, whereas decentralised reorganisation at IKARUS reinforced
the legacy of the plan as a co-ordinating mechanism, at Sachsenring decentralised
reorganisation represented the disintegration of the enterprise and its selective
reintegration into the German and west European auto industry. In mid-1990
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Sachscnring Automobilwerke (SAW) was transformed into a wholly owned limited
liability subsidiary of IFA-Kombinate, which was owned by the THA. The THA,
increasingly under the influence of the West German state as unification approached,
then began to shape the development of SAW by gradually limiting the strategic
development options open to it. Even before the unification of Germany the 1 HA
had effectively begun to preclude certain development paths and in the course of the
early 1 990s slowly narrowed SAWs strategic choice and ultimately forced it into
liquidation.
In keeping with the system of industrial Kombinate, SAW was rigidly
integrated in at least two senses. First, as a major component of IFA-PKW, the
passenger car division of the IFA-Kombinate, SAW was very tightly tied to the
national automotive production system; although raw materials were imported no
components were (see chapter 4). Thus its engines were sourced from IFA-PKW's
plant in Karl-Marx-Stadt. Only glass, some lighting products and rubber parts were
sourced from other Kombinate. In total 8Opc of parts were supplied by IFA-PKW
plants. Second, SAW was internally highly vertically integrated, producing around
6Opc of the parts, with four plants in and around Zwickau.
At the beginning of 1990 SAW's most modern production facility, an
assembly line at Mosel, was hived off by the THA to establish Sächsische
Automobilbau (SAB), a joint venture with VW Group in which the Treuhand had a
majority stake (see above). In May 1990 this plant began to alternate assembly of ckd
VW Polos and Trabants until April 1991 when production was switched to the Golf
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(Mark 2). At the end of 1990 SAW's second most modem plant, built by Peugeot in
the early 1980s to produce drive shafts, was demerged to form Gelenkwellenwerk
Mosel (GWM). At the beginning of 1991 GKN purchased GWM from the THA (see
above). It was only after these important changes that the west German state reneged
on its initial intention to subsidise continued production of the Trabant. However, the
restructuring of the production system, in which new property relations were
established in some elements of the production chain, undennined any remaining
coherence of the system. As a result the production system became unworkable. As a
result the state, through the THA, merely formalised the process of disintegration
from below which resulted from the THA's decision to terminate production of the
Trabant and its privatisation strategy of breaking up the IFA Kombinate. Politically
the course of action was only possible because the state had secured a commitment
from VW to invest in the local area and in the short term, at least, Sachsenring.
SAW was separated from the IFA-Kombinate (which became an empty
holding company and was liquidated) and renamed Sachsenring Automobilwerke
Zwickau (SAZ). It remained lOOpc owned by the THA. However, whereas the THA
created new companies (not legal successors) for acquisition by private investors and
where necessary shouldered debt liabilities, SAZ was not a new company. Rather
SAZ was a legal successor of SAW and as a result inherited SAW's DM600 million
debt' 5 . It thus seemed that the THA was intent on using SAZ as a 'sink' in which to
deposit liabilities whilst at the same time selling its most attractive assets, with
minimal attached risks, to private investors. In addition, many investors chose not to
Subsequently the THA offered to shoulder half of SAZs debt liabilities.
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acquire real estate and buildings but instead lease them from Sachsenring. In this ay
the THA allocated risk to SAZ and minimised it for investors since they were able to
'sink' less investment into their projects.
In the course of 1991 production of the Trabant was halted. At the same time
the workforce was reduced to 1,600 employees and a labour dispute resulted in the
formation of an 'employment company' (see chapter 6). As a result SAZ made a
DM70 million loss on a turnover of DM3 60m. At the same time there were a series
of further demergers as automotive components firms, including Siemens, Dr. Melegy
and Naue-Johnson and a number of engineering service firms, purchased SAZ assets
(see Figure 5.2). By the end of 1991 more than 10 (excluding the 'employment
company') auto-related firms had acquired or leased SAW buildings. These firms
employed 4,047, of which 2,400 worked for SAB-VW Sachsen. In total 19 private
companies - some established by foreign investors and some newly created - had
acquired SAZ assets by March 1992 (see THA 1992). This involved the sale of
1 64,000m2 of SAW's site and the leasing, via a property company, of a further
68,000m2 . Gradually, from having had four plants (three in Zwickau and one 10km to
the north in Mosel) SAZ became confined effectively to just one. The Mosel site was
occupied by SAB-VW Sachsen and GKN and the VW-Bildungsinstitut (and
employment company) occupied a further site in Zwickau itself. A third site was de
facto transformed into an automotive industrial park by the THA, including for
example Siemens. Even portions of SAZ's remaining site were sold and leased to
other firms.
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SAW was thus divided into two: a core business owned by the TI-IA and SAZ,
dependent on VW and, secondly, an industrial park comprising mostly auto-related
private finns. However, the new companies did not represent the privatisation of
portions of SAZ but effectively their liquidation and the sale of assets (without
liability) to new firms. Crucially, then, the parts of SAZ that were privatised were not
sold as going-concerns with liabilities and obligations but as 'hollowed-out' assets
which became branch plant facilities belonging to foreign automotive firms. As a
result the facilities which had formerly been linked together within the enterprise by
the plan, were untied from one and another and were acquired by new companies
which integrated them into German and European production systems. In this way a
local production system, albeit within one enterprise, was dislocated through the
process of privatisation. However, although this was the trend there were some local
linkages between the new companies. Nevertheless, these were limited in scope and
scale and centred not around SAZ but around SAB-VW Sachsen (see Figure 5.2).
Following the end of Trabant production, the core business sought to identify
new business activities. Increasingly it became dependent on the investors which had
purchased its assets, and VW in particular. In order to begin production of the Golf II
\IW required local body assembly facilities. Not only was this a politically-motivated
requirement but it also served to reduce production costs given the large transport cost
of shipping complete bodies from Wolfsburg, which in any case was operating at full
capacity. Thus SAZ was used to assemble car bodies from panels pressed in
Wolfsburg and the THA sanctioned a DM 70 million investment in the necessary
technology. Supply commenced in mid-1991.
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At the same time the TI-IA sent in various teams of consultants to audit and
reorganise the company's profile. This resulted in the division of SAZ into four profit
centres at the beginning of 1992 (see THA 1992). The automotive engineering profit
centre was the enterprise's largest, accounting for 75pc of SAZ's turnover. It
specialised in three activities; body assembly for VW Sachsen (from parts supplied by
VW Wolfsburg), engine and transmission manufacture for several VW plants in
western Germany, and the subassembly of 60 different small components for VW
Sachsen (mostly involving the assembly of parts shipped from other VW plants). The
second largest profit centre, contributing l2pc of the enterprise's turnover,
concentrated on the production of technically simple manufacturing equipment for
automotive firms. This profit centre was also dependent on sales of equipment to VW
and other private companies that had established production in SAZ's former
buildings. The third profit centre, providing 8pc of the enterprise's turnover,
produced spare parts for the Trabant for the ECE aflercare market. The smallest
profit centre, which accounted for 5pc of turnover, specialised in industrial planning
and service functions. Essentially this profit centre acted as a general contractor and
project manager for the investors, including VW, on SAW's former site.
Thus at the beginning of 1992 the supply of parts and equipment to VW
accounted for 82pc of SAZ's turnover. In addition a further 5pc was earned from its
project management business for, amongst others, VW. More importantly although
SAZ had partially replaced production of the Trabant, albeit with 1 5pc of the original
workforce, it had done so at the expense of losing its manufacturing depth and
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value-adding processes and had become a subassembly plant for VW's loss making
politically motivated investment in Mosel. Effectively, therefore, SAZ had been
forced by the THA into a position where it was entirely dependent on VW which
procured around DM150 million worth of components from it per year. At the same
time the relationship that developed between SAZ and VW, structured by the THA,
was organised along a bureaucratic rather than a market dynamic. Thus SAZ had not
secured VW's custom in the 'normal' way. It had not been audited in the way VW
suppliers were usually and had not sought a contract. Rather for national and local
political reasons VW 'put out' work to SAZ in order to 'support' it. As a result SAZ
resembled a subcontractor of VW rather than a supplier. But crucially it allowed VW
to demonstrate that it was committed not only to the region (see above) but also to
east German suppliers. It also neatly fitted into VW's view at the time that logistical
efficiency required Toyota-like clustering of suppliers around the assembly plant.
VW's close engagement with SAZ led Sachsenring's management and workers
alike to regard the assembler as a partner and an ally. As a result it was widely
believed in both companies that VW Sachsen would eventually incorporate SAZ16.
However, in early 1992, VW announced plans to switch production from the Golf II
to the Golf III. This decision meant that SAZ's DM 70 million investment, less than a
year earlier, became obsolete and worthless and increased its debt to around
DM700m. Moreover, the change in production accompanied the partial opening of
VW's new body shop, part of the Mosel II complex. In consequence VW internalised
body construction. At a stroke SAZ lost the majority of its turnover. It continued to
This expectation emanated from VW management which responded to its workers' concerns
about their former colleagues at SAZ by indicating that it would look favourably upon them.
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supply an assorted range of minor subassemblies, such as the steering column and
floor parts, to VW Sachsen. However, even this business reduced in volume as more
elements of the production process were internalised in order to prevent redundancies
at VW's plants following recession in the car market. Moreover, in early 1993 VW
purchasing strategy was altered and the emphasis placed upon local suppliers was
reduced (see above). Any possibility of increased procurement from VW in the
medium term was dashed with the announcement that the complete opening of Mosel
II would be postponed.
As a result VW no longer had a logistical need for SAZ and the political
imperative that existed before was no longer as significant since VW's investment in
the area was so visibly demonstrated by the half-built Mosel II plant. In the course of
1993 VW's procurement from SAZ gradually declined. In consequence SAZ's
capacity utilisation fell and more of the 1,600 workers were put on short-time
working. This was also because SAZ was unsuccessful at securing new customers.
In addition, one plan to begin Trabant production in South America did not
materialise. SAZ did however begin to develop a vehicle customisation and car
recycling business. By the beginning of 1993 the THA became convinced that SAZ
could not be sold as a going concern. It estimated that the cost of cleaning up the
environment at SAZ's site was DM110 million. Moreover it anticipated that
investment of DM 280 million was required in order to transform SAZ into a modern
viable automotive component supplier. 	 Following the failure of a
Management-Buy-Out SAZ was placed into liquidation and some assets were bought
by a western investor which guaranteed to employ at least 280 workers.
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5.5	 Conclusions
Marketisation and the disintegration of the planning system were deeply
bound up together. The uneven development of markets undermined the integrity of
the planning system, which encouraged enterprises to pursue divergent strategies. In
consequence enterprises ceased to be governed by the plan. This left producers
isolated from production systems which ceased to function adequately. There was
thus a lack of any mechanism to co-ordinate enterprises. In Hungary producers were
l)erlllitted to continue in business whereas in east Germany the industry was undone.
At the same time foreign automotive capital flowed into both countries. The
investment was crucial in shaping the industrial and regional development of the host
regions through their integration into German and European production networks.
In Hungary, with the exception of Suzuki, investment by-passed the
indigenous sector and established a number of low-cost 'greenfield' component plants
integrated into pan-European production systems. Suzuki's relations with the
indigenous sector only served to illustrate the problem of trying to restructure
production in enterprises cast adrift from the plan and deserted by the state. The path
of change in east Germany was altogether simpler. The production system was
dismantled by the west German state and replaced by a foreign one transplanted from
west Germany.
There were two types of investment strategy: those which sought to create
regional production systems and those which resembled branch plants. However, a
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close examination of Suzuki and VW's investments showed that even localised
production systems were unlikely to provide a significant engine for local economic
development. Thus it seemed likely that localised production systems would be as
disembedded as branch plants were. This was for three reasons. First, even when
local suppliers were taken into account the local production systems represented
relatively low value adding chains in comparison to conventional automobile
assembly plants. Second, supplier relations were 'clan-like', with indigenous firms
excluded. Third, in practice localisation meant at the continental rather than the local,
regional or national scale. This did not augur well for major local producers. In
1-lungary disembedded foreign investment forced indigenous enterprises to seek
means of preserving and recreating traditional inter-firm links. In doing so they
became increasingly marginalised. In east Germany, the state merely dismantled
enterprises. Overall the disintegration of the plarming system and the subsequent
reliance on automotive DFI transformed production systems into 'global outposts' of
international production networks.
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Table 5.1	 An overview of automotive DFI in Hungary and eastern Germany
Hungary	 eastern
Germany
Automotive DFI (USDm) 	 1,461.3	 5,466.5
pcoftotalDFl	 16	 nd
auto DFI per capita (USD) 	 140.9	 339.5
projects	 29	 73
employment	 24,284*	 22,878
(mcI. 7,140
new jobs)
*Note: figure includes non-auto related employees in enterprises the target of auto
jflVeStrfleflt.
Source: various
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Table 5.2
	
A summary of foreign automotive investment in Hungary and eastern
Germany (USDm)
Car	 pc of car	 pc of other	 PC of Total
assembly	 total	 components total (CVs)	 total
Hungary	 302	 21	 1,099.3	 76	 50	 3	 1451.3
eastern	 3,580	 65	 1,234.5	 23	 650	 12	 5,466.5
Germany
Note:	 The table includes only those projects for which information on the value of
investment is available.
Source:	 various
Table 5.3	 Foreign automotive investment in Hungary and eastern Germany by
country of origin (USDm)
Country of origin Hungary	 pc	 Eastern	 pc
Germany
US	 923.4	 64	 499	 9
West Germnay	 229.6	 16	 4,873	 89
Japan	 236.5	 16	 0
Russia	 50	 3	 0
UK	 3.8...	 45	 1
France	 0	 48	 1
Other	 8 ...	 0
Total	 1451.3	 5,466.5 ________
Note:	 The table includes only those projects for which information on the value of
investment is available.
Source:	 various
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Table 5.4	 Automotive component DFI in Hungary and eastern Germany by sector
Sector/part	 Hungary	 Germany
Sm	 pc	 jobs	 Sm	 pc	 jobs
Engines/parts/clutches etc
	
347.6	 32	 410	 483	 39	 2,223
Electrical parts/lighting	 556.6	 51	 1,630	 178.5	 14	 2,670
Glass	 120	 11	 250	 42	 3	 906
Tools	 124	 10	 1,200
Rubber parts	 55	 5	 70	 100	 8	 906
Seats	 49	 4	 560
Friction products	 6	 1	 nd	 12.5	 1	 600
Suspensionlsteering	 9.8	 1	 nd	 44	 3	 1,110
Cast/forged/pressed parts	 2	 350	 50	 4	 1,278
Batteries	 40	 3	 640
Exhaust/welded parts
	 24	 2	 450
R&D	 12	 1	 200
CV components	 26	 2	 734
Logistics	 10	 1	 72
Other	 2.3	 30	 39.5	 3	 825
T'otal	 1099.3	 1,234.5 _______ ________
Note:	 The table includes only those projects for which information on the value of
investment is available.
Source:	 various
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Table 5.7	 Planned investment and employment in tb. Hungarian automotive sector
No. of	 planned	 of which new jobs investment
	
investments emplyment (n=20)
	 (n18)	 ($m)
(n=20)
target	 actual	 target	 actual
29 24,284	 1 21 ,340 7,140	 J3,370	 1461,3
Sources:	 various
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Table 5.9	 Planned investment and employment in the Hungarian automotive sector
by county, 1993
County	 No. of	 Planned employment	 Investment -
projects	 of which new
Budapest	 5 15,000 (n=4)	 0 403.8 (n=3)
Pest	 2 1,030 (n=2)	 1,030	 21 (n=2)
Nógorád	 0
Borsod-Abaüj-Zemplén 	 3 70 (n=zl)	 56.3 (n=2)
Szabolcs-Szatmár	 0
I-Iájhdü-Bihar	 0
Békés	 2 250 (n=1)	 (nd)	 136 (n=2)
Csongrád	 0
Bács-Kiskun	 I (nd)	 (nd)	 (nd)
Baranyi	 0
Somogy	 0
Zala	 0
Vas	 4 2,150 (n=3)	 2,150	 214.5 (n=3)
Gyor-Sopron	 3 2,100 (n=2)	 800	 213 (n=1)
Koniáron	 2 1,310 (n=2)	 1,310	 236.5 (n=2)
Heves	 2 350 (n=1)	 0 2 (n=1)
Szolnok	 0
Tolna	 0
Veszprérn	 1 400 (n=1)	 400 40 (n=1)
Fejér	 4 1,450 (n=3)	 1,450	 138.4 (n=3)
Total	 29 24,110 (n20) 7,140
	
1,461.5 (n20)
Source:	 various
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Table 5.10
	 Planned investment by west German industry in east Germany 1992
Sector	 Percentage
&utomotive	 20
IectricalIelectronics 	 17
Chemical	 13
1achine tools	 12
Food	 11
Dther	 27
rotal	 100
Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtshaft, Köln in VDA 1992a, 4.
Table 5.11	 Planned investment by the west German automotive industry in east
Germany
Year	 Investment
(DM billion)
1990*	 0.25
1991*	 1.5
1992	 3.2
1993	 2.8
1994	 2.7
1995	 1.3
1996	 1.0
Total	 12.75
* actual figures
Source:	 after VDA 1992a, 4
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Table 5.14	 Planned investment and employment in the east Germanauto sector by
Lander
;tate	 Total no. of	 Planned	 Planned
Projects	 workforce	 Investment
_______________ ______________ _____________ ($ millions)
;axony	 41	 13,323	 3,814
_______________ ______________ (n=30) 	 (n=28)
rhuringia	 21	 7,618	 912
_______________ ______________ (n=14) 	 (n15)
Saxony-Anhalt	 5	 706	 21
_____________ ____________ (n3)
	 (n4)
Brandenburg	 4	 734	 676
______________ _____________ (n=1)	 (n=2)
Mecklenberg-	 1	 320	 27
Western	 (n=1)	 (nr=1)
Pornerania
Berlin	 1	 300	 14
_____________ ____________ (n=1)	 (n=1)
['otal	 73	 23,064	 5,464
_______________ ______________ (n50)	 (n51)
Refers to the number of projects for which there is information.
'The decision by Mercedes Benz to postpone the construction of a new truck assembly
facility reduced its likely medium term investment in east Germany to DMlbn.
Sources: after Automobil-Produktion 1992, 55-6, author's calculations
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Table 5.16
	
Automotive component firms in the Zwickau Region
Firm	 town	 Product	 VW Mosel employees investment
supplier	 (planned) (planned)
USD
GKN-GWM	 Mosel	 driveschafts	 yes	 690	 -	 34
Hoppecke	 Zwickau	 batteries	 no	 340	 20
Varta	 Zwickau	 batteries	 no	 300	 20
Siemens	 Zwickau	 cable	 yes	 300	 8
Dr. Melegy	 Zwickau	 pressed parts	 no (but	 240	 20
supplies
other VW
______________ ___________ ________________ 	 plantrs __________ ___________
Leistriiz	 Stollberg	 dampers	 yes	 175	 10
Gillet	 Zwickau	 exhaust parts	 no	 140	 14
Naue-Johnson	 Zwickau	 seats	 yes	 135	 7.5
VDO	 Glauchau dashboardlinstru	 yes	 70	 1
mentation
Benteler	 Zwickau	 pressed parts	 yes	 33	 3
1-lella	 Meerana	 front-end	 yes	 32	 1
Radsysten	 Zwickau	 wheels	 yes	 25	 1
Allibert	 Meerana	 internal panels	 yes	 13	 1.5
Total	 10	 2,493	 141
Sources:	 various
290
Table 5.17	 VW Sachsen's modular just-in-time suppliers (as of 1993)
Company	 module	 town	 kms from employees investment
assembly on module (DMm)
____________ _____________ _________ plant	 _________ __________
GKN-GWM driveshaft	 Mosel	 0	 60	 3
VDO	 instrumentation Glauchau	 4	 70	 4.9
Naue-Johnson seat
	 Zwickau	 10	 135	 3.5
Benteler-AWE engine frame Zwickau
	 10	 33	 4.9
Radsystem	 wheel	 Zwickau	 12.6	 25	 2
Hella	 front-end	 Meerana	 15	 32	 2
Allibert	 internal panels Meerana	 15	 15	 2
Leistritz	 dampers	 Stollberg	 38	 10	 3
Total	 380	 25.3
Note: In addition Logistic Centre Glauchau was established and owned by suppliers from
where the logistics of eight parts (including internal panels, bumpers, drive train parts, floor
covering, filters etc.) were managed, stored and then delivered just-in-time to Mosel, just
4km away. It employed 100 people and invested DM3.5m.
Source: after Autornobil-Produkiion 1993,48,68 and 104
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Table 5.18	 Direct component suppliers to VW Mosel ii east Germany, 1993
Supplier	 part	 location	 kms from JIT employees
Mosel
AKT	 windscreen	 Gardelegen-	 320 3h	 295
_______________ spray
	 Aitmark
Autoliv	 seatbelt	 Döbeln	 60 lh	 55
Automobiltechnik stopper 	 Heiligenstadt	 265	 150
Bahrataler	 window part	 Bahratal	 130	 61
FWG F	 mechanical	 Glauchau	 5	 110
treatment
FER-Bosch	 horns etc.	 Eisenach	 200	 580
FWG	 transmission Glauchau	 4 15m	 120
Geräte- und	 water pump	 Merbeisrod	 200 4h	 200
Pumpenbau
1-lohe Schleiz	 various	 Schleiz	 90	 321
Maschinenbau	 driveshaft parts Haldensleben	 300	 230
Haldensleben
Move Brems	 brakes/clutches MUhlhausen 	 170	 60
Karosseriewerk	 welded parts	 Dresden	 160	 395
Kunstofftechnik	 various parts
	 Ottendorf	 120	 210
Sächsische	 metal parts	 Chemnitz	 30 lh
	
140
Schraubenwerke
Siemens	 electrical parts Zwickau	 7	 300
Aifred-Teves	 brake parts	 Reichenbach	 20	 150
TrObitzer	 landmaschinen Tröbitz	 140	 420
Landmaschinen
3 disabled peoples sub-assembly Zwickau,	 284
workshops	 Falkenstein,
Glauchau
Total	 3,710
Source: after Automobil-Produktion 1993, 104
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Map 5.5 Planned foreign automotive investment in east Germany by Lander,
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Chapter 6	 The transformation of work: workplace change and employee
reactions in the automotive industry in Hungary and east Germany
6.1	 Introduction
In this chapter we examine the transformation of work in automotive plants in
Hungary and east Germany: the transformation of labour power into profitable labour
power. This involved the marketisation of wage relations and the habituation of
labour to new circumstances. To examine these changes in concrete empirical terms
this chapter is divided into three major parts. The first part of the chapter examines
the transformation (or otherwise) of work in the Hungarian and east German
automotive industries in general. The second section expands upon the case studies
introduced in chapter five, and focuses on the nature of work in foreign owned
assembly and component plants. These plants have been at the forefront of changes
and have formed a 'best practice' which local producers have been encouraged to
mimic in the course of the 'Westernisation' of the economy. The final section also
follows up the case studies by examining the transformation of work, or rather the
lack of it, in two large indigenous automotive firms. Each case study addresses both
management attempts to introduce new regimes or work and worker strategies of
resistance (and co-operation). In doing so the transformation of labour relations
systems at the enterprise level are considered along with the role of the two main
unions in the auto industry, VASAS in Hungary and IG Metall in eastern Germany, as
they attempted to introduce a new basis of trade unionism on the shop floor.
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6.2	 The transformation of work: working conditions in the Hungarian and
cast German automotive industries.
The labour process and working conditions in the automotive industry in
Hungary and east Germany differed little from the general situation in ECE (see
Braverman 1974, Burawoy 1985, 1988, 1992, Clarke et a!., 1993, Filtzer 1986, 1992,
Haraszti 1977, Mandel 1992, and Stark 1988, 1992c). However, there were a few
significant specific factors. Work in Hungarian automotive enterprises was affected
by their integration into the CMEA international vehicle programme and the
introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) as both demanded increased
intensity of work. The links with the CMEA programme permitted access to western
technology which improved work but the uneven development of technology created
imbalances in production and variable standards of ergonomics. The NEM led to
reforms in the mid-1980s which established enterprise councils in large state-owned
enterprises in order to introduce a system of self-management into industry. The
councils could in theory block nearly all decisions for although the enterprise director
had no constraints on his prerogative he was always mindful of the council's ability to
dismiss him. In practice the councils rarely used their powers not least because the
personnel elected by workers tended to be trade union representatives who acted as
mouth pieces for management rather than defenders of worker interests. There were
however opportunities for the trade union to take up individual worker's cases where
evidence of injustice existed. Thus the decentralisation of the Hungarian economy
placed it apart from other CMEA countries and resulted in individualism and the
absence of collective solidarity amongst workers.
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In contrast to Hungary the auto industry in the GDR was organised according
to the classical soviet model right up until 1989. Control remained highly centralised
and the industry was plagued with the problems associated with planning which
forced the generation of informal networks to compensate for planning weaknesses.
The poor co-ordination of the industry resulted in a high intensity of work, because of
production irregularities, and poor working conditions (dirty, dark production halls
and inadequate tools and parts). Despite the high effort demanded of workers, output
and remuneration were poor. Workers were organised and disciplined not only by
supervisors but also by union shop stewards who were very close to the SED. The
union would deal with individual complaints concerning the behaviour of particular
supervisors but only within the confines of the official ideology. It did not therefore
defend the interests of workers but acted in conjunction with management to enforce
discipline, in part through a system of patronage conferring privileges ranging from
career advancement to holidays. However, in contrast to Hungary workers in the
industry had a strong sense of collective consciousness. For many who worked in the
industry before and after the Wende, work, albeit more intense after the changes, was
more enjoyable owing to better conditions. 	 This view indicates that the
transformation of work in the industry was complex and accompanied not only by
new material circumstances but also new attitudes; it is to these changes that we now
turn.
Hungary
The first, and most important influence on the transformation of work was the
decrease in employment following the loss of markets and its effect on the politics of
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the workplace. In the first phase of job losses so-called 'unproductive workers', party
and trade union officials who acted as ideological mouth pieces for the Communist
Party, were forced out. At the same time enterprises continued to feel responsible for
their workers and sought to avoid compulsory redundancies beyond that group. New
retirement rules allowed enterprises to force pensioner and older workers to retire on
state benefits. Also, some workers left voluntarily (and were not replaced) to take
advantage of the new opportunities offered by the labour market.
The second and larger phase of job losses took place once the statutory
framework began to change. Where enterprise councils existed, prior to 1990 the
enterprise management had to win the consent of the council before any redundancy
programme could be implemented. With the disbanding of the councils, management
was free to manage without interference from worker representatives and unilaterally
pushed through redundancies. In most cases some form of social criteria for selecting
workers to be made redundant and the level of compensation was agreed with
employees. In practice, however, management (supervisors or shop managers) used
the redundancies to refashion skill profiles and rid themselves of 'poor performers'.
Resistance to redundancies by workers was muted.
The threat of redundancy undermined the sense of collective solidarity, as
workers were forced to compete with each other and pursue individual strategies. In
addition, the absence of credible institutions representing workers interests', and the
Workers continued to distrust official trade unions owing to the legacy of the past and the
slowness with which union structures within the shop floor began to take on the role of defending
workers rather than acting as a conduit to management attempts to reduce employment levels.
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general acceptance that marketisation demanded job losses both helped to explain the
absence of resistance to redundancies. Instead the threat of redundancy increased
discipline as the level of absenteeism and labour turnover declined. In part this
reflected the new social make up of workforces in which youngsters and pensioners
had been forced out, leaving workers with family responsibilities. This created
workforces which were more dependent and thus less resistant to change. Thus in the
context ofjob losses, in which workers had little choice but to acquiesce, management
possessed a new weapon which could be used to threaten and discipline employees
and create the conditions necessary for management to reorganise and take control of
the labour process.
1-lowever, whilst the threat of redundancy assisted the introduction of new
attitudes towards work, declining volumes of production undermined attempts to
pursue new ways of working. Indeed in many respects the market environment
actually accentuated the anarchy of the labour process. In the first instance the
termination of production - sometimes for as long as six months - or at least the
reduction in the number of shifts worked, meant that workers had more time and an
incentive to concentrate on developing a second income. As a result workers became
less dependent on their employers and discipline declined as absenteeism increased.
Production crises continued and supervisors were forced to improvise in ever more
sophisticated ways to prevent liquidation. Labour was shifted not only between
machines but also between shops. Mechanised assembly lines lay idle since volumes
were too small to make their utilisation worthwhile. Instead workers in very small
groups, perhaps only two or three, assembled components (such as speedometers)
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largely by hand. Unit costs increased and the extremely low capacity utilisation
meant that effective use of labour was difficult to achieve. There were many
opportunities for workers to conceal effort. At the same time supplies were disrupted
as suppliers were liquidated or withdrew from segments of the market, and often new
suppliers took time to match the quality supplied previously. Overall the market
resulted in the slow down of production, an increase in the proportion of
work-in-progress and a labour process at first more anarchic than before.
In response to falling demand, falling employment and the problems identified
above management sought to re-concentrate production. In one of the legacies of the
extensive mode of development many automotive component firms had established
'branch plants' in the I 970s to tap into new reserves of rural female labour to assemble
components manufactured in main towns where labour shortages meant wages were
relatively high. Once demand declined enterprises closed or sold peripheral plants
and shifted production to core plants in the towns. Despite previously lacking
political awareness, the absence of alternative employment opportunities in rural areas
stimulated campaigns by workers to keep branch plants open, even including offers to
purchase production facilities. To enable this the government had set up a scheme to
assist employee buyouts but since the purchase price went to the government rather
than the enterprise, management tried to prevent workers from using the procedure.
The closure of branch plants disproportionately affected unskilled and female
assembly workers. Correspondingly it increased management dependency on a core
group of skilled male workers in the main factories who had played such an important
role under the old system.
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Assembly functions were added to the main plants in urban areas where higher
skilled (generally male) workers had to be persuaded to take over tasks which were
previously categorised as unskilled and done by women. General reluctance to do so
forced management to tap into local reserves of female labour which had developed in
urban areas as a result of the economic changes. Within the core plants production
was also shifted as enterprises tried to cut overheads and reorganise production layout
to increase efficiency and regain control over how work was conducted. Production
was concentrated into main halls cramping workers to give them less chance to 'waste'
time by walking around the site or between different machines, and thus making it
harder for them to conceal effort from supervisors. At the same time some enterprises
shifted certain management functions to the shop floor to break down the gulf
between management and workers. A by-product of such a strategy was to increase
the level of management surveillance. In one enterprise management even introduced
a closed circuit TV camera in order to keep a watchful eye on its workers.
The third influence on the transformation of work was the reorganisation of
production to concentrate on core functions, regularise work, increase flexibility and
raise throughput. Peripheral jobs were terminated and components sourced externally;
this too enhanced the position of core workers whereas auxiliary workers were
dispensed with. To regularise the flow of work inventories were established between
different elements of the production process in order to minimise balance-delay
difficulties and to ensure that when production disruptions occurred, work elsewhere
in the process continued. This contributed to the disintegration of production
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processes in order to increase flexibility. These simple changes forced workers to
work more of the time and also work under pressure since they always had a backlog
of tasks to be done. Production layout was also altered in order to improve the
ergonomics of work and to allow concentration of production in smaller halls to
enable more to be done by one worker. Thus whereas one machine might have had
one operator and an auxiliary in the past, reorganising the layout allowed one worker
to operate two or even three machines simultaneously. However, the move away from
an integrated production system sometimes made it harder to ensure that targets were
met. To overcome this problem some managements replaced time-rates with
piece-rates. The absence of capital prevented significant investment in new
technology which might have altered the labour process. Where investment was
required to meet orders from western customers, customers paid for the new machines
themselves and located them in the supplier's factory. In this way more and more
workers operated machines which did not belong to their employer.
In addition to establishing more logical and efficient production layouts,
management sought to control the labour process in other ways. Having already
reduced the proportion of non-productive to productive workers and the number of
un- and semi-skilled employees, management set about reorganising labour. Jobs
were enlarged, and arguably enriched, to include not only machine operating but also
basic maintenance and auxiliary functions. Production norms were also rewritten.
This was not a simple process of management increasing norms, although this did
occur in some cases, but more often a genuine attempt to reinforce the significance of
norms by making them more realistic and specific to particular production processes.
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In particular, firms which found new western customers were forced to establish
detailed measures of the efficiency of processes and time costs which resulted in the
production of information which could be compared with the west and which armed
management with a weapon in attempts to raise quantity norms by increasing the
speed of processes. At the same time enterprise management introduced new devices
to enable them to control labour time. Managers forced workers to complete
time-sheets and account for their use of time. Discipline was also increased as
smoking on the shop floor was banned and breaktimes enforced much more rigorously
than before.
The newly defined jobs were allocated to skilled workers, whose only
alternative was unemployment, whereas before the tasks had mostly been assigned to
semiskilled workers. Skilled workers were retained often under the pretext that they
would be able to operate new high technology machinery to be introduced in the
future. On the face of it such a strategy seemed to reinforce the dependence that
management had in the past on a core group of workers; however the changes were
often accompanied by efforts to undermine the privileges that group of workers
previously enjoyed. Thus skilled workers were forced to become operators and do
menial tasks like other workers. However, in some cases core workers were able to
retain privileges, particularly in firms where management continued to feel
responsible for their workers. One outcome involved core workers and management
purchasing firms from the state through an ESOP (employee stock ownership plan).
ESOPs allowed firms which had not found foreign investors to remain in business and
offered management the prospect that employee ownership would encourage workers
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to lake nore responsibility for their work and show more willingness to use their
initiative. I lowever, early ESOPs, for example at Perion Battery Factory in Budapest,
tended to show that employee ownership did not have a significant effect on workers,
not least because it seemed too similar to the de jure situation under the Communist
Party. Whereas the majority of firms retained core skilled workers, there was a
counter trend as some enterprises sought to eliminate at least some skilled workers
and become more reliant on semiskilled workers.
In the majority of enterprises the issue of quality control provided the pretext
for management to gain control over the labour process. Improving quality was seen
as the route to win market share in west European markets. As a result enterprises
were very keen to employ management consultants (mostly funded by western aid) to
assess their procedures. In doing so management undermined the power of the core
workers on which it was increasingly dependent by using western 'experts' to discredit
their knowledge and power in the enterprise. New managements were persuaded of
the need to introduce quality control and assurance systems, and the Iso 9000 series
in particular. Whilst the implementation of ISO 9000 often included some technical
change, more pertinently and significantly, it enforced a system of bureaucratic
regulation and control over how work was to be done. The most important aspect of
the system cited by management was the identification of work with particular
workers. This allowed worker effort to be measured and compared and the tracing of
defects to individuals who could be disciplined through fines and ultimately dismissal.
In order to convey the significance of such changes to workers, managements
admitted to having dismissed people as a deterrent to other workers.
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Implementing quality assurance systems did not simply refer to technical or
bureaucratic change but also to attitudes. Management used ISO 9000 as a pretext to
'reorientate' workers to the new market environment. 'Special education programmes'
rarely concentrated on teclmical issues but used seminars to focus instead on
economic, financial and management issues to try to align workers' interests with
those of management. The seminars were used not only to encourage workers to be
more responsible for the quality of their work but also to convey the new roles that
management and workers had to play under the new circumstances. At the same time
supervisors were made responsible for achieving pre-agreed quality targets and
assigned the responsiblity to ensure that workers met their targets. 	 Thus
implementing quality control was used to make supervisors assume greater
responsibility for the way work was carried out by workers.
The introduction of quality control were often linked to new systems of
remuneration. We have already seen that where production processes were altered,
pay systems were changed from time-rate to piece-rate and vice versa but other
general changes also took place. For those who remained in employment pay rates
increased but since inflation was high real wages declined. In order to reward some
workers for taking on greater responsibility pay differentials were increased
considerably. Pay was also increased for supervisors - in the past they were often paid
less than ordinary workers - which with their new responsibilities aligned them more
and more with management. For the first time management had a significant presence
on the shop floor. In addition performance-related pay and bonus payment systems
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were used to encourage workers to meet quality as well as quantity targets. Some
enterprises chose to measure group performance with the result that workers had an
incentive to enforce discipline on their colleagues to ensure that the maximum bonus
was secured. In these cases it gave supervisors considerable leverage as they
distributed this bonus amongst the workers.
Despite these changes, management continued to face difficulties in devolving
responsibility and persuading workers to use their initiative and feel more responsible
for their work. To overcome these problems firms which won contracts from foreign
companies, and Magyar Suzuki in particular, began to introduce quite different forms
of labour organisation. Many talked of wanting to follow the 'Japanese Way' by the
introduction of Suzuki 'Five S's 2 and experimentation with forms of team work. It was
significant that management's ability to exploit the individualism and competitive
spirit bequeathed by the planning regime in Hungary, which was deepened by the fear
of unemployment, had reached its limit. Instead management sought vehicles that
broke-down narrow definitions of self-interest and encouraged co-operation. Overall
workers were forced to compete with each other in the field of workers interests (jobs
and pay) but when it came to the company's interest (work) mechanisms for making
them co-operate and work together were implemented.
All these changes represented a dramatic reform in behaviour and in mental
attitude. Implementation also implied a considerable cost in management time with
the result that new work regimes were confined to certain parts of factories - often on
2	 Suzuki's 'Five S's' refer to the Japanese words for cleanliness, orderliness, the minimisation of
superfluous effort, the mininhisation of effort required, and optimisation.
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lines producing products for export to western Europe. The result was the creation of
'islands' of new production - sometimes they formed internal limited companies (see
Burawoy 1992, Stark 1993) - within which a new work regime, new labour process,
and new remuneration scheme were introduced. Thus the transformation of work was
extremely uneven within and between enterprises. Even within the same factory
workers could be under very different management regimes with quite different labour
processes. One negative feature of this was that workers in other parts of the factory
reacted against those fellow workers who secured larger sums of money. This created
a collective identity amongst the workers on the new lines and also demonstrated the
effort and discipline demanded in factories organised according to western rules. For
those working under new conditions the threat that they would be moved to another
part of the factory and lose pay and privileges was a strong incentive to ensure
compliance to the new work regimes. In these ways new cleavages developed and
worker hierarchies established which helped to reinforce the changes management
were trying to introduce.
As the labour process was transformed so too was the institutional structure of
labour representation (see chapter 4). Under the former regime the main union
represented in the automotive industry was VASAS which was a member of ZWOT,
the association of unions. Whereas some new unions were established in the auto
industry the traditional union VASAS continued to be the main union albeit now
operating as a defender of worker interests rather than as an organ of management.
On the shop floor the major change was the termination of enterprise councils and the
election, as part of the Labour Code introduced in July 1992, of works councils.
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I lowever, in the immediate aftermath of political change there was a vacuum as the
old trade unions had yet to transform themselves and new organisation , had yet to be
established. Thus at the time of most uncertainty labour representation was at its
weakest.
The legacy of the 'labour movement' under the soviet regime undermined
unions' attempts to recruit and mobilise workers. As a result unionisation in the
in1ustry fell considerably. One reason for this was that local union branches were
slower to respond to their new role than was suggested by the pronouncements
emanating from the union's head offices. For in the same way as management had to
internalise a new role, so too did unions and their officials. With the dramatic
reduction in employment levels local union officials were often confused about
whether their interests lay with the workers being made redundant or with
management arguing that redundancies were the only way to ensure the enterprise's
viability. In practice worker representatives agreed to job losses but struggled with
management over pay levels. However, their lack of success in winning pay increases
further undermined workers' faith in the union's ability to defend their interests against
management. For many workers and managers, local union officials continued to
operate in the old way.
The new institutional framework was thus central in establishing the manner in
which workers' interests were to be represented and their relationship to management
interests. The new works councils, whose representatives were often VASAS shop
stewards dating from before the political changes, became the object of struggle.
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l'hcrc was considerable debate between management and workers as to whether the
new councils were meant to assist management, to defend workers' rights, or were just
a complete irrelevance given that management had been given the right to manage
without interference. This debate was resolved in different ways in different
enterprises but the difficult economic situation meant that in practice workers'
representatives had very little influence on management. Another outcome of the
institutional changes was that management no longer had to deal with trade union
oflicials but only the works council representatives who tended to reflect the sectional
interests of their enterprise, or in other words management, rather than broader
industrial or political issues. This was beginning to result in enterprise level labour
representation which did not foster solidarity amongst workers in different enterprises
(see chapter 4). What all this showed was the significance of habit us ; the institutional
machinery was necessary but not sufficient to ensure that worker interests were
represented. Indeed the concealing of this important point was one of the ways
workers were habituated into the new circumstances. Worker de facto control over
work during the soviet era had been replaced by de jure representation which only
served to reduce workers' power.
Eastern Germany
Many of the changes that occurred in the Hungarian automotive industry also
occurred in eastern Germany only more so and with much more rapidity; the effective
closure of the industry and its subsequent reopening concealed the extent to which
change occurred. Thus whereas in Hungary there were a series of struggles over
changes, in the former GDR (west) German capital was so dominant in the course of
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unification and in the years that immediately followed in that many battles were not
even fought. Indeed the manner in which change was heralded as inevitable and the
speed with which it was introduced had a significant impact on the transformation of
work. The most important influence on the transformation of work in east Germany
was the THA. The first phase of transformation resulted in the termination of
production. The THA removed existing management and replaced them with
managers from the west or easterners who were middle managers without links to the
SED or the STASI. The new managements, who owed their position entirely to the
THA, were forced to implement the THA's policy. Most importantly the new
managements were compelled to measure viability of production against a
profitability criteria and to judge labour utilisation according to turnover per
employee. This allowed the THA to force management to terminate inefficient
production: this was most of the industry's output.
Very quickly the new managements dispatched employees who had acted as
local officials of the SED and STASI. With the termination of production in many
plants, the vast majority of the industry's 65,000 workers were placed on short term
working contracts and were compelled to attend training schemes. At the same time
those employees who worked in workshops which manufactured items (such as minor
tools and components) which could be much more cheaply outsourced were made
redundant. Where welfare functions, such as kindergartens, were attached to
enterprises they were removed making it harder for women to continue working.
More controversially the THA also instructed management to cut skilled research and
development personnel. The THA's course of action meant that production virtually
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ceased, the workforce externalised (in one way or another) but productivity had
increased dramatically, albeit without fundamentally changing the labour or
production processes. However, the second phase, the start-up, was to have a
profound impact on the labour process.
The manner in which the industiy was wound down was significant in
establishing the context for its restart and management's ability to forge new work
regimes. As the THA took over effective management of its firms through 'place men'
the issue of redundancies was taken away from the firm and out of the competence of
workers ability to resist; after all, management was only doing what it was being told.
Iii this way antagonism was concealed. The strategy to put employees on short time
working contracts before actually making them redundant diffused potential
resistance. In this way the THA also undermined workers' solidarity by isolating
them from their colleagues. The overall impact of these strategies was the dispersal of
resistance. But moreover, once production resumed and workers were bought back
into work, management were effectively starting afresh with an old, but grateful
workforce under completely new conditions. Management was in a position where it
did not have to bargain with workers but instead could dictate conditions.
The threat of unemployment, as in Hungary, acted as a very powerful weapon
to compel workers to accept the new circumstances; a dependent workforce was a
vulnerable and pliant one. As the enterprises found new customers to replace the ones
they had lost, workers were gradually taken off short time working. In effect this
allowed enterprises to create a new workforce almost from scratch benefiting from a
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hybrid internal-external labour market either workers acce;ted what they were offered
or they were sent home. Skilled workers were the first to be brought back to work and
forced to become operators and thereby lose the status they had previously enjoyed.
As the workforces were reassembled a competitive spirit was engendered as
management set about choosing the best workers to become supervisors. In this way
a completely new hierarchy amongst shopfloor workers was established. This was
significant because a sense of collective solidarity amongst employees, engendered by
the Koinbinat, was much stronger and persisted longer than was the case in Hungary.
Whereas in Hungary supervisory persormel remained the same and were re-educated
in the light of economic change, in east Germany supervisors were mostly new to the
position and were inducted in a management-dominated environment. The role of the
supervisor was defined as one very much on the side of management, and to reinforce
this they were made responsible for quality, productivity and in some cases costs.
With a dominated group of supervisors, who owed their position and privileges to
management, management had devolved power and manufactured the institutional
basis for controlling production. It could then set about fashioning a new work
regime and labour process.
Western managements expressed satisfaction that the factories they took over
were efficiently organised but argued that they were poorly utilised. Management
thus set about changing the nature of work and increase work intensity. Production
processes were systematically undermanned, designed to force workers, operating
under considerable pressure, to find ways of working more efficiently. In addition to
cutting manning levels, jobs were enlarged to include more tasks and greater
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responsibility, such as for quality and basic maintenance. * Not only did the utilisation
of labour differ from before but so too did the nature of work done. For many
suppliers the only orders they could win were subcontracting contracts from large
west German auto suppliers. In some cases these merely involved the subassembly of
already prepared parts. There was a reduction in the complexity of work done with
the result that highly skilled workers were doing menial assembly tasks. Worker
resistance was minimal owing to the condition of the labour market and because as we
have seen a new cohort of supervisors - who had largely internalised management
interests - existed to enforce the new work regime by enforcing discipline and
controlling production. At the same time efforts were made to improve the
ergonomics of work often through basic alterations to the working environment - such
as levelling floors or enhancing lighting - and to clean up the conditions in which
workers had to operate. In this way although workers were having to work harder, for
many work seemed easier and less hazardous than before.
In eastern Germany 'lean production' (see chapter 2) played the role fulfilled
by 'quality' in Hungary, at the centre of the discourse amongst management on the
modernisation of work. The significance of lean production in transforming the
nature of work was two fold: it provided a convincing argument about the German
economy that enticed workers, and it justified new forms of labour organisation. Thus
first, management used lean production to communicate their view on the problems
that faced German industry in general and the automotive industry (assemblers and
suppliers) in particular and the way in which workers were involved in the story.
Management told workers about Germany's lack of competitiveness in Europe and the
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new Landers' uncompetitiveness within Germany. They told the workers too, about
the l)rOhlemS German car assemblers faced and how they were compensating by
forcing suppliers' prices down. However, since all costs in east Germany were the
same, so the story went, as in the west except for labour, the only way to ensure the
viability of suppliers in the new Lander was for workers to consent to minimising
wage increases and greater work efficiency (read: intensity). In this way management
successfully passed the burden for ensuring enterprise viability on to workers whose
best interests, they were told, were served by allowing management to manage.
Second, 'lean production' justified two types of practical changes. The first
was the 'hollowing out' of firms as vertical integration was drastically reduced. In
addition to reducing costs, the threat of further outsourcing hung over workers and
provided an incentive to work harder or risk losing their jobs. Second, lean
production was used to legitimate the introduction of novel forms of labour
organisation: team work, quality circles and continuous improvement schemes. The
introduction of team working was the most significant development not least because
of the implications that rested on the role of the team leader; was the leader to
represent workers or act as the lowest rung of management? In effect the poor
condition of the labour market and the way workers' perceived interests were
marshalled in line with those of management, disguised the sensitivity of the issue.
The introduction of team working was often accompanied by the disintegration of
assembly processes and the organisation of workers into small physically closed cells.
Within these cells workers, paid piece-rates, rotated between job stations and so could
control the speed of work. Management had secured hegemonic control over the
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shop floor which permitted the withdrawal of technology and the transfer of control
over the speed of work to employees at the same time as ensuring that productivity
increased. The similarities between this position and that described by Harazsti
(1977) in Hungary during the soviet era are striking. Management had completely
refashioned the nature of work and seemingly the labour process and in doing so had
re-concealed the new/old exploitative relations by forcing workers to internalise the
labour process.
Quite apart from the role of the THA - something that we will return to - what
made the transformation of work very different from that which occurred in Hungary
was the extension of west German labour laws to include the new Lander (see chapter
four). BGLs were disbanded and works councils were elected according to the West
German Labour Relations Act. At the same time 1GM moved into the new Lander in
order to replace the old union in the industry, IGMO, and set about recruiting and
mobilising members (see chapter 4). On the face of it the new labour laws and the
institutional framework they created would seem to have offered workers a high level
of protection. However, despite the rule book, management, with the might of the
THA behind it, was able to translate its hegemony over the shopfloor into control over
the institutionalisation of labour interests.
In the first instance 1GM recruited shop stewards in larger enterprises and
made contact with workers in smaller businesses to assist workers form and operate
works councils effectively. Despite training by 1GM officials, workers were simply
unaware of their entitlement to co-determination with the result that works councils
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remained weak. A further problem for the new works councils was that they were
continuously being reduced in size as enterprises were broken-up by the TI-IA and
waves of redundancies took place. Works councils were thus on the defensive and
had very little power with which to bargain. It is particularly significant that east
German union activists felt constrained by Germany's complex rules which specify
when collective action is and is not legal. The new rules meant that in the case of
redundancies management had to agree a social plan with the works council in order
to ensure that the most vulnerable were not the ones made redundant and to assist
those made redundant to find other employment or training opporthnities. However,
in practice works councils had very little influence over redundancies and in various
plants managements were able, at least partly, to select workers according to their
ability.	 Even where management was forced to retain workers with social
responsibilities this resulted in a workforce which had little incentive to resist change
and risk losing their jobs.
The works councils in some component suppliers were no more effective in
preserving wage rates (see chapter 4). Of equal significance to the tariff rate (wage
levels) itself was the manner of its application in the new Lander in relation to wage
groups and evasion. Under the German collective bargaining system all workers are
attached to one of ten wage groups according to their experience and skill level.
Wages are lowest in wage group number one and highest in number ten. This means
that the allocation of wage groups to workers (which is supposed to be done in
conjunction with the works council) is significant. In east Germany it permitted the
establishment of differentials between workers and concealed genuine comparative
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wages between east and west. As works councils were barely functioning at many
sites and in others were close to management, management was able to put workers in
lower wage groups than would be the case for comparable workers in western
Germany. This meant that although comparable workers in eastern and western
Germany were on the same tariff scale (albeit with an agreed differential to take
account of lower productivity in the east) the difference in the way the wage groups
were implemented increased the difference between wages in the two halves of the
country.
The withdrawal by employers from the tariff agreement in 1993 (see chapter
4) forged an atmosphere supportive to management strategies to evade paying the
tariff. Some firms left Gesamtmetall and were no longer obliged to pay the tariff.
Many other smaller auto component producers found ways of paying below the tariff
rate. Where there was resistance some offered works councils deals whereby job
security pledges were made in return for workers reneging on their tariff entitlements.
Such deals also implied the exclusion of 1GM influence from the work place and
works councils became more of an adjunct to management than a defender of workers'
rights. It was ironic that these deals also went some way in re-establishing the job
security that workers had enjoyed under the Soviet regime.
6.3	 The transformation of work: workplace implications of foreign
automotive investment
At the same time as work was transformed in the state owned automotive
industry, foreign automotive investment established new work regimes. Foreign auto
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investors used the conditions conjured up by systemic transformation to experiment
and introduce innovative production techniques. Innovation in the field of labour
organisation was integral to these strategies. To examine changes in labour
organisation we return to the four case studies introduced in chapter five.
6.3.1 Suzuki in Hungary and VW in eastern Germany
Magyar Suzuki
Like Japanese auto-related investments elsewhere in Europe Suzuki, sought to
apply some elements of the distinctive labour organisation employed in Japan. This
involved notably the enforcement of rigorous discipline and the organisation of
production workers into teams. The success of establishing a very different factory
regime and organising labour in a manner that was alien to Hungarian workers
depended on a rigorous and sophisticated recruitment and training programme.
When Suzuki first announced its intention to construct a plant in Esztergom
there was a shortage of labour in the local area. The local labour market was
dominated by four large state-owned firms which manufactured specialist products
and employed skilled workers. One of the firms, SZIM, the well known machine tool
supplier, had established one of Hungary's few training centres for mechanical
engineers. The local labour market was skilled. Despite the labour shortage in the
town it lay close to the contracting Dorog coal field which had one of the highest rates
of unemployment in Hungary. By the time Suzuki began recruitment, the local labour
market had been transformed as the four major local employers had closed and
unemployment had risen above the county and national average. The area became
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regarded as an unemployment black spot. This permitted Suzuki to be highly
selective in its recruitment and establish a monopolistic position in a very depressed
local labour market which undermined the bargaining power of workers and would-be
employees.
Initially, Suzuki established strict criteria for selecting workers. Only those
applicants who were male, between the ages of 20 and 22, were in good health, lived
within a 10km radius of the plant (this included Dorog), had attended professional
high-school but did not have a trade or profession, had some competence in spoken
English, and had completed their national service were considered for employment.
Despite these conditions there were two applicants for every vacancy when
recruitment began. Applications were also examined closely to ensure that the 'right'
sort of people were employed. Early recruits had either worked, albeit briefly, in one
of the major four industrial enterprises or in one of the Dorog mines, and had
subsequently been made redundant.
Of equal significance to the selection of workers was their training. Since
Suzuki preferred to train workers on-the-job, the training was initially haphazard and
largely comprised working in the company's factories in Japan. However, the new
employees had either been poorly selected or poorly prepared, for many Hungarian
workers, used to a less intense regime of work, found the experience of work in a
Japanese factory very challenging. It also indicated to local management that if
Hungarian workers were to become accustomed to the Japanese way of work, more
rigorous ways of preparing workers would have to be devised.
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"Hungarian trainees sent to Japan went on strike and 10 per cent of them
returned home early, some sacked for smoking on the factory floor, refusing to
wear safety equipment and, in one case, working on every other car... Besides
a diet of rice and fish - innards and all - that both sickened and starved the
Hungarian meat eaters, compulsory overtime and the unremitting pace of work
were grievances. What made the unpleasant unbearable, said returnees, was
mean pay that was only average by Hungarian standards. Hungarian workers
expect more of foreign companies". (Financial Times, 13 March 1992,14)
It thus became apparent that it would take some time to educate Hungarian
workers to accept the hard work and longer hours of Suzuki's working methods. The
nature of the working regime soon spread amongst local people and the company
found it difficult to attract labour, despite the depressed labour market and its
monopolistic position within it. Indeed it became a question of whether recruits
would work for Suzuki rather than the other way round. At the end of interviewing a
candidate the interviewer, having outlined the working system, would ask whether the
candidate could put up with it. Fifty per cent said no.
As workers were also leaving on account of low morale and the difficulty of
coming to terms with the new way of work, Suzuki's labour shortage was a serious
concern. As a result it relaxed some of the selection criteria. It offered to consider
applicants up to the age of 30 (later this was relaxed even further to include workers
up to the age of 32), who lived within a radius of 20km from the plant and had
completed a minimum of 8 years education. Significantly they became more willing
to consider skilled workers, with a trade or profession, but only if they could
demonstrate they were willing and could work to the Suzuki method. At the same
time they designed a more effective training schedule which was designed to prepare
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recruits better for the rigours of working for Suzuki. This involved informing
potential recruits of the 'Suzuki Standard'. To ensure a steady flow of potential
employees into the factory Suzuki established a formal link with local labour offices
in Ezstergom and Tatabanya. In time it subcontracted the training programme to these
offices. It was not unrelated that the more unemployed people Suzuki employed the
more money it received from the Labour Ministry as a wage subsidy.
When workers were made unemployed, before they were eligible to receive
any state benefit they had to register at the local labour office. As a result the office
had a good knowledge of what sorts of people were available in the local area. In this
way the office identified potential recruits for Suzuki and in effect supplied and
screened potential labour. However, it proved difficult for the labour office to find
people willing to consider working for Suzuki that the company would accept; the
young were reluctant to apply and whilst older workers were, Suzuki was unwilling to
consider them. However, once 50 potential recruits had been identified the labour
office and Suzuki ran a three month long training course with the guarantee that those
who finished would be offered employment at the plant3 . Suzuki designed the course
and had total control over what the labour office officials taught. The first five weeks
of the courses were spent in the labour office. In the first week applicants were taught
the 'Suzuki Standard': a payments system, a working hours/shift system and a
commitment to life-time employment. Underlying the standard was the company's
philosophy of work: although the car was made in Hungary it was a Japanese car and
This turned out to be a hollow promise because in practice all it meant was that the applicant
would be offered ajob if the company wanted them. However, it was a significant promise because
such phraseology implied that the applicants had in their power the ability to control their fate whereas
this was manifestly untrue and revealed much about how the company sought to control workers.
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had to be made in the Japanese way and so workers must accept a Japanese working
culture; workers had to be willing to work hard doing monotonous tasks; and workers
had to be willing to work in teams and learn all the jobs in the team. After this
introduction the applicants spent four weeks being told the practicalities of working at
Suzuki, the pay, hours, and conditions. After this the course moved to the Suzuki
factory where applicants spent periods working on the line to familiarise themselves
with the technology and tools and leaning how production was organised. On average
once the course moved to the factory some 20 out of the 50 starters dropped out.
Overall the course was meant to introduce Suzuki, its goals and strategy, to would-be
workers, it explained the conditions it expected its Hungarian workers to operate
under and sought to orientate and align the interests of workers with those of
management and the company.
On average of the initial 50 potential recruits who took the course some 25
were interviewed. The interviews were short and simply designed to discover the
applicant's education and work experience. Those selected (on average around ten
people out of the 50 who started the course) were offered an unlimited contract.
However during the first three months the worker was on a first period of probation
and the contract could be terminated by either party at any time. During the
probationary period workers were closely examined and evaluated. At the end of the
three month period the workers were interviewed for a second time, this time based on
a 25 minute questionnaire, to ascertain whether they were 'suitable'. The second
interview was designed to paint a picture of the candidate's character and background.
It covered the worker's family and its background, previous work experience, efforts
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the applicants niade to find work while unemployed and 'hy the applicants thought
they were unable to find employment earlier. The questionnaire sought to identify the
applicant's character and whether they suited working alone or in groups. The
interview concluded with a discussion about the Japanese style of work, the strict
discipline, the overtime and holiday regulations, and ended by asking whether the
candidate could cope with such a working environment. By the time the first period
of probation ended on average two of the fifteen starters had left; some 5Opc were
asked to leave whilst the remainder chose to. Thus out of the fifty who started the
training course on average only 13 proceeded beyond the first period of probation.
Once selected, workers were placed on a second period of probation which
lasted nine months. During this period contracts could be terminated by either side
immediately. Having been selected workers experienced harsh conditions. Whereas
the traditional length of shifts in Hungary was eight hours (usually from 6am to 2pm)
including breaks, Suzuki stipulated that workers had to spend the shift actually at line
and breaks were extra and in the workers' own time. Thus the shift ran from 7am to
4.5Opm and included a 30 minute lunch break and three shorter breaks each 17
minutes in length. In addition workers could be compelled to do paid overtime
(receiving 1 5Opc of the basic wage on weekdays and 200pc on Saturdays). Despite
the long hours pay was low. In mid-1993 the operator's average wages were in the
region of HUF 13,000 per month. This contrasted poorly with other employers,
particularly foreign ones, and was not much above the HUF8000 unemployment
benefit. Core workers were paid between I-IUF17-23,000 per month.
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Significantly the shift times meant there was less opportunity for workers to
supplement their pay through second jobs, and helped to enforce management
insistence that worker efforts had to be saved for Suzuki. In addition to the long
hours and poor rates of pay, work was intense and tiring even if the technical demands
were low. Many operators, with no experience of the discipline enforced by a
continuous assembly line, found the repetitive, boring and monotonous tasks
particularly demanding. Quite apart from the physical exhaustion, workers also
complained of a very stressful atmosphere at the plant. Quality control played a large
part in generating the intimidating atmosphere. Every work place was a quality
control position as each worker was responsible for checking the quality of the
previous one. Likewise each team checked the quality of the work done by the team
upstream. In addition, collective responsibility for quality meant that the team
members were compelled to go to the aid of workers who had a problem to ensure that
production continued undisrupted. Quality was also measured, individually, per team
and for the entire factory, according to an audit points system. The quality of early
production scored 133 out of a maximum of 147 and compared well with the average
of 137 in Suzuki's factories in Japan.
The recruitment procedure, even though it had to be relaxed, created a
workforce profile which was designed to meet the needs of the working system. The
manufacturing side of the operation employed just four hierarchical levels. There was
a plant manager in overall control of manufacturing and beneath him were 10
supervisors, each responsible for 5-6 of the 40 foremen. Each foreman controlled
between 10-15 operators. The operators were divided into teams the size and
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structure of which evolved as the company and production developed. Initially there
were four teams, one for each of the shops (press, body, paint and trim, and
assembly). In practice the teams were initially used to justify shifting workers around
the shops (and thereby train them to do more than one job), and also to ease the
definition of work norms, at a time when production volume was increasing
erratically as part of the start-up phase. As the production volume increased the teams
became more significant in establishing the nature of work. Teams became smaller
and were used increasingly to measure performance. They became the main vehicle
for motivating workers to improve their performance; workers began to ensure that
their colleagues did not slack. Team work was also used to design flexible job
specifications, representing loose bundles of between 10 and 14 different operative
steps. As a result worker responsibilities were informal in the sense that they were
ill-defined and could easily be enlarged. The lack of institutionalisation when it came
to job definition in conjunction with the factory regime conspired to permit
management consistently to raise expectations of work performance.
The production process, in part through the technology and in part through
team work, was organised to make work technically easy. The vast majority of the
tasks were very simple and were designed to be done by almost anybody; within four
days workers were expected to know how to do all the operative tasks allotted to their
team. However the company sought neither unskilled nor highly skilled workers but
applicants who fell in-between the two categories. This was because Suzuki
anticipated the two groups, for different reasons, would exhibit attitudes in opposition
to the Suzuki working method. Thus unskilled workers were thought likely to be
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disruptive and 'work shy' whilst skilled craftsmen with a trade or profession were
thought less likely to accept supervisor's and foremen's orders. Instead the company
established a workforce that was dominated by young workers (in mid-1993 the
average age of the operators was just 20), without the bad habits of soviet production,
who exhibited a general work ability. The workforce was overskilled for the technical
tasks required of it but bright enough to internalise the 'soft' aspects of the work
regime. However, there was no danger of a specialist or craft-like working culture
developing. For management as well as workers the new job definitions rendered the
traditional view of skill inappropriate. The definition of skill had been refashioned
from a measurement of technical ability to the willingness of workers to accept
management's will.
Central to Suzuki's strategy was the prevention of collective interest amongst
workers. This was in part achieved by generating a collective identification amongst
all employees - administrative and manufacturing - with the company. Equally
significant was the company's use of individual contracts which excluded collective
bargaining. All workers were given a basic salary but were subject to complex and
detailed measures of individual and group performance. The first key element in the
system occurred at the end of the probationary periods. Workers were evaluated
according to four measures: attendance, effort, performance and character. In each
case the workers were given a score and an overall rating of 'A' (best) to 'C' (worst)
which determined which of the three base salaries they started on. Workers that were
classified as 'C' (2pc of the workforce) were regarded by the company as expendable,
those classed as '13' (1 8pc) were deemed to be acceptable for they could be expected to
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reach the level of standard of the 'A' workers (8Opc). In addition to the basic salary,
which varied according to the overall performance of the plant, there was a maximum
1 5pc bonus based on attendance.
Once workers had proceeded beyond the probationary period having been
allocated a basic salary, they were evaluated and their performance graded from 'A'
(best) to 'E' (lowest) every six months. The top two levels represented performance
which was acceptable to the company whereas the other three automatically triggered
disciplinary procedures of varying severity. Workers who performed well were
considered for promotion but the number of promotions was strictly limited. Thus in
the assembly hail some 8 workers out of 80 could be promoted each year. Where
more people sought promotion than there were opportunities the supervisors and
foremen decided who was elevated. The best 'A' workers were offered special
contracts which included a spell of training in Suzuki's Japanese factories. Thus the
endeavour of hard working operators was rewarded with the opportunity to go to
Japan and learn how to work even harder. The exploitation of workers had been
intemalised. Other 'rewards' for good performance included becoming team leaders
and foremen. In this way Suzuki successfully implemented a very complex internal
labour market which acted as an incentive for workers not only to work hard and be
ambitious but also identify with the company and be committed to its future
development. It also acted to create a dual workforce split between core workers
(those which had been sent to Japan) and had worked in several teams, and a
peripheral group which was less experienced. At the same time it also undermined
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workers when it approached the company in 1992. In MaFch 1993 VASAS leaders
had a series of meetings with Suzuki's Hungarian general manager but no accord to
establish a union presence was agreed.
Despite the control that management clearly exercised there were increasing
signs of resistance. Workers not onLy complained of the monotony and continuous
nature of work but also of the lack of challenge that the tasks provided. Overtime and
pay were also a considerable cause of resentment among workers. Not least although
pay gradually increased to around HUF17,000 for ordinary workers and up to
HUF23,000 for core workers by mid-1994, increments were often below the rate of
inflation. Other evidence of workforce problems were the high level of absenteeism,
6pc, (particularly amongst workers in the body shop who worked off-line), and a high
late of turnover. Between October 1992, when production commenced, and
mid-1993, more than 50 workers left the company. Some 25 had been sacked by
management whereas the rest left because they could not stand the conditions and pay.
Gradually the number of workers leaving continued to rise, the proportion sacked
declined dramatically to 5pc, and turnover reached 20-30pc 5 . Management responded
to criticism of the conditions by trying to underline that the company was a young one
still finding its way in the market, and that the conditions would 'probably' improve in
the future as the firm developed. Privately the management were much more
concerned by the increasingly rebellious behaviour of the workforce than they
admitted and started tracking workers who left the company voluntarily. They
At the same time a steady proportion of the 80 administrative staff began to leave. Indeed in
the course of the first eight months of 1993 six of the top ten Hungarian managers resigned their
positions. This followed complaints about the behaviour of their Japanese 'shadows' and stressful
working conditions.
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discovered that the majority found other jobs with pay rates on average between one
half and twice that which they received at Suzuki. The Hungarian managers gradually
isolated the low pay levels as behind the company's inability to secure the workers'
consent to a factory regime which was very different to that which they were used to.
However, the Japanese 'shadow' managers forbade a new attitude to wage levels
despite the fact that Suzuki paid below all of the major automotive investors in
Hungary.
Despite vague assurances, and management's attempts to exclude VASAS, a
number of workers established a small trade union in early 1993 which arose out of
the grievances first expressed when the early recruits were sent to Japan (see above).
One particular concern of the union leaders was the company's right to enforce
overtime, even on a Saturday, if targets had not been met. Overtime had been
enforced 12 times, including 3 times on Saturdays, and members disliked their lack of
choice over the matter. Sometimes they only had two hours warning. On some
occasions when workers were told to work on Saturdays they broke their contracts
and failed to turn up to work. Out of fear the union, whose membership had increased
to between 50 or 100 (mostly young workers) by mid-1993, was organised outside the
factory and based in an office at one of the workers' homes in Esztergom. The local
union made contact with VASAS and the two devised a strategy to mobilise the
workers. In the light of the company's refusal to recognise the union the aim was to
recruit two-thirds of the workers since under the Labour Code the management would
be compelled to negotiate with workers and sign a collective agreement to replace the
individual contracts which did not refer to the rights of workers at work.
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However, the union's membership grew only slowly because management
would not let it operate in the plant and because workers feared losing their jobs if
they joined. Management offered to meet the union leaders and provided a notice
board and room for them to use but the union declined to take up their offer for fear of
intimidation. One condition that management put in the way of a meeting was its
insistence that the union had to provide management a list of its members. Other
events occurred which indicated management's willingness to use heavy-handed
tactics to try to prevent the union from establishing a foothold amongst the workers.
Management sought ways of identifying and undermining the union's leaders and a
prominent union member's locker was searched by management where some tools
were found. Having contravened Suzuki's strict rules about storing tools the worker
was accused of attempting to steal them and was very nearly sacked. As a result of
such treatment the union continued to operate outside of the factory and sought to
recruit core workers, those which had been sent to Japan, and who were indispensable
to management, by visiting them at their homes.
In the course of late 1993 and early 1994 the union increased its membership,
became more visible and began to make demands of management. It remained based
outside the factory. It also turned its attention away from overtime towards the crucial
issue of pay. In March 1994 the union demanded a 25pc pay increase from
management and threatened to hold a series of strikes if its demand was not met.
However, management responded by only offering a l2pc pay increase. The union
reacted by staging some short strikes. However without the support of a national
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trade union, management was able to sack three of the union leaders. All three of
them were welders who worked in the body shop, the portion of the factory that
management had long identified as a potential 'hotbed' of aggravation, because of the
absence of a continuous manufacturing process.
Volkswagen Sachsen GmbIl6
The political changes in the GDR occurred as the VW Group faced renewed
competitive pressure. Costs rose just as cheaper producers (in some cases Japanese
transplants) established new capacity in the UK and on the Iberian peninsular. VW
embarked on two interrelated strategies to reduce production costs. First, supply
networks were refashioned, including experimentation with an innovative Toyota-type
system in Saxony, and second, and arguably more fundamentally, the company sought
to rework the balance of power between capital and labour. In both cases VW's
investment in eastern Germany was central in the success of these strategies. Here we
focus on VW's attempts to use the Wende to introduce a new factory regime in which
management secured greater control over the labour process. In doing so VW was
able to capitalise upon the role played by the German state and in particular the TI-IA,
which contributed so much to create an environment in which labour was weakened
encouraging management to take advantage. As the 1 990s proceeded the persistence
of the consciousness-deficit emanating from the SED regime (see Habermas 1994)
and its role in creating a subject-less society after unification became more clear
(Haussermann 1992). Within the enterprise this was reflected in a weak political
I am indebted to Nick Marshall for making a transcript of an interview he conducted with an
VW Sachsen manager on 9th December 1993 available.
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consciousness and a remarkable level of deference and passivity which permitted
management to wrest control over work from workers.
In the midst of the deindustrialisation of the former GDR, VW's highly
political investment was well placed to benefit from what seemed to be an act of
salvation by east Germans. Moreover the manner in which VW took over assets in
the former GDR and the phasing and timetable of its investment, helped to secure
management dominance over labour which permitted it freedom that VW did not
enjoy elsewhere in Germany. In the first instance VW took over a single SAW plant
and a small portion of the Kombinat's 12,000 employees but held out the prospect of
gradually incorporating more of SAW's assets and workers into VW Sachsen. This
created a very dependent workforce committed to the company's success so that more
of their former colleagues could gain employment at the plant. The solidarity between
ex-SAW workers who had subsequently become fragmented working for many
different companies or unemployed, persisted at least amongst union activists. This
was in sharp contrast to the individualism prevalent in Hungary. In addition, being
such a high profile company, and in many eyes symbolising West Germany's post-war
stability and success, VW's workers were very proud to work for them. At the same
time the company widely publicised its commitment to the region - largely connected
to its aim to attract local investments by suppliers - and could present its role as one of
paternalistic philanthropy.
As a result VW secured a very powerful position locally in which its
workforce, the remainder of SAW's employees and more generally the entire town
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were dependent, and projected their hopes, on the success bf the project. VW was at
the centre of a local growth coalition which resulted in the generation of a remarkable
degree of collective identification in the company which spilled over into the
workplace. In addition the timetable of VW investment phases left room for
uncertainty, Of particular significance was VW's intention to use the existing
ex-SAW facility (Mosel I) until the completion of an entirely new one (Mosel II) at
which point the future of the old facility would be decided. It was not insignificant
that the new plant was initially scheduled to begin production in 1994 - just as the
second east German collective bargaining agreement was due to be negotiated 7. From
the beginning therefore management had the upper hand as there was a thinly-veiled
threat of closure hanging over the old plant.
In such circumstances management felt able to implement broad ranging
changes to its normal practices in West Germany. In particular management drew
upon the leitmo1f of 'lean production' (see chapter 2) which had quickly gained
considerable currency across German industry to introduce a system of labour
organisation which effectively undermined VW's system of 'co-determination' as
management won more control over manning levels and the intensity of work. The
failure of JO Metall's strike in 1993 fundamentally to alter management's course,
served further to illustrate the impotence of organised labour to prevent management's
onslaught despite the application of west German labour laws in the new Lander.
The collective agreement was actually re-negotiated in early 1993 (see chapter 4).
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At the centre of VW Sachsen's new system of labour organisation was a form
of team working. It established the organising principle for all other management
strategies and the terrain of struggle between management and the IG
Metall-dominated works council. In December 1990 VW took over management
responsibility for Mosel I and the labour representation system was changed in
accordance with West German labour law. In January 1991 a works council was
formed but the personnel were exactly the same as those who sat on the council of
shop stewards under the SED regime. In April 1991 an election was held to appoint a
new works council (according to IG Metall's constitution) which took over in May.
Although some of those elected were the same people who had been active prior to the
changes, in order to demonstrate discontinuity 1GM persuaded VW to employ a
westerner, Herr Dieter Riemann, who was active on VW Kassel's works council in
west Germany to stand for chair of the new works council. He was duly elected. The
second most senior works council representative had been a labour representative
under the old regime when he worked for SAW. In total the works council consisted
of 15 members all of whom were members of 1GM and the majority of whom were
also shop stewards. Despite the presence of Herr Riemann and new 1GM offices in
Zwickau (which had 70,000 local members at the time 8) and Dresden, the works
council was largely unfamiliar with west German labour law and spent a lot of time
learning the system at the same time as management undermined it.
8	 When 1GM first moved into Zwickau in 1990 it recruited 90,000 members in south-west
Saxony. As deindustrialisation proceeded and unemployment increased membership fell to just 22,000
at the end of 1993.
344
Almost immediately it became clear that management sought to exclude the
works council from being involved in decisions and strategies that were the norm in
other VW plants. Recruitment was a case in point. In the first stage of the investment
VW took over management control of the paint and trim and assembly shop (Mosel I)
from IFA-PKW-SAW via Sachsenring Automobilbau (SAB), a joint venture with the
THA. However, it did not automatically inherit the 1,000 workers in the facility.
Instead SAW workers had to apply for jobs at VW's operation owned by SAB. This
allowed VW to select the best of the workers, the youngest and the healthiest, who
had previously worked on the Trabant assembly line9.
Initially VW employed 450 workers, sufficient to establish the operation, but
as VW's plans developed, additional people were recruited. By the end of 1993 VW
Sachsen employed some 2,095 workers (plus 400 white collar employees), comprising
1,200 in the trim and assembly shop, 300 in the paint shop (both Mosel I) and 350 in
the new body shop (Mosel II). Effectively VW was able to select workers from the
remaining pool of ex-SAW workers numbering in excess of 8,000. As a result VW's
management could be highly selective in recruitment as it sought to employ younger
people with qualifications and considerable experience. The average age of the
workers was a relatively high 38 and only SOpc had previously worked for SAW.
However, all were highly skilled and had worked in the local engineering industry'0.
In addition the workers at Mosel I were some of SAWs best employees having been selected
for transfer to the new plant in the mid-1980s from the older sites in Zwickau itself. In addition SAW's
Mosel plant was built and the workforce socialised at a time when state planners were demanding a
stricter working regime because of national economic stagnation with the result that the factory
operated in a manner far more similar to that in the west than was generally the case in other SAW
plants. Thus within the ideological constraints of the political system shop stewards acted much more
in line with the interests of workers and less like an organ of management and the SED.
This contrasted with VW's plants in west Germany where unskilled workers were employed in
addition to skilled workers.
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The contrast to the strategy pursued by Magyar Suzuki could hardly have been
greater, but perhaps reflected the different paths of transformation as much as their
different goals.
VW Sachsen used a particular procedure to select workers it thought would be
best suited to work in teams. As a result management included team and group
leaders in the process and used psychological profiling techniques to identify suitable
people, despite resistance from the works council. The works council tried
unsuccessfully to encourage management to select individuals who faced particularly
severe problems in the labour market, namely women and older people. However
management sought to appoint young people who did not have a record of political
activism. When VW began recruitment the local IG Metall office had only recently
been established and had not compiled a list of local members with the result that
management was unable to identify potential 'trouble makers'. However, and with
some irony, as IG Metall's presence in the region grew, the compilation of a
membership list permitted VW the opportunity to exclude IG Metall members. In this
way management sought to use mass unemployment beyond the plant to forge a
workforce unreceptive to the mobilisation attempts of the works council and trade
union.
If the recruitment procedure was designed to create a management-friendly
workforce the system of labour allocation was designed to increase management
control over work. This was achieved by reducing line management to a minimum
and permitting workers the carefully controlled freedom to work in the manner of
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their choosing. Foremen were replaced by Group Leaders, mostly ex-SAW middle
managers under the SED regime, who were responsible for discipline. Each Group
Leader was responsible for up to three teams of workers. By the end of 1993 the
workforce comprised 162 teams in Mosel I and Mosel II. Each team consisted of up
to II workers and had a leader who was appointed by management and replaced
sub-foremen. The other major change was the inclusion of maintenance workers with
operators in the teams depriving them of their former higher status. Within the teams
the workers rotated and operated according to a skill matrix system borrowed from
Nissan's plant in the UK. The teams were used as a disciplining system and thus
operated according to a supplier-customer relationship with the result that competition
developed between them. They disciplined one another in exactly the same way as
members disciplined each other within the teams. Elaborate criteria were established
to measures the teams' performances. The team system was thus designed to place a
higher degree of responsibility on to the individual worker constrained within a social
organisation of labour that was highly particular and designed to generate a stressful
environment in which workers were disciplined without being told what to do in an
authoritarian manner.
In large measure social control was materially based not only in the existence
of the teams themselves but through the establishment of control over the quality of
work. This was achieved in two ways: the first was the particular attitude towards
quality performance (in a narrow sense) and second through procedures designed to
improve the quality of work (in a broad sense). Two management strategies were of
particular significance in this respect: the introduction of Total Quality Management
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(TQM) and continuous improvement programmes (or kaizen), both borrowed from
Japanese industry. Crucially, both devices blurred the distinction between quality
performance and the quality of work and could therefore be used to exercise control
over not only how much work was done but also how it was done and crucially why it
was done. Once the matter of why work was done had been established the issue of
how much and how became merely a technical and management concern. However,
and this is the central point, the internalisation of the 'technical' issues established why
work was done. In short the technical and social basis of work were intertwined in a
mutually supporting way.
With the introduction of TQM everyone was made responsible for quality and
its management. Thus significant elements of the quality control management system
were built into the team working system. Teams were responsible for the quality of
their work and downstream teams controlled that work-in-progress supplied by the
team immediately upstream. Within the team all the members were collectively
responsible for the quality performance of the team as a whole. Quality performance
was calculated for each team, for which the leader was responsible. Thus the system
was not only a means of achieving a certain quality performance but also establishing
an informal control mechanism. In this way, the apolitical issue of quality in part
legitimised the exercise of social control (a certain performance had to be achieved)
and in part replaced it (in the sense that the quality performance target was beyond the
arena of struggle). In this way control was concealed and obscured. The final
element of control, namely why work was done, was achieved through continuous
improvement programmes.
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Having established the team system, management divided the plant's different
production shops into separate cost centres each with responsibility for their own
budgets. In this way each shop was measured according to value-adding processes,
non-value-adding processes and waste. The task of each shop was to ensure that the
former increased and the latter two costs were reduced. As with quality, the
performance criteria and forms of control were established together in a
self-supporting manner. The vehicle for establishing the procedure of increasing
efficiency involved the implementation of a continuous improvement system which
VW entitled KVP (this was later replaced by KVP 2) and which consisted of
problem-solving workshops and a suggestions scheme. Accompanying KVP 2 was the
idea of benchmarking, namely the transparency of performance and its comparison
with other plants. For VW Mosel the aspiration was to match and exceed the success
of Nissan's plant in the UK and become the most productive plant in Europe. In this
way management sought to establish why work was done: namely for the benefit of
the company (and therefore not simply to earn money) and used this to untap workers'
constructive potential for improving the efficiency of the plant. Thus KVP2 meant
that workers could be compelled to participate in workshops designed to improve
efficiency for the company thereby undermining worker interests and ability to
control work for themselves.
In this way workers were socialised in a very different manner from that in
VW's plants in west Germany. By developing a corporate-centred identity
management sought to appeal to workers' individual consciousness above that of their
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collective sense of solidarity with their fellow workers; a one manager from west
Germany put it, 'the workers here are willing to do anything for money'. Control
was intertwined and exercised through a complex matrix of team working, quality
control, and continuous improvement (via cost centres and KVP workshops) which
centred on a subtle and sophisticated psychological control that depended on the
conditions of transformation that stretched beyond the workplace.
Unification forged an environment in which innovative forms of work were
legitimised and worker interests could be denied. In such circumstances management
enjoyed the ability to establish new norms largely without both worker resistance and
input from other institutions - since there were none to speak of. As a result
management was able to argue that the changes were universally accepted, a device
which further prevented the development of any collective action. In addition western
management behaviour, in particular the 'openness' of the approach and transparency
of work (which on the face of it seemed far more positive and humane than had
existed under the SED regime) contributed to a feeling amongst workers that
management had their interests at heart. With such a viewpoint it easy to see why,
initially, capitalist production was deemed to be more genuinely socialist than the
previous regime. Despite the fact that the former GDR became part of Germany, with
all that that entailed, there were no rules, no blinkers and no rigidities; as the manager
responsible for new work organisation put it, somewhat ironically, 'there are walls in
the west but not in the east" 2. After a pause he emphasised that the labour rules in
Interview, 8th September 1992
Interview, 27th October 1993
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eastern Germany were the same as in the west. Later the same manager developed the
thought:
"Labour relations and bargaining with the trade unions are exactly the same as
in west Germany except for the fact that here they don't know the rules".'3
The introduction of team working raised two important issues for the works
council. First, management used the introduction of team working to increase the
intensity and the nature of work. The intensity of work was increased in two ways. In
the first, and most visible way, management enlarged jobs by forcing teams and their
members to accept additional responsibilities; the flow of parts, quality, and basic tool
maintenance. The second method of intensifying work was more subtle and more
difficult to counter since it centred on the way bundles of tasks were organised, given
time norms and then allocated to a set number of workers.
To organise work and to calculate time norms VW used a system called MTM
to establish the maximum work effort that workers could sustain over a given period
of time (without undue degradation of the workforce). In order to attempt to evaluate
the way in which MTM was used in Mosel it is instructive to compare it with VW's
headquarters plant, Wolfsburg, where the Golf III was also assembled. At
Wolfsburg's Golf assembly line the MTM system was used to calculate work norms
and times for individual workers. This was because the line was designed so that only
one task and one action was required at the workstation. This meant that there were
Interview, 27th October 1993
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many more workstations at Wolfsburg with the result that the line moved faster, three
metres every minute, and was physically longer.
In contrast, at Mosel the unit of labour in the MTM calculations was the team
rather than the individual worker. This meant that 'the same' MTM system resulted in
very different work norms and times in the two plants. The line at Mosel moved three
metres every two minutes and thus travelled at half the speed of Wolfsburg. To
compensate for that, workers (in teams) were required to do considerably more tasks
with the result that there were less workstation and the length of the line was shorter.
The fundamental difference was that whereas at Wolfsburg there was time enough for
each worker to do only one task with one movement, at Mosel workers were required
to do more tasks at the same work station, including doing several tasks with one
movement.
At Wolfsburg the MTM calculations were used to ensure the standardisation
of effort and time between individuals on the line. However, at Mosel where the team
was the unit of labour, MTM was used not to standardise work between individuals
but across teams and to optimise work within the team. The assumption made was
that the team automatically standardised work itself. This enabled MTM to be
operated in a different way by reducing the amount of time 'wasted', that accounting
for balance delay problems. However, in practice this meant that since the time norm
for a specific task was not defined in isolation but as an element of a bundle of tasks,
balance delay was said to approximate rest periods with the result that the MTM
calculation did not have to include as much down time as in Wolfsburg. However, the
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assumption that team members rested at different points inthe work cycle because of
tile effects of balance delay may be unjustified. In other words by changing the way
work norms were calculated balance delay was almost entirely eliminated without any
physical change to the production process. However, in reality work was intensified
because team members had to manage balance delay problems within the overall
constraints of the time norm. The result was that in place of a standardised work
effort the intensity of work continuously and rapidly varied from hard to easy
depending on circumstances. However, management could argue that theoretically
the intensity of work was the same as that at Wolfsburg over a given period of time.
The overall effect was that whereas at Wolfsburg the time norm included
10-20 seconds of rest in every 10 minutes in Mosel the figure was only 8-12 seconds.
However, evaluation of work loads in the two plants was further complicated by the
fact that the workers at Mosel were responsible for more indirect tasks in addition to
the direct ones than was the case at Wolfsburg. Management claimed to compensate
for this by excluding team leaders from the MTM calculation even though they spent
6Opc of their time on the line. All this served to obscure the intensity of work and
prevent adequate comparison between Wolfsburg and Mosel. However, crucially
MTM based on the team served to informalise time norms, within the team.
Whilst the works council accepted management's insistence that MTM work
norms were the same as in Wolfsburg only organised differently, the works council
representatives who had been to Wolfsburg to observe production there were
convinced that management had used MTM to intensify work in Saxony. This was
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indicated by it taking 33 hours to assembly a Golf in Wolfsburg compared to just 24
hours in Mosel (however this in part reflected the low level of vertical integration).
The result was that workers complained that it was difficult to keep up with work,
especially if the team was having to cover for an absent colleague. The relatively high
rate of absenteeism of 7-lOpe, compared to 5-6pc at Wolfsburg, prompted the
personnel department to investigate only to find it genuine, and therefore indicative
that the pace of work effected the workforce.
In addition to more intensive work loads the team working system also
included a mechanism for increasing work loads as teams became more efficient.
Once established the teams were given a 'credit' representing normal efficiency thus as
efficiency gains were made, and costs were reduced, the team's credit increased.
Management could thus keep a close eye on how productivity changed. When a
team's credit increased by a significant margin the number of people in the team was
reduced and the excess labour was re-deployed to the press shop which was in its
start-up phase at the time.
In the same way as the intensity of work was altered by team working so too
was the nature of work. Work changed in three important ways: the lengthening of
cycle times, the improvement of ergonomics, and the disintegration of tasks. First, the
introduction of team working accompanied the lengthening of cycle times and a move
away from monotonous work associated with classically Taylorist labour processes.
Thus within the teams workers were said to be freer to allocate tasks amongst
themselves. The teams were said to be seif-organising in the sense that the workers
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managed themselves. In addition, team working, according to management, was
designed to enhance the degree of the workers' involvement in work as a means of
generating identification in their work, job and company. However, in reality the
seif-organisation of team working was a device employed by management to secure
the consent (and crucially the motivation) of workers. Thus seif-organisation of teams
was permitted only within certain parameters which suited the interests of the
company and may have only coincidentally increased the satisfaction of work in the
eyes of the workers. Thus a major example of self-organisation was the way in which
workers were able to organise their holidays amongst themselves. This may have
given the workers an additional convenience but its purpose for management was to
ensure that the plant did not have to shutdown for an annual holiday since workers
could arrange to stagger their leave. Workers were only given certain freedoms and
only then once other forms of control had been established.
Second, management improved the ergonomics of work by introducing
power-assisted tools on to the assembly line which was the same one that was used to
assemble the Trabant. For many workers who had worked on the Trabant line, work
was much easier. Parts for the Trabant were often badly made and did not fit with the
result that workers had to be inventive and improvise through reworking which led
workers to liken Trabant assembly to 'sticking' parts together whereas now it was
genuine 'assembly'. The ease of work (the absence of technical challenge) meant that
they became less skilled and were transformed from specialists to generalists.
However, rather than accept the inevitability of being de-skilled, workers sought to
skill themselves. This was just one indication of the way management had
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successfully redefined the nature of skill, and equally impoitant, skill acquisition: skill
had become a function of how many different workstations a worker could operate.
The lengthening of cycle times, which made work more varied and more
interesting, and improved ergonomics, crucially allowed management to present the
intensification of labour as the humanisation of work which was more politically
acceptable to IG Metall at a regional and national level and helped to convince
workers that management had their interests at the forefront of its plans. After all
management was trying to make work easier and easier, and certainly less chaotic
than under the old system. In this way management was able to present the
transformation of work as a manifestly good thing for all.
A third way in which work changed centred on the growth of off-line work
within the plant and at the bigger scale on the plant's low level of vertical integration
(see chapter 5) and high level of outsourcing. The works council and union were
unwilling to see outsourcing used as a device to cut costs by 'exporting' jobs to other
regions. In this way IG Metall mirrored the VW management, by also presenting a
commitment to the region. Thus the local office's rally cry was 'Live and work in
Saxony'. Moreover, workers were acutely aware that workers in supplier factories
could do the tasks they were presently doing for considerably lower rates of pay and
benefits' 4 . In response the Mosel works council attempted to encourage unionisation
and strong works councils in local suppliers, albeit with little effect. In one instance
Events at VW-SKODA in the Czech Republic, where suppliers were invited to take greater
responsibility by positioning workers in the SKODA factory and on the line to fix their components
oiito the vehicle, had important implications for VW Mosel.
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management indicated that it wished to outsource the final assembly of the cockpit
module to VDO which had a small plant in Glauchau some five kilometres to the
north of Mosel.' 5 However, the works council opposed this and sought to defend its
position by inviting the VDO works council to a meeting at VW to discuss the issue.
VW's works council argued that it disagreed with the externalisation of production not
on the grounds of jobs but instead on the basis that VDO did not pay its workers the
tariff rate agreed with Gesamtmetall because workers had been allocated to wage
groups 3 and 4 compared to 7 and 8 in Mosel. In this instance VW's management
backed down but in raising the possibility gradually and almost imperceptibly
extended the boundaries of what could be deemed acceptable. Issues such as these,
although crucial in regional and national terms, only served to distract the works
council from internal battles with management and indicated the weakness of labour
Iii the region.
Second, management also used the introduction of team working to refashion
the balance between labour and management, in part by undermining the traditional
role of the works council by using the teams as the primary mechanism for
communicating with and controlling labour. The context of labour relations at the
plant helped to reinforce the view that management was determined to use the plant as
a vehicle for altering labour relations. Thus the plant's position within VW was
significant for two reasons. First, since VW Sachsen was a GmbH and a wholly
owned subsidiary of VW AG's worker representatives did not sit on either the VW
AG General Works Council nor the VW Group European Works Council with the
VDO already sub-assembled the cockpit module.
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rcsult that they were deprived of the resources of thos important organisations.
Crucially it also meant that there were fewer obligations on management to consult
the works council than would otherwise have been the case' 6 . Second, the collective
agreement at Mosel was not based on the VW tariff (which covered all of its other
plants) but the Saxony agreement (which was based on the one for the Bavarian metal
industry). In addition to the lower rates of pay that applied in the east it also meant
that workers enjoyed less benefits and VW non-wage labour costs were 3Opc lower
than those in western Germany.
In addition, the legacy of the Soviet regime created an environment in which
labour was weakened. First, a demobilised and subject-less society acted as a barrier
to the generation of workers' collective interest. Not least absence of networks
amongst workers during the soviet regime bequeathed a situation in which workers
continued to see themselves as anonymous, isolated individuals who bowed to
pressure to avoid conflict. Thus despite the very high numbers of workers who joined
IG Metall, largely because under the soviet regime union membership was
compulsory, a remarkable level of passivity existed amongst the workforce. Second,
the works council representatives were unacquainted with German labour law and
were distracted by the need to learn the habitus of how to bargain effectively with
16	 This provoked ill will amongst management in VWs plants in western Germany who
considered that the discrepancies in conditions undermined their position within the company, which
had begun to compare the productivity and efficiency of different facilities. Moreover, the different
labour agreements forged a wedge between workers and management in different plants with the effect
that 'plant-level' interests developed amongst local management, the works council and local IG Metall
officials, It legitimised a new harsher management style and provided a weapon (the fear ofjobs being
'exported' to eastern Germany) with which to pressure workers to accommodate the new approach. In
this way the relationship between management and labour in Mosel had significant impacts across VW
AG as a whole, one of the country's most visible companies and an important bulwark of
co-determination.
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management. The result was that the works council in cfucial respects was either
unaware of its rights to co-determination or unable/unwilling to exercise them. In
particular the works council often failed to exercise its right to force management into
negotiations over manning levels. This itself was a function of the dependence of
works councils on shop stewards supplying information and mobilising resistance.
However, the shop stewards were new to the system too and often uncertain about
their role and how to combat management.
The unusual political situation arising from unification tended to create
sensibilities which distracted workers and their representatives from more important
longer term issues (such as the team working system itself). Thus in the first years
following VW's take over one of the most significant issues concerned individual's
former links with the STASI and SED. Whereas the management sought to
investigate individual's pasts, and prevent informers being employed it was not
possible to avoid such cases. Concern centred on the Group Leaders many of whom
had been SAW managers under the former regime and were former members of the
SED. Their links with the old system was one source of resentment and resulted in
them being nicknamed the 'Red Socks'. However, since the group leaders were
responsible for personnel and disciplinary issues they enjoyed considerable power.
For many workers the group leaders, shouldering the need to prove themselves to be
good harsh capitalists, behaved in a similar fashion to the despotic foreman prevalent
under the soviet working regime (see Burawoy 1985). The result was that labour
representatives were distracted by individual cases from assessing the significance of
the existence of group leaders, who were indeed foremen in another name.
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One other factor bound up in the politics of unification was also important in
determining the development of labour-management relations. In this case it was a
more ambiguous factor. On the one hand the organisation of work under the SED
regime was such that it made it easier for VW managers to introduce team working;
however on the other hand the similarity between the two regimes of work created
problems. Thus the soviet organisation of labour in which workers worked in
brigades meant that team work was not a wholly new concept. Likewise the old
dependence on the state owned enterprise assisted in generating identification with the
firm. Other similarities included the high emphasis placed on targets and auditing
results. However, perhaps most important was the similarity in ideology. Thus the
soviet model's use of 'work for the good of all' as the main motivational device was
very similar to the ideas behind enterprise democracy and corporate identification
associated with lean production. Thus political sensitivities served further to obscure
management's strategies to enhance control over work.
The team working system also directly undermined the influence of the works
council in two ways. First, the informal organisation of labour undid solidarity. The
devolution of responsibility from the plant level to the level of the shop (cost centre)
and team meant that decisions were taken informally on the shop floor away from the
eyes of the works council. This meant that issues on which the works council might
have expected to make a collective decision were not brought to its attention. The
effect was that the acceptability of management requests became individualised as
workers decided what they would and would not do based on their own self-interest
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without reference to labour representatives and the collectiVe interest. Moreover, the
insecurity and isolation of workers and teams ensured that management was able to
win concessions from workers that the works council might have been able
successfully to counter. Second, team working excluded the works council and shop
stewards. Not only were some working conditions not brought to the works council's
attention but communication between management and labour was via the teams and
not the works council. The result was that on the shop floor the relevance of the
works council became questioned and its influence marginalised.
Thus as the works council was being formed management was in the process
of undermining it through the establishment of team working. This meant that the
works council was presented with afait accompli and had to try to make an agreement
over team working after it had been established. In 1992 the works council tried to
secure a set of assurances from management. These included that workers would not
be exploited within the teams, that management would not use the teams to undermine
co-determination and the powers of the works council by unilaterally controlling the
teams outside agreements between the council and management.
However, in many respects the works council had lost the struggle over team
working before it had even begun. Management only gradually increased the
responsibilities of the teams and the power of the team leader with the result that the
works council was often too slow at recognising management's strategies. As team
working became more established management began to be more direct. In addition
to establishing an alternative form of control over workers, in the course of 1992
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management launched explicit attempts systematically to undermine the power and
role of the works council in a number of ways. First, compared to other VW plants,
the management was less generous in providing the resources - such as time away
from the line in which to consult managers - for the works council members. Second,
management sought to exclude IG Metall shop stewards from certain parts of the
plant, such as the paint shop. This strategy was usually accompanied by increases in
the volume of production - as part of the start-up of production of the Golf III -
without any corresponding increases in manning levels. As a result the intensity of
work only gradually became apparent as output increased by which time it was very
difficult for labour representatives to combat it. Thirdly, management at Mosel had
responsibility over the engine plant at Chemnitz and the small cylinder head plant at
Eisenach and were able to manufacture issues in these two plants, which had very
small and weak works councils as a way of distracting the Mosel works council.
At the heart of the issue was a debate between management and the works
council as to whether the team system was an additional communication system or a
replacement for the role played by the works council. However, the works council
itself was split over the significance of team working. For some the introduction of
teams was an irrelevance which had no implications for labour representation but for
others the new labour organisation was a means by which management could exclude
the works council from operational issues, such as manning, on the shop floor. This
split in the works council contributed to weakening the council and limiting its
effectiveness in countering management strategies' 7. This culminated in a struggle
7	 The works council was not assisted by IG Metall's ambiguous approach to team working in
general. Although the union was split the official policy was that team working should be welcomed as
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between the council and management over the role and manner of the selection of the
team leaders.
For management the team leader was regarded as the lowest rung of
management whose role was to co-ordinate the essentially seif-organising teams.
However, the works council feared that as line management was eliminated the team
and the leader would become more important and increasingly act less as a
co-ordinator and more like a traditional foreman telling workers what to do. Initially,
management wanted the team leaders to be elected by the members as a way of
cementing a new team- and firm-centred collective consciousness. At this time the
works council opposed the election of team leaders as part of its outright rejection of
team working, fearing that it would undermine its elected representatives. However,
as the works council began to realise that it could not stop management introducing
team working they campaigned for the team leaders to be team representatives or team
speakers elected by the team's members in a manner connected to the election of
works council representatives. In this way the works council sought to intertwine the
team and labour representative structures on the shop floor. Workers would raise
issues of their interest within the team and then if needs be they would be passed on to
the works council to resolve if necessary. However, by this time management itself
had altered its position and wanted to reserve the right to appoint permanent team
leaders. Once appointed, team leaders, usually the most highly skilled team member
or someone with good communication skills, were given additional training in
management, motivation and 'moderation'.
part ol'the humanisation of work and the first step towards genuine group work or Kalmarism.
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The significance of the role of the team leaders stemmed from the ambiguous
and liminal position they fulfilled between management and workers. Thus
management sought to define the team leaders as both the lowest rung of management
and prim us inter pares amongst their team colleagues. Crucially the team leaders
were classified as a worker and not a salaried employee. In this way the boundary
between management and workers was blurred as a way of obscuring the conflicting
interests of the two groups within the firm. The creation of a cohort of team leaders,
who were paid a bonus on top of their basic worker's pay, created a new hierarchy
and an elite group of 'workers' (they worked on the line, and wore the same uniform)
committed to management. Nevertheless, even some of the team leaders seemed not
to understand their role as was indicated by some of them participating in a strike in
May 1993.
Following long protracted negotiations management and the works council
came to an agreement surrounding the team working system and how labour was to be
represented. It was agreed that every team would have a shop steward in addition to a
team leader. Thus in teams where no shop steward existed one was elected. In such
circumstances the shop steward and team leader met with the team members at the
beginning of every week to discuss the week's production schedule and plan how to
cover absences from work. Likewise if problems developed, such as a worker
'concealing effort' then it was as much the shop steward's job as the team leader's to
deal with the offender. However the relationship between the team leader and shop
steward sometimes created problems. The two most common problems in the eyes of
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the works council were the team leader failing to pass on information to the shop
steward and the team leader and shop steward establishing a coalition within the team
to demonstrate their superiority. Thus as far as the works council was concerned there
was no inherent conflict of interest between the team leader and the shop steward,
oniy individual cases where things did not work properly.
To further complicate the picture it seemed that in some cases the shop
steward and the team leader were the same person. The works council had thus
apparently become convinced that the two roles were not contradictory and that the
interests of the team (leader) and the workers were the same - at least up to a point.
This was despite the view that in some cases shop stewards (elected in 1991) who
were subsequently appointed as team leaders and given the bonus payment had as a
result began to play a role less like that associated with a shop steward and more like a
team leader or junior manager. In many respects the agreement meant that the works
council contributed to management's strategy to conceal the interests of workers
behind the umbrella of the success of the company.
It seemed therefore that the works council had succumbed to operate within
rather than struggle against management's preferred system of labour organisation.
Overall there was a tendency to accommodate rather than challenge management,
which in part reflected a division within IG MetaIl between those in western Germany
who sought to struggle and those in the new Lander who were more individualistic
and accommodating. The division was reflected in the works council. In particular it
centred on the issue of the introduction of a third shift. The chairman of the works
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council, the westerner Herr Riemann, wanted to resist management plans but had to
back down because all the other representatives wanted the extra shift to allow the
workers to earn more money' 8. However, the works council did resist total
incororation. One reflection of this was its refusal to accept an expenses paid visit to
SEAT's plant at Martorell in Spain on which Mosel had been based'9.
However, the early years of the plant were not all about the works council
failing to prevent the introduction of a system of labour organisation which threatened
to undermine elements of the system of co-determination. There was also resistance
by workers including the first major post-unification strike which had been held in the
local area in May 1993. The strike seemed to mark the beginning of a new phase in
the labour relations in the plant and beyond it in the local area in which workers
recognised and began to seize on their powers of influence and resistance as a
mobilised political force.	 Moreover the pretence previously employed by
management that their interests and that of the firm as a whole coincided with the
workers' interests (and those of the region) was undone as management tried hard to
prevent workers from joining in the industrial action. In particular the Group Leaders
went quite some way to try to persuade their workers not to participate in the
industrial action. Indeed following the strike some of those who continued to report
for work said they had done so because their group leader had threatened that they
would lose their jobs if they joined in the strike. According to the works council some
of the group leaders sympathised with the action but feared that if their workers
8	 As it happened as over capacity developed in VW's plants introduction of the third shift was
abandoned.
19	 The works council at GM Europe's plant at Elsenach had been roundly criticised for accepting
an expenses paid trip to North America to visit a number of GM plants.
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participated they would not be looked kindly upon by shop management. This was
one indication of the way discipline in the plant operated not only for workers but also
for different layers of management. As a result in the first two days of the 12 day
stoppage some 300 workers continued to work. This resulted in confrontations at the
factory gates as strikers, and in particular a core group of around 150 activists who
picketed the plant, tried to persuade their colleagues not to work whilst group leaders
sought to entice them into the factory. Following these confrontations management
took steps to prevent them from being repeated by informing those who wished to
work that they could report to a local supermarket to be registered before being
allowed to go home.
Of those who continued to work some 100 were group leaders or team leader,
a further 100 were adamant in their opposition to the strike and the remainder later
changed their minds and actually joined the union. The strike helped to identify a
workers' interest and thereby define the role of the union and the works council. In
total the level of unionisation at the plant increased from 8Opc to 9Opc. However, the
strike had also created a division between those who participated and those who did
not which served to colour relations between colleagues for some time after the events
themselves. In some instances team members refused to work in the same teams as
those who had not joined in the strike.
However if the strike in May 1993 had bolstered the power of 1GM and had
sought to establish a workers' collective interest above that of the firm, this was soon
undone. The transformation of work and the labour relations environment at Mosel
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were significantly effected by the German recession and VW's subsequent over
capacity towards the end of 199320. As a result the project in Saxony was delayed,
with DM1 .8bn of the DM4.7bn commitment having been spent, and the opening of
Mosel II (which had been scheduled for 1994) was postponed until either 1996 or
199721. With work on the new facilities effectively brought to a standstill those
working on the site declined in number. The postponement also affected the morale
of the workforce and the balance of power between management and the works
council. The result was that, with expansion delayed there was an over supply of
labour within the firm. In addition despite an annual capacity of 73,000, production in
1993 was confined to 66,00022. As a result 'overmanning' occurred and as efficiency
gains were achieved in certain parts of the plant, the personnel department found it
difficult to reallocate labour to other parts of the site (work on the press shop had
stopped). More importantly the vulnerability of the investment had been indicated
which had an important impact on the labour relations environment which altered
fundamentally as the works council was put on the defensive. Instead of the works
council making demands on management, the management was able to use the lever
of further investment as a weapon to urge it to behave in a co-operative manner. The
continuation of the project depended on the flexibility of the works council and local
IG Metall officials to be more accommodating to management's wishes.
20	 This resulted in the introduction of a four-day week rostering system, after a period of
short-time working, in agreement with IG Metall as a way of avoiding mass redundancies.
21	 At the same time the opening of the new engine plant at Chemnitz was put back from 1994 to
1995/6.
22	 It was not insignificant that the anticipated production volumes known to the works council
were considerably higher: 78,000 in 1993 and 64,000 in 1994.
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'I'hc transformation of work at VW Sachsen served not only to intensify work
hut also illustrated the 'hollowing out' of Germany's system of co-determination and
its replacement with co-management. This had occurred because a social organisation
of labour had been successfully established which enabled management to appeal to
workers' individual consciousness as participants in a pioneering project above that of
the collective worker struggling with management. In achieving this management had
depended crucially on the national and regional paths of transformation. It remained
to be seen whether the intensification of work, as production volumes increased,
would provoke renewed labour struggle.
6.3.2 Ford in Hungary and GKN in eastern Germany
Ford Hiiizgaria
Ford used its investment in Hungary to experiment with a new type of factory
regime. In particular, drawing on a body of increasingly influential ideas in US
business theory entitled 'Fifth Discipline', Ford sought to create a self-learning
organisation that could rival the efficiency of manufacturing in Japan. The
recruitment of the workforce was central to the achievement of its aims. The plant
was located on the outskirts of Szekésfehévãr, one of Hungary's five major cities and
a centre of the engineering industry (including IKARUS's municipal bus assembly
plant). The local labour market was dominated by specialist engineers and other
technically skilled workers. As the state-owned enterprises, and especially the
adjacent Videoton (the consumer electronics producer), shed labour Ford could be
highly selective in its recruitment. When the first 120 jobs were advertised Ford was
inundated with more than 7,500 applications. Even in later phases of recruitment
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there were still in excess of 10 applications for every vacancy: on average three out of
every ten were offered an interview and one out of the three was offered a position at
the company.
In the first instance applications were screened and divided into those who met
the company's selection criteria (or who could be expected to do so) and those who
did not. After a second filtering process candidates were invited to the factory and
given three tests which examined their intelligence, technical competence and
concentration. Those who performed best were selected for interviewing. The
interviews reflected the sort of self-managing labour organisation that the company
wanted to instil in the workforce. Once the first few core workers had been selected
by management, the selection procedure was opened up to include workers. Potential
employees were interviewed at least twice by teams, comprising management and
workers, who conferred and selected the candidates. Thus the teams were seen to hire
and employ their own members. In choosing the workforce the company sought
individuals suited to a team and self-organisation environment. The high level of
technical skill in the local labour market meant that selection panels placed great
emphasis on applicants' character and interpersonal skills. Thus the company was
very keen to weed-out strong-willed individuals with egotistical characteristics. Since
many of the recruits had work experience in state-owned factories management
restricted the number of people from any one plant to prevent the importation of any
'bad habits' (such as a sense of collective identity amongst workers from the same
plant). Similarly the company sought to create a varied workforce. Although the
average age was 35, Ford employed a number of older workers who were intended to
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have a moderating influence on the younger ones. For the same reason 5Opc of those
selected by the company were female. The company also sought to create a
dependent workforce by stipulating that workers were not allowed to hold 'second
jobs'.
Once appointed the new recruits were given a permanent employment
contract, allocated to a team and given training. Each worker received some 300
hours of training over a six week period. The first recruits formed a core workforce to
be used to train later recruits and as a result they were trained for a longer period of
nine weeks, which included a spell in a similar plant in Portugal. The training
concentrated on technical, social and business issues. The technical training, in
addition to on-the-job experience focused on the teaching of statistical process control
methods. The social training centred on imparting leadership, communication and
problem solving skills. The business training provided an opportunity to teach the
worker about how firms operate in a market environment. In particular workers were
told about Ford's business, why it had located in Hungary and what was expected of
the plant. By making workers party to business strategy management sought to
encourage workers to act and think like managers. Training was not simply seen as a
one-off process but rather a continuous exercise in which workers were given access
to resources to enable them to develop their skills in different ways. Thus the
company established a computer room which all employees could use to develop their
own general skill and education level. The aim was to create a learning company.
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Training and other forms of communication wer.e used to prevent barriers
developing between different groups of workers and so to raise collective
identification with the company. All of the plant's employees (including the 70 sales
and administrative personnel) were trained to work on the line and were expected to
do so if required. Likewise operators were expected to work in the office if it was
necessary. To reduce barriers all employees were salaried and met every two or three
weeks to address questions, and solicit comments and complaints. In addition, three
times a year all the employees were taken off site for two days to discuss particular
themes relating to the plant's performance. Thus communication was used to generate
creative development through feedback amongst employees.
There were no real job classifications nor demarcation but instead two types of
manufacturing employee at the plant. Half were SOM workers (set-up, operate and
maintain) and the rest were skilled workers (engineer/maintenance). Thus there were
no written-down job specifications or labour standards: everyone was expected to
work on the line and everyone was required to do some maintenance work. Job
descriptions and the responsibilities of workers were left purposely vague. The
production process was highly automated (labour cost accounted for just 4pc of total
costs) with the result that operating functions were technically simple. The workforce
selected had a minimum of 11 years education and was overqualified for the technical
challenge that the jobs offered. The workforce was divided into two large teams, one
for each of the two products (ignition coil and fuel pump) manufactured at the plant,
which were in turn divided into subgroups (each comprising between 6 and 21
workers). Workers moved from subgroup to subgroup every nine months. Within the
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work-teams workers first rotated every month; however since this generated resistance
rotation became steadily more infrequent. In mid-1993 the ignition coil line
employed 35 workers divided into three teams responsible for the three elements of
the production process.
The work teams were intended to have a psychology of common self-interest
and to be as self-directing as possible. This also included self-disciplining and thus
the groups banned their members from smoking in the workplace - a sensitive issue in
Hungarian factories. In order to eliminate the need for supervisors the personnel
departnient set weekly production targets to ensure that the plant met its orders from
other Ford plants elsewhere in Europe but the scheduling of work was left to the
teams. At the beginning of each week the teams met to plan the week's work. The
management expected the teams to meet the targets they had 'set for themselves' by
the end of the week. In connection with this it was perhaps indicative that the main
complaint with the Labour Code when it was introduced in 1992 was its restriction on
overtime. Management were clearly set on establishing a working regime which
depended on self-motivation. In order to ensure that workers worked hard they were
expected to do everything in their power to ensure targets were met and discipline was
dealt out if appropriate. The legality of overtime was an important part of the
strategy.
The only competences beyond the team were the setting of wage levels and the
dismissal of workers. The teams were set-up to operate like mini-businesses within
the plant and were evaluated according to input, throughput and operating expense
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(costs). In order to make the teams operate as effectivJy as possible each team was
allocated a 'facilitator' (for a six-month period), who was usually an engineer who had
been specially trained to resolve problems and assist in interpersonal issues.
According to management the facilitator operated in a quite different manner from
that of team leaders elsewhere, fulfilling the role of a resource upon which the teams
could draw to improve their effectiveness. Seen in another light the facilitator was an
ideological device to assist workers internalise the 'management view' since they also
coached and counselled workers and were the point of liaison between management
and the team.
The extent to which management devised a remuneration system which took
pay out of the realm of bargaining and into a very technical scientific one was
significant. At frequent intervals Ford Hungary surveyed the rates paid by other
western employers in Hungary. The information was used to put the wages on a scale
from the lowest to the highest to identify the 66th percentile which Ford used to
decide the salaries it would pay. In addition individual's pay also depended on their
experience and performance. Individual workers performance was judged by peers
within the subgroups using criteria of problem-solving, production and
communication skills. Product management evaluated the performance of the
sub-teams. Based on this information management generated a performance ranking
which workers could comment upon. The final ranking was used to determine the
individual pay increase. The result was that every worker's pay increased to a
different extent in the annual rise. In this way management created a payment system
which rewarded performance but which was based ultimately on forces beyond the
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control of management and workers; namely the rates of pay paid by other
comparable employers elsewhere in the country. The system thus attempted to
depoliticise the issue of pay. In doing so the company also successfully de-coupled
pay from the rate of inflation. This was particularly significant due to the high rate of
inflation in Hungary at the time.
Habituating the workforce to the innovative organisation of labour was not
always easy. Resistance was small, turnover was I .5pc (two workers were fired by
management between mid-1992 and mid-1993) and absenteeism l.8pc (up from under
1 pc as the plant started operating), but the approach created problems. Not least
workers were able to draw parallels between Ford's philosophy of work and that in
soviet industry. Thus Ford rhetoric stressed that the firm was organised in such a way
that everyone worked for the good of each other and for the good of society. For
some workers this was uncomfortably close to the way ideology was used by soviet
managers. For its part, management tried to convince workers that it was only the
rhetoric that was similar.
Once the Labour Code was introduced management became concerned that it
should not undermine the organisation it had established. Having set up a very
complex communication system which concealed the exploitation of work
successfully enough for workers to show unexpected levels of initiative and
motivation, management feared the antagonistic feeling that establishing a works
council might create. Management's reading of the Labour Code was such that it
believed it only had to set up a works council if workers asked for it. According to
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management they did not. In any case management fe.lt that their factory regimes
more than met the spirit of the Labour Code.
In keeping with such a strategy management explained that it would not
prevent the establishment of trade union representation in the factory if the workers
expressed a wish for it, which they had not. There was some limited evidence
however to suggest that two attempts to establish a union in the plant had been tried
and failed. Those involved were concerned with the rates of pay. Officials in VASAS
resisted attempting to mobilise workers in the plant for fear of finding it difficult and
thus leaving the leaders vulnerable to management.
Ford had thus set up a factory regime which appeared to be very successful at
concealing antagonistic relations of work and emphasising those which would appear
to benefit all. The main device for achieving this was selective informalisation and
bureaucratisation in the workplace. Thus the definition of work and the expectations
of workers were informalised with the result that there were no established minimum
labour standards. Consequently management's expectations of labour and the
intensity of work could always be increased in the absence of prejudged criteria. In
addition, other factors, particularly the issue of pay, were unduly bureaucratised as a
means of securing greater control over a potentially antagonistic concern. The
subcontracting of non-core labour, caterers and security guards neatly illustrated this
and served to divide workers (on very different rates of pay and conditions) on the
same site. However, in other matters, for example communication, a combination of
formal and informal procedures was employed. In addition, philosophy and ideology
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were central in establishing the conditions of management control and in articulating
that control itself. Thus through a particular rhetorical device - 'we won't tell you
what to do other than you must make a profit' - a western investor successfully
secured the consent of workers, without authoritarian discipline, by forcing them to
conceal (through internalisation) their own exploitation of themselves. The contrast
with Suzuki's authoritarian approach and the resistance it generated was striking. The
soviet ideology had gone but ideology remained a crucial weapon at the workplace.
Indeed a crude version was replaced by one far more subtle and believable and
potentially successful. Crucially, the conditions of transformation permitted and
assisted the generation of such forms of control. Workers had no preconceived ideas
about working in a capitalist factory and thus had no sense over what was legitimate
and what was not. This and the factory regime meant that workers believed
management and did as they were told.
Gelenkwellenwerk Mosel (GWM) - GKN
In the late 1 970s SAW contracted Citroen to construct a new plant to supply
drive shafts for its assembly of the Trabant. Once the THA took over SAW the
driveshaft plant was separated from SAZ (as it had then become known) to become an
independent company called Gelenkwellenwerk Mosel (GWM).
	
The new
management came from SAZ and was charged with setting up a bureaucracy and
taking over the workers' contracts and updating them in the light of West German
labour legislation. In January 1991 (after just three months) GKN purchased the
company from THA and leased the site from SAZ. Thus, in contrast to Ford, GKN
took over a going concern which had been partly transformed.
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The plant had previously exported products to both western and eastern
Europe but GKN found the plant inefficient, in part because of the way it had been
separated from SAZ. Thus unlike Ford which enjoyed a tabula rasa, GKN embarked
on the task of genuinely transforming work within the same factory by first undoing
the legacy bequeathed by the soviet system. GKN set about reducing the workforce
from 1,335 at the time of its take over to 500 at the end of 1994. Crucially for GKN
the reduction of the workforce had been begun by THA whilst it was the owner which
legitimised and justified the need to cuts jobs. In addition, at the time the THA sold
the plant to GKN it had not begun to demand employment guarantees. The
redundancies took place in three phases, each one accompanied by a social plan and
severance payment system agreed to by the works council which had been established
in the plant with the formation of GWM. The first phase of redundancies, totalling
465, took place between January 1991 and early 1992. The second phase took place
later with the closure of the forge with the loss of 250 jobs, taking employment to
610. The third phase involved the loss of 110 jobs between mid-1992 and the end of
1993.
The management and works council agreed to use a points system in order to
identify which workers would be retained by the company. Thus each worker's
circumstances were evaluated (length of service, age, family responsibilities,
likelihood of finding alternative employment) and those with the most points were the
most secure. This resulted in an increase in the average age of the workers to 35 and
raised the proportion of employees with family commitments who had more to lose
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than most should they have lost their jobs. The system not onJy enforced a degree of
social concern on the part of the company but also helped to turn the process into a
technical exercise devoid of political or personal consideration. Thus creating a
technical procedure contributed to establishing and co-ordinating management and
workers' interests. It was significant that the management of the plant continued to be
dominated by the GWM management previously employed by SAW, who clearly
continued to feel responsible for the workers since they were reluctant to make people
redundant. One outcome was the unwillingness of management to make high skilled
and high status engineer/maintenance workers redundant. Despite this procedure
works council representatives complained that in practice in certain parts of the plant
supervisors and foremen were able arbitrarily to select the poorest performers for
redundancy. This illustrated the poor bargaining position of the works council. In
addition, the works council agreed to a redundancy payment scheme which the
management considered to be cheaper than expected.
This reflected the inability of the works council to identify and defend
workers' interests. The works council effectively conspired with management to
reduce the workforce. Thus it did little to assist the few workers who resisted
redundancy including one worker who went to court to fight his case. He lost his job.
In general the works council was convinced of the need for substantial changes to
enable the company to compete in the new market environment. It believed that its
best interests were served by enabling management to do everything in its power to
keep the company afloat. The continual fear of further job losses and the unspoken
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threat of' closure, as orders fell, forced the works council into-line. The works council
was simply unable to articulate a workers' interest.
At the same time as the workforce was more than halved, although turnover
fell, output remained fairly stable as labour productivity doubled. This was largely a
consequence of technical change, production reorganisation, and new forms of using
and allocating labour. The reorganisation of production involved the disintegration of
production processes and concentrating machines to reduce the use of space as a
ineans of reducing overheads and improving productivity. The company was divided
into three sections: the forge which was closed in early 1993, the machining hall and
the assembly hall. The machining hail was dominated by metal forming machines
which were linked by chain conveyer systems. Once GKN took over, most of the
conveyer belts were removed and work-in-progress was moved from machine to
machine in pallets by workers. As a result central control over the machines was
removed as the tools became individually operated. Work thus became more labour
intensive and the production system more flexible, able to respond to disruptions
caused by old and poorly maintained tools. At the same time the tools were moved
closer together to reduce the need for operators by increasing the number of machines
any one worker could supervise. At the same time to facilitate flexibility of outcome
management sought to increase sandardisation of production processes and
components so that there was as much in common between different parts as possible.
In the assembly hail the conveyer systems were also broken up as work stations were
reorganised into short circular labour intensive lines or cells. Instead of the
work-in-progress moving between the workstations on conveyers the workers moved
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between the positions carrying the work with them. The ergonomics of work were
also improved by installing cheap simple power-assisted assembly tools. In these
ways the reorganisation of technology first altered the mechanisms that were used to
control workers. Thus central control by technology was replaced by control by
layout.
In addition to the mechanism of physical control over workers GKN
established a new hierarchy of responsibility and enforced the intensification of work.
As the workforce was refashioned the proportion of skilled maintenance specialists
increased. Management enlarged operator jobs to include some maintenance and
repair functions. Thus the high status maintenance workers were told to become
operators or leave the company. In doing so they were forced to take a pay cut in
keeping with the lower skill demanded by the new jobs and lost their status. In this
way management effectively broke the power of the core workers in the company. It
also ensured a highly qualified and highly skilled group of operators. aaving
established its power the management was in a position to push through a series of
other changes which transformed work. However, it was to some extent constrained
by the low capacity utilisation of the plant which not only increased unit labour costs
but also restricted management's ability to intensify work.
To intensify work, as we have seen, machine tools were moved closer together
to enable workers to operate up to three machines (in contrast to one in the past).
Management also made time norms stricter to force the speed of production to
increase. As well as enlarging the role of operators and reducing the importance of
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maintenance workers, management altered the role of foremen. Whereas before the
regime changed the foremen assisted work and were authoritarian in setting targets
GKN sought to alter their role into managers using communication skills to create a
different atmosphere on the shop floor. In sending these workers to GKN plants in
western Germany, management sought to encourage foremen to show greater interest
in how workers performed their duties and act as a facilitator for them. In these ways
responsibility, or in other words the burden, was devolved and placed on workers and
foremen rather than management.
One of the most visible strategies to intensify work was the introduction of
cells in the assembly hail. This involved the creation of lines of up to eight
workstations in a horseshoe pattern. Each cell did not have a leader but a 'feeder',
usually the most skilled worker, responsible for ensuring that all the workstations
were supplied with the components to make the driveshaft. To do this the feeder
would fetch parts from the machining hail. In this way production was pulled through
the production process. The workers stood in the inside of the horseshoe placing them
in an extremely intimidating and cramped environment. There were two ways in
which the cells operated. Either all the workstations could be occupied by workers
and they passed the driveshafis from position to position or the workers walked
around the horseshoe carrying and assembling the product as they went. Each cell
was not product specific but dedicated to a geographical market area. The number of
workers in the cell and the organisation of work varied according to the volume of
demand. Management found that it was more efficient for individual workers to
assemble the entire product than just a part of the process except for at the highest
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volumes when a segmented labour process was more efficient.• In part this was due to
the fact that with less than maximum capacity the cell would operate with less
workers than there were workstations. The result was that there were always free
work positions which contributed to create an atmosphere of haste as the slowest
worker was always being followed closely by the fastest. At the same time the
introduction of cells was used as a way of establishing a new time system which
increased the speed at which workers had to operate. The result was that workers had
to work much harder than before, so fast indeed that it was not possible for the
workers to talk to each other, and they complained that they felt more exhausted at the
end of a day's work than in the past. However, on the other hand the workers also
expressed their view that although work was harder it was also more enjoyable and
provided a greater degree of professional challenge.
The use of the cell system underlined one of the most important elements of
the new factory regime. That was to place workers under stress and pressure to force
them to find more efficient ways of doing things. Thus as important as reorganising
production and labour was the creation of a work culture in the plant which facilitated
change. Management divided the firms into three profit centres which were judged
according to input, throughput and output. This created a competitive environment in
which the three centres acted like mini-businesses within factory. It was designed to
encourage initiative but was found also to undermined co-operation between different
parts of the plant. Thus management had to establish mechanisms for co-operation
and competition. As a result the management introduced a more communicative
system to try to make workers feel part of the company and its success. One result of
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this was that workers were impressed that the new management was open and
concerned about the welfare of the workers. Communication was also designed to
foster problem-solving skills with the result that a programme of item specific
workshops was introduced as a way of breaking down barriers. The purpose was to
make workers identify the links between their own individual performance and the
success of the company overall. One of the ways management attempted to do this
was to introduce a large performance related element to the pay system. Thus the
maximum performance-related bonus could be l3Opc of the standard wage.
Management intended that increased communication and the enhanced willingness of
workers to want to solve problems would create an environment in which team
working would develop almost incrementally from below as networks between
workers emerged.
Whereas the works council basically supported management's alterations to
production and accepted its view that job losses were necessary, wage levels were a
point of dispute. Underlying the dispute was the allocation of workers into wage
groups by the management that was installed when the THA separated GWM from the
rest of SAW. Although they were in control for only a few months prior to GKN's
take over, they applied west German labour law to the plant. Most significantly they
placed GWM's workers in wage groups six to ten, somewhat above the average in
other local firms. This meant that GKN paid the highest wages amongst auto
component producers in the local area. The result was that GKN management
prevented workers from moving up to higher wage groups and actually tried to
persuade the works council to agree to pay cuts. In doing so management raised the
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prospect of not only further job losses but also the possibilit9 that GKN could divest
itself of the plant23.
Thus management continued the slow transformation of work by instilling in
the workers the need to work harder and more flexibly for the same or preferably less
pay than before. The works council was initially unwilling or unable to challenge
management but as time passed the council became more confident, especially after the
strikes of spring 1993 which seemed to engender a new spirit of collective
consciousness in the plant which was harnessed better to defend workers interests.
During the course of the strike there were only five workers who continued to report
for work.
6.4	 The transformation of work: workplace change in indigenous automotive
enterprises
Having examined in detail the transformation of work at four locations of direct
foreign automotive investment this section considers the two most important
indigenous auto firms in Hungary and east Germany (see chapter 4). In looking at first
IKARUS, and second Sachsenring, we examine the extent to which it was possible to
transform work in the absence of significant foreign investment. In doing so, it
becomes clear that social relations of production within the workplace were only
partially transformed, and even then at some cost to the firm's viability.
23	 In connection with this threat two points were significant. First, being one of the first
companies to purchase a manufacturing company from THA, GKN did not have to sign enforceable
employment and investment commitments and as a result did not face financial penalties for
divestment. Second, by the end of 1993 capital investment in the plant by GKN had been only DM3
million despite its public pledge to invest DM60 million. In consequence, the costs to GKN of
divesting itself from GWM would be very small.
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6.4.1 IKARUS
The transformation of work at Hungary's best known and largest
manufacturing enterprise took place amid perpetual financial crisis and uncertainty
over the company's future ownership. Under such circumstances sheer survival was
the first priority and the need to transform work was a secondary issue. Indeed it was
significant that amongst IKARUS's senior management survival was seen in the
context of the company's relationship to the Hungarian state and its traditional
customers in the former Soviet Union. As a result the restructuring that occurred in
the company was, at least initially, defensive - designed to preserve as much of the
existing business relationships as possible - rather than part of a genuine attempt to
restructure its operations in response to change in the economic system. Thus in
response to the Soviet Union's inability to finance its bus orders first IKARUS and the
Hungarian state permitted Soviet equity investment and later, once Mercedes Benz had
decided not to enter into a joint venture, supported the establishment of small assembly
facilities in five cities across the former Soviet Union as a means of enabling its existing
customers to continue ordering. At the same time the state continued to subsidise the
company. Thus the context surrounding the change in work place relations was the
preservation of relationships with the major customer and the state dating from the era
of state planning which were designed to reduce the need for change. The submission
of the company to the law of value was postponed.
The transformation of work comprised three factors: the contraction of the
workforce and the reduction of production, the partial and selective intensification of
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work, and the reform of the industrial relations system at the p'ant. On the shop floor
changing conditions centred on mass redundancies and an even greater reduction of
production volumes. The first stage in the unwinding of the commercial vehicles
production system actually involved an increase in IKARUS's workforce from 8,000 to
9,100 in 1991 as the state compelled the bus maker to take over a plant which it did
not want from Csepel Auto (the chassis supplier). Thereafter the workforce began to
fall, at first gradually to 8,600 in 1992 and then more rapidly to 6,600 in 1993. Thus
the size of the workforce fell by around 25pc between 1991 and 1993. However,
redundancies did not keep pace with the decline in production. Between 1989 and
1993 production fell 75pc, from 10,000 units in 1989 (production had peaked at
14,000) to 5,000 in 1991 and again to 3,500 in 1993. The first substantial wave of
redundancies was announced in the second half of 1992 when 2,000 job losses were
announced. It was not insignificant that management had initially wished to make
3,000 people redundant. Those made forcibly redundant were offered severance
payments worth between six and 12 month's pay depending on the worker's length of
service. In addition, men over the age of 58 and women workers aged 53 or more
were forcibly retired.	 The job losses were particularly concentrated at the
headquarters plant in Budapest. Thus after this round of redundancies employment at
IKARUS's five main plants was: 1,600 at Budapest assembling 500 coaches, 3,200 at
Székesfehévár assembling up to 3,000 buses, 1,000 at Mor producing seats, wiring
harnesses and other components, 500 at Kiskunhalas producing steel parts, and 300 at
a plant in Szeged producing doors.
387
The loss of market and job cuts forced the company to reorganise the
production process. In the first instance the production of town buses was stopped at
the headquarters plant in Budapest and concentrated at the Székesfehévár plant. At
the same time the production of touring coaches was located entirely in Budapest.
IKARUS also made its largest component plant (IMAG, located in Mór) increasingly
independent, turning it into a company limited by shares owned by TKARUS and the
state. Underlying the strategy was IKARUS's wish to transfer ownership and
responsibility of IMAG to the state so that it could concentrate on assembly and
externalise component production. However, at the same time there were some
contrary developments which suggested that the company was not so much intent on
disintegration as on protecting its core workforce. Most significant was IKARUS's
decision to stop sourcing the chassis from Csepel Auto and to source inhouse. This
provided work for its employees and reduced the number of necessary redundancies.
Thus the reorganisation of the production process was in part governed by the
continuing feeling amongst management that it should protect workers from the
consequences of the market. The internalisation of other smaller parts of the
production process resulted in an increase in vertical integration from between 15 and
2Opc (depending on the model) to around 4Opc. At the same time management sought
to diversify, into special commercial vehicles for example, as another way of sustaining
development.
The second major change to the production process concerned final assembly.
IKARUS was alone in the global bus industry in having built and operated a moving
assembly line. However, with the reduction in the volume of production the assembly
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line became a hindrance and was abandoned in favour of a do.ck-based process. As a
result, to prevent bottlenecks in the production process, in certain parts of the plants
the pace of work had to be reduced. In addition, the low volume of orders, and the
uncertainty that surrounded their financing, resulted in an unevenness of work. Thus
workers would lie idle for weeks at a time waiting for an order to be secured and then
sometimes would have to meet it rapidly. The interruptions to work rendered
scheduling difficult and undermined discipline on the production floor. As a
consequence management argued that quality actually fell and that it proved harder to
tell workers what to do and ensure that they met quantity targets. The effect of the
break-up of the assembly line was to reduce the control enforced by the production
process just when management needed to secure greater control over the labour
process.
Despite this, management sought to introduce mechanisms to enable it to
secure greater control over the labour process and change workers' attitudes towards
their work. The threat of redundancy had a bigger effect on workers than any
management strategies. Unskilled workers feared most for their jobs with the result
that they, amongst all the workers, were most enthusiastic in responding to
management. In contrast, the skilled workers struggled with management, not least
because they sought to preserve their privileges dating from the old system. As a
consequence management used the redundancies to try to remove some of these
workers rather than the unskilled. Thus management sought to gain control over the
production floor by removing and undermining the power of key skilled workers. At
the same time a retraining programme was introduced. The purpose of the programme
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was to encourage workers to take more care over their work. In"particular the training
focused upon quality control and formed part of a long term strategy to introduce
Total Quality Management (TQM). Initially quality control personnel were retrained
and the long term aim was to retrain every employee. At the same time, ftinded by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry, IKARUS employed consultants to draw up plans to
satisfy ISO 9000 series certification. Once again management sought to use the
pretext of improving quality as a way of securing and controlling greater effort from
workers. Integral to this strategy was a plan to upgrade the company's technology to
improve efficiency by importing computer controlled processes. However, in practice
a great deal remained to be done not least; management recognised that it would not
be able to extract greater effort from the workers whilst the real value of pay remained
in decline.
Whilst management struggled to transform work in the two large assembly
factories it enjoyed more success elsewhere. Like some other Hungarian engineering
enterprises, in the 1970s IKARUS established a small factory to try to break into
western markets. The plant, also located in Budapest, had a capacity of around 100
units annually and was organised in a completely different manner than the plants
supplying the Soviet market. Since it competed at world prices the Special Coach
Factory customised models, by including imported components such as engines, to
meet the customer's requirements. In the early 1990s the factory was turned into a
joint venture and concentrated on assembling top quality vehicles made mostly from
foreign components. At the same time work in the plant was intensified and workers
were paid higher wages in recompense.
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In addition, IKARUS negotiated, after one failed attempt in 1991, to establish a
production line to supply Suzuki with small pressed parts. It intended to organise the
activity into a separate company within IKARUS in which it was hoped Suzuki would
take an equity stake in order to turn it into a joint venture. Whereas the contract was
designed to utilise some of JIKARUS's huge excess press capacity, more significantly
management saw it as an opportunity to introduce Japanese working conditions into
the factory. IKARUS's subsidiary IMAG had already used a similar strategy of
transforming work in self-contained parts of the site - either joint ventures or lines
producing components for foreign customers - as a means of gradually modernising the
entire company.	 Within these transformed 'islands', work was intensified and
speeded-up, and workers were more highly disciplined and better paid.
The third element of the transformation of work at IKARUS centred on labour
relations and the representation of workers. In the course of the company's crisis the
relationship between management and the workers deteriorated severely. This began
in January 1990 when workers were first laid off as production was halted because of
the government's refusal to continue to allow shipments of buses to insolvent
customers in the Soviet Union. In consequence workers staged a demonstration
outside the Hungarian parliament against the government's desertion of an enterprise it
had created. In addition to the grievance with the state there were two main concerns
with enterprise management. First, management rewards increased at a time when the
workers' average pay failed to keep pace with increases in inflation. This led to
speculation that management was pursuing the privatisation of the enterprise - which in
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the workers' mind was associated with redundancies -because it stood to benefit
personally from any sale. The debate focused on the issue of who owned the company
and therefore who could make the decisions surrounding any sale and who stood to
benefit from the proceeds24. Thus the workers tended to see management as stealing
property owned by them all and then selling it. The second, and related issue, was that
the powerful cohort of skilled workers did not trust management's ability to manage
the company's crisis. Not least workers believed they were not being kept frilly
informed about the company's position and future prospects.	 As a result
communication between management and the workers broke down and a series of
symbolic one and two hour strikes was held.
This was in part because of the unstable institutional framework for
representing labour since labour law had not been reformed in the light of political
changes (see chapter 4). This meant that IKARUS's management dealt with nine
different trade union bodies which collectively represented 6Opc of the workforce.
Without a permanent structure ad hoc ephemeral bodies were created to manage
relations with the unions. At the same time many of the unions were in competition for
members which meant that management was not dealing with a unified force. The
introduction of the Labour Code in mid-1992 established an institutional framework
and eased the uncertainty. The ru!e that only trade unions with lOpc or more of the
workforce as members had consultation rights cut the number of unions management
regularly dealt with to just two: VASAS (the metal workers' union dating from the
soviet system) and a smaller local or company union called the Council of Workers.
24	 In addition to the debate between workers and management over who was the real owner of
the company, local and central government and the company itself all disagreed over the precise
ownership details.
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Also following the Labour Code, a collective agreement was made between the
workers and management. The agreement was signed by all nine trade unions with
members in the factory but only offered full negotiating rights (over wages, social
welfare and pay awards) to the largest two unions. The collective agreement covered
recruitment, employment contracts, redundancy and disciplinary procedures. In most
cases the unions secured agreement from management which was some way above the
legal minimum. Thus whereas statutory severance pay was six months' wages,
IKARUS offered to pay 12 months' worth of wages. In addition, IKARUS agreed to
continue a tranche of social support above the statutory minimum. The company
continued to subsidise catering in the plant and contribute towards the cost of workers
purchasing their own flats. The company also maintained its tradition of providing
workers with clothes, and operating holiday resorts and nursery schools. The
collective agreement did not include a factory-wide pay agreement since different
grades had their own employment contracts. Despite this the main union in the
factory, VASAS, was satisfied that the company paid above the national average and
in line with what could be afforded. The final element of the new labour relations
structure in IKARUS involved the election of a works council which was dominated by
VASAS but whose influence remained to be seen.
In general, despite the symbolic strikes which centred on privatisation,
IKARUS's workers were relatively docile. In particular there was very little resistance
to the loss of jobs but this was in large part because management had yet to force
through the dramatic restructuring the company required in order to compete in the
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new market environment. This explains the lack of worker resistance; management
had yet to confront them and indeed persisted with strategies designed to postpone
radical change. However, after the company had decided to establish a series of small
bus assembly plants in the former Soviet Union, concern was expressed that it would
effectively lead to the exportation of Hungarian jobs. This perhaps better than
anything else indicated the extent to which the old style of thinking (by management,
labour and the state) continued albeit in combination with concerns more usually
associated with capitalist economies. For it showed that efforts to protect IKARUS
from the vagaries of the market (because of its inability to transform the social
relations of production) required it to relocate part of the production process to
locations where the law of value remained absent. In this sense 1IKARUS's 'spatial fix'
involved escaping the market. In doing so it illustrated the extent to which the
company remained untransformed, persisting with strategies designed to insulate it
from the discipline of the law of value. Not least this was because of an inability to
secure greater control over the labour process in the face of an inability to find the
capital needed to restructure the company.
6.4.2 Sachsenring Automobilwerke Zwickau GnibH
On 3rd April 1991 the last Trabant came off the assembly line at IFA-PKW
Sachsenring Automobilwerke (SAW) in Zwickau. Shortly afterwards the remainder of
SAW (VW and GKN having already purchased some of its most valuable assets) was
transformed into Sachsenring Automobilwerke Zwickau GnibH (SAZ), a
I OOpc-owned subsidiary of the THA. The THA's Direktorat Fahrzeugbau then
25	 1 am indebted to Nick Marshall for making a transcript of an interview with a SAZ works
council representative on 15th November 1993 available to me..
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embarked on attempting to turn the former auto maker into"a 'service enterprise' for
the industry based on four cost centres (THA 1992, see also chapter 5)26 By the end
of 1993 about a half of SAW's former site had been either sold or leased to around 19
newly created companies employing 3,500 people27.
In the course of these changes, work was not so much transformed as
undermined.	 Workplace relations focused on three important factors: first,
employment levels, as rounds of mass redundancies were announced and implemented;
second, the privatisation of portions of the company's assets and the break up of the
workforce; and third, the investment by VW in Mosel. Employment at SAW's four
sites in and around Zwickau fell gradually from a peak of 11,500 in the late 1980s to
8,000 in April 1991. Following the creation of SAZ the size of the workforce fell
much more rapidly. In the course of nine months between April 1991 and January
1992 around 6,500 jobs were lost as the workforce shrank to just 1,500. Thereafter
the size of the workforce remained stable until the end of 1993. This was possible
because VW sourced the bodies for the Golf II from SAW before transferring them for
final trim and assembly at Mosel I.
At the same time as the redundancies were being implemented, sizeable parts of
SAZ were hived off and sold to investors. The overall effect of the substitution of a
26	 At the end of 1993 SAZ was liquidated and a new 'empty shell' company was established in
part of the former site employing 280 people.27	 This figure is an estimate. It was significant that owing to the manner in which the THA
privatised state owned assets and extracted employment and investment pledges from investors it was
able to point to the potential of these firms to employ 5,800 workers and to conceal actual
employment levels (see Chapter 4). In addition, even though the THA presented the establishment of
these new companies as absorbing labour from SAW, not all those who found work were former SAW
workers.
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social division of labour for a technical one (see Sayer and Walker 1992) was to break
up a workforce which had been talked about in terms of a 'family'. Thus solidarity
amongst workers was broken down as the interests of workers in newly established
firms and those at SAZ differed. Moreover the contrast between working in new
modern 'foreign' firms and a declining SAZ served to discipline workers in both. The
largest privatisation of part of SAW was, of course, VW's (with the THA) take over of
its most modern site to the north of Zwickau at Mosel. The result of this was to link
the future of VW's investment in Saxony with that of SAZ. Hence YW used SAZ as a
temporary body shop. However, once production of the Golf II was replaced by Golf
III and the body shop had been built at Mosel II, SAZ lost this business. As a result
although SAZ's workforce remained around 1,500, in practice more and more workers
were placed on short time working as the future of the company was established. In
the course of this period the reliance on VW, which had been universally seen as SAZ's
salvation, came to be seen as a problem contributing to the company's crisis.
The significance of the case of Sachsenring lay in the failure to transform and
intensify work because the social relations dating from the soviet regime remained
largely intact in the form of a commitment to place. The state, primarily in the form of
the THA, was unable and unwilling to break-up the entrenched interests in the
workplace whose resistance, in the form of a coalition between management and
labour resulted in a notable victory over capital (as reflected in state policies).
However the coalition of management, labour and local state officials bound together
in a web of non-capitalist social relations could not prevent the liquidation of their
company.
396
As the former producer of the Trabant, SAZ was an extremely symbolic, visible
and politically significant company before and after unification. The legacy of the SED
regime bequeathed a powerful institution with which both management and workers
identified. In large part this was because of the important role that Zwickau had
played in the development of the automobile industry in continental Europe prior to
the partition of Germany. Crucially, then the locality's links with the auto industry
predated the Soviet regime and the Trabant. In part this explained why helping to
build the Trabant conferred privileges, such as pay levels 2Opc above the average, and
contributed to the creation of a strong-willed workforce with a collective
identification. Although this identification was in the enterprise rather than a workers
interest, the crucial point is that even though it was state owned, SAW had an identity
that was distinct from the state in general. Thus the historical links of the local area
with the automotive industry, the symbolic, political and economic significance of the
company in conjunction with the dependence of the local economy on SAZ, generated
a real commitment to place which was embodied in the firm. This all served to
underline the sensitivity that surrounded the company's future and helped to explain
why entrenched interests proved so resistant to change.
The visibility of the company led to a series of high profile visits by government
and trade union officials, including one by the German Federal President, and resulted
in much attention being paid to the privatisation of SAZ. In these circumstances the
THA, which became the owner once the WA was liquidated, was unable or unwilling
to exercise its normal level of control. Whereas elsewhere the THA sought to
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eliminate or marginalise supervisory boards, in the case of SAZ it was unable to do so.
The supervisory board at SAZ contained a number of prominent individuals who
represented powerflul interests, including IG Metall, and local and regional
government. This meant that interests other than the purely financial - as embodied in
the TI-IA - were represented including a 'local interest'. It meant also that the THA did
not have unfettered proprietorial rights. One other difference between SAZ and other
firms is that whereas the THA usually replaced top managers with west German
managers or promoted junior managers, in the case of SAZ the management from the
SED regime was left largely intact. Only one senior western manager was implanted
but as far as the TI-IA was concerned he 'went native'. The result of this continuity was
the preservation of soviet-style management and the maintenance of a corporate
interest.
In the same way as management interest remained intact in the course of
unification (despite institutional change) the labour interest was largely untransformed.
Whilst SAW was part of the IFA Kombinat the workforce was organised into
departments comprising 150 workers who elected up to five shop stewards each. The
stewards, despite being able to raise individual issues of concern to workers, essentially
worked in tandem with the supervisors in scheduling production and overtime. This
meant that in effect the shop stewards, intimidated by the supervisors, were part of the
disciplinary system that was employed in SAW. The shop stewards collectively elected
representatives to sit on SAW's company trade union committee or
Be(riebsgewerkschaftleilung (BGL)28 . Nominally, the BGL institutionalised worker
28	 The BGL was the executive of the Betriebgcwcrksorgaiiisation (BGO).
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self-management of the firm but in practice had little more than a symbolic or dignified
role which involved conferring privileges as a means of securing workers' consent and
managing SAW's schools and holiday accommodation.
However, crucially this system of labour representation did not work well in
SAW. In particular, it proved difficult to persuade workers to stand for election as
either shop stewards or BGL representatives (in part because it involved a reduction in
pay). However, more significantly the reluctance of the workers to participate in the
labour structures illustrated their resistance to the bodies which were supposed to
represent labour. The fact that the BGL could not be distinguished from the SED
meant that labour representatives were politically vulnerable because they were
effectively the mouthpiece of management. This meant that labour representatives
were squeezed between management and supervisors on the one side and disgruntled
workers, whose representatives did not represent them, on the other. An antagonistic
relationship existed between workers and managers (which was also indicated by
absenteeism) which was not institutionalised and therefore articulated and thus the
management was unable to incorporate and eliminate worker interest. The result was
that a tradition of worker militancy survived the SED regime.
In 1990 JIFA, the holding company that owned SAW, transformed the system
of labour representation to reflect West German law. The BGL was replaced by a
works council in early 1991. However, the personnel remained similar. As a result the
old leader of the BGL, with a close relationship to management, was elected the leader
of the works council (Jurgens el a!., 1993)29. At the time, SAW employed 8,000
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workers which under labour law permitted a council consisting of 39 representatives of
which seven were released from their jobs to concentrate full-time on the council's
business. Thus a powerful institutional basis was created for representing labour
interest which untapped the latent resistance that already existed in the company.
Considerable levels of interest were shown by workers in the establishment of the
council. At the same time IG Metall established a powerful presence in the firm by
recruiting the majority of the workforce as members and through the establishment of a
group of shop stewards. The relationship between the works council and IG Metall
developed closely with many of the works council representatives also 1GM shop
stewards. With union support the works council was powerful and successful in
establishing a close and, significantly, a co-operative relationship with management.
Indeed the preservation of the existing management resulted in no attempt being made
to prevent the development of a powerful political consciousness amongst the workers.
Thus although the institutions of labour representation were reformed in many
respects, the changes merely permitted articulation of a labour interest which dated
from the state planning regime. As a result the new social basis of the firm acted to
incorporate the workers' interest and disperse workers' resistance. In short workers
were given cause to identif,' in SAZ, as it had by then become, in ways which had
simmered under the surface during the era of the GDR. Thus paradoxically the
freedom to organise permitted workers to express the long-held identification in the
firm above an interest which could be identified as the workers. The change in the
institutional basis of the enterprise actually convinced workers that the firm could be
29	 Jürgens Ct al., do not refer to SAZ by name but refer to it as plant b.
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run in their interests. The ideological promise held out in the course of the SED regime
had become a genuine possibility upon its demise.
The result of these changes was a coalition between the supervisory board,
management and labour which undermined the THA's attempts to transform the
company. The most visible form of resistance centred on the establishment of an
agency to absorb redundancies, which culminated in a sit-in by 1,000 workers in 1991
and management's refusal to accept THA's directives. With the announcement that the
state would no longer subsidise production of the Trabant considerable concern was
generated by the prospect of thousands of redundancies. IG Metall's deputy president
visited SAZ on 3rd April 1991 to witness the last Trabant come off the assembly line
and to lend his support to workers who were demanding measures to limit
redundancies. At the same time IG Metall suggested the establishment of a
'qualification' or training company to retrain those made unemployed.
	
With
representatives on the company's supervisory board, IG Metall introduced the idea to
management. This followed the use of similar companies in the Ruhr in west Germany
in the early 1980s to manage waves of redundancies in the steel industry.
Later that month, SAZ workers staged a series of demonstrations during a visit
by the German President to the company. In response the President agreed to support
the foundation of a qualification company. However, despite the weight of opinion the
director of the THA, Brigit Breuel, indicated its opposition to the strategy. As a result
the THA forbade the management, who supported the idea, from using any of its
premises - owned by the TI-IA - for the company. In response to the THA's refusal to
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support the plan the workers staged a sit-in of the factory. Inthe course of the sit-in
the supervisory board ignored the view of the nominal owner - the THA - and agreed
to the establishment of Sachsische Aufbau- und Qualifizierungsgesellschaft Zwickau
(SAQ) as a IOOpc owned subsidiary of SAZ. Following its establishment the THA
changed its mind and agreed to finance SAQ initially until the end of 1992
(subsequently extended into 1993).
The purpose of the SAQ was to provide one or two-year training and work
opportunities for up to 4,000 workers made redundant by SAZ under the ABM
scheme. By the middle of 1993 some 2,000 SAZ workers had attended retraining
courses and the company had begun to tender for external training contracts, including
VW Sachsen. The establishment of SAQ was presented as a victory for the workers
despite their having failed to prevent SAZ from making thousands redundant, which
was the real issue. Instead of securing jobs SAZ workers secured training with little
expectation of employment thereafter. Moreover, the establishment of the company
made it easier for SAZ to push through redundancies and undermined initial demands
that the redundancies themselves be prevented. In this sense, whereas the industrial
action had demonstrated the power of the workers and forced the THA to alter its
view, it contributed to little more than a visible political gesture. The creation of an
alternative, other than unemployment, made it easier for the works councils to support
management implemented redundancies. Seen in this light the SAQ should have
permitted greater transformation than had occurred earlier.
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However, in spite of the establishment of the SAQ ev • nts conspired to prevent
the transformation of the social relations of production in the firm. This was for three
main reasons: the coalition of interest between management and labour, the
non-market relationship between SAZ and VW, and finally, the failure to intensify
work.
Firstly, the struggle to set up the qualification company, although it did not
prevent redundancies, cemented a coalition of interest between the supervisory board,
the management and the works council against the TI-IA concerning the future of the
company. As time went by without a serious offer for the whole firm by an investor
the TI-IA decided that the only way of securing a future for SAZ lay in breaking up the
company. The THA sent in a team of 40 management consultants to identify viable -
but not necessarily going-concern - businesses within SAZ which could be hived off
and sold independently to investors. The result was the identification of nine different
profit centres which could be privatised separately. However, the supervisory board,
management and the works council wanted to prevent SAZ from being broken up
more than it already had been. To achieve this the management, backed by the works
council, tried to arrange a management buy out (MBO), supported by Deutsche Bank,
but negotiations with the THA came to nothing. The business plan that was drawn up,
however, indicated the extent to which management retained the old style of thinking
that accompanied the planning system in which work could be 'found' to be done.
Thus the plan envisaged that SAZ could become a supplier to major German and
European car assemblers but did not demonstrate its ability to do so. Despite the
failure of the MBO the management and the works council continued to argue that all
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the profit centres should be privatised together. In these ways they were able to
obstruct the THA's plans and the work of the management consultants.
Second, the nature of the relationship between SAZ and VW served to prolong
those attitudes associated with the state planning system and therefore acted to prevent
the transformation of the social relations of work. The manner in which the West
German state and \TW conspired to maintain car production in Zwickau both depended
upon and undermined the ability of SAZ to transform itself by introducing the law of
value. The establishment by YW of a temporary ckd operation was as much symbolic
as a genuine attempt at establishing a profitable commercial enterprise in the short
term. Given the size and tooling of Mosel I, VW was forced to outsource body
fabrication. Since VW's plants were operating at fill capacity as a result of the
post-monetary union consumer boom, it sought to source bodies from SAZ. In the
absence of any alternative SAZ had little choice but to become involved in VW's short
term plans. In order to meet VW requirements the THA sanctioned capital investment
of DM7Omillion by SAZ.
However, the relations between the two companies were not strictly
commercial. Thus VW in effect 'put out' work to SAZ as a means of giving it work
which established a relationship that was not disciplined by the law of value. The
relationship was more political and social rather than financial with the result that there
was no incentive nor rationale to intensifj work. Thus once the body shop had opened
at Mosel II VW no longer required SAZ. Likewise when VW began to suffer from the
recession in the German car market the volume of parts sourced from SAZ declined.
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In the meantime the work was not according to a contract in the typical sense of the
term but was much more akin to a planning system: namely work was centrally
distributed to keep people busy. The result was to perpetuate modes of thinking that
were bequeathed by the planning system. Moreover these circumstances allowed VW
to use the run down of SAZ as a resource from which to enhance the viability, and
crucially the visibility and thus the social and political value, of both the ckd operation
and the construction of the new plant which secured such favourable state backing. At
the same time the presence of VW in the area meant that there was always the
prospect of \TW potentially becoming more involved in SAZ. This not only dissuaded
other potential investors but also created a 'wait and see' dependency environment
which postponed restructuring. This helped to cement the view, which was prevalent
amongst the dynamics of unification and the transformation of the ex-GDR, that
restructuring had to be imposed from outside rather than generated from internal
resources. Thus the success of VW's project in Saxony, with all the political
ramifications surrounding it, in part depended on the conditions which contributed to
the failure to transform SAZ by submitting it to the law of value.
These two factors contrived to prevent the intensification of work and the
transformation of the social relations of work. In short the massive reduction in the
amount of work carried out by the firm made it very difficult to increase labour
productivity. At the time the THA took over SAW, turnover per employee was just
DM50,000, compared to DM300,000 that was regarded by it as viable. By the middle
of 1993 the figure was still well below DM200,000. These figures showed that it
proved difficult to maintain exiting levels of efficiency, let alone improve them, whilst
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the firm severely contracted. Costs per unit increased substantially, not least because
the proportion of overheads in the total costs rose but also because of the vast
under-utilisation of capital. Moreover reduced production volumes enforced changes
in the organisation of work with the result that labour utilisation fell. Thus many of the
body components that continued to be supplied to VW were produced in very low
volumes enforcing manual processes. Indeed the variety of the parts manufactured
was such that production was craft-like. With increasing numbers of employees placed
on short time working it proved harder and harder to maintain discipline, both that
enforced by the production process, and that instilled by the labour process. The
overall effect was that even those workers who were still employed by SAZ had very
little work to do and the work that they did do was not efficient.
Thus the existing interests in the firm and the business environment contributed
to insulate SAZ from the market and prevented the transformation of work by
obstructing and delaying the TI-IA's plans for the firm. However the coalition between
the management and workers was crucially unable to pursue alternatives strategies to
ensure the company's future viability. As a consequence the firm's crisis continued and
both management and the works council were seen as increasingly impotent in the face
of the firm's problems. Indeed gradually the coalition lost its influence. In the course
of 1992 and 1993 the company was effectively hollowed out as the workforce was cut
through redundancies and the privatisation of parts of the firm. As the size of the
company decreased so the labour law forced a corresponding reduction in the size of
the works council.
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With the company in a state of limbo in early 1993 the TI-IA transferred
responsibility for the company from the Direktorat Fahrzeugbau, responsible for
privatisation, to the Abwicklung department responsible for liquidating the firm. In the
course of this period the power of management and the works council continued to
wane, as they were unable to suggest any alternative. Thus through time the THA had
subtly undermined the coalition of interests but at the cost of effectively managing the
closure of the company. Finally, in the middle of 1993 the management agreed to the
break up of the company but by this time SAZ was effectively bankrupt. The result
was the creation of an 'empty shell' firm utilising part of the SAZ site.
In the case of SAZ the west German state, in the guise of the TI-IA, was unable
to reform or by-pass entrenched existing interests and transform the company, only
succeeding ultimately in closing the company. Transformation was not possible
because broader interests, of the workers and the local area, were projected on to
SAZ. The prolonged undermining of the company served a wider purpose for capital
and the state, which together stood to gain most from the transformation in the
ex-GDR. However, the inability and unwillingness to transform work in SAZ reflected
the endurance of social relations embodied in a commitment to a place and to a firm.
Thus the non-capitalist social relations in SAZ proved unreformable without the
wholesale break-up of the firm itself. The lesson to be drawn from this example was
that transformation depended on a new social division of labour as SAW was split up
between corporate boundaries (see Figure 5.2). In other words it was the change of
ownership, as facilities were bought by companies such as VW, Siemens, and GKN,
which brought about transformation. However, this was only the case because of the
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way unification and transformation was conceived by the west German state at the
national level; SAW/SAZ was never given the necessary tools which could have
permitted in situ transformation.
In addition, SAZ also highlighted the contradictory nature of the
transformation process itself Not least it indicated that the conditions that were
brought about by the introduction of the law of value to the former GDR undermined
the potential for SAZ as an individual producer to transform its social relations of
work. In the same way that state enterprises under the soviet regime suffered from
inertia, so too this continued in the new situation. Also the debate over SAZ
illustrated the difference between the local and the national interest and how this gulf
was managed by different arms of the state.
6.5	 Conclusions
This chapter then, has sought to examine to what extent and how work was
transformed in automotive enterprises, and the sorts of resistance that this provoked.
The legacy of the soviet system was a chaotic labour process which permitted core
workers a high level of influence because supervisors and managers needed to secure
their consent in order to overcome production irregularities. As a result following the
disintegration of the soviet system, indigenous auto firms introduced strategies which
centred on securing greater control over the labour process and the intensification of
work as a way of reforming the social basis of production. This involved defining the
roles of management and employees and in establishing vehicles for managing sectional
interests.
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At the same time foreign automotive firms used their investments to experiment
with forms of labour organisation which were not only new to the host countries but
also largely new to the automotive industry in general. Crucially, the dynamics
underpinning the socio-economic transformations created conditions somewhat akin to
the 'greening' of 'brownfield' sites30, in which foreign companies could establish new
regimes of work which involved securing, by authoritarian (Magyar Suzuki) or subtler
means (VW and Ford), greater control over workers. In doing so the significance
attached by management to devices such as quality illustrated the importance of
management discourses in controlling work and incorporating and dispersing worker
resistance to change. However, whereas auto DFI successfully transformed work, in
the indigenous sector transformation was much more partial and uneven. This was
particularly evident in the cases of IKARUS and SAZ, where the reliance on foreign
(commercial and state) 'expertise', as enshrined in the neo-liberal conception of
transition to capitalism, prevented the generation of the conditions of
self-transformation.
The principle conclusion from the evidence presented here, in particular
demonstrated with regard to VW Sachsen and SAZ but also to a lesser extent by
Magyar Suzuki and IKARUS, is that the opportunities for transforming work in one
plant depended upon the partial or complete failure of transformation elsewhere. In
short, it was industrial stagnation and deindustrialisation which created the conditions
that permitted management to secure control over labour. Thus transformation of
30	
am indebted to Tim Strangleman for this phrase.
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work necessarily had to be partial and uneven. The establishment of new regimes of
work in foreign owned factories was predicated on their not being a generalised
transformation beyond their workplace.
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Chapter 7
	
Conclusions: corporate and territorial-institutional fixes, and the
geographically uneven institutionalisation ofcapitalism.
7.1	 Introduction
Change in the west European automotive industry and in east and central
Europe (especially after about 1988) contributed dramatically to restructure the
geography of automotive production. The uneven combination of these two sets of
processes shaped the transformation of the automotive industry in Hungary and east
Germany. Marketisation and integration with the global economy emerged from the
mutual constitution of corporate fixes for capital and territorial-institutional fixes for
societies in east and central Europe. The transformation of the industry in ECE was
highly regionally uneven and deeply implicated in the geographically uneven
institutionalisation of capitalism.
This concluding chapter begins to draw out the major findings from the
evidence presented in this thesis, pointing to the geographically uneven
institutionalisation of capitalism. It does so in three interrelated steps which together
seek to locate micro (local) changes with macro (supra-local) changes in order to begin
to specif' the nature of the spatial fix that has been conjured up in east and central
Europe since 1989. The first step involves an examination of Hungary and east
Germany from the point of view of a corporate fix for auto companies. In doing so it
examines, at the micro level, automotive direct foreign investment. The second step
involves an investigation of transformation from the point of view of the two
case-study countries; namely territories' search for an institutional fix following the
disintegration of the soviet system. The third step involves combining the corporate
and territorial-institutional fixes, and in doing so identifies some of the points of
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theoretical significance that arise from the thesis. In doing so..the chapter argues that
the spatial fix visited on east and central Europe involved the co-evolution of corporate
and territorial-institutional fixes, which produced a spatial configuration of intensified
and highly unstable geographical inequalities which equated to the uneven
geographical institutionalisation of capitalism. The chapter ends by identifying several
issues which emerge from this thesis which warrant ftirther research.
7.2	 Step one: Corporate fixes?
Change in east and central Europe opened up a new range of opportunities for
automotive firms. As a result a new round of investment by the industry took place in
ECE, not least in Hungary and east Germany. Four factors were particularly important
in stimulating investment. First, the region provided a low-wage low-cost production
location proximate to the EU market. Second, the disintegration of the soviet system
and the neo-liberal policies pursued by ECE states (largely imposed by the west) led to
a broadly welcoming stance, involving investment incentives, towards foreign
investors. This and the post-soviet crisis permitted relatively risk-free low-cost
investment opportunities. Third, low levels of car ownership and the diffusion of
western consumption norms raised the prospect of BCE in time becoming a large
market for cars. Fourth, and arguably most importantly, the disintegration of the
soviet system created an environment which permitted investors to experiment with
new forms of production.
Auto-related investments in Hungary and east Germany fitted into two
coexisting types of corporate strategy: the establishment of regionally integrated
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investments such as Suzuki and VW, and functionally integrated 'branch-plant'
investments, such as Ford. However, in referring to the strategies two points must be
identified. First, different forms of integration coexisted both within enterprises and
within countries. This was particularly the case in Hungary, where there was a greater
variety of investment strategies than in east Germany. This variety had important
implications for regional paths of development. It was largely due to the different
legacies of the soviet systems in the two countries and to their very different paths of
post-soviet transformation. Second, the two strategies bore a number of important
similarities, not least in terms of their likely impacts on regional development. Thus
even where there was evidence of regionally integrated investment, the local economic
development impacts were relatively insignificant.
The blurring of the distinctions between regional and functionally integrated
investments was in large part due to auto firms using their investments in Hungary and
east Germany to experiment with and forge new production techniques. The
opportunity to experiment depended on the disintegration of the soviet system (which
rendered rules, norms and roles uncertain), and crucially, on the dominant path of
transformation in which new forms of embedded governance and regulation were not
established. The experimental production techniques concentrated firstly on new
forms of supply linkage connected with the disintegration of the value-added chain,
and secondly on new ways of organising work within plants.
First, the assembly plants that were constructed by Suzuki in Hungary and VW
in east Germany had a low level of vertical integration. In consequence their
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construction represented a lower commitment of capital and the establishment of fewer
value adding processes than in traditional Fordist assembly plants. This allowed
assembly firms to minimise investment in capital assets reducing a firms' commitment
to place and ensuring continued mobility. It also meant that the links between the
assembly plant and the suppliers were significant. There were two important features
to the supply relationships that were established in Hungary and east Germany.
Assemblers attempted to create a dependent supply base in order to allow them to
dictate terms. As a result the networks of key suppliers became 'clan-like' and difficult
for other suppliers to penetrate. Such changes were also associated with greater
marketisation of relations lower down the supply pyramid. This was significant
because smaller investors and indigenous suppliers were pushed down the supply
pyramid and became dependent subcontractors producing standardised low
value-added parts in competition with many other suppliers in ECE and beyond.
Second, investors sought new means to secure greater control over work. This
centred on three important factors. The conditions conjured up by post-soviet
transformation enabled investors not only to be highly selective in their recruitment
(owing to deindustrialisation and unemployment) but also in establishing new social
norms relating to work. Particularly important in this respect was the enduring
weakness of trade unions which itself was in part a consequence of concerted efforts
by governments. Second, employers introduced new forms of work organisation.
This involved the simplification and standardisation of work so that it only required
general skills. Also, management introduced new rules of work, particularly
concerning team working and quality control, which combined elements of
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bureaucratisation (especially connected to quality and remuneration) and
informalisation (usually connected to time norms and communication). Third, and
connected to the rules of work, management established new and more subtle forms
of controlling labour. These centred on management discourses and were designed to
foster corporate identification which served to support the rules of work and obscure
conflicting interests within the workplace. In doing so the parallels between these
management strategies and with the soviet labour process were particularly poignant.
These changes to the supply chain and the nature of work represented the
intensification of Fordism or neo-Fordism: division of the production process was
deepened and management sought greater control over work. The motivation behind
these experiments was to develop new standards of efficiency and new models of
production which could be used to force reorganisation at existing plants in western
Europe and particularly undermine employee bargaining power.
The experimentation strategies pursued by investors met with mixed success.
Those investments which sought to establish regionally integrated investments faced
considerably more problems than those investors which embarked on building 'branch
plants'. This reflected the boundaries of what was considered possible given the
conditions of post-soviet transformation. In short the legacy of the soviet system and
the neo-liberal paths of transformation served to preclude that form of economic
development. Instead ECE was 'prepared' for investment which was functionally
integrated with pan-European production systems.
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In Hungary the problems that surrounded the investment by Suzuki, which
sought to modernise the indigenous automotive sector and establish a localised
production system, illustrated the difficulty associated with trying to restructure
production in a rapidly transforming economy and society. In consequence Suzuki
altered its strategy away from localisation within Hungary, towards integrating the
plant with the European auto industry. In this way the disintegration of the soviet
system forced Suzuki to 'Europeanise' the project which involved increasingly
regarding Hungary as the location of assembly of parts supplied from Japan, western
Europe and only thirdly Hungary. Thus a close examination of the project revealed a
low level of genuine localisation and an operation which resembled a branch plant.
Likewise VW's investment in east Germany whilst superficially resembling a regionally
integrated production system, was little more than an assembly operation shared
between its own plant and those of a number of its most favoured traditional suppliers.
Such a development was possible because of the conditions conjured up by German
unification, namely the cloning and transplantation of a socio-economic formation into
the new Lander. VW simply played its part in the process by cloning and transplanting
the low value-added elements of the production system, mostly assembly, into Saxony.
Therefore, despite the rhetoric, the development more closely resembled a 'branch'
plant economy than a localised production system. There was however the possibility
that as production volume increased there would be greater local value-added.
However, this depended upon market conditions in west Germany and beyond in west
Europe and indicated that the region's development depended upon events elsewhere.
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Increasingly, the integration of both Hungary and,, east Germany into the
automotive industry involved the establishment of global outposts. As disintegration
of the soviet system proceeded, the Hungarian state used market protection measures
to force auto firms to invest in the country in return for preferential access to the
domestic market. Later the state liberalised the trade and investment regime (as
dictated by a neo-liberal agenda) which permitted investors to establish wholly-owned
(mostly) greenfield projects rather than joint ventures with local producers. In
consequence most investment by-passed the indigenous sector. Also the majority of
the investment in the country involved the production of capital and labour intensive
components which were supplied to other component producers in west Europe and
occasionally directly to car assemblers themselves. Crucially these branch plant
investments were isolated from the host region and the domestic supplier industry.
Indeed these plants were dependent on being insulated from the environment around
them. In consequence the regional development impacts of these projects were limited
and arguably even counterproductive. As the 1990s proceeded it seemed increasingly
likely that Hungary's integration in the European automotive industry would follow the
Portuguese route, specialising in the production of low value added components for
car assemblers in north west Europe, rather than the Spanish route, where car
assembly and an indigenous market developed.
Investment in east Germany involved the complete integration, not so much of
the industry (for that was effectively closed down) as of the region into German
production systems. The complete integration of the region was a complex process.
On the one hand it involved the location of assembly functions and some associated
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investments by suppliers. On the other hand it involved ihe 'hollowing-out' of a
production system through the closure of some elements and the transformation of
others into peripheral outposts of west German production systems. As a result there
was a delocalisation of production and the creation of a disintegrated production
system. Complete integration therefore did not represent the establishment of a
greater 'stake' in the European auto industry but rather rendered it more dependent and
less able to establish alternative development paths. East Germany thus seemed likely
to become an assembly location of parts manufactured either in west Germany (high
value-added components) or east and central Europe and especially over the border in
the Czech Republic (low value-added parts). Thus the west German state sought to
shape development to keep real wages and non-wage labour costs substantially lower
than in the west, and to maintain the condition of social fragmentation that allowed the
establishment of new methods of production.
Crucially, the forging of new forms of production depended on the conditions
that existed beyond the factory gates. The socio-economic fragmentation that
accompanied the soviet system (behind the facade) and which persisted after its
disintegration, was intensified by the substitution of forced soviet industrialisation for
forced dependence on re-industrialisation by foreign investors. 	 The
re-industrialisation, such as it was, was 'hollowed-out' and had only minimal local
roots. We will investigate this further by examining the territorial-institutional fix that
national states sought.
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7.3	 Step two: Territorial-institutional fixes?
In both Hungary and east Germany the attraction of direct foreign investment
was seen as a key component in engineering the 'transition to capitalism'. However,
the role that direct foreign investment played in instituting capitalism fell short of
expectations for three principal reasons: the legacies of the soviet system, the process
of its disintegration, and the neo-liberal paths of transformation pursued by both
countries.
First, the legacies of the different ways the soviet system had operated in the
two countries were crucial in shaping the impact of direct foreign investment, as
exemplified by their automotive industries. Production in Hungary was loosely
organised, involving the decentralisation of economic decision making, and relatively
low levels of vertical integration. In contrast in East Germany production links were
highly rigid, decision making was centralised, and vertical integration was high. This
meant there was more 'agency' and greater social fabric (including informal horizontal
networks) in Hungarian production systems than in East Germany (where informal
networks were weaker and more vertical). As a result the most important legacy of
the soviet system was the disembeddedness of social relations; the paucity of social
fabric from which social action could emerge. This was a far more severe problem in
east Germany than it was in Hungary, largely due to important differences in the
organisation of production.
Second, the significant differences in the nature and the extent of the
disintegration of the soviet system had important implications for the role that DFI
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played in the two countries. Economic decentralisation in Hungary permitted
enterprises to pursue development paths which were not tied to the plan nor to
prescribed soviet social relations. As the planning system ceased to meet the needs of
its constituent parts, enterprises increasingly looked beyond the plan to export to and
import from western Europe. This undermined the integrity of the planned industry.
By comparison, centralisation in East Germany had prevented the development of
enterprise strategies, and the social fabric associated with them. As a res)t once the
plan broke up there was less capacity to respond to change which resulted in more
precipitous disruption than in Hungary.
Third, both countries pursued a neo-liberal path of transformation. In both
countries this agenda disguised the weak state and legitimised the state's desertion of
enterprises and the forced dependence on foreign capital and expertise. However, there
were important differences between the paths of transformation in Hungary and east
Germany which had significant implications for the restructuring of the auto industries.
In Hungary the gradual break-up of the plan and the relatively negotiated reform
programme that was introduced by the weak state, resulted in the creation of a
marginalised group of automotive firms that teetered on the brink of collapse. In
contrast the disintegration of the planned industry in east Germany was accompanied
by the dismantling and closure of the industry by the strong (west) German state. The
transformation of the industry there was highly statist. As a result in east Germany the
industry was offered for sale to western investors. In Hungary there was greater
continuity but even there auto enterprises were forced to seek foreign strategic
partners.
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As a result of these differences, whilst both countries relied on inward
investment as the major tool of transforming their auto industries, the extent to which
they did so differed. In Hungary the transformation of production relied, in part, on
existing socio-economic resources whereas producers in east Germany were
dismantled - disrupting scarce socio-economic resources - and forced to rely on the
transplantation of alien foreign resources. This meant that change in Hungary was
decentralised (see for example the case of IKARUS) whereas change in east Germany
was highly centralised (see the case of SAZ). Thus the territorial-institutional fix in the
two countries was quite different.
The legacy and the disintegration of the soviet system and the neo-liberal path
of transformation meant that the institutionalisation of capitalism was limited and
highly uneven. We will examine this in greater detail with reference to the four main
claims made for foreign investment by the proponents of the neo-liberal 'transition to
capitalism'; namely that inward investment would stimulate the marketisation of
economic transactions, contribute to the privatisation of state owned enterprises,
accelerate the reorientation of trade and industry towards the global economy, and
stimulate the restructuring and modernisation of industrial capacity.
Firstly, the insulation and isolation of enterprises, and the foreign owned plants,
limited the diffusion of market transactions. The path of transformation resulted in
enterprises being cast adrift as forward and backward linkages were broken. As a
result producers were paralysed; isolated from any mechanisms of co-ordination and
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without the means (social fabric) from which strategic actiôn could emerge. The
disintegration of the soviet system and neo-liberal reforms disrupted not only formal
networks (the plan) but also to varying extents informal networks (the shadow plan)
especially in east Germany. This intensified the isolation and paralysis that enterprises
were plunged into and made it difficult to transform the social relations of production.
Thus although relations between enterprises were marketised, market forms of
co-ordination were blocked. As a result there was a shift from a systemic failure to a
market failure.
The isolation of enterprises was met with two contrasting strategies. The first
strategy, dominant in Hungary, involved enterprises insulating themselves from the
chaotic economy (which suffered from a regulatory deficit) whilst seeking investors.
This was accompanied by the maintenance of entrenched social relations associated
with the continuation of established behaviour, such as management-trade union
coalitions. The way in which IKARUS sought to maintain its traditional links with
customers in the former Soviet Union and the VASAS trade union was a good
example of this strategy. The second strategy, dominant in east Germany, was the
enforced break-up of enterprises by the state under the guise of privatisation to create
the conditions under which capitalism could be imported and 'kick-started'. The
break-up of the former Trabant producer, SAZ, and the denial of the possibility of in
situ change was a good example of this form of development.
Secondly, the privatisation of state owned enterprises, regarded as a central
process in creating a capitalist industry, proceeded slowly and was fraught with
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problems. In Hungary it proved almost impossible to self the most important and
largest auto firms because of the economic crisis emanating from the lack of
co-ordination in industry. As a result the majority of foreign automotive capital
by-passed the indigenous sector. In east Germany the privatisation of the auto industry
occurred more rapidly. However, a close examination of privatisation showed that the
Treuhandanstalt sold bundles of 'empty' assets rather than enterprises. In this way the
state prepared east Germany for a specific form of privatisation. In the light of this it
would be misleading to argue that an industry was privatised and more accurate to
argue that an industry was closed and its saleable assets forcibly prepared for
exploitation by foreign investors.
Thirdly, the reorientation of trade and industry proceeded more successfully
than privatisation, albeit with some ambivalent implications. The reliance of auto
enterprises in Hungary on existing suppliers and customers fell but some key firms
remained dependent on barter trade with former CMEA enterprises. Exports to
western Europe increased (from a very low base) but in doing so Hungarian firms
became locked-in to subservient positions in west European and Japanese supply
chains. Moreover, the growth in exports was based on underutilising over capacity
rather than on new processes and products. In contrast to Hungary's partial
reorientation, in east Germany the reorientation of the auto industry was virtually total.
Trade with former CMEA countries was halted and the industry became an 'extended
workbench' of west German production systems.
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Fourthly, the impact of direct foreign investment on the restructuring and
modernisation of industrial capacity proved highly uneven. It was in part due to the
difficulty of attempting to intensify production whilst output and demand declined
precipitously. There were two particular problems. First, the complexity of change
arising from the lack of co-ordination created a very uncertain economic and social
environment which precluded strategic planning. The problems Magyar Suzuki faced
when it sought to contract local state-owned suppliers was an indication of this
problem. Second, enterprises lacked the means to institute change owing to the
desertion of the state and poor access to investment capital. As a result the only means
of intensifying production was to attempt to secure greater control over the labour
process in order to increase labour efficiency. Deindustrialisation, unemployment and
the weakness of labour and their representatives which accompanied transformation
were all crucial in permitting greater management dominance over the workplace. In
turn enterprises sought to compete in international markets not on the basis on their
skilled workforces but on low labour costs. This had important implications for the
way in which firms became integrated in the global economy.
Where foreign automotive investment played a highly significant role - albeit
not one trumpeted by the neo-liberal exponents of transition - was in reshaping the
balance of power between management, and employees. In particular the attraction of
foreign investors and the institution of 'normal' capitalist behaviour proved sufficient
justification to curtail the strength of labour where it was influential and sustain its
weakness where it was not. In short the territorial-institutional fix pursued in Hungary
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and east Germany involved weak labour which was both a condition for and a
consequence of foreign investment.
Overall the result of these developments was the highly uneven transformation
of social relations. Some enterprises were able to intensify production whereas others
were not. Moreover, often intensification only took place in islands within enterprises
or single enterprises within production systems. This was because transformation in
one factory or one production shop often depended on there not being a generalised
transformation elsewhere.	 Change in east Germany exemplified this best:
transformation, which according to the neo-liberal agenda meant privatisation,
depended on the closure of the industry. The relationship between SAZ and VW's
investment in east Germany illustrated this very well. The success of VW's project
depended on forging new ways of producing automobiles which in turn depended on
the conditions arising from the statist path of transformation which created or fostered
a dependent, apathetic, weakened and alienated social fabric (the retraditionalisation of
society) unlikely to internalise the capitalist habitus. Likewise the development of
Suzuki and the stagnation of Ikarus in Hungary also indicated the ways in which the
fates of different companies were intricately interwoven.
7.4	 Step three: The spatial fix?
In the course of the 1990s the corporate and territorial fixes co-evolved to
produce a new spatial configuration in east and central Europe as witnessed in
Hungary and east Germany. Moreover the socio-economic transformation in the
region was bound up with the development of capitalism beyond the region.
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Principally, socio-economic transformation in ECE comprised a spatial fix which
conjured-up the opportunity for western capital to expand and intensify Fordism.
At the macroeconomic scale the socio-economic transformation involved
mustering political forces (both within and beyond the region) to adopt and sustain a
particular vision of the development of capitalism and establishment of the mechanisms
and institutions required to articulate and execute that vision in the countries
concerned. This process constructed a macro-environment which was securely
wedded to a version of capitalist development which depended on inter-territorial
competition based on the adoption of exogenous resources ranging from foreign
capital at one end of the spectrum to foreign accounting procedures and quality
assurance systems at the other. The result was the opening-up of the region to the
dynamics of global capitalism and its representatives in the form of direct foreign
investors at the expense of the domestic producers.
At the micro scale the intensification of Fordism comprised a refashioning of
the boundaries and balances between spatial and functional integration. Within
individual plants there was a trend towards greater functional integration of work
tasks. This typically involved job enlargement and a greater intensity of work
accompanied by greater (apparent) commitment towards employees on the part of
employers. Beyond individual plants there was a tendency towards increasing
disintegration of the production process through greater outsourcing and the
development of complex supply networks. However, greater outsourcing did not
equate with regional integration. Indeed the emphasis placed by investors on their
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employees and in some instances to place merely masked theit limited commitment to
the local area and an absence of regional integration.
Instead, foreign investments were locked-in to increasingly globalized
production networks, the flexibility of which depended on global 'switching' decisions
rather than localised 'adaptability'. The result was the generation of production
systems based not on regional networks but on localised nodes or 'clans' (either within
a single plant or across multiple plants of interconnected suppliers and customers)
wedded to global networks. In this way the course of developments in ECE mirrored
those elsewhere in Europe. The organisation of these production systems depended on
a territorial order based on inter-regional competition which created the conditions
which permitted corporations to consider switching functions from one place to
another almost at will and went some way to suggest that even the larger investments
did not necessarily represent long term commitments. Instead there was the prospect
of firms withdrawing as rapidly and as easily as they had arrived.
The combination of the local adoption of exogenous resources and of
adaptation and flexibility at the global scale through international switching decisions
depended on a balance of neo-Fordist and negotiated forms of capitalism. Thus
commitment to workforces took the form of relatively negotiated forms of social
control. These were particularly connected to forms of economic democracy and the
empowerment of workers associated with team working. However, these forms of
negotiation were highly partial, more apparent than real, and depended on the absence
of a negotiated form of capitalism beyond the factory gates. In this way capital used
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locating in ECE as a way of intensifying Fordism, in other words creating
neo-Fordism.
In doing so the spatial configuration that was produced comprised three
elements: disembedded regional economies (especially evident in east Germany but
which more generally replicated the geography of production which existed under
central planning), intensified geographical inequality, and the prospect (at least) of
intensified and accelerated geographical inconstancy. This in turn reflected the
importance of place in shaping local paths of transformation. The varied legacies of
the soviet system in different places were highly significant in shaping post-soviet
transformations. These, and post-soviet changes were geographically mediated and
highly spatially uneven. Uneven regional development was therefore simultaneously
path dependent and path-shaping; specific forms of local development precluded the
establishment of others. The most far reaching effect of this was that the options open
to investors and territorial policy makers were increasingly inter-linked and
correspondingly limited in scope.
7.5	 Future research
Two sets of questions warranting further research emerge from this thesis. The
first set revolve around the issues connected to the extent to which enterprises and
foreign investors are successful in achieving their aims. In this respect two issues,
above all demand future investigation. Owing to the significance of inter-firm
relationships in shaping production systems and paths of regional development, the
extent to which production is localised in the cases where such a development was a
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stated intention requires further research. In particular it remains to be seen whether
clusters of local suppliers emerge around assembly plants. The evidence presented in
this thesis suggests that such a course of development is unlikely and that even if such
a development were to take place the impact on the local economy is unlikely to be
particularly marked. Also investigation into whether and if so, how, employees and
their representative institutions develop and articulate their interests in the context of
weak trade unions and in the face of employer attempts to intensifj production and
establish greater control over the workplace is due.
The second set of questions centres on the aspects of corporate strategy other
than production and costs which form the focus of this thesis. A fuller consideration of
the role of firms as social organisations which manage not only production, through
the inter-firm relationships but also the wage relation through the labour process, and
also contribute to the construction of markets, would contribute much to a broader
appreciation of the intricacies of socio-economic transformation in east and central
Europe. Not least the role that firms as organisations play, through the establishment
of development goals and norms and modes of operation warrants deeper
consideration. Additionally, the issue of the role of firms (and other institutions) in the
construction of markets and patterns of trade and consumption a at variety of
geographical scales demands further attçntion.
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